

1 La Rond Baker, WSBA No. 43610  
lbaker@aclu-wa.org  
2 AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF WASHINGTON FOUNDATION  
901 Fifth Avenue, Suite 630  
3 Seattle, WA 98164  
Phone: 206-624-2184

4 Dror Ladin (admitted *pro hac vice*)  
5 Steven M. Watt (admitted *pro hac vice*)  
Hina Shamsi (admitted *pro hac vice*)  
6 Jameel Jaffer (admitted *pro hac vice*)  
AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION FOUNDATION  
7 125 Broad Street, 18th Floor  
New York, New York 10004

8 Paul Hoffman (admitted *pro hac vice*)  
9 Schonbrun Seplow Harris & Hoffman, LLP  
723 Ocean Front Walk, Suite 100  
10 Venice, CA 90291

11 Attorneys for Plaintiffs

12 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON

13 SULEIMAN ABDULLAH SALIM,  
14 MOHAMED AHMED BEN SOUD, OBAID  
ULLAH (AS PERSONAL  
15 REPRESENTATIVE OF GUL RAHMAN),

2:15-CV-286-JLQ

16 Plaintiffs,

17 v.

18 JAMES ELMER MITCHELL and JOHN  
"BRUCE" JESSEN

PLAINTIFFS'  
PROPOSED  
DISCOVERY PLAN  
AND SCHEDULING  
PLAN

19 Defendants.

PLAINTIFFS' PROPOSED  
DISCOVERY PLAN AND  
SCHEDULING PLAN  
NO. 2:15-CV-286-JLQ

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UNION OF WASHINGTON  
FOUNDATION  
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Seattle, WA 98164  
(206) 624-2184

1 Pursuant to the Court's Order Directing Filing of Discovery Plan and  
2 Proposed Schedule, ECF No. 30, the Parties conducted a Rule 26(f) conference  
3 on March 23, 2016 and further consulted by email thereafter. In accordance with  
4 the Court's Order, the Parties' stipulated stay of discovery remains in effect at  
5 this time. ECF No. 30 at 2. The Parties continue to agree that the stay on  
6 additional discovery should remain in place until Defendants' Motion to Dismiss,  
7 ECF No. 27, is resolved. The parties further agree that if discovery is required to  
8 resolve Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, the Court should initially limit discovery  
9 to that necessary to resolve the Motion.

10 Plaintiffs' continuing agreement to the discovery stay is based on the  
11 interests of efficiency and avoidance of unnecessary expense. Plaintiffs disagree  
12 with Defendants that a stay is required based on Defendants' eligibility for  
13 immunity. Although qualified immunity provides public officials with "an  
14 immunity from suit" that must be determined at the threshold, *Mitchell v. Forsyth*,  
15 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985), Defendants are private individuals and have failed to  
16 demonstrate any eligibility for immunity. *See* Plaintiffs' Memorandum in  
17 Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 28, at 16–17; *see*  
18 *generally Al Shimari v. CACI Int'l, Inc.*, 679 F.3d 205, 219 (4th Cir. 2012)  
19 (private contractor not entitled to threshold resolution of contractor defense

1 because, *inter alia*, in contrast to suits against the government, “[w]hen properly  
2 conducted, suits against private contractors pose minimal risk that military  
3 personnel will be improperly haled into court or their depositions taken”). In any  
4 event, the parties’ dispute regarding immunity is separately before the Court for  
5 adjudication.

6 The Parties are in substantial disagreement as to the appropriate scope and  
7 timeline for discovery. Therefore, in accordance with the Court’s Order, ECF  
8 No. 30 at 2, Plaintiffs respectfully submit the following individual report of their  
9 Proposed Discovery Plan and Proposed Scheduling Plan.

10 **I. PLAINTIFFS’ PROPOSED DISCOVERY PLAN**

11 a. Timing, form, and requirement for disclosures under Rule 26(a)

12 Plaintiffs made their initial disclosures pursuant to Rule 26(a) to  
13 Defendants on April 6, 2016.

14 b. The subjects on which discovery may be needed

15 The facts necessary to adjudicate this matter are available in the public  
16 record. Plaintiffs’ mistreatment as part of the CIA’s Rendition Detention and  
17 Interrogation (RDI), and the details of Defendants’ participation in the Program  
18 are publicly available. *See* Cmpl. ¶¶ 20–21, ECF No. 1 at 10–11 (listing sources).

19 To the extent that Defendants seek to raise defenses relating to government

1 officials' approval of Defendants' torture methods, the role and actions of those  
2 officials—including the Office of Legal Counsel—have been exhaustively  
3 detailed in public government records and reports. *See, e.g.*, Department of  
4 Justice's Office of Professional Responsibility Investigation into the Office of  
5 Legal Counsel's Memoranda Concerning Issues Relating to the Central  
6 Intelligence Agency's Use of "Enhanced Interrogation Techniques" on Suspected  
7 Terrorists (July 2009).

8 Limited discovery, although unnecessary in light of the public record, may  
9 be relevant as to two discrete topics: the actions of Defendants and the injuries  
10 suffered by Plaintiffs. If Defendants plan to argue that they did not devise and  
11 promote the torture methods Plaintiffs endured, carefully limited discovery of  
12 Defendants' roles in designing their torture program may be relevant. And the  
13 surviving Plaintiffs are available to testify as to the torture and abuse they  
14 endured in accordance with Defendants' methods, as are the medical  
15 professionals who examined and treated Plaintiffs. These discrete topics do not  
16 require the extensive discovery Defendants propose.

17 Plaintiffs disagree with Defendants' proposed plan because Defendants  
18 seek overbroad, protracted, and unduly burdensome third-party discovery that  
19 would not advance the needs of the case. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26

1 authorizes relevant discovery provided that it is “proportional to the needs of the  
2 case, considering the . . . importance of the discovery in resolving the issues, and  
3 whether the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely  
4 benefits.” *See* Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) (effective December 1, 2015); *see also*  
5 Fed. R. Civ. P. 1 (the purpose of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is “to  
6 secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action”).

7 Defendants’ plan is disproportionate to the needs of the litigation. They  
8 propose to undertake an exhaustive inquiry into the entire chain of command and  
9 decisionmaking in the CIA’s RDI Program and Plaintiffs’ detention and torture,  
10 virtually none of which is necessary to resolve the issues before the court.

11 Defendants’ plan includes seeking the identities and communications of  
12 numerous individuals involved in the RDI Program who are not relevant to the  
13 claims here; voluminous internal CIA communications relating to the Program;  
14 and discovery from Congress. The information Defendants seek will not benefit  
15 this litigation, but will inevitably prove contentious, time-consuming, and  
16 expensive to resolve.

17 Much of the discovery Defendants seek is predicated on the mistaken  
18 premises that Defendants’ liability turns on (1) whether they personally ordered  
19 or were present for Plaintiffs’ capture or torture, and (2) the participation and

1 approval of other actors. But Plaintiffs' complaint alleges that Defendants are  
2 responsible for Plaintiffs' injuries because they collaborated in the CIA's RDI  
3 Program, including by devising and promoting the use of the abusive methods  
4 that Plaintiffs and others endured in the Program. Defendants' own acts are  
5 sufficient to establish liability. *See* Cmpl., ECF No. 1 at 73–78 (Defendants are  
6 liable for planning, aiding and abetting, and conspiring in violations of customary  
7 international law). Plaintiffs have not alleged that Defendants made decisions as  
8 to which individuals the CIA would subject to the RDI Program, nor that  
9 Defendants had final decisionmaking authority as to the RDI Program itself. That  
10 Defendants' torture methods were approved by others is a matter of public record,  
11 and cannot justify the unbounded fishing expedition into third party actions and  
12 communications that Defendants propose. The actions of others are also  
13 irrelevant to damages, because Defendants are jointly and severally liable for  
14 injuries inflicted as part of their collaboration with the CIA

15 Defendants' proposed plan would replace the proportional discovery Rule  
16 26 requires with an expansive license to investigate the U.S. government on  
17 issues unnecessary to the disposition of this action. Plaintiffs do not oppose third-  
18 party discovery as a general matter, and understand that the Department of Justice  
19 plans to propose a set of procedures that will likely allow for limited and

1 proportional discovery of information in the government's possession. But  
2 Defendants should not be permitted to turn the discovery process in this case into  
3 a far-flung and irrelevant inquiry that will guarantee unnecessary expense and  
4 delay. *See* Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1); 45(d)(1) (limiting unduly burdensome third-  
5 party subpoenas).

6 c. When discovery should be completed

7 Plaintiffs propose that the court set a reasonable deadline for discovery:  
8 180 days from the lifting of the stay for fact discovery, with a further 45 days of  
9 expert discovery. This case involves a small number of parties and a discrete set  
10 of issues relevant to Plaintiffs' three legal claims. Plaintiffs disagree with  
11 Defendants' proposal that no discovery deadlines be set. For the reasons set forth  
12 above, information in the public record is all that is necessary to resolve this case.  
13 Even if there were some relevant information to be obtained from the government  
14 in accordance with Rule 26's proportionality requirement that could not be more  
15 easily obtained from public sources, the Department of Justice plans to propose  
16 procedures that will likely allow information to be acquired in an orderly fashion.  
17 Should the Parties disagree with the Justice Department's proposals, or encounter  
18 obstacles that threaten to delay discovery beyond the scheduled deadline, Rule 16  
19 provides for pretrial conferences through which the parties may, for good cause

1 shown, seek to alter the discovery schedule. Speculation about potential obstacles  
2 should not preemptively derail the orderly progress of this action.

3 d. Whether discovery should be conducted in phases or be limited to or  
4 focused on particular issues

5 The Parties agree that if discovery proves necessary to resolve Defendants'  
6 Motion to Dismiss, it should initially be limited to facts necessary to resolve the  
7 Motion. For the reasons stated in Section I.b above, Plaintiffs believe that any  
8 subsequent discovery should be focused on issues that would aid in resolution of  
9 the litigation: specifically on Defendants' role in designing and promoting torture  
10 methods and on Plaintiffs' injuries. Should there be a need to conduct further  
11 discovery after this phase, such discovery should be limited to discrete, identified  
12 areas of necessary information, rather than Defendants' proposed plan for  
13 overbroad, unnecessary, and burdensome inquiry.

14 e. Any issues about disclosure, discovery, or preservation of  
15 electronically stored information, including the form or forms in  
16 which it should be produced

17 Plaintiffs do not possess electronically stored information that is likely to  
18 be relevant to the claims and defenses in this case. To the extent Defendants  
19 intend to seek such information from third parties, they must comply with Rule  
45's prohibition on unduly burdensome third-party subpoenas. Defendants'



1 proposed plan to seek vast amounts of the CIA's internal communications and to  
2 subpoena years of Congressional testimony will present substantial burden issues.

3 f. Any issues about claims of privilege or of protection as trial-  
4 preparation materials, including—if the parties agree on a procedure  
5 to assert these claims after production—whether to ask the court to  
6 include their agreement in an order under Federal Rule of Evidence  
7 502

8 Plaintiffs do not anticipate issues with claims of privilege or work product  
9 protection to materials in their possession or control. Plaintiffs will agree to a  
10 procedure to assert and address claims of privilege after production if requested  
11 by Defendants or a third party.

12 g. What changes should be made in the limitations on discovery  
13 imposed under these rules or by local rule, and what other limitations  
14 should be imposed

15 Plaintiffs do not seek a modification of the general limitation on 10  
16 depositions provided for in the Federal Rules. *See* Fed. R. Civ. P. 30. This is an  
17 action involving a small number of parties, arising from a common nucleus of  
18 fact. Plaintiffs disagree with Defendants that this Court should not impose a limit  
19 on depositions at this time. To the extent the Court grants a change of the Rule  
30 limit, Plaintiffs suggest that the Court impose a reasonable limit rather than  
grant Defendants' proposal.

1 h. Any other orders that the court should issue under Rule 26(c) or  
2 under Rule 16(b) and (c)

3 The Department of Justice has indicated to the Parties that it will seek a  
4 protective order to restrict disclosure of certain information in this action.  
5 Plaintiffs expect that it will be possible to come to agreement with the  
6 Department of Justice on the scope of discovery that may be sought from the  
7 government, and procedures that will allow that discovery to take place. Entry of  
8 an agreed-upon protective order would advance the interest of an orderly  
9 discovery process, and may help to limit the overbroad inquiries that Defendants  
10 propose to make.

11 **II. PLAINTIFFS' PROPOSED SCHEDULING PLAN**

12 a) Limit on joinder and amendment of pleadings

13 Plaintiffs propose that deadlines for joinder and amendment of pleadings be  
14 set for 60 days prior to the discovery cut-off.

15 b) The anticipated time needed for discovery

16 For the reasons stated above, Plaintiffs propose that the Court set a schedule  
17 allowing 180 days from the lifting of the stay for fact discovery, with a further 45  
18 days of expert discovery. Should the Parties encounter obstacles that threaten to  
19 delay discovery beyond the scheduled deadline, Rule 16 provides for pretrial

1 conferences through which the parties may, for good cause shown, seek to alter  
2 the discovery schedule.

3 c) Dispositive motions deadline

4 Plaintiffs propose that dispositive motions be set for 45 days after the  
5 discovery cutoff.

6 d) Any need for special procedures, bifurcation, etc.

7 Plaintiffs believe that orders requiring special procedures or bifurcation would  
8 be premature at this time.

9 e) Any issues as to service of process, jurisdiction, or venue (other than as  
10 presented in the Motion to Dismiss)

11 Plaintiffs are not aware of any such issues.

12 f) Whether the parties are amendable to mediation and prospects of settlement

13 Plaintiffs are amenable to mediation and exploring settlement, but recognize  
14 that Defendants do not anticipate a realistic possibility of settlement at least until  
15 resolution of their Motion to Dismiss.

16 g) Proposed final pretrial conference date

17 Plaintiffs propose the Court set a final preconference date for 10 days after the  
18 resolution of any summary judgment motions.

1 h) Trial dates

2 Plaintiffs propose that trial be set for 45 days after the resolution of any  
3 summary judgment motions.

4 i) Anticipated length of trial

5 Plaintiffs estimate that trial will take between one and two weeks due to the  
6 anticipated need for language interpreters during plaintiffs' testimony.

7 DATED this 8th day of April, 2016.

8 By s/ LaRond Baker

9 LaRond Baker, WSBA #11686  
lbaker@aclu-wa.org  
10 901 Fifth Ave, Suite 630  
Seattle WA 98164

11 Dror Ladin, admitted *pro hac vice*  
dladin@aclu.org  
12 Steven M. Watt, admitted *pro hac vice*  
swatt@aclu.org  
13 Hina Shamsi, admitted *pro hac vice*  
hshamsi@aclu.org  
14 Jameel Jaffer, admitted *pro hac vice*  
jjaffer@aclu.org  
15 ACLU Foundation  
125 Broad Street, 18th Floor  
16 New York, NY 10007

17 Paul Hoffman  
hoffpaul@aol.com  
18 Schonbrun Seplow Harris & Hoffman,  
LLP  
19 723 Ocean Front Walk, Suite 100  
Venice, CA 90291

**CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**

I hereby certify that on the 8th day of April, 2016, I electronically filed the foregoing document with the Clerk of Court using the CM/ECF system, which will send notification of such filing to the following:

Christopher W. Tompkins (WSBA #11686)  
CTompkins@bpmlaw.com  
BETTS, PATTERSON & MINES P.S.  
701 Pike Street, Suite 1400  
Seattle, WA 98101-3927

Henry F. Schuelke III (admitted pro hac vice)  
HSchuelke@blankrome.com  
BLANK ROME LLP  
600 New Hampshire Ave NW  
Washington, DC 20037

James T. Smith (admitted pro hac vice)  
Smith-jt@blankrome.com  
Brian S. Paszamant (admitted pro hac vice)  
Paszamant@blankrome.com  
BLANK ROME LLP  
One Logan Square, 130 N. 18th Street  
Philadelphia, PA 19103

By s/ Dror Ladin  
dladin@aclu.org  
AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES  
UNION FOUNDATION