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**NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
CENTRAL SECURITY SERVICE**
FORT GEORGE G. MEADE, MARYLAND 20755-6000

8 February 2019

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT BOARD

THROUGH: Office of the DoD Senior Intelligence Oversight Official

SUBJECT: (U) Report to the Intelligence Oversight Board (IOB) on NSA Activities, Fourth Quarter, Calendar Year 2018 – INFORMATION MEMORANDUM

(U//~~FOUO~~) Except as previously reported to you or the President or otherwise stated in the enclosure, we have no reason to believe that any activity conducted under DIRNSA authority, direction, or control during the period ending 31 December 2018 was unlawful or contrary to Executive Order or Presidential Directive and, thus, should have been reported pursuant to Section 1.6 (c) of Executive Order 12333, as amended. This report summarizes questionable intelligence activities as well as other matters required to be reported to the IOB.

(U) The NSA Intelligence Oversight Officer and the General Counsel continue to exercise oversight of Agency activities focused on achieving compliance with the laws and regulations for protecting privacy during the conduct of Agency operations.

[Redacted]


PATRICK J. REYNOLDS
Director of Compliance
Intelligence Oversight Officer

(b) (6)

[Redacted]

GLENN S. GERSTELL
General Counsel

(U) I concur with the report of the NSA Intelligence Oversight Officer and the General Counsel and hereby make it our combined report.


PAUL M. NAKASONE
General, U.S. Army
Director, NSA/Chief, CSS

Encl:
Quarterly Report

(U) This document may be declassified and marked "UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY" upon removal of the Enclosure.

Approved for Release by NSA on 06-17-2019, FOIA Case # 105767 (litigation)


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**(U) NSA FOURTH QUARTER CY2018
INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT REPORT**




(b) (3) - P.L. 86-36

..... Classified By
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Dated: 20181107


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


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129 **b. File Number: NSA 2018-024-Q**

130 (1) ~~(S//NF)~~ **Incident Description:** Provider misprovision of call detail records (CDRs)
131 produced pursuant to Title V of FISA, as amended by the USA FREEDOM Act (UFA).

132 ~~(TS//SI//NF)~~ Pursuant to UFA, the FISC has authorized the targeted production to NSA
133 of CDRs pertaining to certain specific selection terms, and issued Secondary Orders to certain
134 providers to compel the production of those CDRs. On or about October 12, 2018, NSA

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(b) (1)
(b) (3) -50 USC 3024 (i)
(b) (3) -P.L. 86-36

135 technical analysts examining the targeted production of CDRs observed an anomaly.
136 Specifically, these analysts identified a larger than expected number of [redacted]
137 [redacted]
138 [redacted] Further investigation determined
139 that these records were produced by [redacted] On October 12, 2018, NSA requested the
140 provider investigate the anomaly. The provider later confirmed that [redacted]
141 [redacted] had resulted in the creation of CDRs [redacted]
142 [redacted]
143 [redacted] According to the provider, it produced CDRs affected by the error
144 starting on or about October 3, 2018.

145 (2) (U) **Timeline:** Date(s) of incident: October 3-12, 2018
146 Date of incident reported in IRT: October 12, 2018
147 Date reported to DoD SIOO: February 1, 2019

148 (3) ~~(S//NF)~~ **Reason for Report:** Production by the provider of erroneous CDRs that
149 were not authorized by the FISC's orders.

150 (4) ~~(S//NF)~~ **Cause:** [redacted]
151 [redacted]

152 (5) (U) **Impact on National Security or International Relations:** None.

153 (6) (U) **Impact on Civil Liberties or Privacy:** CLPT will reassess the scope of the
154 civil liberties and privacy impact of this incident upon completion of the investigation. CLPT's
155 initial assessment is that the impact was limited given the quick identification, purge processes,
156 and lack of reporting.

157 (7) ~~(TS//SI//NF)~~ **Remedial Action:** On [redacted] NSA suspended the data
158 flow from the provider until it could validate that the issue had been resolved. The provider
159 informed NSA on [redacted] that it implemented a solution that corrects the error, and
160 NSA worked with the provider to verify the solution. On [redacted] NSA reinitiated the
161 data flow from the provider. NSA is continuing to review the production of CDRs.

162 (8) (U) **Additional Information:** None.


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163 (9) (U) **Status:** Open.


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
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
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
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
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