

(b)(3) NatSecAct

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NOFORN-	Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals
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ORCON-	Dissemination and Extraction of Information
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OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

REPORT OF INVESTIGATION

(S//NF) DEATH OF A DETAINEE IN (b)(1) (2003-7402-IG)

(b)(3) NatSecAct


27 April 2005

(b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct

INTRODUCTION

(b)(1) 1. (S//NF) On November 2002, an individual detained by (b)(3) NatSecAct the CIA in Gul Rahman, died. On November, the Deputy Director for Operations (DDO) informed the Deputy Inspector General that the DDO had dispatched a team to investigate the death. In January 2003, the Office of Inspector General (OIG) initiated an investigation. This report reviews the events leading to Rahman's death.

SUMMARY (b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct



C06541713 Approved for Release: 2016/09/30 C06541713 · (b)(3) NatSecAct SECPET/ NOFORN//MR (b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(1)(b)(1)(b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(1) · to a detention and interrogation facility, (b)(3) NatSecAct security guards reportedly found in Rahman dead in his cell on the morning of November 2002 (b)(1)(b)(1)(b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(3) NatSecAct November 2002, Rahman 3. (S//NF) Between and underwent at least six interrogation sessions by Agency personnel. The interrogation team included the Site Manager, an independent contractor (IC) (b)(1) (b)(3) CIAAct psychologist/interrogator, (C) Bruce Jessen; the Station's (b)(3) NatSecAct and an IC linguist, (b)(6) (b)(7)(c), had no interrogation experience or relevant training before his arrival in in July 2002. However, he acquired some on-the ich training and experience during the four $m_{(b)(1)}^{i+1}$ he $\dot{(b)}(3)$ NatSecActrior to Rahman's death. had been (b)(3) NatSecAct Rahman was subjected to sleep deprivation (b)(3) NatSecAct 4. (S/ sessions of up to 48 hours, at least one cold shower, and a "hard takedown" termed "rough treatment" as reported in pre-death cables addressing the progress of the interrogation. In addition, Rahman (b)(1) reportedly was without clothing for much of his time at (b)(3) NatSecA Despite these measures, Rahman remained uncooperative and provided no intelligence. His only concession was to acknowledge (b)(1)his identity on November 2002 and, subsequently, to explain what (b)(3) NatSecAct village he came from; otherwise, Rahman retained his resistance posture, and demeanor. The cable from November 2002 on (b)(1)(b)(3) NatSecAct eporting that Rahman had admitted his identity stated, "Rahman spent the days since his last session with Station officers in cold conditions with minimal food and sleep." A psychological assessment of Rahman, prepared by Jessen and reported in a cable on (b)(1)(b)(3) NatSecAct November 2002, noted Rahman's remarkable physical and psychological resilience and recommended, in part, "continued environmental deprivations." (b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct

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 2 (U//POUOT Not all members of the interrogation team were involved in every interrogation session.

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Case 1:15-cv-09317-AKH Document 53-7 Filed 10/17/16 Page 7 of 68 C06541713 Approved for Release: 2016/09/30 C06541713 -SECRET/ NOFORN//MR (b)(1)(b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(3) NatSecAct <u>5. (S//N</u>F) On the afternoon of November 2002, when guards delivered food to Rahman, he reportedly threw his food, water bottle, and defecation bucket at the guards. In addition, he reportedly threatened the guards and told them he had seen their (b)(1)(b)(3) CIAAct faces and would kill them upon his release. When was (b)(3) NatSecAct informed of this incident, he approved or directed the guards to (b)(6) .. shackle Rahman's hands and feet and connect the shackles with a (b)(7)(c)short chain. This position forced Rahman, who was naked below the waist, to sit on a cold concrete floor and prevented him from standing up. 6. (S//NF) The following morning, the guards reported that (b)(1) $(\tilde{b})(3)$ NatSecActRahman was slumped over in his cell. The ambient temperature was recorded at a low of degrees Fahrenheit. Rahman was still in the "short chain position," wearing only a sweatshirt. (b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct 7. (S//NF) Station reported Rahman's death that day in (b)(3) NatSecAct cable to the DDO. The DDO dispatched an investigative team [the Directorate of Operations (DO) Investigative Teaml consisting of a senior security officer assigned to the (b)(3) CIAAct an Office of General Counsel ct(OGC) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(1) attorney, and an Agency pathologist to (b)(3) NatSecA The DO Investigative Team conducted interviews, and the pathologist performed an autopsy of Rahman.

was caused by hypothermia.³
8. (S//NF) On 22 January 2003, the General Counsel informed the Inspector General (IG) that Rahman died as a result of the conditions at a facility substantially controlled by A genera officers.

The autopsy indicated, by a diagnosis of exclusion, that the death

conditions at a facility substantially controlled by Agency officers. OIG initiated an investigation into the circumstances surrounding this incident and reported the death to the Department of Justice

³ (U) Hypothermia is subnormal temperature within the central body. The term hypothermia is used when an individual's body temperature is below 95 degrees Fahrenheit. This will occur , when the loss of body heat exceeds heat production.

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(DoJ) by letter on 13 Feb uary 2003.⁴ On 29 December 2003, the Chief of the Counterterrorism Section, DoJ reported by memorandum that DoJ would not pursue a federal prosecution of criminal charges (b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct regarding Rahman's death. The matter is under review by the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Eastern District of Virginia. (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(6) 9. (S<u>//NF)</u> At the time of his assignment in was (b)(7)(c)operations officer who had no training or a first-tour experience to prepare him to manage a detention facility or conduct (b)(1)interrogations. At the time of Rahman's death, had not

10. (S//NF) This OIG investigation concludes that treated Rahman harshly because of his alleged stature, lack of cooperation, pressure to break Rahman, and inexperience approved or ordered with a committed interrogation resister. (b)(1)placing Rahman in the short chain position while naked below the (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct vaist in near freezing confinement conditions and this directly led to Rahman's death by hypothermia. exhibited reckless (b)(6)(b)(7)(c)indifference to the possibility that his actions might cause injuries or result in Rahman's death. (b)(1)


(b)(3) NatSecAct


11. (S//NF) OIG found that Rahman did not receive a physical examination during his detention at ______ and concludes that the Station's Physician's Assistant (PA) ______ did (b)(1) (b)(3) CIAAct internet to Rahman in the same manner and with the same (b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(6) (b)(7)(c)

⁴ (S7/NF) This referral is a requirement of Title 50 United States Code (U.S.C.), § 403q(b)(5) that mandates OIG to report information concerning possible violations of federal criminal law to DoJ. The General Counsel had orally advised the Chief of the Criminal Division, DoJ, of the circumstances of Rahman's death on 24 January 2003.

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(b)(1)

(b)(3) NatSecAct

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(b)(3) NatSecAct

FINDINGS

(S//NF) Gul RAHMAN'S CAPTURE, RENDITION AND DETENTION (b)(3) NatSecAct

19. (S/ Rahman was a suspected Afghan extremist from Lowgar Province, who was associated with the HIG organization.⁷ CTC identified him as a close associate of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and Abu Abd Al-Rahman Al-Najdi, an alleged member of Al-Qa'ida.⁸ Rahman was an ethnic Pashtun who spoke Pashtu, Dari, and Farsi and was approximately.34 years old.

(b)(1)

(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(3) NatSecAct 21. (8/ Rahman was apprehended in Islamabad, Pakistan, on October 2002, during an early morning raid

(b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(3) NatSecAct_

7 (S/ During an interrogation session after he admitted his true identity, Rahman said he was from Kolangar Village, Pol-E-Alam Region, Lowgar Province. Lowgar Province is immediately southwest of Kabul.

(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1)

(b)(3) NatSecAct

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ĺ.	(b)(1)	
,	(b)(3) NatSecAct	
	(b)(3) NatSecAct(b)(3) NatSecAct	
	22. (S// On October 2002, Station sent a	. [
(b)(1) (b)(3) NatS		ſ
(interrogation session had identified one of	
(b)(1)	his fellow detainees as Gul Rahman. requested that the	l l
(b)(3) NatSec	Act of the apprehension. In a reflection of how important a detainee Rahman	
(b)(1) ·	was believed to be, Headqu rters subsequently advised	
(b)(3) NatSec/		· .
•	requested an update on $t(b)(1)$ case.	•
	(b)(3) NatSecAct	
y ••		
	(b)(1) (b)(2) NotSpaAct	
(b)(1)	(b)(3) NatSecAct	;
(b)(3) NatSe	CACI On	ļ
· · ·	November 2002. Rahman was rendered to (b)(1)	1
(b)(1)		
(b)(3) NatSec	Act24. (5/ Following Rahman's rendition to generated six cables regarding Rahman, including two cables	•
· · ·	following his death. Only one of these cables, which reported the	
	chronology of Rahman's dea h, provided a characterization of	•
	Rahman, describing him as an "enemy combatant." ¹²	
		ł
	12 (U//F OUO) The Department of Defense defines an "enemy combatant" as an individual who, under the laws and customs of war, may be detained for the duration of the conflict. (Letter from William J. Haynes II to Senator Carl Levin, 26 November 2002.)	· · · ·
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Case 1:15-cv-09317-AKH Document 53-7 Filed 10/17/16 Page 13 of 68 (b)(3) NatSecAct 06541713 Approved for Release: 2016/09/30 C06541713 /NOFORN//MR -SECRET7 25. (5/ (b)(1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct He was targeted because of his role in Al-Qa'ida. Rahman was considered an Al-Qa'ida operative because he assisted the group. Being both a HIG member and an Al-Qa'ida operative is not inconsistent. there is no formal definition of the term "operative." In Rahman's (b)(6)viewed a (b)(7)(c)case, it would be similar to the term "facilitator." facilitator as somewhat less involved than an operative. .(b)(1)-(b)(3) NatSecAct (S//NF) MANAGEMENT AND CONDITIONS AT (b)(1)(b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct 27. (S//NF) The detention facility consisted of 20 individual concrete structures used as cells. (b)(1)(b)(3) NatSecAct Four of the cells had a metal bar above eye level that ran between two walls to which detainees could be secured by their hands in a standing sleepdeprivation position. The facility's windows were covered to (b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct 13 (S//NF) A replacement facility for was completed in 2004 and detainees were removed from SECRET NOFORN//MR (b)(3) NatSecAct Approved for Release: 2016/09/30 C06541713

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suppress outside light. Stereo speakers in the cellblock constantly played loud music to thwart any attempt to communicate between detainees.

(b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1)(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1) 29. (S//NF) was not insulated and had no central air (b)(3) NatSecAct conditioning or heating; an Agency-purchased generator supported its power requirements. When received its first detainee in September 2002, by many accounts the temperature was hot and
(b)(1) (b)(3) CIAAct remained generally hot or warm until November 2002.¹⁵ Individual (b)(3) NatSecActells were designed with a recess for electrical space heaters;
(b)(6) however, electrical heaters were not placed in the cells.

30. (S//NF) estimated there were between six and 12 gas heaters in the cellblock at the time of Rahman's death.

officer who participated in the DO Investigation Team, reported there were five gas heaters in the detainee area of the (b)(1) facility before Rahman's death.

31. (S//NF) According to the customary practice at (b)(1) was to shave each detainee's head and beard and conduct a (b)(3) CIAAct medical examination upon arrival. Detainees were then given (b)(3) NatSecAct uniforms and moved to a cell. Photographs were taken of each detainee for identification purposes. While in the cells, detainees (b)(7)(c)were shackled to the wall. The guards fed the detainees on an alternating schedule of one meal on one day and two meals the next (b)(6)⊺ day. In anticipation of the cold weather, directed (b)(7)(c) (b)(1)

(b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct - (5//NF) According to the door had to be opened to deliver water bottles and access (b)(6) the excrement bucket. (b)(7)(c) 15 (U) In November 2002, the temperature (b)(1) ranged from a high of o a low of degrees Fahrenheit.

(b)(3) NatSecAct

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(b)(3) NatSecAct

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	(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(1)	
(b)(3) CIAAct	assistant, to acquire warmer uniforms, heaters,
(b)(3) NatSecAct	propane, and blankets. According to he was successful in purchasing the uniforms, blankets and some heaters. It was difficult
(b)(6)	to purchase heaters because they were in high demand. If a detainee
(b)(7)(c)	was cooperative, he was afforded improvements in his environment
	to include a mat, blankets, a Koran, a la p, and additional food
	choices. Detainees who were not cooperative were subjected to
	austere conditions and aggressive interrogations until they became
	compliant ^{(b)(1)}
	(b)(3) NatSecAct
	32. (S//NF) for the U.S. Bureau of Prisons
(b)(1)	(BOP) to send a training team to from to
(b)(3) NatSecAc	
(b)(1)	concentrating on techniques such as entry and escort procedures,
(b)(3) CIAAct	application of restraints, security checks, pat down and cell searches, and documenting prescribed checks of detainees.
(b)(3) NatSecAct	and documenting presended enecks of detainees.
(b)(6) (b)(7)(c)	33. (S//NF)
	characterized as "so many accidents
yer an yer a ditta teat a	"Waiting to happen." For example, there could be an attack from the
(b)(1)	outside, the detainees could hurt themselves,
(b)(3) NatSecAd	COS
	described as a "high risk, high gain intelligence facility." ¹⁷
(b)(1) (b)(3) CIAAct	
(b)(3) NatSecA	Act
(b)(6);	
(b)(7)(c)	In an electronic message
1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1	(e-mail) to the DDO two days after Rahman's death wrote, in
	part,
• •	On an employee impact note, I have made it clear to all hands involved that the responsibility is mine alone, nothing more need
ę ••	
	(b)(1)
	(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(1)	17 ($\frac{6}{NE}$) served i(b)(1) from August 2002 until July 2003.
(b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct	t (b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)	SECRET NOFORN//MR
(b)(7)(c)	
	(b)(3) NatSecAct
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
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be said on that, and I am and have been coordinating with appropriate senior hqs levels since the inception of this program.

(b)(1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(6) (b)(7)(c)

(b)(1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecA (b)(6) (b)(7)(c)	35. (S//NF) said he did not know what his duties ctwould be when he arrived in He believed the primary factors in his assignment as Site Manager were the vacancy in the detention program and that had no formal instruction relating to interrogations until April 2003, months into his tour. ²¹ (b)(1)
. '	36. (S//NF) In assigned (b)(3) NatSecAct
() (1)	responsibility for all detention-related functions
(b)(1) (b)(3) CIAAct	
(b)(3) NatSecA	was also responsible for
(b)(6) (b)(7)(c)	renditions to and from other countries and detainee transfers.
	(b)(1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(6) (b)(7)(c)
· · · · · ·	
(b)(1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecA (b)(6) (b)(7)(c)	²¹ (S//NF) was not designated as a Certified Interrogator until he completed the two- week interrogation course and 40 hours of supervised interrogations with an experienced interrogator. rertification was awarded on April 2003.

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(b)(3) NatSecAct

 $\begin{array}{cccc} & & & & & & \\ \mbox{(b)(1)} & & & & & \\ \mbox{(b)(3) ClAAct} & & & & \\ \mbox{(b)(3) NatSecAct} & & & & & \\ \mbox{(b)(3) NatSecAct} & & & & & \\ \mbox{(b)(6)} & & & & & \\ \mbox{(b)(6)} & & & & & \\ \mbox{(b)(7)(c)} & & & & \\ \end{array} \right) \end{array} \\ \begin{array}{ccc} & & & & & & \\ \mbox{(b)(3) NatSecAct} &$

CTC often relied on talented young officers—such as to take on responsibilities beyond their training and expe ience. In case, he was asked to take on no mous responsibilities at principally because of his and relative maturity, which qualified him better than

(b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1)

and relative maturity, which qualified him better t most for this entirely new DO mission.

(SHNF) POLICY FOR CUSTODIAL INTERROGATIONS AT THE TIME OF RAHMAN'S DEATH

42. (S//NF) Prior to the time of Rahman's death, CTC and OGC disseminated policy guidance, via cables, e-mail, or orally, on a specific case-by-case basis to address requests to use specific interrogation techniques. Agency management did not require those involved in interrogations to sign an acknowledgement that they had read, understood, or agreed to comply with the guidance provided; nor did the Agency maintain a comprehensive record of individuals who had been briefed on interrogation procedures.

(b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct 43. (S//NF) According to in (b)(6)2002, a senior operations offic(b)(1)(b)(7)(c)interrogated a particularly obstinate d(b)(3) NatSecAct The officer drafted a cable that proposed techniques that, ultimately, became the model for recalled that the proposal included use of darkness, sleep deprivation, solitary confinement, and noise; (b)(3) NatSecAct use of cold temperatures was not addressed.²³ The response from (b)(1)Headquarters was that the proposal was acceptable, based on the fact (b)(1)(b)(3) CIAAct. (b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(6)²³ (S//NF) As noted below (b)(7)(c) uppears mistake about the absence of a proposal to use cold as a technique.

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that no permanent harm would result from any of the proposed measures.²⁴ Prior to the death of Rahman, that cable from Headquarters served as the Station's guidance on what could be done in interrogations.

 44. (S//NF)
 explained that Station guidance was to

 (b)(1)
 adhere to the four techniques approved by Headquarters. Guidance

 (b)(3) CIAAct
 to individual interrogators initially was "catch as catch can." It was

 (b)(3) NatSecAct
 responsibility to monitor things at

 (b)(6)
 that the issue of when the Station needed to seek Headquarters


 (b)(7)(c)
 that the issue of when the Station needed to seek Headquarters

 (b)(2) NatSecAct
 (b)(1)

(b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(3) NatSecAct 45. (S/ 2002, submitted to Headquarters a proposed interrogation plan for the detainee at the (b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct It requested "specific Headquarters concurrence and definitive CTC/Legal authority" to employ specified interrogation techniques with the detainee. It proposed sound disorientation, time deprivation, light deprivation, physical comfort level deprivation, lowering the quality of the detainee's food, and unpredictable round-the-clock interrogation that would lead to sleep deprivation. The cable offered a specific description of each of the proposed techniques. One specific proposal was,

> Physical comfort level deprivation: With the use of a window air conditioner and a judicious provision/deprivation of warm clothing/blankets, believe we can increase [the detainee's] physical discomfort level to the point where we may lower his mental/trained resistance abilities.

(b)(1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(6) (b)(7)(c)'NOFORN//MR SECRET (b)(3) NatSecAct Approved for Release: 2016/09/30 C06541713



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(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(7)(c)
(c)
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49. (S//NF) According to the initial interrogations (b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct:onducted at in September and October 2002 were more custodial interviews, with the added psychological impact of being in that facility with total darkness and separation from other detainees. When Agency officers came to conduct interviews or interrogations, the only guidance he provided them was how to get in and out of the facility securely. stated that the interrogators enjoyed the (b)(1) . . (b)(3) CIAAct freedom to do what they wanted. He did not possess a list of "do's (b)(3) NatSecAct and don'ts" for interrogations. (b)(6)

(b)(7)(c)

50. (S//NF) The Director of CTC—in written comments on the draft report endorsed by the DDO said that, at the time of Rahman's death, there was a lack of clear, applicable program guidance for operations to detain and interrogate terrorists captured on the battlefield. He stated,

(b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct [T]he opening of ______in September 2002 came as a practical response to a clear-cut and urgent operational need. Unfortunately, ______began operation while CIA was still in the process of establishing uniform and detailed program guidance on detention and interrogations practices, and prior to development of the structured, tightly controlled CTC detention and interrogation program managed by CTC . . . today. While that program—which was launched in November 2002 from a low base of experience, personnel, and overall expertise—also came together without well developed and detailed CIA policies_ on detention and interrogation.

> (b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct

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(b)(3) NatSecAct

Case 1:15-cv-09317-AKH Document 53-7 Filed 10/17/16 Page 22 of 68 C06541713 Approved for Release: 2016/09/30 C06541713 (b)(1)NOFORN//MR SECRET / / (b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(3) NatSecAct 51. (S//NF) Accordingly, when (b)(1) (b)(3) CIAAct arrived in on November 2002, for his first TDY assignment reportedly advised "You cannot harm or (b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(6) kill the deta ees, but you can handle the debriefings/interrogations (b)(7)(c)as you see fit." It was not apparent to that knew what the rules were.²⁶ (b)(1) (SIINF) RESPONSIBILITY FOR RAHMAN'S INTE **OGATION** (b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(1) stated that it was his normal practice to 52. (S//NF) (b)(3) NatSecAct meet all rendition aircraft flights unless he needed to be elsewhere. However, he said he did not have a specific (b)(6) recollection of the rendition of Rahman on November (b)(7)(c) 2002.²⁷ There was no logbook documenting the arrivals and departures of Agency personnel at the facili y. (b)(1)contends that Rahman w s the 53. (S//NF) (b)(3) NatSecAct sponsibility of Jessen. was not certain whether Jessen was sent to with Rahman or another case.²⁸ Jessen (b)(6) (b)(1) conducted several interrogation sessions with Rahman. (b)(7)(c)(b)(3) NatSecAct 54. (S/./NF) According to Jessen met with Rahman every day.²⁹ Those sessions were documented in a series of cables indicated were drafted by Jessen. that said he participated in some of the interrogations Jessen conducted but could (b)(1) not remember how many. When informed that a pre-death cable (b)(3) CIAAct. (b)(3) NatSecAct² ported that Jessen conducted six sessions with <u>Rahman</u>, estimated he p rticipated in about three of those. (b)(6) stated that (b)(1) (b)(1) (b)(7)(c) (b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(3) NatSecAct 26 (S//NF) served in November 2002 until January 2003. fron (b)(1)^{_} (b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(3) NatSecAct 28 (9) According to a October 2002 CTC/UBL cable, Jessen was being sent to "to conduct in-depth interrogations of several key Al-Qa'ida operatives recently detained in Rahman was not captured until October 2002. (S//NF) Jessen was in (b)(1) on October until November 2002. (b)(3) NatSecAct SECRET, JOPORN//MR (b)(3) NatSecAct

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(b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1)he did not recall which interpreter participated in the interrogation(b)(3) CIAActsessions with Rahman. According toafter Jessen left(b)(3) NatSecActNovember 2002, Rahman becamecase by default, adding(b)(6)that all of the detainees who were not being interrogated were under(b)(7)(c)his general control.

55. (S//NF) Jessen, who holds a Ph. D in clinical psychology, was experienced from nearly two decades of work in the Department (b)(1)(b)(3) NatSecActof Defense SERE program and had conducted interrogations of CIA's first high value detainee at a different location.³⁰ Jessen explained (b)(1) to conduct an evaluation of that he was directed to go to (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecActanother detainee, While there, he evaluated several other detainees, prepared interrogation plans, and forwarded (b)(6) (b)(7)(c)them to Headquarters. also asked Jessen to evaluate Rahman, described as a "hard case." Jessen said Rahman, got a lot of attention and he became the focus of and the Station's High Value Target cell.

56. (S//NF) Jessen explained that asked Jessen to look (b)(1) at Rahman in addition to the other detainees Jessen was evaluating at (b)(3) NatSecAct According to Jessen, was responsible for all of the detainees that came to When detainees arrived, it was (b)(1) responsibility to interrogate them. When asked if Rahman (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecActwas his case, Jessen responded, "Unequivocally, no." When informed (b)(6) asserted that Rahman was Jessen's case, Jessen averred that (b)(7)(c)that was wrong.

> (b)(6) (b)(7)(c)

³⁰ (C) Jessen became a CIA independent contractor or 2002, following his retirement from active duty with the U.S. Air Force.

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(b)(3) NatSec	cAct

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C06541713	Ар	proved for Release: 2016/0 CRET/	9/30 C06541713 RN//MR	
o)(1) o)(3) CIAAct o)(3) NatSecAc		(b)(3) NatSecAct		(b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct
5)(5) NatSecAt 5)(6) 5)(7)(c)	t 57. (S//NF) Ac contractor psychologi to work with another in one of Jessen's sess on Novembe	st/interrogator, (C) detainee during Nov ions with Rahman. ³¹	vember. Mitchel	ca e to Il participated
9)(1) 9)(3) CIAAct 9)(3) NatSecAc 9)(6) 9)(7)(c)	Rahman on one occas uncooperative. Mitch he had scratches on hi were black and blue. Rahman's hands ³² ^{(k}	ell stated Rahman a s face, bruises on his	utes; Rahman w ppeared healthy 5 ankles, and his	; however, wrists
b)(1) b)(3) CIAAct b)(3) NatSecAo b)(6) b)(7)(c)	59. (S//NF) did no and did not see him w Rahman was someone	L	ity to i terrogate was informe	e Rahman
b)(1) b)(3) CIAAct b)(3) NatSecAc b)(6) b)(7)(c)	60. (S//NF) Rahman was detained interrogation there. ³⁴ said interrogations of Rahu participated with she participated in fiv (b)(1) (b)(3) NatS	and traveled to she participated in a nan but estimates it and Jessen on two e interrogations of R	pated in his initiant after he was n undetermined was fewer than o occasions. She ahman after Jes	as rendered l number of 10. She estimated
(b)(1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecA (b)(6) (b)(7)(c)	31 (S//NF) Cable records ind had a background with the SE 2001 following retirement from interrogation of the Agency's f 32 (S//NF) According to examine Rahman, his hands, o Ct	RE program similar to Jesser n the U.S. Air Force. Like Jes irst high value detainee. the Station PA		C in September involved in the

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(b)(3) NatSecAct

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C06541713	Approved for Release: 2016/09/30 C06541713 SECRET/ NOFORN//MR
(b)(1) (b)(3) NatSe	(b)(3) NatSecAct
	November 2002. When asked who had the interrogation
•	responsibility for Rahman, responded, "no one in particular—so I guess and me."
· · ·	(SHNE) RAHMAN'S TREATMENT DURING DETENTION AND
(b)(1)	INTERROGATION (b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecA	ct 61. (S//NF) said he did not specifically recall Rahman's
(b)(6) (b)(7)(c)	treatment upon arrival at stated that Rahman's clothes would have been removed early in his detention, and most of
	the time Rahman was naked or would have been wearing only a
•	diaper.
(b)(1) (b)(3) CIAAct	62. (S7/NF) said that Rahman was either in his cell or
(b)(3) NatSecA (b)(6)	fild not know exactly now match this Rammar spent in the
(b)(7)(c)	sleep deprivation cell but estimated it was about 50 percent of the time contended that no sleep deprivation was conducted on
	Rahman after Jessen departed [on November] and added there
· •-	would have been no point in continuing it then because Rahman was not being interrogated. ³⁶ Accordig to Rahman arrived at
(b)(1)	in a diaper and it was removed at some point. He was
(b)(3) NatSecA	Act ^r robably put back in a diaper when he was put in a sleep deprivation cell. ³⁷ However said there would have been no reason to use
(b)(1)	a diaper when Rahman was not in a sleep deprivation cell.
(b)(1) (b)(3) CIAAct. (b)(3) NotSoo(63. (S//NF) characterized Rahman as stoic and very
	Act tubborn, unlike the other detainees. He was the most stubborn individual they detained at the facility. ³⁸ Although most of the other
(b)(7)(c)	detainees were "compliant" almost immediately, Rahman was hard- (b)(1)
•	(b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(3) NatSecAct (c)(3) NatSecAct (c)(3) NatSecAct
	bar across the top of the cell and secured to two walls. These cells could be used to force the detainee to stand during sleep deprivation sessions.
(b)(1)	36 (S//NF) Despite contention, recalled that Rahman was in a sleep deprivation cell on November 2002 when she checked on the detainees.
	Ct ¹⁷ (S77NF) During the OIG visit to on and May 2003, two detainees were undergoing standing sleep deprivation in these cells. Both were naked.
	³⁸ (S//NF) At the time of Rahman's death, $(b)(1)$ een in operation for 69 days. (b)(3) NatSecAct
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(b)(3) NatSecAct

core Pashtun. He had been a combatant all his life and had been (b)(1) wounded many times. Rahman did not complain and simply said, (b)(3) NatSecAct "Thanks to God, all is well." When reminded that in his videotaped 19 December 2002 interview with the DO Investigative Team, (b)(6) said he just (b)(7)(c)stated that Rahman complained incessantly, recalled Rahman being stoic.

(b)(3) NatSecAct

64. (S/ According to cables reporting Rahman's interrogations, he did complain about conditions. After the first two days of interrogation, reported that Rahman "complained (b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecActout poor treatment, complained about the violation of his human rights, and claimed inability to think due to conditions (cold)." The subsequent cable reporting Rahman's interrogation sessions described Jessen's impression that Rahman "continues to use 'health and welfare' behaviors and complaints as a major part of his resistance posture."

65. (S//NF) The DO Investigative Team interviewed (b)(3) NatSecAct guard commander four days after Rahman's death. According to the guard commander, Rahman wore pants for $(b)(1)^{1}$ then spent the approximately his first three days at remainder of his detention without pants. (b)(3) NatSecAct

> 66. (S//NF) Jessen said that Rahman's diaper and clothes would have been removed at the interrogators' direction. The guards would not have removed them without direction. According to Jessen, Rahman was without his clothes more than he was with them. The interrogators gave Rahman some clothing after he admitted his identity on November 2002. (b)(1)

(b)(3) NatSecAct explained that it was difficult 67. (S//NF) The linguist, (b)(1)for him to remember how often he assisted in Rahman's interrogation (b)(3) NatSecAc but estimated it was approximately five to seven times.³⁹ at in the interrogation of two detainees, including He assisted (b)(1)(b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(6)

(b)(1)

(b)(7)(c)

IOFORN//MR SECRET


(b)(3) NatSecAct

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· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
Rahman. stated that during the entire time he saw Rahman at
(b)(1) Rahman was either wearing a diaper or was naked below
(b)(3) NatSecActist. said that he could not be precise about when
Rahman wore a diaper as opposed to being naked, but his condition
seemed to alternate from one to the other. The shirt that
Rahman wore was not sufficient to cover his genital area. Rahman
(b)(1) was particularly concerned with being naked in front of
(b)(3) NatSecAct the guards. Every time Rahman came to the
The Gaurage, Every unite randing to the
nterrogation room, he asked to be covereddid not observe a
supply of diapers at the but it was evident to
(b)(1) him that Rahman had received a replacement diaper at $som(b)(1)$
(b)(3) CIAAct juncture. (b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6) 68. $(S//NF)$ According to prior to the first interrogation
(b)(7)(c) session stated that Rahman was a "really bad guy." was
present when Rahman was rendered to and was
present when Rahman was first interrogated at That was
(b)(1) either the night Rahman was rendered toor the succeeding
(b)(3) NatSecActday. The first interrogation session included Jessen, and
The only other person remembered being
(b)(1) present during one of Rahman's interrogations was Mitchell. The
(b)(3) CIAACtive instance of the section sections with Rahman word normally brief because of the section
(b)(3) NatSecAct List up willing negator connerate. They were mostly around 15 minutes
(b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(6) his unwillingness to cooperate. They were mostly around 15 minutes
(b)(7)(c) in duration; the longest was one or two hours.

69. (S//NF) Jessen estimated that he interrogated Rahman two to four times.⁴⁰ He employed an "insult slap" with Rahman once but determined it was only a minor irritant to Rahman and worthless as a continuing technique. Jessen occasionally observed encounters with Rahman and said he was the hardest case in (b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6) aptivity that Jessen had ever observed. Even when Rahman was depleted psychologically, he would routinely respond that he was (b)(7)(c)

40 (S/(NF) A cable reported that Jessen was involved in six interrogation sessions with Rahman.



(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1)

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SECRET//

(b)(3) NatSecAct

"fine" when asked about his condition. The only concession Rahman made was to admit his identity when it was clearly established and irrefutable. (b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1) 70. (5/ Jessen prepared the interrogation plan for Rahman
 (b)(3) NatSecActefore departing and noted that there was no quick fix to get him to cooperate. It would take a long time and it was necessary to keep up the pressure on Rahman and to provide medical assessments. Jessen did not foresee that the interrogation plan on Rahman would be implemented for some time, at least not until the Station was augmented by graduates of the interrogation classes.⁴¹ Jessen wrote in a cable dated November 2002 as a part of the Interrogation Plan
 (b)(3) NatSecAct

It will be important to manage the [proposed interrogation] deprivations so as to allow [Rahman] adequate rest and nourishment so he remains coherent and capable of providing accurate information. The station physician should collaborate with the interrogation team to achieve this optimum balance.⁴² It is reasonable to expect two weeks or more of this regimen before significant movement occurs.

> 72. (S//NF) stated that he is not certain how many detainees at (b)(1) have been naked from the waist down. It (b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(3) NatSecActording to a Headquarters cable sent November 2002, the first interrogation course was scheduled to run from November 2002, with 10 students scheduled to attend that session. responded on November 2002, with concurrence for a (b)(3) NatSecAct DY interrogation team to travel to following completion of the course. Later, the senior interrogator in CTC wrote an e-mail regarding the request and noted in part, "... At least one of the guys they have in mind is Gul Rahman, who is an Afghan, and I do not think he is truly a [High Value Target] or [a Medium Value Target.] How do you think we should proc ed on this?"

24 SECRET7 NOFORN//MR (b)(3) NatSecAct

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(b)(1)	(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct	depends upon how they are acting; "It may be needed to break them."
(b)(6)	It was used in Rahman's case to break him down to be more
(b)(7)(c)	compliant. He was defia t a d strong and made threats, according
·	to (b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(1)	73. (S/ Rahman's Medical Care. According to the
(b)(3) NatSecAct	
, L	connected with Rahman's death, Rahman was brought to on
(b)(1)	November and given a physical examination. However, despite this
(b)(3) NatSecAc	official reporting, the PA who accompanied Rahman
	stated that neither he nor any other
(b)(1)	PA conducted physical examinatio s at on Rahman or other
	detainees who were rendered there during that period. The brief
	check the PA performed on rendition detainees if could not
(b)(1) .	
(b)(3) NatSecAc	be considered a physical examination because, in part, it did not
	^t involve questioning the detainees about their health history and
	current condition (b)(3) NatSecAct
	74 $\frac{1}{100}$ November 2002 Station reported (b)(1)
	, 1
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	by cable that
(b)(1)	medics made visits to
(b)(3) NatSecAc	evaluate the detaineës:43
	"approximately a fourth of the prisoners have one or more significant
	pre-existing medical problems upon ^{(b)(1)} -1 " (b)(3) NatSecAct
·	
	75. (S 7 The November 2002 cable reported that
(1.)(4)	during two monthly assistance visits to by the medics, all
(b)(1)	detainees were taken from their cells to a room and given a private
(D)(3) Nalseck	Actuedical evaluation where they were interviewed by an Office of
·	Medical Services (OMS) officer and a urine specimen was taken to
	determine the specific nutrition and hydration levels. It reported that
(b)(1) .	the last routine visit _a November 2002 and the urine testing
(b)(3) NatSecAc	tdetermined all of the detainees were receiving sufficient
	nourishment and hydration. The cable further reported that all the
· ·	
	$12 \dots 12 \dots 12$
	43 $-(S//NF)$ When $\binom{(b)(1)}{(b)(3)}$ NatSecAct
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(b)(3) NatSe	ecAct

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detainees were cooperative with the medical personnel regarding their health and welfare except for Rahman, who simply stated, (b)(1) "Thanks to God, all is well."44 (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(6) 76. (S//NF) PA advised that he visited (b)(7)(c)shortly after his November 2002 arrival The . facility had opened since his prior assignment He consulted with OMS by telephone and received guidance to treat the (b)(1)(b)(3) NatSecActletainees at if they are ill. then examined the detainees, heard their health concerns, and tested their urine to (b)(3) NatSecAct determine if they had sufficient nourishment. said he did not perform any arrival medical examination on Rahman or any other newly arrived detainee at and was unaware of detainee (b)(1)(b)(3) NatSecActrivals and departures from the facility. was confident he would remember if he had examined Rahman.45

(b)(1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(6) (b)(7)(c)

78. (5//NF) According to ______ in an interview with the OIG, on a subsequent date, possibly ______ November 2002, he checked on the detainees and observed Rahman for the first time. _______ (b)(1) (b)(3) CIAAct reported that Rahman was wearing a blue sweatshirt and blue (b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(6) (b)(7)(c) 44 (c) _______ stated that be provided _______ with some of the information that

)(c)	44 (E)	stated that he provided	with some of the informa	tion that
	appeared in this cable	·		•
	45 (S) As reported pr	eviously, Rahman arrived the	re on November 2002.	stated that
	he did not prepare tre	atment notes or medical record	ds while (b)(1)	
	(b)(1)		(b)(3) NatSecA	Act
	(b)(3) CIAAct			
	(b)(3) NatSecAct	-		. '
•	(b)(6)			
	(b)(7)(c)	-SECRET/	IOFORN//MR	
		(b)(3) NatSecAct	·	

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sweatpants, and possibly socks, and was standing in his cell with his arm chained to a pin on the wall. believed Rahman had (b)(1)abrasions on his wrists, similar to the other detainees. stated (b)(3) CIAAct that he did not know what language Rahman spoke, but Rahman (b)(3) NatSecAd indicated that he was okay and did not make any complaints. (b)(6) he did not examine Rahman nor (b)(7)(c)Consequently, according to test his urine and did not know if there were any abrasions beneath his clothes.⁴⁷ did not know of any medical contact with Rahman by the other two medical care providers at the Station.⁴⁸

(b)(1)79. (S//NF) recollection that Rahman was wearing (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecActsweatpants is at odds with others who spent considerable time at (b)(6) during that period. No other interviewee mentioned that (b)(7)(c) Rahman was wearing pants after his first couple of days. The guard commander said that Rahman's pants were removed after approximately three days and he was without pants. The deputy guard commander said that Rahman was naked most of the time. (b)(1)the interpreter, recalled that Rahman was naked below the (b)(3) NatSecAct waist or wore a diaper during his entire period of detention. said that Rahman's clothes were removed early and he was naked or (b)(**1**) wore a d(b)(3) NatSecActhe time. (b)(3) NatSecAct the weather the provide state 12327. 1110. +s. 100

 (b)(1)
 80. (5/
 Reports of Rahman's Interrogation.

 (b)(3) NatSecAct first cable report of Rahman's interrogation was issued three days after his rendition to
 It reported that

 (b)(1)
 interrogated Rahman over a 40-hour period and noted that the

 (b)(3) CIAAct
 psychological and physiological pressures available for use were

 (b)(3) NatSecActunlikely to make Rahman divulge significant information. The cable

 (b)(6)
 (b)(7)(c)

	(b)(3) NatSecAct
	(b)(6) (b)(7)(c)
48 (S//NF) A TDY physician	reported they did not have any interaction wit
Rahman while he was alive.	· · · ·

(b)(3) NatSecAct

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	(b)(3) NatSecAct	. {
/b)/1)		. 1
(b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecA	_{ct} ted that, although the other detainees who had been brought to	
	dropped their resistance within 48 hours, Rahman	1
ľ	remained relatively unchanged. It added,	
	Despite 48 hours of sleep deprivation, auditory overload, total	
· •	darkness, isolation, a cold shower, and rough treatment, Rahman remains steadfast in maintaining his high resistance posture and	8
	demeanor	
	(b)(3) NatSecAct	I
(b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAc	81. (3/) A second, post-rendition cable was sent from	I
	to on November 2002. It reported that Rahman	l
	appeared to be physically fatigued but defiant during interrogations.	. 1
(b)(1) Γ	t sought material to employ as psychological pressure and requested	
(b)(3) NatSecAc	that prepare a videotape of	ι
		·
(b)(1)	(b)(3) NatSecAct	
(b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct		
(b)(6)		
(b)(7)(c)	November 2002, "Subject: Gul Rahman Admits His Identity." It reported that Jessen, and interrogated Rahman	1
\$	reported that, Jessen, andinterrogated Rahman onNovember 2002, and that Rahman had spent the days since his	· ·
	ast interrogation session in cold conditions with minimal food and	•
	sleep. ⁵⁰ It further reported that Rahman was confused for portions of	•
	the interviews due to fatigue and dehydration ⁵¹ The cable reported	ſ
	that Rahman provided his true identity and biographical information	.
	but provided fictitious and rehearsed responses about his	
	telationship with reported that	
	Rahman was afforded improved conditions and would be	•
1	reinterviewed or November 2002.	
	(b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(1)	
· · ·	(b)(3) NatSecAct	
Λ	19 (C.()) There is no indication that the mat this request	1
	⁴⁹ (S//NF) There is no indication that met this request. 50 (S /	1
	Rahman at However, this wa the only occa ion when her presence is documented in	
· · ·5	51 (S / As previously reported, the November 2002 cable reported the Station's	
	medical support to detainees. The cable cited that, during the to November 2002 medical assistance visit to $(b)(1)$ it was determined that all detainees were receiving ufficient	
	hydration. $(b)(3)$ NatSecAct $(b)(1)$.
	(b)(3) NatSecAct	ł
		·1
	SECRET/NOFORN//MR	· ;
	(b)(3) NatSecAct	

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. ,	Approve	ed for Release: 2016/09	/30 C06541713 XN//M R	(1.) (4)	
	(b)(1) SECR (b)(3) NatSecAct		NatSecAct	(b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct	
·	-		Nucces loc		
(b)(3) Nat	83: (3 /	sent a fourth c	able on Nove	mber 2002.	
	That cable was prepared				
	exa ination and a recom				
	reported that Rahman ha	•	· •		
	resistance posture and w				
	interrogations. The cable				
	deprivations and institut				
	18 out of 24 hours. It als			(b)(6)	
. •	collaborate with the inter			imum (b)(7)(c)	
	balance and noted it was	•	-		
	the regimen before seein				
	using the newly trained		•		
	training class. (b)(3) Na	•	· • • •	•	
(b)(1)			(b)(3) NatSecAct	
(b)(3) NatSecA	84. (S // On	the reported day	of Rahman's de	ath	
	November 2002,	sent a cable to t		- Gul	
	Rahman: Chronology of			n appeared '	
	calm and controlled to h	–			
(b)(1)	threatened	uards previously,	vowing to kill	hem all or	
(b)(3) NatSec	Act nave them killed followi	ng his release.53	This was cited a	s the reason	•
\$**	that Rahman was consta	tly restrained w	ith hand and an	kle	
(b)(1)	restraints in his cell.54 It	also reported that	t	astsaw	
(b)(3) NatSec	Actahinan on the afternoo	n of November	2002, and that	Rahman	
	was found dead on the r	noming of <u>Nov</u>	vember 2002. Th	ne Station	
	concluded it was not pos	ssible to determin	e the cause of R	ahman's	
•	death without an autops	y. The cable did	not include the	nformation	
	(b)(1		(b)(1)		
	(b)(3	3) NatSecAct	(b)(3) NatSe	cAct	
(t	o)(3) NatSecAct				
		· ·		1	
	52 (87 The mental status e CTC/UBL noted "[Headquarters]	xam was requested by C UBL is motivated to extr		nber 2002. Ional information	•
	on Al-Qa'ida and [HIG] from Rah				
	mportance. We would I ke to wo			-	
	53 (C//NF) Jessen reportedly heat the guards were and three	ard from before before before before	November 2002 that I	Rahman sensed	
(b)(3) NatSecA	^{Ct} guards in streat Rahman.	ateried to kind diedity but j	essen salu ne never w	chessed the	
	54 (S) Despite the assertion	on that Rahman was cons	tantly restrained with	hand and ankle	
(b)(1)	restraints in hiscell, the same cabl	e reported that Rahman's	s hand restraints were	removed on	
	Act_November 2002.				
-		29	• • •	•	
· ·	SECT	τέτ (NOFO	RN//MR		
	(b)(3) NatSecAct	······································		

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that Rahman was naked below the waist or that a series of chains and restraints (the short chain position) was used on Rahman that forced (b)(3) NatSecActum to sit bare-bottomed on the concrete floor of his cell.⁵⁵

 (b)(1)
 stated that on November 2002, was occupied with other

 (b)(3) CIAAct
 duties and asked her to check on each detainee because it was getting

 (b)(3) NatSecAct
 went from cell to cell and gave apples to detainees.

 (b)(6)
 Also, she gave a few of them blankets and, if they did not have socks, she provided socks to them.

86. (S//NF) did not provide a blanket, socks, or an apple to Rahman. She returned his apple to and stated she did did w th the apple but doubted he would have (b)(1) not know what (b)(3) NatSecAct given it to Rahman because he was noncompliant. said she saw all of the detainees, except Rahman. He was in one of the sleep (b)(6) deprivation cells when she provided apples to the detainees.⁵⁶ The (b(7)(c))other detainees she observed all wore sweatshirts and sweatpants and most had socks; none of the detainees was without clothes. Some wore wool knit sweaters on top of the sweatshirts.

(b)(1)	87. (S//NF)	· · ·	· ·	stated		
(b)(3) CIAAct	that it was very cold	d in	when he was th	ere on a brief TDY		
(b)(3) NatSecAd	and the issue of hy	othermia cro	ssed his mind as	s he saw Rahman		
(b)(6)	wearing only socks and a diaper. ⁵⁷ He commented on the cold and					
(b)(7)(c)	hypothermia to the	▲				
•	but not to	explaine	ed that he was a	t _{(b)(1)} only to		
	(b)(3) NatSecAct			(b)(3) NatSecAct		
(b)(1)		·	· · ·			
	55 (S/ This cable w	as the basis for the	information provided	in the 29 November 2002		
	Congressional Notification	on Rahman's death	. It was not until a sec	cond Congressional		
(b)(6)	Notification was made on	May 2003, three m	ionths after the DO Inv	vestigative Team's report was		
(b)(7)(c)				he waist and shackled in the		
•	short chain position that pr			•		
	56 (S//NF) This account 1					
(b)(1)	appears to conflict with		Cahman's sleep depriva	ation was discontinued on		
(b)(3) NatSecA	November 2002, when J	•				
		d he visited		hman's arrival there,		
, (b	novembe:	also also	witnessed the hard tak	edown of Rahman while at		
,)(3) CIAAct	•	,			
· ·)(3) NatSecAct		00			
•)(6)		_30	B		
)(7)(c)	SECRET /	NOFORN//M	×		
·	· · · ·	(b)(2) NotS	oo A ot			

(b)(3) NatSecAct

Ca C06541713		53-7 Filed 10/17/16 Page 35 of 68 2016/09/30 C06541713 Act
o)(1) o)(3) CIAAct o)(3) NatSecAct o)(6) o)(7)(c)		clothed for a long period. her cells and assumed Rahman ecognized that someone could not
b)(1) b)(3) CIAAct b)(3) NatSecAct	detainee complained about being c about the cold conditions at else doing so.	hat both Rahman and another olddid not approach and was not aware of anyone
b)(6) b)(7)(c) (b)(1)	÷	November 2002. There were some ea but none in the individual cells.
(b)(3) NatSecA	ct	(b)(6) (b)(6) (b)(7)(c)
	(b)(1) (b)(3) Na	atSecAct
	•	
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	(b)(3) NatS	SecAct

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(T)(a)	Approved for Release: 2016/09/30 C06541713 SECRET/ // VOFORN///VIR
(b)(3) CIAAct	(h)(2) Note $0 = 0$
(b)(3) NatSecA	(b)(c) Natecover (b)(c) NatSecAct
(b)(6) (b)(7)(c)	
	November, a contract linguist, was assigned
	by or his assistant, to perform a daily check of the
	detainees in their cells at9 It was during that period that
(b)(1)	the temperature dropped precipitously; checks were normally
(b)(3) NatSecAd	conducted in the morning, and also in the evening if the weather was
	colder. They had observed the detainees shivering around the period
	of November. Some detainees with blankets were shivering.
(D)(1)	Those without blankets were those who were not cooperating.
	91. (S//NF) remembered that sometime around
(b)(1)	November 2002 montioned the temperature was
(b)(3) NatSecA	dropping, it was getting cold, and they should try to keep the
	detainees warmer. It was a general statement made to a group
(b)(1) (b)(3) CIAAct	including and was also present during a
	tdiscussion between and about supplying warmer
(b)(6)	
(b)(7)(c)	clothes. They were concerned that the provision of blankets to all of
	the detainees at that time could send the wrong signal; they tried to
	use desired items like blankets as something to earn by cooperation.
	· · · · ·
	92. (S//NF) A contract linguist,
(b)(1)	stated that he askeda few days before
(b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct	Rahman died (probably on November) at what temperature
(b)(6)	hypothermia occurred. ⁶⁰ reportedly responded that he
(b)(7)(c)	believed it occurred when the atmospheric temperature dropped to
	58 degrees Fahrenheit. ⁶¹ According to did not
	respond in a manner indicating he was going to do something about
	it; he just said "okay." was certain, however, that
	had heard him. explained that he did not raise the issue of
(b)(1)	the cold with because of anything he $s^{(b)(1)}$, heard about
(b)(3) NatSecAc	$(\mathbf{b})(\mathbf{s})$ CIAACI
	(b)(3) NatSecAct
	(b)(6) (b)(7)(c)
•	⁵⁹ (S//NF)
	(b)(1) (b)(1)
. [(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(1)	61 (G//NF) During an interview with the DO Investigative Team on November 2002,
(b)(1) (b)(3) CIAAct	cited that did not know at what temperature one would reach hypothermia.
(b)(3) NatSecAct	32
(b)(6)	SECRET //NOFORN//MR
(b)(7)(c)	(b)(3) NatSecAct
■ 	
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•	

(b)(1)

Approved for Release: 2016/09/30 C06541713 SECRET/ NOFORN//MR____ (b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecActRahman. Rather, it was based on whatpbserved with two(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)other detainees he was working with, as well as the fact that he was(b)(6)other detainees he was working with, as well as the fact that he was(b)(7)(c)cold even when wearing a jacket.

93. (S//NF) told OIG that, based on his knowledge of thermodynamics and conductivity, if a person's body temperature. drops to 95 degrees Fahrenheit, the brain would be impacted. At 90 (b)(1)(b)(3) CIAAct degrees Fahrenheit the person will die. However, if the room (b)(3) NatSecAct temperature is 70 degrees Fahrenheit or above and a person is sitting (b)(6) naked on the floor, the person will be all right. If the room (b)(7)(c)temperature is 30 degrees Fahrenheit, a person could sit on the floor and be unaffected if he is clothed. explained that he was aware that a concrete floor would suck the heat out of someone who was sitting on the floor without pants. From his knowledge of thermodynamics opined that Rahman had only a 30 percent chance of surviving the night while sitting on the cold floor (b)(1) (b)(3) CIAAct of his cell without pants. (b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(6)

(b)(7)(c)

94: (S//NE) Five days after Rahman's death, the DO Investigative Team interviewed The one and one-half page report that resulted from that interview contained the following:

(b)(1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(6) (b)(7)(c)	that after his first or second visit to (b)(1)
	he mentioned the temperature at the facility to
	facility, the prisoners were shivering, and it was not cold out ide yet.

95. (S//NF) During an OIG interview, less than four months later, when asked if he had concerns regarding the temperature at at the time of Rahman's death, responded, "not (b)(1)(b)(3) NatSecActreally." When asked if he had a conversation with anyone about the temperature at responded that he believed he told that had mentioned to someone added that he did not remember the identity that it was cold. of the person with whom he discussed the issue of the cold (b)(1)temperature; "it could have been nyone." When asked what (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecActorompted his comment about the cold stated that it was (b)(6) (b)(7)(c)

33 NOFORN//MR SECRET / (b)(3) NatSecAct

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(b)	(3)) NatSecAct	
<u>،</u>	~ /	(•		

(b)(1) starting to get cold. "I walked by and must have said it was getting (b)(3) CIAAct cold." said he had forgotten the comment; it was not made in (b)(3) NatSecAct a formal context. However, eminded him (b)(6)of his comment. When asked if this comment could have been made (b)(7)(c)who had the responsibility for to (b)(1) responded, "It could have been [made to] anyone." $\overline{62}$ (b)(3) NatSecAct 96. (S//NF) To assist in remembering the identity of (b)(1)(b)(3) NatSecActhe person with whom he spoke about the cold condition in read the interview report prepared by the DO **Investigative Team** after the death of Rahman. then (b)(1) observed, "I guess it could be he would have been the most (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct kely officer." When asked to quantify that likelihood as a percentage, responded it was 50 percent. denied he (b)(6) (b)(7)(c)told the two members of the DO Investigative Team that the detainees were shivering. When asked if cold was used as a technique at responded, "Not that I know." He explained that he was more focused on the use of loud music there. (b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct 97. (S//NF)| recalled that, at the (b)(1) time of Rahman's death lamented that he previously raised (b)(3) NatSecA ^{.Cl}the issue of the cold with someone at specifically said, "I told those people that they had stated that to do something about the cold there." said it was clear from the context that was not referring to (b)(1) (b)(3) CIAAct some low-level person, but did not identify whom (b)(3) NatSecActhe was describing. (b)(6) (b)(7)(c)98. (S//NF) stated that he has no recollection of having a conversation with rega ding the cold weather. However, mentioning that he thought Rahman's death did recall was induced by the cold. (b)(1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(6) (b)(7)(c) 62 (C) Additionally, the notes prepared by the OGC attorney during interview with the DO Investigative Team read, "The first and second time mentioned temperature to them; meaning and others unknown." SECRET NOFORN77MR (b)(3) NatSecAct

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(b)(1)	(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(3) CIAAct	
(b)(3) NatSecAct	99. (S//NF) According to no one brought to his
(b)(6)	attention or to the front office any concerns about the cold.
(b)(7)(c)	said it was not apparent in talking with that there was a
	problem with cold at (b)(3) NatSecAct
(6)(1)	100. (S/ In December 2002, less than one month after
(b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct	Rahman's hypothermia-induced $der(b)(1)$ reported the following
	regarding another detaine(b)(3) NatSecAct
• •	
	[The detainee] was submitted [sic] to sensory deprivation, cold, and
•	sleep deprivation within the parameters of [a referenced cable]
	When moved to the interrogation room for interrogation sessions
	[the detainee] was stripped and had to earn his clothing with cooperation and information. When he demonstrated resistance,
	[the detainee] was left in a cold room, shackled and stripped, until
,	he demonstrated cooperation.
(b)(1)	
(b)(3) NatSecA	101. (S//NF) Cold Showers. who was
,	present at in November 2002, reported that she witnessed
,	"the shower from hell" used on Rahman during his first week in
and the second	asked Rahman his identity, and when he did not
	respond with his true name, Rahman was placed back under the cold
(b)(1) (b)(3) CIAAct ^{**}	water by the guards at direction. Rahman was so cold that
	Che could barely utter big align. A coording to
(b)(6)	^{ct} e could barely utter his alias. According to the entire
(b)(7)(c)	process lasted no more than 20 minutes. It was intended to lower
	Rahman's resistance and was not for hygienic reasons. At the
,	conclusion of the shower, Rahman was moved to one of the four
	sleep deprivation cells where he was left shivering for hours or
	overnight with his hand chained over his head. $(b)(1)$
	(b)(3) NatSecAct
	102. (S//NF) Jessen, who was present atat the same
•	time, recalled the guards administering a cold shower to Rahman as a
	"deprivation technique." Jessen subsequently checked on Rahman
	after he had been returned to his cell. Jessen detected that Rahman
	was showing the early stages of hypothermia and ordered the guards
, • •	to give the detainee a blanke $(b)(1)$ who interpreted for Rahman,
(b)(1)	(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(3) CIAAct	
(b)(3) NatSe	
(b)(6)	1
(b)(7)(c)	35
•	SECRET NOFORN//MR
•	(b)(3) NatSecAct

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(b)(1)also witnessed order a cold shower for Rahman. Rahman was (b)(3) CIAAct being uncooperative at the time, and stated it was evident that (b)(3) NatSecAct the cold shower was not being ordered for hygienic reasons. (b)(6) (b)(7)(c)

103. (S//NF) A Bureau of Prisons officer, conducting training for the guards at witnessed a tall detainee wearing a blindfold and a diaper fastened by duct tape arrive at an unheated and cold area where the shower was located.64 The diaper was (b)(1)(b)(3) NatSecActremoved and discarded. The detainee was placed under the stream of the shower for approximately five minutes and he was shivering. Because of the detainee's height, a guard wearing rubber gloves stood on a stool to ensure the detainee was covered head to foot with the water spray. There was soap in a bucket, but it was not used. The (b)(1)(b)(3) NatSecActOP officer was informed that a contractor was coming to that day to repair the water heater. There was no towel present; the detainee was dried with his shirt and then escorted back to the cell wearing a new diaper and his wet shirt. In the cell, the guards restrained the detainee's hands to a bar at the approximate height of his head. It occurred to the BOP officer that the cold shower might have been intended as a deprivation or interrogation technique.65

(b)(1)(b)(3) NatSecAct

104. (S//NF) Based on the length of time Rahman was at (b)(1)estimated that Rahman would have received (b)(3) NatSecAct two showers. witnessed only one shower and it was a cold shower. Rahman did not like the shower, but the guards (b)(6)were able to get him clean. was not certain if the BOP (b)(7)(c)officers witnessed the showers.

105. (S//NF) Several of the officers interviewed about the possible use of cold showers as a technique cited that the water heater was inoperable and there was no other recourse except for (b)(1)cold showers. However, explained that if a detainee were (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecActooperative, he would be given a warm shower if possible. (b)(1)

(b)(6)(b)(7)(c)

(b)(3) NatSecAct

65 (S//NF) BOP officer provided a similar account of the cold shower. He did not believe it was employed as an interrogation technique because the water heater was broken at the time.

> SECRET NOFORN//MR

(b)(3) NatSecAct

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	(b)(3) NatSecAct
	stated that when a detainee was uncooperative, the interrogators
	accomplished two goals by combining the hygienic reason for a
	shower with the unpleasantness of a cold shower.
·,	
(b)(1)	106. (S//NF) According to cold was not supposed
(b)(3) CIAAct	to play a role in the interrogation. Cold was not a technique; it was a
	^{ct} -hange of season. When asked in February 2003, if cold was used as
(b)(6) (b)(7)(c)	an interrogation technique, responded, "not per se." He
	explained that physical and environmental discomfort was used to
	encourage the detainees to improve their environment.
	observed that cold is hard to define. He asked rhetorically, "How
	cold is cold? How cold is life threatening?" stated that
(b)(1) .	Rahman was not given cold water. He stated that cold water
(b)(3) NatSecA	ct ^o ntinues to be employed at however, showers were
	administered in a heated room. He stated there was no specific
	guidance on it from Headquarters, and was left to its own
(b)(1)	discretion in the use of coldasserted that there was a cable
(b)(3) NatSecAd	documenting the use of "manipulation of the
	environment."66
(b)(1)	
(b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAc	107. $(S//NF)$ Hard Takedown. During the course of
(b)(6)	Rahman's autopsy, the Agency pathologist noted several abrasions
(b)(7)(c)	on the body. ⁶⁷ Jessen, who was present during the first 10 days of
	Rahman's confinement, reported that, while in the company of
• •	Jessen witnessed a team of four or five
<u>(</u> b)(1)	officers execute a "hard takedown" on Rahman.68
(b)(3) CIAAct	According to Jessen, the team dragged Rahman from his cell, cut his
(b)(3) NatSecAc	t clothes off, secured his hands with Mylar tape and put a hood over his head. They ran Rahman up and down the long corridor adjacent
	to his cell. A couple of times he stumbled and was momentarily
	dragged along the ground until they were able to get Rahman back
	undged along the ground than they were able to get randhalf back
(b)(1)	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
(b)(3) CIAAct	
(b)(3) NatSecAd	Ct67 (S//NF) The Final Autopsy Findings noted "superficial excoriations of the right and left
(b)(6) (b)(7)(c)	upper shoulders, left lower abdomen, and left knee, mechanism undetermined."
	(b)(1)
	(b)(3) NatSecAct
,	37
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	(b)(3) NatSecAct

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.

(b)(1)

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on his feet. Rahman was slapped and punched in the stomach during this episode, but Jessen could determine that the officers were pulling their punches to limit the pain. Jessen said the takedown was rehearsed and professionally executed. The process took between three to five minutes, and Rahman was returned to his cell. Rahman had crusty contusions on his face, leg, and hands that looked bad, but nothing that required treatment. Jessen heard that other hard (b)(1) takedowns were also executed at ⁵⁹ Three other officers (b)(3) NatSecAct who were present at the same time provided similar accounts of the incident.

108. (S//NF) Jessen saw a value in the hard takedown in order to make Rahman uncomfortable and experience a lack of control. Jessen recognized, however, that the technique was not approved and recommended to that he obtain written (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecActpproval for employing the technique.

(b)(6) the hard takedown was 109. (S//NF) According to (b)(7)(c) employed often in interrogations at as "part of the atmospherics." It was the standard procedure for moving a detainee to the sleep deprivation cell. It was performed for shock and (b)(1) psychological impact and signaled the transition to another phase of (b)(3) NatSecAct the interrogation. He said that the act of putting a detainee into a diaper also could cause abrasions if the detainee struggles because the floor of the facility is concrete.

110. (S//NF) contended that he ordered the hard (b)(1)takedown on Rahman to make him think he was being taken to a (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecActlifferent cell This was accomplished by running him up and down the corridor. As (b)(6) (b)(7)(c)Rahman was being moved down the corridor, he fell and got a scrape on his shoulder. did not remember where else Rahman explained that the scraping was not received injuries.

b)(1) b)(3) NatSecAct (S//NF) According Washington, D.C., a	g to one BOP officer who supervisor, name	o traveled to	
hard takedown technic		After the BOP team arrived	the
(b)(1) (b)(2) NotSeeAct	• •	(b)(1) (b)(3) Nat	SecAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct	_SECRET/	NOFORN//MR	

(b)(3) NatSecAct

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•	(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(1)	the second of the process of the way disclosed with the
(b)(3) CIAAct	expected to be part of the process, and he was displeased with the
(b)(6)	Actresults because Rahman was injuredasserted that he had no
(b)(7)(c)	interest in hurting the detainees. He observed that abrasions cause
	management problems because there is a need to summon the
	physician to the facility to tend to the detainees' wounds to prevent infection. ⁷⁰ stated that neither he, Station management,
(b)(1)	Actor anyone else involved with the program ever authorized or
(D)(3) Naisec/	encouraged anyone to hit, slap, or intentionally inflict pain on a
	detainee.
(b)(1) -	uetainee.
(b)(3) CIAAct	111. $(S//NF)$ stated that this hard takedown was the
(b)(3) NatSecA	only time Rahman could have received the abrasions on his body.
(b)(6) (b)(7)(c)	He recalled only one instance when the hard takedown was used on
	Rahman. According to the reference to rough treatment in the
	November 2002 cable refers to the hard takedown, as well as
	the insult slap given to Rahman by Jessen. ⁷¹
,	
(b)(1)	112. (S//NF) noted there was an alternative to the hard
(b)(3) NatSecA	takedown that he called the "gentle takedown." It was reserved for
: • • •	' detainees who had been cooperative and were being transferred from
(b)(1)	In those instances, the detainee is advised what to expect
(b)(3) CIAAct	in advance and instructed to lie on his stomach and not resist (b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSec	Act (b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6) (b)(7)(c)	113. (S//NF) stated he did not discuss the hard
	takedown with Station managers; he thought they understood what
	techniques were being used at stated that,
	after completing the interrogation class, he understood that if he was
(b)(1)	going to do a hard takedown, he must report it to Headquarters. ⁷²
(b)(3) NatSec/	Act
	(b)(6)
	$70 \frac{(3/NF)}{(3/NF)}$ if treated Rahman for those abrasions, it was not reported to OIG
	during the contact with the three medical care providers present during Rahman's detention.
(b)(1)	71
(b)(3) CIAAct	
(b)(3) NatSec	CAct reported that Rahman was pushed and shoved a bit. It was only after interviewed
(b)(6) (b)(7)(c)	Jessen that he learned of the hard takedown. At that point, after two interviews with
	did not see any purpose in recontacting a third time to question him on this issue.
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	(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(3) NatSecAct

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(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(3) NatSecAct

takedown.

(b)(1)

(b)(1)

(b)(3) NatSec

114. (5/_____ When the November 2002 cable reporting the treatment of Rahman reached CTC, a senior CTC/Renditions Group officer forwarded this cable via an e-mail message to a CTC attorney. The officer highlighted part of the paragraph that reported, "Despite 48 hours of sleep deprivation, auditory overload, total darkness, isolation, a cold shower, and rough treatment, Rahman remains steadfast in maintaining his high resistance posture and demeanor." The CTC officer commented, "Another example of field interrogation using coercive techniques without authorization."

(b)(3) CIAAct (b)(6) 115. (S//NF) a CTC attorney, stated that she (b)(7)(c)was not familiar with the "hard takedown" technique and was not aware that this technique had been used at She explained had sought approval to employ the hard takedown, that if intentionally cold conditions, and the short chain restraint, she would (b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecActave responded that they were not available for approval since they did not fit the legal parameters. Although a cold shower for Rahman was an available technique, she would have recommended that it not be approved if had provided all the relevant details (b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecActcluding that Rahman's cell was cold and he was not fully clothed. stated that he was generally familiar 116. (S//NF) with the technique of hard takedowns. He asserted that it is (b)(1) (b)(3) CIAAct authorized and believed it had been used one or more times at (b)(3) NatSecAct in order to intimidate a detainee.73 stated that he (b)(6) would not necessarily know if it had been used and did not consider (b)(7)(c)

(b)(3) NatSecAct ⁷³ (S//NF) There is no evidence that hard takedowns or short chain restraints are or were authorized. They are not listed in relevant Agency guidance as approved interrogation measures.

it a serious enough handling technique to require Headquarters approval. When asked about the possibility that a detainee might have been dragged on the ground during the course of a hard

understand the point of dragging someone along the corridor in

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(b)(3) NatSecAct

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responded that he was unaware of that and did not

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117. (S//NF) contended that he observed Rahman's dead body and the abrasions did not appear to be fresh. (b)(1)stated (b)(3) CIAAct that he understood from that the abrasions on Rahman's (b)(3) NatSecAct shoulders predated his transfer to (b)(6) However, after examining three postmortem (b)(7)(c)photographs taken during the autopsy, advised OIG that, in his professional judgment, the abrasion on Rahman's shoulder was between two and five days old. He estimated the abrasion on (b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct Rahman's hip as ranging from three or four days to a maximum of seven days old. 118, (S//NF) Following his return to Headquarters subsequent to the autopsy, the pathologist learned that Rahman had been subjected to a technique that was used to disorient him and he (b)(1) had fallen; that was presumably the hard takedown. It was the (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecActPathologist's medical opinion that the abrasions on the shoulders and hip occurred fairly simultaneously. He estimated they occurred from (b)(6) one to three days, at most, before Rahman's death and certainly did (b)(7)(c)not occur two weeks before his death. The pathologist did not ask who assisted during the autopsy, whether he had seen the (b)(1) abrasions prior 1(b)(3) NatSecActath. (b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct 119. (8/) Despite the visible presence of abrasions on Rahman's body, Station reported in the November 2002 cable that constituted the official report of Rahman's death to the DDO, "The Station medic inspected the body and noticed no obvious contusions, abrasions, marks, swelling, or other indications of specific cause of death." This same language was incorporated in the 29 November 2002 Congressional Notification of Rahman's death. (b)(1) (S//NF) RAHMAN'S LAST THREE DAYS (b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(1)120. (S//NF) In the November 2002 cable sent to the DDO, (b)(3) NatSecAct Station reported a chronology of the events regarding Rahman, with specific reference to the last days of his detention and his death. No other cables documented Rahman's activities or status after November 2002. (b)(1)(b)(3) NatSecAct

SECRET / NOFORN//MR (b)(3) NatSecAct

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C06541713-	Approved for Release: 2016/09/30 C06541713 SECRET //NOFORN//MR (b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(3) NatSecA (b)(6) (b)(7)(c)	121. $(S//NF)$ stated that he drafted this cable. stated that he is familiar with this cable. He does not remember much of the contents of the cable, but the necessary documentation of acte circumstances of the death would be in the cable. It was drafted by and released by edited it for clarity, as was his custom for $a(b)(1)$ be he released from $(b)(1)$ He had no recollection reg(b)(3) NatSecActtance of the (b)(3) NatSecActo the cable.
(b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAc	122. $(S//NF)$ November 2002. The November 2002 t chronology cable reported:
(b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAc	The last time Rahman was seen by officer prior to his death was on the afternoon of Monday November 2002. At that time Rahman was assessed to be in good overall health. Station noted that Rahman had small abrasions on his wrists and ankles as a result of the restraints. His ankle restraints were loosened and his hand restraints were removed when Rahman was returned to his cell. ⁷⁴
(b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAc (b)(1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAc (b)(6) (b)(7)(c)	123. (S//NF) recalled that he had one brief session with Rahman on November 2002, four days after Jessen left stated that this was based on Jessen's recommendation that Rahman be left alone and environmental deprivations continued. ⁷⁵ The purpose of the session in an interrogation room, according to was just to check on Rahman to determine if he was more compliant. Rahman never went any further than admitting his ^t identity. did not recall if Rahman was wearing a diaper at that time but noted there would have been no reason to use a diaper because Rahman was not in a sleep deprivation cell.
(b)(1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(6) (b)(7)(c)	124. (S//NF) contended he has little specific recollection of the session on November 2002.(b)(1) also did not (b)(3) NatSecAct 74 (S//NF) This is the only passage in the cable that addressed the events of November 2002. would have made this assessment of Rahman's health. 75 (S//NF) sent an e-mail message on November 2002, to her supervisors at
(b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAd	Headquarters She wrote, "I am the primary interrogator on six detainees is concentrating on Gul Rahman a d other new detainees and already has a full plate."
	(b)(3) NatSecAct
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Approved for Release: 2016/09/30 C06541713 (b)(1) SECRED / INCREMINITY (b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(3)

(b)(3) NatSecAct

recall which interpreter was used in this session, but he would have used one to conduct an stated the session was neutral in tone and not interrogation. (b)(1) confrontational. Accordingly, he would consider it a debriefing, not (b)(3) NatSecAct interrogation. (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(6) recalled that, during the last few days of 125. (S//NF) (b)(7)(c)his detention, Rahman did something that caused to order the guards to give Rahman a sweatshirt and possibly some socks and to loosen his restraints. stated Rahman must have been somewhat compliant because his hand restraints were removed. The (b)(1) · (b)(3) CIAAct fact that his wrists had pretty bad scabs on them was also a factor in (b)(3) NatSecAct aving the restraints removed. According to the sweatshirt (b)(6) was not the result of Rahman complaining of being cold or (b)(7)(c)surmising Rahman was cold because he saw Rahman shivering. They were in the interrogation room, which was relatively warm with two 1000-watt lights and an electric heater. stated that he might have given Rahman the sweatshirt because it was getting was trying to find a way to do something positive for cooler; stated he did not recall having a conversation with Rahman. anyone about the cold conditions at the time. He could not, however,

discount the possibility that concerns raised by others might have played a role in his decision to give Rahman the sweatshirt. explained that he did not prepare a cable as a result of the (b)(1) ambar because not much happened (b)(1)

(b)(3) NatSecActⁱⁿ on (b)(3) NatSecActⁱⁿ because not much happened (b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1) **126. (3/ November 2002.** The November 2002 (b)(3) NatSecAct chronology cable reported:

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At 1530 local on November 2002, the commander told station that when Rahman had been given food at 1500 local, he had thrown it, his plate, his water bottle and defecation bucket at the guards who had delivered the food. Station requested that

(b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct

··· (b)(3) NatSecAct

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C0654171	3	
(b)	(1) Approved for Release: 2016/09/30 C06541713	•
	(3) NatSecAct SECRET/ NOFORN//MR	
	(b)(3) NatSecAct	í
	·	1
• •	the commander to replace [sic] Rahman's hand	• }
	restraints to prevent this from reoccurring, or prevent him from	
	undertaking any other violent actions. ⁷⁶	1
(b)(1)	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	f
(b)(3) CIAAct	127. (S//NF) recalled that, on November, he was at	
(b)(3) NatSec		
(b)(6)		. I
(b)(7)(c)	The guard(a) reported that Dehman	1
	The guard(s) reported that Rahman	ŀ
	had been acting violently and had thrown his food and defecation	
	bucket at the guards. Rahman had also threatened the guards, noting	
(b)(1)	that he had seen thei faces and would kill them when he got out of	l
(b)(3) CIAAct	the facility. confirmed it is likely that Rahman had seen the	
(b)(3) NatSecA	^{Act} uards' faces, because they were sometimes lax about using their	
(0)(0)	kerchiefs to cover their faces.	ı
(b)(7)(c)		1
		.
	128. (S//NF) did not recall whether	
	were present at when Rahman threw his food.	1
	He did not specifical y recall telling others about the incident but	I
	acknowledged that he may have told	1
	and who would have	
(b)(1)	had an interest in the case.	,
(b)(3) CIAAct		Í
(b)(3) NatSec	cAct 129. (S//NF) approached and on	•
(b)(6)	November 2002, between 1500 and 1800 hours, according to	i.
(b)(7)(c) ⁻		
	was laughing and revealed that Rahman had been violent in	I
	his cell, threatened the guards, and had thrown his food.	.1
	added that he would take care of itinterpreted this as a	·
	lighthearted comment and assumed was laughing because no	
	detainee had done this previously. further assumed that when	
	said he would take care of it, he meant he would have the cell	l
(b)(1)	cleaned and have Rahman chained. believed he departed	- F
(b)(3) NatSecA		
	comment by did not recall for certain whether	•
		:
(b)(1)	came back with him or remaine $a_{(b)(1)}^{t}$ with	1
(b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecA	(b)(3) NatSecAct	1
(b)(6)		
(b)(7)(c)	76 (\ominus) This is the only passage in the cable that addresses the events of <u>November 2002</u> . It	1
	has been established that the term "station" in this paragraph means	. [
•		l
· .	<u> </u>	
·	SECRET/ NOFORN//MR	
		1
	(b)(3) NatSecAct	<u> </u>
•	Approved for Release: 2016/09/30 C06541713	

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b)(1) b)(3) CIAAct	(b)(3) NatSecAct	
b)(3) NatSecAc	did not remember hearing that Rahman ha	ad thrown
b)(6) (b)(7)(c)	anything else besides his food. did discussion of the Rahman incident on November 200	not recall a)2.
	130. (S//NF) recalled that, approximat before Rahman's death, casually mentioned Rah	
(b)(1) (b)(3) CIAAct	thrown his food and defecation bucket at the guards. T	
(b)(3)	ctappeared to be a normal update on Rahman	interpreted s was "not a
(b)(7)(c)	big deal," but rather an indication of Rahman's stature of core	of being hard
(b)(1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSocA	131. (S//NF) stated he did not know what ctprompted Rahman to act in this manner. He was the or	
(b)(6)	who had ever threatened the guards or thrown food at	
(b)(7)(c)	result of this conduct, ordered the guards to shad	
· •· ·	hands. was not certain who proposed the idea to Rahman. suspected the guard(s) recommended	
	approved. Regardless of the origin,acknowledg	
	would have authorized Rahman's short chaining on $(b)(1)^{-1}$	November
	1 (E)(d)	NatSecAct
(b)(1)	132. $(5//NF)$ explained that the short cha	in was
(b)(1) (b)(3) CIAAct	necessary to prevent Rahman from throwing things.77	rether, he still
(b)(3) NatSecA (b)(6)	would have been able to thow objects. That is, manacl	ing one hand
(b)(7)(c)	to the other still permitted the limited range of moveme	ent that would
		· · · · ·
2		(b)(1)
		(b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct
. '		(b)(5) (b)(6) (b)(7)(c)
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• •	(b)(3) NatSecAct	
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(b)(1)allow Rahman the ability to throw something.⁷⁸ In view,(b)(3) ClAActtrying to harm others when they entered the cell crossed the line; a(b)(3) NatSecActletainee who acted in this manner needed to be restrained.(b)(6)did not want Rahman throwing things even though the tray was(b)(7)(c)constructed of cardboard and the bucket and water bottle were madeof plastic.did not know if the defection bucket was empty atthe time it was thrown.⁷⁹

the short chaining was not 133. (S//NF) According to the result of the verbal threat to the guards. did not have any firsthand knowledge of the threat; the guards told him about it. They d d not appear very worried <u>or frightened by the threat.</u> (b)(1)(b)(3) CIAAct found this surprising because (b)(3) NatSecAct Rahman had reportedly (b)(6) did not recall Rahman threatened the guards previously. (b)(7)(c)being punished for the prev ous threats thought he would recall if Rahman had been punished.

134. (S//NF) stated it never occurred to him that short cha ning Rahman while wearing no pants would have consequences. (b)(1) (b)(3) CIAAct said he can see there were problems caused by In retrospect (b)(3) NatSecActhat action. At the time, he v ewed short haining as just a (b)(6)mechani m to safely secure Rahman. did not think he had (b)(7)(c)crossed the line in ordering the short chaining. It was not done to induce pain or suffering. His only thought at the time was to make stated they are not in the punishment Rahman immobile. (b)(3) NatSecActare in the business of getting information. game at

 (b)(1)
 135. (S//NF) According to
 it was ev dent to him

 (b)(3) ClAAct
 it was ev dent to him
 it was ev dent to him

 (b)(3) NatSecAct
 it was ev dent to him
 it was ev dent to him

 (b)(3) NatSecAct
 it was ev dent to him
 it was ev dent to him

 (b)(3) NatSecAct
 it was ev dent to him
 it was ev dent to him

 (b)(6)
 treated and interrogated. The guards would not have chained

 (b)(7)(c)
 it was ev dent to him

⁷⁸ (S//NF) Despite this view, there was no need for the guards to enter the cell to deliver food. The doors for each cell were constructed with a small slot near the bottom of the doors. The purpose of the slot was for the safe delivery of food to the detainee without opening the doors. The same slot was used by the guards to inspect the cell and monitor detainees during security checks.

⁷⁹ (S//NF) Four of the officers who responded to Rahman's cell on November 2002 said they did not see or smell urine or excrement in or around the cell. (b)(1)

(b)(3) NatSecAct

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(b)(1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecA	Rahman without being instructed to do so.
(b)(6) (b)(7)(c)	Anything that happened to Kanman would have come through
	(b)(3) NatSecAct
	136. (S//NF) the BOP officers explained that taught the use of a short chain to the guards and mentioned
	it as an alternative method of securing a prisoner. ⁸⁰ BOP
(b)(3) NatSecA	^{ct} officer said "short chaining" is used by BOP officers in cases where
	the inmate has bee viole t or kicks at the guards and would never
	be used for an inmate who threw food at a guard. The guards
	practiced the technique for approximately an hour and were told to
•	practice all the techniques in the evening on each other. According to the BOP officers, they did not offer a y scenarios for the use of the
(b)(1) (b)(3) CIAAct	short chain, that is, under what circuinstances it $(b)(1)$ ld be used; they
	Actimply taught the technique. (b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)	
(b)(7)(c)	137. (S//NF) who assisted at from late
	September to early December 2002, and had considerable contact
	with the guards, stated that the guards used a form of short
(b)(1) · · · ·	shackling prior to the arrival of the BOP officers. The original technique involved chaining both the hands and the feet to the wall.
	^{CACt} he wall hook was less than two feet from the floor. The detainee
	would have to sit on the floor of the cell with his arm elevated and
	bent. ⁸¹ stated that he saw Rahman short chained in his cell.
· ·	He never saw any other detainee placed in that position. (b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(1) (b)(3)	138. (S7 November 2002. The November 2002 CAct chronology cable reported: (b)(1) Not SecAct
(b)(1)	Interviewed separately on November 2002, each of the two
(b)(3) NatSec	and usub on $(b)(1)$ (b)(1)
(b)(1) (b)(3)	(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6) (b)(7)(c)	⁸¹ (S//NF) The difference between the two techniques is that, with the original technique, the
	detainee is chained to the wall, and there is no third chain connectig the hands to the feet.
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	(b)(3) NatSecAct

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(b)(1) b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(1)(b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(1)(b)(3) NatSecAct

cell. Rahman was visually inspected through the door cell slot but no guard entered his cell. Both of the two guards on the 0900 cell check said independently that Rahman was definitely alive, with his eyes open, seated in his cell at 0800 hours on November 2002.... Shortly after 1000 hours on November 2002, Station personnel then present at the facility to conduct an interrogation of guards that Gulanother individual were notified by Rahman was sleeping in his cell but there was some problem. These officers were escorted to the cell by the guards. These officers realized Rahman was deceased and they subsequently requested via secure radio that Station medic visit the facility. Officers reported that a small amount (palm-sized pool) of dried blood was present in and around the mouth and nose of subject. Rahman was observed still shackled, and slumped over in the seated position . . .

At approximately 1030 hours, Station medic arrived at the location. The Station medic inspected the body and noticed no obvious contusions, abrasions, marks, swelling, or other indications of specific cause of death. He noted that the blood in evidence was dark, not in keeping with a wound to the nose or mouth area. The medic's notes on Rahman's condition are filed at Station. His estimation was that Rahman had been dead less than a few hours.

(b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(6)

(b)(7)(c)

139. (S//NF) According to the two TDY officers who were present at when Rahman was reported dead, he was lying on his side; his hands were shackled together as were his feet. His hands were then sec red to his feet and his feet were chained to a rate on the wall with a six- to 12-inch cha $_{(b)(1)}$

(b)(3) NatSecAct

140. (S//NF) stated he was unaware that Station (b)(1)(b)(3) Claact officers tried to contact him on the morning of November 2002 (b)(3) NatSecActhen Rahman's death was discovered. He indicated the radio was (b)(6). said he was not certain where he was at the not always on. (b)(7)(c)time Rahman's body was found. thought perhaps he was at , but he acknowledged that had he been at the Station the Station and the trio called, someone would have located him.⁸² (b)(1) (b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(1)(b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(3) CIAAct ⁸² (S//NF) None of the personnel, including who were present in

(b)(3) NatSecActnd became aware of Rahman's death that date could account for whereabouts throughout the morning when Rahman's death was reported to the Station.

> SECRET NOFORN/7MR (b)(3) NatSecAct

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, ⁻ (b)(1) (b)(3) Na	SECRET/ NOFORN//MIR	•
(D)(3) Na	tSecAct (b)(3) NatSecAct	
	When the officers subsequently returned to the Station from	
(b)(1)	they informed selected Station personnel of Rahman's	
(h)(3) CIAAct	death. One of them, identity unrecalled, informed they had found Rahman dead in his cell. ⁸³ When went to see he	
(b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(6)	was already aware of Rahman's death.84	
(b)(7)(c)	was already aware of Rahman's death. ⁸⁴ (b)(3) NatSecAct	
	141. (S7 acknowledged that the account of the	
	guards checking on Rahman at 2200 and 2300 and 0400 hours, as	
	reported in the cable, was odd and inconsistent with the policy of the rounds conducted every four hours. He maintained, however, that	•
	this was what the guards told him said he thought it was	
	unusual that the guard commander was not present at	
	when ahman's death was reported. Other officers also cited that	
(b)(3) NatSecAc	t his absence appeared unusual. (b)(3) NatSecAct	
	142. (S/ From what he heard said he was	
	confident Rahman died of h pothermia. Being on the bare floor was	
	likely a factor. stated he had no more experience than the	
(b)(1)	average person with hypothermia. From life experience recognized that if the ground is colder than your body, it is prudent	•
(b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAc	to have something between your body and the ground.	•
(b)(6)	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	
(b)(7)(c) [·]	assumed	
	that other detainees did not die because they were more warmly dressed. Rahman was the only prisoner short chained in his cell at	
•	the time; he was different from the other prisoners. When asked if he	
	thought Rahman would have been alive on November 2002 if he	•
(b)(1) (b)(3) CIAAct	had cooperated responded that if Rahman had been	
	ct ^o operative, he would probably still be alive. (b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct	
(b)(6) (b)(7)(c)		
	83 (S//NF) When interviewed by the DO Investigative Team three days after Rahman's death,	
(b)(1)	stated he learned of the death from confirmed this during his OIG	
(b)(3) CIAAct	interview. ACt ^l (S//NF) No photographs were taken of Rahman or the condition of his cell. The only	
(b)(6) .	photographs of Rahman were the photographs taken in conjunction with the autopsy on	
(b)(7)(c)	November 2002.	•
•	49	
	(1) SECRET / NOFORN//MR	
(d)	(3) NatSecAct (b)(3) NatSecAct	,
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(b)(1) 143. (S//NF) stated that he is hesitant to conclude that (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct hypothermia was the cause of Rahman's death. He is not convinced that there were not other unspecified medical conditions that existed (b)(6) with Rahman that contributed to his death. stated that it is (b)(7)(c)hard for him to square with hypothermia as the cause of death since Rahman was alive through the night. (UI/FOUO) THE INVESTIGATION BY THE DO INVESTIGATIVE TEAM (b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct 144. (S//NF) Station reported Rahman's death in an (b)(3) NatSecAct cable to the DDO on November 2002, the day of Rahman's death. Shortly thereafter the DDO dispatched three (b)(3) NatSecAct Agency officers (the "DO Investigative Team") to on a to investigate the circumstances of the death.⁸⁵ The DO Investigative Team, consisting of who was the senior security officer assigned to (b)(1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct conducted interviews, and the (b)(6) pathologist performed an autopsy of Rahman.86 (b)(7)(c) 145. (S//NF) advised the DO Investigative Team that detainees were examined and photographed upon their arrival to ANCE TO ITAL (b)(1) (b)(3) CIAAct protect the Agency in the event they were beaten or otherwise • • • • • (b)(3) NatSecActnistreated prior to rendition. However, when on (b)(6) January 2003, two months after Rahman's arrival in (b)(7)(c)requested the identity of the medical officer, the results of Rahman's medical examination, and copies of the rendition photographs did not produce them. reported that no me ical documents were retained from the renditions, and the Station did not retain (b)(1) medical documentation of detainees said he could not (b)(3) NatSecAct

> (b)(1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(6) (b)(7)(c)

> > SECRET / NOFORN//MR

(b)(3) NatSecAct

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(b)(3)	NatSecAct
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(b)(1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAc (b)(6) (b)(7)(c)	identify the medic who reportedly examined Rahman and also said the digital photographs of Rahman had been overwr tten. (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct t 146. (S//NF) The DO Investigative Team interviewed CIA employees and contractors and the inside guards. was interviewed a second time when he returned to Headquarters while on leave from and by an e-mail message that was sent to
(b)(1) (b)(3) NatSec	later attempting to locate additional information. On January 2003, completed a 33-page report with 50 attachments, including the post-mo tem photographs.
(b)(6) (b)(7)(c)	147. (S//NF)
(b)(1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAc (b)(6) (b)(7)(c)	148. (S/ OnNovember 2002,sent an e-mail message to several OGC attorneys assigned to the DO that was intended to be a preliminary report of his findings. ⁸⁷ Included in the e-mail message was the following:
1941 - 1941 - 1942 - 1942 - 1942 - 1942 - 1942 - 1942 - 1942 - 1942 - 1942 - 1942 - 1942 - 1942 - 1942 - 1942 -	(b)(5)
	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
(b)(1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAc (b)(6) (b)(7)(c)	87 (U//FOUO) said he did not prepare any other report on this matter.
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C06541713	Approved for Release: 2016/09/30 C06541713 (b)(1) SECRET/	
(b)(1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(6)	(b)(3) NatSecAct 149. (8/ On November 2002, prior to departing sent an e-mail message to his supervisors which	
(b)(7)(c)	was forwarded to the DDO and Associate DDO. The e-mail reported	
· · · ·	in nart: (b)(1)	.
	(b)(3) NatSecAct which is where our Subject was housed, is a newly constructed concrete facility that has no heating or cooling. Temperatures have recently dropped into the thirties at night. Having walked through the facility in the afternoon, it was still very cold. Most prisoners are fully clothed, however this prisoner was somewhat difficult to handle and uncooperative. He had thrown food and threatened to kill the guards. As punishment his pants were taken from him. He had not worn pants (meaning he was naked from the waste [<i>sic</i>] down) for several days. There was no carpeting or matting on the floor,	
	which means that when he was shackled, his naked body sat against the bare concrete.	· [
	(b)(1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct	
	(b)(5) (b)(6) (b)(7)(c)	
,		,
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	52 SECRET NOFORN//MR	
•	(b)(3) NatSecAct	

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151. (S//NF) The autopsy indicated, by a diagnosis of exclusion, that Rahman's death was caused by hypothermia.⁸⁸ The Final Autopsy Findings reported the cause of death as "undetermined," the manner of death as "undetermined," and the clinical impression as hypothermia.

152. (S7/NF) The DO Investigative Team concluded:

- There is no evidence to suggest that Rahman's death was deliberate.
- There is no evidence to suggest that Rahman was beaten, tortured, poisoned, strangled, or smothered.
- Hypothermia was the most likely cause of death of Rahman.
- Rahman's death was not deliberate but resulted from incarceration in a cold environment while nude from the waist down and being shackled in a position that prevented him from moving around to keep warm. Additionally, this kept him in direct contact with the cold concrete floor leading to a loss of body heat through conduction.
- Rahman's actions contributed to his own death. By throwing his last meal, he was unable to provide his body with a source of fuel to keep him warm. Additionally, his violent behavior resulted in his restraint, which prevented him from generating body heat by moving around and brought him in direct contact with the concrete floor leading to a loss of body heat through conduction.

⁸⁸ (U) A diagnosis of exclusion in a death case is one where all other causes of death are excluded and the clinical environment in which the victim was found is examined along with the immediate history developed during the investigation. However, no definitive tests or findings establish that diagnosis.

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(b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(6)

112.80

(C) OTHER TECHNIQUES EMPLOYED OR APPROVED BY (b)(7)(c)-

153. (S//NF) A senior CTC operations officer stated that when between 13 September and 3 October 2002 he wa at offered to fire a handgun outside the interrogation room while the operations officer wa interviewing a detainee who was thought to be (b)(1)withholding information. Reportedly staged the incident, (b)(3) NatSecAct which included screaming and yelling outside the cell by other CIA guards. When the guards moved the detainee from officers and (b)(1)the interrogation room, they passed a guard who was dressed as a (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecActhooded detainee, lying motionless on the ground and made to (b)(6) appear as if he had been shot to death. The operations officer added (b)(7)(c)openly discussed his plan for the mock execution for that several days prior to and after the event with Station officers. (b)(1)154. (S//NF) Station officer recounted that (b)(3) NatSecAct 2002, she heard that this same senior CTC. around operations officer staged a mock execution. She was not present but (b)(1) understood it went badly; she was told that it was transparently a (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecActruse and no benefit was derived from it. (b)(6) (b)(7)(c) ------155.--(S//NF) Four other officers and ICs who were interviewed admitted to either participating in such an incident or hearing about one of them.⁸⁹ An IC who led a CTC review of procedures at after Rahman's death stated that described staging a mock execution of a detainee. Reportedly, a detainee who witnessed the "body" in the aftermath of the ruse "sang (b)(1) (b)(3) CIAAct like a bird." (b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(6) 156. (S//NF) admitted that he participated in a "mock (b)(7)(c)exe ution" at when the first detainees arrived. He contended the detainees were there only one day, and he hoped to explained he discharged a firearm in a shake them up quickly. officer lay on the floor and safe manner while an (b)(1) (b)(1)-(b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct (3//NF) It is difficult to determine how many mock executions were staged during this period. There appear to be at least two. admits to participating in only one. (b)(6) (b)(7)(c)-SECRET NOFORN//MR (b)(3) NatSecAct

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(b)(1)	Approved for Release: 2016/09/30 C06541713 SECRE T/ {\ NOFORN//M R (b)(6)
(b)(3) CIAAct	(b)(3) NotSocAct $(b)(7)(c)$
(b)(3) NatSecAd	
(b)(6) (b)(7)(c)	chicken blood was splatter <u>ed on the wa</u> ll. The technique was
	idea and was based on the concept of showing
	something that looks real, but is not. According to in that case
(b)(1)	(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3) NatSecAc	t157. (S//NF) stated that
Ĺ	also employed the mock execution technique once; the officer
(b)(1)	informed about it afterwards. The reportedly tried
(b)(3) CIAAct	the technique because the detainee knew it was facility
(b)(6)	^t and the officer wanted to induce the belief that would do
(b)(7)(c)	anything contended that he did not know when this incident
	occurred or if it was successful.
	158. (S//NF) When asked about the possibility that handguns
(b)(1)	had been used as props or mock executions had been staged at
(b)(3) NatSecAc	responded, "We don't do that there's none
	of that." said he would be surprised if someone said that a
(b)(1)	gun was used; it was not part of an interrogation tec que. He
(b)(3) CIAAct	explained that handguns were not allowed in the vicinity of
(b)(3) NatSecAc	detainees, for fear that the weapons could be taken away or turned
(b)(6) (b)(7)(c)	on the interrogators.
	159. (S//NF) Upon further discussion, revealed that
	approximately four days before his interview with OIG, told
	of an instance when conducted a mock execution at
(b)(1)	
(b)(3) NatSecAc	the firearm was discharged outside of the building, and it was done
	because the detainee reportedly possessed critical threat information.
(b)(1)	stated that he did not hear of a similar act occurring at
(b)(3) CIAAct	subsequently.
(b)(3) NatSecAc	pubbequeray.
(b)(6)	(S//NF) NOTIFICATIONS OF RAHMAN'S DEATH TO CONGRESS (b)(1)
(b)(7)(c)	(b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(3) NatSecAct
	160 /6 / A a discussed measured measured in the second second measured in the second s
	160. (S// As discussed previously, reported
1- 1-1 ;	Rahman's death to Headquarters in a November 2002 (b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(1)	(b)(1)
(b)(1) (b)(3) CIAAct	90 (C was interviewed on February 2003.
(b)(3) NatSecAd	90 (C) was interviewed on February 2003. t (b)(3) CIAAct 1
(b)(6)	
(b)(7)(c)	SECRET NOFORN//MR
	(b)(3) NatSecAct

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(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct _______ to the DDO. (See Exhibit.) On _____November 2002, (b)(3) NatSecAct _______ to the DDO. This addressed the medical care provided to detainees in general along with a comment about the

medical treatment provided to Rahman.

(b)(3) NatSecAct

161. (S/ On 29 November 2002, the Director of Congressional Affairs (D/OCA) provided the Chairman and ranking member of each Intelligence Committee and the Chairman and Ranking Member of the House and Senate Appropriations Subcommittees on Defense a background paper entitled "Death of Detainee Gul Rahman." The paper identified Rahman as "an Al-Qa'ida operative and Hezbi-Islami Gulbuddin/Hekmatyar associate who was also a close contact of senior Al-Qa'ida facilitator Abu Abdul Rahman Al-Najdi." It reported CIA was sending a team of officers to to conduct an inquiry into Rahman's death, (b)(1) including an autopsy to determine the cause of death. The (b)β)NatSecAct background paper reported, "Rahman arrived at the detention facility on November [2002] and was given a physical examination (b)(1) which indicated no medical issues or preexisting medical (b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(3) NatSecAct conditions."91 (b)(3) NatSecAct

162. **1**S/ On 23 January 2003, the IG reported to the DCI by memorandum that the General Counsel had informed the IG on 22 January 2003 of the death of Gul Rahman. Further, the IG s ated that the OIG was investigating the issue. On 30 January 2003, the DCI forwarded the IG's memorandum to the Congressional oversight committees and reiterated the DCI had notified the committees of this matter by formal notification on 29 November 2002. The DCI's letter added that the DO Investigative Team's report was nearing

(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1)

(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(3) NatSecAct

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(b)(3) NatSecAct

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(b)(3) NatSecAct

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(b)(1)

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completion and CIA would be sending the committees a follow-up notificatio (b)(3) NatSecAct

On 2 May 2003, the D/OCA provided an 163. (\$/) update to the Intelligence Committees of Congress and Chairman and Ranking Member of the House and Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Defense in the form of a background paper entitled "Death of Detainee Gul Rahman." The background paper, "Investigation by the Directorate of Operations," which included an autopsy and toxicology, disclosed that Rahman's death was accidental and most likely resulted from hypothermia."92 The background paper reported that Rahman was nude from the waist down and that "an autopsy disclosed several surface abrasions which he obtained within the first few days of his incarceration."93 The background paper reported, "During his incarceration, Rahman threatened several times to kill guards.⁹⁴ . . . At 1500 (b)(3) NatSecAct nours] on November 2002... Rahman again threatened to kill the guards and threw his food, water bottle, and waste bucket at the guards." Finally, the background paper reported, "As a result of his violent behavior, and following procedures recommended by the U.S. BOP, Rahman was shackled to the wall in a short chain position which prevents prisoners from standing upright."95

(b)(3) NatSecAct

92 TS// As reported above, in actuality, the autopsy reported the cause of death as "undetermined," the manner of death as "undetermined," and the clinical impression as (b)(3) NatSecAct hypothermia. The investigative report concluded, "There is no evidence to suggest that Rahman's death w s deliberate."

> 93 ts// The initial report to Congress on 29 November 2002 did not report that Rahman was naked below the waist and chained in a position that forced him to sit on the concrete floor. The autopsy did not address the age of the abrasions. As explained earlier, the pathologist opined to OIG that the abrasions to the shoulders and hips occurred from one to three days, at most, before Rahman's death,

94 (6/) Rahman reportedly threatened the guards two times only,. According to (b)(3) NatSecActduring the week of November and on November,

(b)(6) 95-15/j As reported previously advised OIG that he did not recall punishing (b)(7)(c) (b)(1) Rahman for the first alleged verbal threat. BOP officers, who taught the short chain position, indicated that they had never seen (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecActhe short chain position used in a cell situation. Additionally, they did not offer scenarios for use of the short chain position and would not employ the technique on a detainee for throwing food. (b)(6) They simply taught the technique. (b)(7)(c)

SECRET b)(3) NatSecAct

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(b)(3) NatSecAct

(U) APPLICABLE LAWS, REGULATIONS AND POLICIES

164. (U) Title 18 U.S.C. §112, *Manslaughter*, provides in pertinent part :

Manslaughter is the unlawful killing of a human being without malice. It is of two kinds:

Voluntary – Upon a sudden quarrel or heat of passion. Involuntary – In the commission of an unlawful act, not amounting to a felony, or in the commission in an unlawful manner, or without due caution and circumspection, of a lawful act which might produce death.

165. (U) Title 18 U.S.C. §2441, *Torture*, provides penalties for "who[m]ever outside the United States commits or attempts to commit torture." The statute defines the crime of torture, in pertinent part, as:

an act committed by a person acting under the color of law specifically intended to inflict severe physical or mental pain or suffering (other than pain or suffering incidental to lawful sanctions) upon another person within his custody or physical control.

166. (U) Title 18 U.S.C. §2441, *War Crimes*, provides penalties for "whomever, whether inside or outside the United States, commits a war crime" wherein "the person committing such war crime or the victim of such war crime is a member of the Armed Forces of the United States or a national of the United States." The statute defines a war crime as any conduct defined as a grave breach of the Geneva Conventions [or any protocol to such convention to which the United States is a party].⁹⁶ The proscribed conduct includes the following

⁹⁶ (U) The United States is not yet a party to either of the two "Protocols Additional to the Geneva Conventions."

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(b)(3) NatSecAct

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relevant offenses: willful killing, torture or inhuman treatment, including biological experiments, willfully causing great suffering to body or health.⁹⁷

167. (U) On 7 February 2002, President Bush issued a memorandum noting that the "provisions of Geneva will apply to our present conflict with the Taliban" [in Afghanistan] but would not apply to Al-Qa'ida.⁹⁸ Neither the Taliban nor Al-Qa'ida would be entitled to enemy Prisoners of War status, however. Nonetheless, the President ordered, "As a matter of policy, the United States Armed Forces shall continue to treat detainees humanely and, to the extent appropriate and consistent with military necessity, in a manner consistent with the principles of Geneva."

168. (S//NF) On 24 January 2003, the General Counsel orally informed the Chief of the Criminal Division, DoJ of Rahman's death. On 13 February 2003, OIG reported Rahman's death in detention to the U.S. DoJ by memorandum.

169. (S//NF) On 29 December 2003, the Chief, Counterterrorism Section, Criminal Division, DoJ, reported by letter that it declined to pursue a federal prosecution of criminal charges in this matter. As of April 2005, the matter is under review by the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Eastern District of Virginia pursuant to the direction of the Attorney General.

⁹⁷ (U) Grave breaches are defined in the Fourth Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Persons in Time of War are listed in Article 147. (Article 130 of the Third Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War lists these same offenses as "grave breaches.")

98 (U) Memorandum from the President to the Vice President, Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, Attorney General, Chief of Staff to the President, Director of Central Intelligence, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, "Humane Treatment of al Qaeda and Taliban Detainees," dated and signed 7 February 2002.

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(b)(3) NatSecAct Approved for Release: 2016/09/30 C06541713

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170. (U//FOUO) Agency Regulation 13-6, Appendix I, Standards for Employee Accountability provides:

a. Consequences will follow an employee's failure to comply with a statute, regulation, policy or other guidance that is applicable to the employee's professional conduct or performance.

b. The lack of knowledge of a statute, regulation, policy or guidance does not necessarily excuse the employee. However, lack of knowledge may affect the level of employee responsibility and the extent to which disciplinary action is warranted. Therefore the following factors will be considered prior to holding an employee accountable for a particular act or omission:

- (1) Agency efforts to make employees aware of the statute, regulation, policy or guidance;
- (2) The extent of employee awareness of the statute, regulation, policy or guidance;
- (3) The importance of the conduct or performance at issue;
- (4) The position or grade of the employee.
- c. Any finding of deficient performance must be specific and may include omissions and failure to act in accordance with a reasonable level of professionalism, skill, and diligence.
- d. Determinations under the above standard will be based in part on whether the facts objectively indicate a certain action should have been taken or not taken and whether the employee had an opportunity and the responsibility to act or not act.
- e. Managers may be held accountable in addition for the action(s) or inaction of subordinates even if the manager lacks knowledge of the subordinate's conduct. Such accountability depends on:

(1) Whether the manager reasonably should have been aware of the matter and has taken reasonable measures to ensure such awareness.

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(2) Whether the manager has taken reasonable measures to ensure compliance with the law and 'Agency policies and regulations.

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CONCLUSIONS

171. (S//NF) CIA had not issued any applicable custodial
interrogation guidelines by the time of Rahman's detention. The
practice at that time was for interrogators to propose interrogation
(b)(3) NatSecAct echniques to CTC for pre-approval.(b)(3) NatSecAct echniques to CTC for pre-approval.did not take
this step prior to the interrogation of Rahman. Further, a CTC legal
advisor said Headquarters would not have knowingly approved
several of the techniques that employed, including cold
showers, cold conditions, h rd takedowns, and the short chain
restraint.

(b)(1) 172. (S//NF) treated Rahman harshly because of (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(6) interrogation and lack of cooperation, the pressure on to (b)(7)(c) "break him," and lack of experience with a committed interrogation resister. (b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct

173. (S//NF) On November 2002 ordered or approved the guards placing Rahman in the short chain position (b)(1)whereby he was compelled to sit on the concrete floor of his cell. (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct Rahman was only clothed in a sweatshirt. This act directly led to (b)(6) Rahman's death by hypothermia. was fully cognizant that the (b)(7)(c) had fallen sharply in November. Two temperature in individuals said that they raised the subject of the cold temperatures with November, directed that actions be taken to On help other detainees ward off the cold. Other officers and contractors n November 2002 stated they recognized it was present at (b)(1)(b)(3) NatSecAct very cold and some detainees were inadequately protected against the cold. They stated they were personally aware of the possibility of hypothermia, but some said they assumed it was the responsibility of someone else to address.

SECRET NOFORN//MR (b)(3) NatSecAct

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(b)(6) (b)(7)(c)	(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(7)(c)	174. (S//NF) exhibited reckless indifference to the
	possibility that his actions might cause injuries or result in Rahman's
	death. There is no indication that intended that Rahman
(b)(1)	should be severely harmed or killed.
(b)(3) NatSecA	
	175. (S//NF) The initial account of guards that
	Rahman died in the mid-morning of November 2002 is unreliable
(b)(1)	and self-serving. It is likely that Rahman died during the night and
(b)(3) NatSecAd	cthe guards waited until Station officers were present atto
	report his death. Nonetheless, there is no evidence that the (b)(1)
(b)(1)	guards assaulted or independently mistreated Rahman. (b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(3) NatSec	
(b)(1)	176. (S//NF) Rahman did not receive a physical examination
(b)(3) CIAAct	following his rendition from or at any time while detained
(b)(3) NatSecA	ct despite report to the contrary. Although
(b)(6) [the physician's assistant at that time, reported that he examined all the other detainees held at he did not
(b)(7)(c)	
	well to supplant a physical examination $(b)(1)$ $(b)(1)$
	examine Rahman. allowed Rahman's statement that all was well to supplant a physical examination. (b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(1) [.]	$177 \left(\frac{S}{N}\right)$ who was in during the first
(b)(3) CIAAct	ays of Rahman's detention, did not attend to Rahman in the same
(b)(3) NatSecA (b)(6)	manner and with the same standard of care as the other detainees.
(b)(7)(c)	was aware of the cold conditions; indeed the temperature in
	had reached a low of 31 degrees the day before he departed
Ĺ	on November. As a medical care provider, he should have
	advocated more humane treatment for Rahman that would ensure
(b)(1)	his health and safety. (b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecA	
•	178. (S//NF) Station's reporting of the details of
(h)(1)	Rahman's detention and death in Station cables contained false
(b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecA	etatements and m terial omissions. Consequently, the Congressional
	notification drawn from the cable information bore inaccuracies and
	material omissions. The inaccurate reporting obscured or minimized
	the circumstances of the death, the involvement of in the
	mistreatment of Rahman, and the absence of adequate supervision by
(b)(1) (b)(3) CIAAct	A follow-up report to the Congressional oversight
(b)(3) NatSecAc	st l
(b)(6)	دء دي
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(b)(1) (b)(3) CIAAct	committees was prepared on 2 May 2003. That report, drawn from the DO Investigative Report, accurately reported salient circumstances that contributed to Rahman's death that were initially omitted.
(b)(3) NatSec (b)(6) (b)(7)(c) (b)(1) (b)(3) NatSec	to include pertinent facts in his November 2002 official written account of Rahman's death. The cable specifically withheld information known to and that directed the guards to place Rahman in the short chain position while he was naked below the waist, thereby forcing him to sit bare bottomed on the bare concrete floor of his cell in what were known to be very cold
	180. (S//NF) bears responsibility for not
	providing adequate supervision ofactivities at(b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct
· · · · ·	(b)(1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(6) (b)(7)(c) (b)(7)(c)

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RECOMMENDATIONS

1. (S//NF) The Director of the Central Intelligence Agency should convene an Accountability Board to review the performance of _________in regard to the events that contributed to the death of Gul Rahman.

> (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(5)

CONCUR:	,	· · ·	
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VInspector General			
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