



NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY  
CENTRAL SECURITY SERVICE  
FORT GEORGE G. MEADE, MARYLAND 20755-6000

6 May 2019

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT BOARD

THROUGH: Office of the DoD Senior Intelligence Oversight Official

SUBJECT: (U) Report to the Intelligence Oversight Board (IOB) on NSA Activities, First Quarter, Calendar Year 2019 INFORMATION MEMORANDUM

(U//FOUO) Except as previously reported to you or the President or otherwise stated in the enclosure, we have no reason to believe that any activity conducted under the Director, National Security Agency Chief, Central Security Service's authority, direction, or control during the period ending 31 March 2019 was unlawful or contrary to Executive Order or Presidential Directive and, thus, should have been reported pursuant to Section 1.6 (c) of Executive Order 12333, as amended. This report summarizes questionable intelligence activities as well as other matters required to be reported to the IOB.

(U//FOUO) The NSA Intelligence Oversight Officer and the General Counsel continue to exercise oversight of Agency activities focused on achieving compliance with the laws and regulations for protecting privacy during the conduct of Agency operations.

[Redacted]

(b) (6)

PATRICK J. REYNOLDS  
NSA Intelligence Oversight Officer

[Redacted]

GLENN S. GERSTEL  
General Counsel

(U) I concur with the report of the NSA Intelligence Oversight Officer and the General Counsel and hereby make it our combined report.

*Paul M. Nakasone*  
PAUL M. NAKASONE  
General, U.S. Army  
Director, NSA Chief, CSS

Encl  
Quarterly Report

(U) This document may be declassified and marked "UNCLASSIFIED FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY" upon removal of enclosures)

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
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(U) NSA FIRST QUARTER CY2019

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INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT REPORT




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Department of Defense  
Office of Inspector General  
Washington, DC 20301

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


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
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
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
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


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
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
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
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(b) (3) -50 USC 3024 (i)  
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386 **d. File Number: NSA 2018-025-Q**

387 **(1) ~~(S//NF)~~ Incident Description:** Provider misprovision of CDRs produced pursuant to  
388 Title V of FISA, as amended by the USA FREEDOM Act (UFA).

389 ~~(TS//SI//NF)~~ Pursuant to UFA, the FISC has authorized the targeted production to NSA  
390 of CDRs pertaining to certain specific selection terms, and issued Secondary Orders to [redacted]  
391 [redacted] to compel the production of those CDRs. On or about October 12, 2018, NSA technical  
392 analysts examining the targeted production of CDRs observed an anomaly. Specifically, these  
393 analysts identified a larger than expected number of [redacted]

394 [redacted]  
395 [redacted] Further investigation determined that these records were  
396 produced by [redacted] On October 12, 2018, NSA requested the provider investigate the  
397 anomaly. The provider later confirmed that [redacted] had resulted  
398 in the creation of CDRs [redacted]

399 [redacted]  
400 According to the provider, it produced CDRs affected by the error starting on or about October 3,  
401 2018.

402 **(2) (U) Timeline:** Date(s) of incident: October 3-12, 2018  
403 Date of incident reported in IRT: October 12, 2018  
404 Date reported to DoD SIOO: February 1, 2019

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405 **(3) ~~(S//NF)~~ Reason for Report:** Production by the provider of erroneous CDRs that were  
406 not authorized by the FISC's orders.

407 **(4) ~~(S//NF)~~ Cause:** [redacted]  
408 [redacted]

409 **(5) (U) Impact on National Security or International Relations:** None.

410 **(6) (U) Impact on Civil Liberties or Privacy.** The CLPT office assesses the impact to  
411 civil liberties and privacy was limited given the quick identification, purge processes, and lack of  
412 reporting.


413 **(7) ~~(TS//SI//NF)~~ Remedial Action:** On [redacted] NSA suspended the data flow  
414 from the provider until it could validate that the issue had been resolved. The provider informed  
415 NSA on [redacted] that it implemented a solution that corrected the error, and NSA worked  
416 with the provider to verify the solution. On [redacted] NSA reinitiated the data flow from  
417 the provider. [redacted]

418 [redacted]  
419 [redacted]  
420 [redacted]  
421 [redacted]

422 **(8) (U) Additional Information:** None.

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423 (9) (U) Status: Closed/Substantiated.



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440 **5. (U) Significant Inspection Findings/Intelligence Oversight Program**  
441 **Developments**


442 (1) (U//~~FOUO~~) Report on the Review of the National Security Agency/Central Security  
443 Service's Deletion of Certain USA FREEDOM Act Data (SI-18-0008) Special Study

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444 ~~(TS//SI//NF)~~ Following the discovery that NSA received inaccurate CDRs pursuant to the  
445 UFA, and a subsequent request by two U.S. Senators for an independent review of certain aspects  
446 of NSA's UFA program, including whether NSA's deletion was sufficient to ensure that all  
447 inaccurate CDRs were deleted, the NSA OIG conducted a limited scope study of NSA's deletion  
448 of CDRs and data derived from those CDRs (hereafter collectively referred to as "UFA data  
449 objects") ingested prior to 23 May 2018. The OIG generally found that NSA had been successful  
450 in deleting the [redacted] UFA data objects derived from CDRs that it received from  
451 U.S. telecommunications service providers under the UFA program; however, the OIG identified  
452 [redacted] that should have been deleted, but were not based upon  
453 NSA's mistaken assumption regarding the age-off configurations for a single SIGINT repository  
454 [redacted]. The OIG made one recommendation to assist the Agency in strengthening its  
455 controls in the event that a future UFA deletion is required.

456 (U//FOUO) The Compliance Group, OGC, and the Capabilities Directorate will ensure that  
457 this recommendation is considered if any future UFA deletion is required.



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<sup>1</sup> (U//FOUO) NSA reported this previously as 2018-008 Q

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