EXHIBIT A

ACLUS AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION

May 24, 2018

AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION FOUNDATION LEGAL DEPARTMENT

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Federal Bureau of Investigation Attn: FOI/PA Request Record/Information Dissemination Section 170 Marcel Drive Winchester, VA 22602-4843

Chief Privacy Officer/Chief FOIA Officer The Privacy Office U.S. Department of Homeland Security 245 Murray Lane SW, STOP-0655 Washington, D.C. 20528-0655

FOIA Officer U.S. Customs & Border Protection 90 K Street NW, 9th Floor, Mail Stop 1181 Washington, D.C. 20229

National Records Center, FOIA/PA Office U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Services P. O. Box 648010 Lee's Summit, MO 64064-8010

FOIA Office U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement 500 12th Street SW, Stop 5009 Washington, D.C. 20536-5009

U. S. Department of State
Office of Information Programs and Services
A/GIS/IPS/RL
SA-2, Suite 8100
Washington, D.C. 20522-0208

SIG MAY 2 9 2018

RECEIVED

Re: Request Under Freedom of Information Act (Expedited Processing & Fee Waiver/Limitation Requested)

To Whom It May Concern:

The American Civil Liberties Union Foundation and the American Civil Liberties Union Foundation of Northern California (together, the "ACLU"), submit this Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA") request (the "Request") for records pertaining to social media surveillance, including the monitoring and retention of immigrants' and visa applicants' social media information for the purpose of conducting "extreme vetting."

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I. Background

Multiple federal agencies are increasingly relying on social media surveillance to monitor the speech, activities, and associations of U.S. citizens and noncitizens alike.

The Department of Homeland Security ("DHS") has used social media surveillance for "situational awareness," intelligence, and "other operations." According to documents that the ACLU obtained through FOIA, as of 2015 the DHS Office of Intelligence and Analysis was collecting, analyzing, retaining, and disseminating social media information related to "Homeland Security Standing Information Needs"—subjects on which DHS continuously gathers information. A February 2017 report by the DHS Inspector General also confirmed DHS's use of manual and automated social media screening of immigration and visa applications, the establishment within DHS of a "Shared Social Media Screening Service," and the planned "department-wide use of

¹ The American Civil Liberties Union Foundation is a 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) organization that provides legal representation free of charge to individuals and organizations in civil rights and civil liberties cases, educates the public about civil rights and civil liberties issues across the country, directly lobbies legislators, and mobilizes the American Civil Liberties Union's members to lobby their legislators. The American Civil Liberties Union is a separate non-profit, 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(4) membership organization that educates the public about the civil liberties implications of pending and proposed state and federal legislation, provides analysis of pending and proposed legislation, directly lobbies legislators, and mobilizes its members to lobby their legislators.

² Dep't of Homeland Security, Privacy Impact Assessment of the Office of Operations Coordination and Planning, *Publicly Available Social Media Monitoring and Situational Awareness Initiative* 3 (June 22, 2010), available at https://goo.gl/R1LVxM.

³ Dep't of Homeland Security, Office of Intelligence and Analysis, Policy Instruction IA-900, Official Usage of Publicly Available Information 2 (Jan. 13, 2015), available at https://goo.gl/6gnmzn.

social media for screening."⁴ The same report concluded, however, that DHS lacked the means to evaluate and measure the effectiveness of such programs.⁵ Similarly, internal reviews obtained through FOIA from U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services show that its social-media screening efforts lacked protections against discrimination and profiling and yielded few actionable results.⁶

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Nonetheless, DHS is expanding its social media surveillance efforts as part of the Trump administration's "extreme vetting" initiatives. The department issued a public notice in September 2017 indicating that the records it retains in immigrants' files include "social media handles, aliases, associated identifiable information, and search results." U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement ("ICE") also solicited proposals from contractors to utilize "social media exploitation" to vet visa applicants and monitor them while they are in the United States. According to contract documents, ICE plans to spend \$100 million on a program that will employ approximately 180 people to monitor visitors' social media posts. 9

The State Department plays a significant role in the collection of social media information for vetting purposes. In May 2017, the department submitted an emergency request to the Office of Management and Budget to expand the information sought from approximately 65,000 visa applicants each year to include, *inter alia*, social media identifiers. ¹⁰ On March 30, 2018,

⁴ Office of Inspector General, OIG-17-40, DHS' Pilots for Social Media Screening Need Increased Rigor to Ensure Scalability and Long-term Success 1 n.2, 4 (Feb. 27, 2017), available at https://goo.gl/WDb5iJ.

⁵ *Id.* at 2.

⁶ See Aliya Sternstein, "Obama Team Did Some 'Extreme Vetting' of Muslims Before Trump, New Documents Show," Daily Beast, Jan. 2, 2018, available at https://goo.gl/azKwLm.

⁷ Dep't of Homeland Security, Privacy Act of 1974; System of Records, 82 Fed. Reg. 43,557 (Sept. 18, 2017), available at https://goo.gl/GcLYoQ.

⁸ Dep't of Homeland Security, Immigration & Customs Enforcement, Extreme Vetting Initiative: Statement of Objectives §§ 3.1-3.2 (June 12, 2017), available at https://goo.gl/ZTHzBS.

⁹ Dep't of Homeland Security, Acquisition Forecast No. F2018040916 (Apr. 11, 2018), available at https://goo.gl/Zd7p1p; see also Drew Harwell & Nick Miroff, "ICE Just Abandoned Its Dream of 'Extreme Vetting' Software That Could Predict Whether a Foreign Visitor Would Become a Terrorist," Wash. Post, May 17, 2018, available at https://goo.gl/UxiF5P.

¹⁰ Notice of Information Collection Under OMB Emergency Review: Supplemental Questions for Visa Applicants, 82 Fed. Reg. 20,956 (May 4, 2017), available at https://goo.gl/2hsRNi. On August 3, 2017, the State Department notified the public that it would extend the collection of social media information beyond the emergency period. *See* Sixty-Day Notice of Proposed Information Collection: Supplemental Questions for Visa Applicants, 82 Fed. Reg. 36,180 (Aug. 3, 2017), available at https://goo.gl/JXTFfi.

the department signaled a dramatic expansion of its collection of social media information, publishing two notices of new rules which, if adopted, would require nearly all of the 14.7 million people who annually apply for work or tourist visas to submit social media identifiers they have used in the past five years on up to 20 online platforms in order to travel or immigrate to the United States. The notices do not indicate how such information may be shared across government agencies or what consequences its collection may have for individuals living in America, including U.S. citizens.

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The Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI") also engages in extensive social media surveillance. In 2012, the FBI sought information from contractors on a planned "social media application" that would enable the FBI to "instantly search and monitor" publicly available information on social media platforms. The FBI revealed in November 2016 that it would acquire social media monitoring software designed by Dataminr that would enable it to "search the complete Twitter firehose, in near real-time, using customizable filters" that are "specifically tailored to operational needs." News reports indicate that the FBI is now also establishing a social media surveillance task force, the purpose and scope of which remain unclear.

The FBI uses social media surveillance not only "to obtain information about relevant breaking news and events in real-time," but also to identify subjects for investigation. ¹⁵ For instance, it acquired the Dataminr software so that it could identify content that "track[s] FBI investigative priorities." ¹⁶ Similarly, the FBI appears to be using social media as a basis for deciding who to interview, investigate, or target with informants or undercover agents. ¹⁷

¹¹ 60-Day Notice of Proposed Information Collection: Application for Immigrant Visa and Alien Registration, 83 Fed. Reg. 13,806 (Mar. 30, 2018), available at https://goo.gl/Raktlv; 60-Day Notice of Proposed Information Collection: Application for Nonimmigrant Visa, 83 Fed. Reg. 13,807 (Mar. 30, 2018), available at https://goo.gl/SxJVBk.

¹² Federal Bureau of Investigation, Strategic Information and Operations Center, Request for Information – Social Media Application (Jan. 19, 2012), available at https://goo.gl/kRPLZt.

¹³ Federal Bureau of Investigation, Requisition Number DJF-17-1300-PR00000555, Limited Source Justification, 1 (Nov. 8, 2016), available at https://goo.gl/Ty9WFZ.

¹⁴ Chip Gibbons, "The FBI Is Setting Up a Task Force to Monitor Social Media," The Nation, Feb. 1, 2018, available at https://goo.gl/Ud6mVD.

¹⁵ See FBI, Limited Source Justification, supra note 13 at 1.

¹⁶ See id.

¹⁷ See, e.g., Center on National Security at Fordham Law, Case by Case: ISIS Prosecutions in the United States 19 (July 2016), available at https://goo.gl/eCE8hh (concluding that a significant percentage of individuals prosecuted for certain national security-related crimes came to the attention of the FBI through social media use).

Technology plays a critical role in enabling government agencies to surveil and analyze social media content. The migration of speech and associational activity onto the social media web, and the concentration of that activity on a relatively small number of social media platforms, has made it possible for government agencies to monitor speech and association to an unprecedented degree. At the same time, advances in data mining, network analysis, and machine learning techniques enable the government to search, scrape, and aggregate content on a vast scale quickly and continuously, or to focus and filter such content according to specific investigative priorities.

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Government surveillance of social media raises serious constitutional and privacy concerns. Most online speech reflects no wrongdoing whatsoever and is fully protected by the First Amendment. Protected speech and beliefs particularly expression or association of a political, cultural, or religious nature—should not serve as the sole or predominant basis for surveillance, investigation, or watchlisting. When government agencies collect or share individuals' online speech without any connection to investigation of actual criminal conduct, they foster suspicion about individuals and make it more likely that innocent people will be investigated, surveilled, or watchlisted. Additionally, the knowledge that the government systematically monitors online speech has a deeply chilling effect on the expression of disfavored beliefs and opinions—all of which the First Amendment protects. People are likely to stop expressing such beliefs and opinions in order to avoid becoming the subject of law enforcement surveillance. Basic due process and fairness is also undermined when significant decisions affecting peoples' lives—such as decisions about immigration status or whether an investigator targets a person for additional scrutiny--are influenced by proprietary systems running secret algorithms, analyzing data without necessary context or rules to prevent abuse. Finally, suspicionless social media surveillance can facilitate government targeting of specific racial and religious communities for investigation and promotes a climate of fear and self-censorship within those communities.

Despite the significant resources federal agencies are expending on social media surveillance and the constitutional concerns it raises, little information is available to the public on the tools and methods agencies use for surveillance, or the policies and guidelines that govern their use. The public similarly lacks information on whether surveillance of social media contributes meaningfully to public safety or simply floods agencies with information on innocent individuals and innocuous conduct. Because government social media surveillance could impact free expression and individual privacy on a broad scale, it has generated widespread and sustained public and media interest.¹⁸

¹⁸ See, e.g., Harwell & Miroff, supra note 9; Michelle Fabio, "Department of Homeland Security Compiling Database of Journalists and 'Media Influencers,'" Forbes, Apr. 6, 2018, available at https://goo.gl/THDSLZ; Brendan Bordelon, "New Visa Rules Suggest

To provide the public with information on the federal government's use of social media surveillance, the ACLU submits this FOIA Request.

II. Requested Records

- 1) All policies, guidance, procedures, directives, advisories, memoranda, and/or legal opinions pertaining to the agency's search, analysis, filtering, monitoring, or collection of content available on any social media network;
- 2) All records created since January 1, 2015 concerning the purchase of, acquisition of, subscription to, payment for, or agreement to use any product or service that searches, analyzes, filters, monitors, or collects content available on any social media network, including but not limited to:
 - Records concerning any product or service capable of using social media content in assessing applications for immigration benefits or admission to the United States;
 - b. Records concerning any product or service capable of using social media content for immigration enforcement purposes;

Expanded Plans for 'Extreme Vetting' Via Algorithm," Nat'l Journal, Apr. 5, 2018, available at https://goo.gl/9Ux2mX; Arwa Mahdawi, "Hand Over My Social Media Account to Get a U.S. Visa? No Thank You," Guardian, Mar. 31, 2018, available at https://goo.gl/tpU6Ba; Sewell Chan, "14 Million Visitors to U.S. Face Social Media Screening," N.Y. Times, Mar. 30, 2018, available at https://goo.gl/RDUvKm; Brendan O'Brien, "U.S. Visa Applicants to be Asked for Social Media History: State Department," Reuters, Mar. 30, 2018, available at https://goo.gl/3PRMef; Stephen Dinan, "Extreme Vetting: State Department to Demand Tourists' Social Media History," Wash. Times, Mar. 29, 2018, available at https://goo.gl/YwazXd; "U.S. Plans 'Enhanced Vetting' of Every Visa Applicant With Orders to Hand Over Their Social Media History, Old Email Addresses and Phone Numbers," Daily Mail, Mar. 29, 2018, available at https://goo.gl/yY1g6m; Gibbons, supra note 14; Sternstein, supra note 6; Lily Hay Newman, "Feds Monitoring Social Media Does More Harm Than Good," Wired, Sept. 28, 2017, available at https://goo.gl/4obGFi; Tal Kopan, "Vetting of Social Media, Phones Possible as Part of Travel Ban Review," CNN.com, Sept. 12, 2017. available at https://goo.gl/BXf4k3; Aaron Cantú & George Joseph, "Trump's Border Security May Search Your Social Media by 'Tone,'" The Nation, Aug. 23, 2017, available at https://goo.gl/MuTmVN; Conor Finnegan, "Trump Administration Begins Vetting Social Media Profiles for Visa Applicants," ABC News, June 5, 2017, available at https://goo.gl/cJbnjg; Russell Brandom, "Can Facebook and Twitter Stop Social Media Surveillance?", Verge, Oct. 12, 2016, available at https://goo.gl/hzA2fY; Ron Nixon, "U.S. to Further Scour Social Media Use of Visa and Asylum Seekers," N.Y. Times, Feb. 23, 2016, available at https://goo.gl/y5C7Ba.

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- c. Records concerning any product or service capable of using social media content for border or transportation screening purposes;
- d. Records concerning any product or service capable of using social media content in the investigation of potential criminal conduct;

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- 3) All communications to or from any private business and/or its employees since January 1, 2015 concerning any product or service that searches, analyzes, filters, monitors, or collects content available on any social media network;
- 4) All communications to or from employees or representatives of any social media network (e.g., Twitter, Facebook, YouTube, LinkedIn, WhatsApp) since January 1, 2015 concerning the search, analysis, filtering, monitoring, or collection of social media content; and
- All records concerning the use or incorporation of social media content into systems or programs that make use of targeting algorithms, machine learning processes, and/or data analytics for the purpose of (a) assessing risk, (b) predicting illegal activity or criminality, and/or (c) identifying possible subjects of investigation or immigration enforcement actions.

With respect to the form of production, see 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3)(B), the ACLU requests that responsive electronic records be provided electronically in their native file format, if possible. Alternatively, the ACLU requests that the records be provided electronically in a text-searchable, static-image format (PDF), in the best image quality in the agency's possession, and that the records be provided in separate, Bates-stamped files.

III. Application for Expedited Processing

The ACLU requests expedited processing pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(E). ¹⁹ There is a "compelling need" for these records, as defined in the statute, because the information requested is "urgen[tly]" needed by an organization primarily engaged in disseminating information "to inform the public concerning actual or alleged Federal Government activity." 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(E)(v)(II).

¹⁹ See also 6 C.F.R. § 5.5(e); 28 C.F.R. § 16.5(e); 22 C.F.R. § 171.11(f).

A. The ACLU is an organization primarily engaged in disseminating information in order to inform the public about actual or alleged government activity.

The ACLU is "primarily engaged in disseminating information" within the meaning of the statute. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(E)(v)(II). Obtaining information about government activity, analyzing that information, and widely publishing and disseminating that information to the press and public are critical and substantial components of the ACLU's work and are among its primary activities. See ACLU v. DOJ, 321 F. Supp. 2d 24, 29 n.5 (D.D.C. 2004) (finding non-profit public interest group that "gathers information of potential interest to a segment of the public, uses its editorial skills to turn the raw material into a distinct work, and distributes that work to an audience" to be "primarily engaged in disseminating information").²¹

The ACLU regularly publishes *STAND*, a print magazine that reports on and analyzes civil liberties-related current events. The magazine is disseminated to over 980,000 people. The ACLU also publishes regular updates and alerts via email to over 3.1 million subscribers (both ACLU members and non-members). These updates are additionally broadcast to over 3.8 million social media followers. The magazine as well as the email and social-media alerts often include descriptions and analysis of information obtained through FOIA requests.

The ACLU also regularly issues press releases to call attention to documents obtained through FOIA requests, as well as other breaking news,²² and ACLU attorneys are interviewed frequently for news stories about

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²⁰ See also 6 C.F.R. § 5.5(e)(1)(ii); 28 C.F.R. § 16.5(e)(1)(ii); 22 C.F.R. § 171.11(f)(2).

²¹ Courts have found that the ACLU as well as other organizations with similar missions that engage in information-dissemination activities similar to the ACLU are "primarily engaged in disseminating information." See, e.g., Leadership Conference on Civil Rights v. Gonzales, 404 F. Supp. 2d 246, 260 (D.D.C. 2005); ACLU, 321 F. Supp. 2d at 29 n.5; Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr. v. DOD, 241 F. Supp. 2d 5, 11 (D.D.C. 2003).

²² See, e.g., Press Release, American Civil Liberties Union, U.S. Releases Drone Strike 'Playbook' in Response to ACLU Lawsuit (Aug. 6, 2016), https://www.aclu.org/news/us-releases-drone-strike-playbook-response-aclu-lawsuit; Press Release, American Civil Liberties Union, Secret Documents Describe Graphic Abuse and Admit Mistakes (June 14, 2016), https://www.aclu.org/news/cia-releases-dozens-torture-documents-response-aclu-lawsuit; Press Release, American Civil Liberties Union, U.S. Releases Targeted Killing Memo in Response to Long-Running ACLU Lawsuit (June 23, 2014), https://www.aclu.org/national-security/us-releases-targeted-killing-memo-response-long-running-aclu-lawsuit; Press Release, American Civil Liberties Union, Justice Department White Paper Details Rationale for Targeted Killing of Americans (Feb. 4, 2013), https://www.aclu.org/national-security/justice-department-white-paper-details-rationale-targeted-killing-americans; Press Release, American Civil Liberties Union, Documents Show FBI Monitored Bay Area Occupy Movement (Sept. 14, 2012), https://www.aclu.org/news/documents-show-fbi-monitored-bay-area-occupy-movement-insidebayareacom.

documents released through ACLU FOIA requests.²³

Similarly, the ACLU publishes reports about government conduct and civil liberties issues based on its analysis of information derived from various sources, including information obtained from the government through FOIA requests. This material is broadly circulated to the public and widely available to everyone for no cost or, sometimes, for a small fee. ACLU national projects regularly publish and disseminate reports that include a description and analysis of government documents obtained through FOIA requests. The ACLU also regularly publishes books, "know your rights" materials, fact sheets, and educational brochures and pamphlets designed to educate the public about civil liberties issues and government policies that implicate civil rights and liberties.

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The ACLU publishes a widely read blog where original editorial content reporting on and analyzing civil rights and civil liberties news is posted daily. See https://www.aclu.org/blog. The ACLU creates and disseminates original editorial and educational content on civil rights and civil liberties news through multi-media projects, including videos, podcasts, and interactive features. See https://www.aclu.org/multimedia. The ACLU also

²³ See, e.g., Cora Currier, TSA's Own Files Show Doubtful Science Behind Its Behavioral Screen Program, Intercept, Feb. 8, 2017, https://theintercept.com/2017/02/08/tsas-own-files-show-doubtful-science-behind-its-behavior-screening-program/ (quoting ACLU staff attorney Hugh Handeyside); Karen DeYoung, Newly Declassified Document Sheds Light on How President Approves Drone Strikes, Wash. Post, Aug. 6, 2016, http://wapo.st/2jy62cW (quoting former ACLU deputy legal director Jameel Jaffer); Catherine Thorbecke, What Newly Released CIA Documents Reveal About 'Torture' in Its Former Detention Program, ABC, June 15, 2016, http://abcn.ws/2jy40d3 (quoting ACLU staff attorney Dror Ladin); Nicky Woolf, US Marshals Spent \$10M on Equipment for Warrantless Stingray Device, Guardian, Mar. 17, 2016, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/mar/17/us-marshals-stingray-surveillance-airborne (quoting ACLU staff attorney Nathan Freed Wessler); David Welna, Government Suspected of Wanting CIA Torture Report to Remain Secret, NPR, Dec. 9, 2015, http://n.pr/2jy2p71 (quoting ACLU project director Hina Shamsi).

²⁴ See, e.g., Hugh Handeyside, New Documents Show This TSA Program Blamed for Profiling Is Unscientific and Unreliable — But Still It Continues (Feb. 8, 2017, 11:45 AM). https://www.aclu.org/blog/speak-freely/new-documents-show-tsa-program-blamed-profilingunscientific-and-unreliable-still; Carl Takei, ACLU-Obtained Emails Prove that the Federal Bureau of Prisons Covered Up Its Visit to the CIA's Torture Site (Nov. 22, 2016, 3:15 PM), https://www.aclu.org/blog/speak-freely/aclu-obtained-emails-prove-federal-bureau-prisonscovered-its-visit-cias-torture; Brett Max Kaufman, Details Abound in Drone 'Playbook' -Except for the Ones That Really Matter Most (Aug. 8, 2016, 5:30 PM), https://www.aclu.org/ blog/speak-freely/details-abound-drone-playbook-except-ones-really-matter-most; Nathan Freed Wessler, ACLU Obtained Documents Reveal Breadth of Secretive Stingray Use in Florida (Feb. 22, 2015, 5:30 PM), https://www.aclu.org/blog/free-future/aclu-obtaineddocuments-reveal-breadth-secretive-stingray-use-florida; Ashley Gorski, New NSA Documents Shine More Light into Black Box of Executive Order 12333 (Oct. 30, 2014, 3:29 PM), https://www.aclu.org/blog/new-nsa-documents-shine-more-light-black-box-executiveorder-12333; ACLU, ACLU Eye on the FBI: Documents Reveal Lack of Privacy Safeguards and Guidance in Government's "Suspicious Activity Report" Systems (Oct. 29, 2013), https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/assets/eye_on_fbi_-_sars.pdf.

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publishes, analyzes, and disseminates information through its heavily visited website, www.aclu.org. The website addresses civil rights and civil liberties issues in depth, provides features on civil rights and civil liberties issues in the news, and contains many thousands of documents relating to the issues on which the ACLU is focused. The ACLU's website also serves as a clearinghouse for news about ACLU cases, as well as analysis about case developments, and an archive of case-related documents. Through these pages, and with respect to each specific civil liberties issue, the ACLU provides the public with educational material, recent news, analyses of relevant Congressional or executive branch action, government documents obtained through FOIA requests, and further in-depth analytic and educational multi-media features.

The ACLU website includes many features on information obtained through the FOIA. For example, the ACLU's "Predator Drones FOIA" webpage, https://www.aclu.org/national-security/predator-drones-foia, contains commentary about the ACLU's FOIA request, press releases, analysis of the FOIA documents, numerous blog posts on the issue, documents related to litigation over the FOIA request, frequently asked questions about targeted killing, and links to the documents themselves. Similarly, the ACLU maintains an online "Torture Database," a compilation of over 100,000 pages of FOIA and other documents that allows researchers and the public to conduct sophisticated searches of FOIA documents relating to government policies on rendition, detention, and interrogation. ²⁶

²⁵ See, e.g., Nathan Freed Wessler & Dyan Cortez, FBI Releases Details of 'Zero-Day' Exploit Decisionmaking Process (June 26, 2015, 11:00 AM), https://www.aclu.org/blog/freefuture/fbi-releases-details-zero-day-exploit-decisionmaking-process; Nathan Freed Wessler, FBI Documents Reveal New Information on Baltimore Surveillance Flights (Oct. 30, 2015, 8:00 AM), https://www.aclu.org/blog/free-future/fbi-documents-reveal-new-informationbaltimore-surveillance-flights; ACLU v. DOJ - FOIA Case for Records Relating to the Killing of Three U.S. Citizens, ACLU Case Page, https://www.aclu.org/national-security/anwar-alawlaki-foia-request; ACLU v. Department of Defense, ACLU Case Page, https://www.aclu.org/cases/aclu-v-department-defense; Mapping the FBI: Uncovering Abusive Surveillance and Racial Profiling, ACLU Case Page, https://www.aclu.org/mappingthefbi; Bagram FOIA, ACLU Case Page https://www.aclu.org/cases/bagram-foia; CSRT FOIA, ACLU Case Page, https://www.aclu.org/national-security/csrt-foia; ACLU v. DOJ - Lawsuit to Enforce NSA Warrantless Surveillance FOIA Request, ACLU Case Page, https://www.aclu.org/aclu-v-dojlawsuit-enforce-nsa-warrantless-surveillance-foia-request; Patriot FOIA, ACLU Case Page, https://www.aclu.org/patriot-foia; NSL Documents Released by DOD, ACLU Case Page, https://www.aclu.org/nsl-documents-released-dod?redirect=cpredirect/32088.

²⁶ The Torture Database, ACLU, https://www.thetorturedatabase.org; see also Countering Violent Extremism FOIA Database, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/foia-collection/cve-foia-documents; TSA Behavior Detection FOIA Database, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/foia-collection/tsa-behavior-detection-foia-database; Targeted Killing FOIA Database, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/foia-collection/targeted-killing-foia-database.

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The ACLU has also published a number of charts and explanatory materials that collect, summarize, and analyze information it has obtained through the FOIA. For example, through compilation and analysis of information gathered from various sources—including information obtained from the government through FOIA requests—the ACLU created an original chart that provides the public and news media with a comprehensive summary index of Bush-era Office of Legal Counsel memos relating to interrogation, detention, rendition, and surveillance. Similarly, the ACLU produced an analysis of documents released in response to a FOIA request about the TSA's behavior detection program²⁸; a summary of documents released in response to a FOIA request related to the FISA Amendments Act²⁹; a chart of original statistics about the Defense Department's use of National Security Letters based on its own analysis of records obtained through FOIA requests³⁰; and an analysis of documents obtained through FOIA requests about FBI surveillance flights over Baltimore.

The ACLU plans to analyze, publish, and disseminate to the public the information gathered through this Request. The records requested are not sought for commercial use and the requesters plan to disseminate the information disclosed as a result of this Request to the public at no cost.

B. The records sought are urgently needed to inform the public about actual or alleged government activity.

These records are urgently needed to inform the public about actual or alleged government activity. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(E)(v)(II). Specifically, the requested records relate to the federal government's use of social media surveillance and its interactions with the private sector for the purpose of obtaining social media surveillance technology. As discussed in Part I, supra, federal agencies are expanding their use of social media surveillance—which implicates the online speech of millions of social media users—but little information is available to the public regarding the nature, extent, and consequences of that surveillance.

²⁷ Index of Bush-Era OLC Memoranda Relating to Interrogation, Detention, Rendition and/or Surveillance, ACLU (Mar. 5, 2009), https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/safefree/olcmemos 2009 0305.pdf.

²⁸ Bad Trip: Debunking the TSA's 'Behavior Detection' Program, ACLU (2017), https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/field_document/dem17-tsa_detection_report-v02.pdf.

²⁹ Summary of FISA Amendments Act FOIA Documents Released on November 29, 2010, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/files/pdfs/natsec/faafoia20101129/20101129Summary.pdf.

³⁰ Statistics on NSLs Produced by Department of Defense, ACLU (2014), https://www.aclu.org/ other/statistics-nsls-produced-dod.

³¹ Nathan Freed Wessler, *FBI Documents Reveal New Information on Baltimore Surveillance Flights* (Oct. 30, 2015, 8:00 AM), https://www.aclu.org/blog/free-future/fbi-documents-reveal-new-information-baltimore-surveillance-flights.

Given the foregoing, the ACLU has satisfied the requirements for expedited processing of this Request.

IV. Application for Waiver or Limitation of Fees

The ACLU requests a waiver of document search, review, and duplication fees on the grounds that disclosure of the requested records is in the public interest and because disclosure is "likely to contribute significantly to public understanding of the operations or activities of the government and is not primarily in the commercial interest of the requester." See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(A)(iii). The ACLU also requests a waiver of search fees on the grounds that the ACLU qualifies as a "representative of the news media" and the records are not sought for commercial use. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(A)(ii)(II).

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A. The Request is likely to contribute significantly to public understanding of the operations or activities of the government and is not primarily in the commercial interest of the ACLU.

As discussed above, credible media and other investigative accounts underscore the substantial public interest in the records sought through this Request. Given the ongoing and widespread media attention to this issue, the records sought will significantly contribute to public understanding of an issue of profound public importance. Because little specific information about government surveillance and monitoring of social media is publicly available, the records sought are certain to contribute significantly to the public's understanding of whether and under what circumstances the government monitors social media content, and how such monitoring affects individual privacy and liberty.

The ACLU is not filing this Request to further its commercial interest. As described above, any information disclosed by the ACLU as a result of this FOIA Request will be available to the public at no cost. Thus, a fee waiver would fulfill Congress's legislative intent in amending FOIA. See Judicial Watch, Inc. v. Rossotti, 326 F.3d 1309, 1312 (D.C. Cir. 2003) ("Congress amended FOIA to ensure that it be liberally construed in favor of waivers for noncommercial requesters." (quotation marks omitted)).

B. The ACLU is a representative of the news media and the records are not sought for commercial use.

The ACLU also requests a waiver of search fees on the grounds that the ACLU qualifies as a "representative of the news media" and the records

³² See also 6 C.F.R. § 5.11(k); 28 C.F.R. § 16.10(k); 22 C.F.R. § 171.16.

AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION FOUNDATION

are not sought for commercial use. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(A)(ii)(II).33 The ACLU meets the statutory and regulatory definitions of a "representative of the news media" because it is an "entity that gathers information of potential interest to a segment of the public, uses its editorial skills to turn the raw materials into a distinct work, and distributes that work to an audience." See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(A)(ii)(III); see also Nat'l Sec. Archive v. DOD, 880 F.2d 1381, 1387 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (finding that an organization that gathers information, exercises editorial discretion in selecting and organizing documents, "devises indices and finding aids," and "distributes the resulting work to the public" is a "representative of the news media" for purposes of the FOIA); Serv. Women's Action Network v. DOD, 888 F. Supp. 2d 282 (D. Conn. 2012) (requesters, including ACLU, were representatives of the news media and thus qualified for fee waivers for FOIA requests to the Department of Defense and Department of Veterans Affairs); ACLU of Wash. v. DOJ, No. C09-0642RSL, 2011 WL 887731, at *10 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 10, 2011) (finding that the ACLU of Washington is an entity that "gathers information of potential interest to a segment of the public, uses its editorial skills to turn the raw materials into a distinct work, and distributes that work to an audience"); ACLU, 321 F. Supp. 2d at 30 n.5 (finding non-profit public interest group to be "primarily engaged in disseminating information"). The ACLU is therefore a "representative of the news media" for the same reasons it is "primarily engaged in the dissemination of information."

Furthermore, courts have found other organizations whose mission, function, publishing, and public education activities are similar in kind to the ACLU's to be "representatives of the news media" as well. See, e.g., Cause of Action v. IRS, 125 F. Supp. 3d 145 (D.C. Cir. 2015); Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr., 241 F. Supp. 2d at 10–15 (finding non-profit public interest group that disseminated an electronic newsletter and published books was a "representative of the news media" for purposes of the FOIA); Nat'l Sec. Archive, 880 F.2d at 1387; Judicial Watch, Inc. v. DOJ, 133 F. Supp. 2d 52, 53–54 (D.D.C. 2000) (finding Judicial Watch, self-described as a "public interest law firm," a news media requester). 34

On account of these factors, fees associated with responding to FOIA requests are regularly waived for the ACLU as a "representative of the news media."³⁵ As was true in those instances, the ACLU meets the requirements for a fee waiver here.

³³ See also 6 C.F.R. § 5.11(d)(1); 28 C.F.R. § 16.10(b)(6); 22 C.F.R. § 171.14(b).

³⁴ Courts have found these organizations to be "representatives of the news media" even though they engage in litigation and lobbying activities beyond their dissemination of information / public education activities. See, e.g., Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr., 241 F. Supp. 2d at 5; Nat'l Sec. Archive, 880 F.2d at 1387; see also Leadership Conference on Civil Rights, 404 F. Supp. 2d at 260; Judicial Watch, Inc., 133 F. Supp. 2d at 53-54.

³⁵ In August 2017, CBP granted a fee-waiver request regarding a FOIA request for records relating to a muster sent by CBP in April 2017. In May 2017, CBP granted a fee-

Pursuant to applicable statutes and regulations, the ACLU expects a determination regarding expedited processing within 10 days. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(E)(ii).

AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION FOUNDATION

If the Request is denied in whole or in part, the ACLU asks that you justify all deletions by reference to specific exemptions to FOIA. The ACLU expects the release of all segregable portions of otherwise exempt material. The ACLU reserves the right to appeal a decision to withhold any information or deny a waiver of fees.

Thank you for your prompt attention to this matter. Please furnish the applicable records to:

Hugh Handeyside American Civil Liberties Union 125 Broad Street—18th Floor New York, New York 10004 hhandeyside@aclu.org

I affirm that the information provided supporting the request for expedited processing is true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(E)(vi).

waiver request regarding a FOIA request for documents related to electronic device searches at the border. In April 2017, the CIA and the Department of State granted fee-waiver requests in relation to a FOIA request for records related to the legal authority for the use of military force in Syria. In March 2017, the Department of Defense Office of Inspector General, the CIA, and the Department of State granted fee-waiver requests regarding a FOIA request for documents related to the January 29, 2017 raid in al Ghayil, Yemen. In May 2016, the FBI granted a fee-waiver request regarding a FOIA request issued to the DOJ for documents related to Countering Violent Extremism Programs. In April 2013, the National Security Division of the DOJ granted a fee-waiver request with respect to a request for documents relating to the FISA Amendments Act. Also in April 2013, the DOJ granted a fee-waiver request regarding a FOIA request for documents related to "national security letters" issued under the Electronic Communications Privacy Act. In August 2013, the FBI granted the feewaiver request related to the same FOIA request issued to the DOJ. In June 2011, the DOJ National Security Division granted a fee waiver to the ACLU with respect to a request for documents relating to the interpretation and implementation of a section of the PATRIOT Act. In March 2009, the State Department granted a fee waiver to the ACLU with regard to a FOIA request for documents relating to the detention, interrogation, treatment, or prosecution of suspected terrorists.

AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION FOUNDATION

Hugh Handeyside American Civil Liberties Union Foundation 125 Broad Street—18th Floor New York, New York 10004 212.549.2500 hhandeyside@aclu.org

Respectfully,

Matt Cagle
American Civil Liberties Union
Foundation of Northern California
39 Drumm Street
San Francisco, CA 94111
415.621.2493
mcagle@aclunc.org

EXHIBIT B

National Records Center P.O. Box 648010 Lee's Summit, MO 64064-8010



June 6, 2018 COW2018000654

Hugh Handeyside American Civil Liverties Union 125 Broad St 18th Floor New York, NY 10004

Dear Hugh Handeyside:

We received your on June 4, 2018. You specifically requested the following:

- 1. All policies, guidance, procedures, directives, advisories, memoranda, and/or legal opinions pertaining to the agency's search, analysis, filtering, monitoring, or collection of content available on any social media network;
- 2. All records created since January 1, 2015 concerning the purchase of, acquisition of, subscription to, payment for, or agreement to use any product or service that searches, analyzes, filters, monitors, or collects content available on any social media network, including but not limited to:
 - a. Records concerning any product or service capable of using social media content in assessing applications for immigration benefits or admission to the United States;
 - b. Records concerning any product or service capable of using social media content for immigration enforcement purposes;
 - c. Records concerning any product or service capable of using social media content for border or transportation screening purposes;
 - d. Records concerning any product or service capable of using social media content in the investigation of potential criminal conduct;
- 3. All communications to or from any private business and/or its employees since January 1, 2015 concerning any product or service that searches, analyzes, filters, monitors, or collects content available on any social media network;
- 4. All communications to or from employees or representatives of any social media network (e.g., Twitter, Facebook, YouTube, LinkedIn, WhatsApp) since January 1, 2015 concerning the search, analysis, filtering, monitoring, or collection of social media content; and
- 5. All records concerning the use or incorporation of social media content into systems or programs that make use of targeting algorithms, machine learning processes, and/or data analytics for the purpose of (a) assessing risk, (b) predicting illegal activity or criminality, and/or (c) identifying possible subjects of investigation or immigration enforcement actions.

COW2018000654 Page 2

Your request is being handled under the provisions of the Freedom of Information Act (5 U.S.C. § 552). It has been assigned the following control number: COW2018000654. Please cite this number in all future correspondence about your request.

We respond to requests on a first-in, first-out basis and on a multi-track system. Your request has been placed in the complex track (Track 2).

Your request for expedited processing has been granted.

In accordance with Department of Homeland Security Regulations (6 C.F.R. § 5.4(a)), USCIS uses a "cut-off" date to delineate the scope of a FOIA request by treating records created after that date as not responsive to that request. Therefore, in determining which records are responsive to your request, we will only include records in the possession of this agency as of June 6, 2018, the date we began the search for records.

Consistent with 6 C.F.R. § 5.5(a) of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) FOIA regulations, USCIS processes FOIA requests according to their order of receipt. Although USCIS' goal is to respond within 20 business days of receipt of your request, FOIA does permit a 10-day extension of this time period in certain circumstances. Due to the increasing number of FOIA requests received by this office, we may encounter some delay in processing your request. Additionally, due to the scope and nature of your request, USCIS will need to locate, compile, and review responsive records from multiple offices, both at headquarters and in the field. USCIS may also need to consult with another agency or other component of the Department of Homeland Security that have a substantial interest in the responsive information. Due to these unusual circumstances, USCIS will invoke a 10-day extension for your request pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(B). Please contact our office if you would like to limit the scope of your request or to agree on a different timetable for the processing of your request. We will make every effort to comply with your request in a timely manner.

This office will be providing your records on a Compact Disc (CD) for use on your personal computer. The CD is readable on all computers through the use of Adobe Acrobat software. A version of Adobe Acrobat will be included on the CD. Your records can be viewed on your computer screen and can be printed onto paper. Only records 15 pages or more are eligible for CD printing. To request your responsive records on paper, please include your control number and write to the above address Attention: FOIA/PA Officer, or fax them to (816) 350-5785.

USCIS FOIA has agreed to grant your fee waiver request.

In accordance with Department of Homeland Security Regulations (6 C.F.R. § 5.3(c)), your request is deemed to constitute an agreement to pay any fees that may be chargeable up to \$25.00. Fees may be charged for searching for records sought at the respective clerical, professional, and/or managerial rates of \$4.00/\$7.00/\$10.25 per quarter hour, and for duplication of copies at the rate of \$.10 per copy. The first 100 copies and two hours of search time are not charged, and the remaining combined charges for search and duplication must exceed \$14.00 before we will charge you any fees. Most requests do not require any fees; however, if fees in excess of \$25.00 are required, we will notify you beforehand.

COW2018000654 Page 3

The National Records Center (NRC) has the responsibility to ensure that personally identifiable information (PII) pertaining to U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) clients is protected. In our efforts to safeguard this information, we may request that additional information be provided to facilitate and correctly identify records responsive to your request. Though submission of this information is voluntary, without this information, your request may be delayed while additional steps are taken to ensure the correct responsive records are located and processed. Further, if we are unable to positively identify the subject of the record we may be unable to provide records responsive to your FOIA request.

You may check the status of your FOIA request online, at www.uscis.gov/FOIA. Click the "Check Status of Request" button in the middle of the web page or "FOIA Request Status Check & Average Processing Times" on the left side under "Freedom of Information and Privacy Act (FOIA)." Then click "FOIA Check Status of Request" at the bottom of the page and follow the instructions given. We will make every effort to comply with your request in a timely manner. In the interim if you have questions about the status of your request, you may contact Karl Bloom by e-mail at Karl.D.Bloom@uscis.dhs.gov.

All FOIA/PA related requests, including address changes, must be submitted in writing and be signed by the requester. Please include the Control Number listed above on all correspondence with this office. Requests may be mailed to the FOIA/PA Officer at the PO Box listed at the top of the letterhead, emailed to USCIS.FOIA@uscis.dhs.gov, or sent by fax to (816) 350-5785. You may also submit FOIA/PA related questions to our email address at FOIAPAQuestions@uscis.dhs.gov.

Sincerely,

Jill A. Eggleston

Director, FOIA Operations

EXHIBIT C

SIG SCAN AS JAN -9 2019

COW2018000654

□ NEW REQUEST



- ☐ REQUESTER DOCS
- ☐ RESPONSIVE RECORDS

REMARKS: <u>Emails with requester discussing</u> request and setting up a conference call.

DATE: 1/8/18

NAME: Allen Jaynes

From:

Hugh Handeyside hhandeyside@aclu.org

Sent:

Monday, January 07, 2019 11:19 AM

To:

Jaynes, Thomas A (Allen)

Subject:

RE: USCIS FOIA Request Regarding Social Media (COW2018000654)

No problem – I'm available today. Would 2 p.m. work? I'm at 212-519-7857.

Best, Hugh

From: Jaynes, Thomas A (Allen) [mailto:Thomas.A.Jaynes@uscis.dhs.gov]

Sent: Monday, January 07, 2019 7:57 AM

To: Hugh Handeyside

Subject: RE: USCIS FOIA Request Regarding Social Media (COW2018000654)

Hugh Handeyside,

I apologize for the delay in getting back with you. I had a health issue come up. If you are still available today to speak with me concerning your request please let me know.

T. Allen Jaynes
Senior Government Information Specialist
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services

(816) 350-5500, ext 5095

From: Hugh Handeyside [mailto:hhandeyside@aclu.orq]

Sent: Wednesday, January 02, 2019 12:51 PM

To: Jaynes, Thomas A (Allen)

Subject: RE: USCIS FOIA Request Regarding Social Media (COW2018000654)

Mr. Jaynes,

Apologies for the difficulty in reaching each other to this point. I'm happy to set a time to discuss the request – tomorrow, Friday, and Monday of next week are looking flexible at this point – although I imagine you have been affected by the government shutdown.

As for your assertion that the request as written does not allow your office to conduct a reasonable search, our position is that the plain language of the request is more than adequate to enable a search for responsive records. We have made that position clear to other agencies to which we have directed this request. For instance, DHS responded that the request did not reasonably describe the records sought; we submitted the attached administrative appeal to DHS in response, and the appeals officer remanded the matter to DHS for corrective processing (decision attached).

I look forward to discussing this at your convenience.

Regards,

Hugh Handeyside

From: Jaynes, Thomas A (Allen) [mailto:Thomas.A.Jaynes@uscis.dhs.gov]

Sent: Friday, December 28, 2018 10:25 AM

To: Hugh Handeyside

Subject: RE: USCIS FOIA Request Regarding Social Media (COW2018000654)

Hugh,

I am following up with you regarding your USCIS FOIA request COW2018000654. I would like to discuss your request to clarify certain items. Is there a specific date and time we can set up a telephone call to discuss your request?

T. Allen Jaynes

Senior Government Information Specialist Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (816) 350-5500, ext 5095

From: Jaynes, Thomas A (Allen)

Sent: Wednesday, December 12, 2018 9:33 AM

To: 'hhandeyside@aclu.org'

Subject: RE: USCIS FOIA Request Regarding Social Media (COW2018000654)

Hugh Handeyside,

It seems you and I keep missing each other on the telephone to discuss your FOIA request. Can we set up a specific date and time that I can call you to discuss this request?

T. Allen Jaynes

Senior Government Information Specialist Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (816) 350-5500, ext 5095

From: Jaynes, Thomas A (Allen)

Sent: Tuesday, November 20, 2018 11:55 AM

To: 'hhandeyside@aclu.org'

Subject: USCIS FOIA Request Regarding Social Media (COW2018000654)

Hugh Handeyside,

I am following up on the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request you submitted to USCIS dated May 24, 2018 requesting information regarding social media. USCIS assigned the case number COW2018000654. For your reference, attached is a copy of your request.

Item 3 of your request asks for all communications to or from any private business and/or its employees since January 1, 2015. Item 4 asks for all communications to or from employees or representatives of any social media network (e.g., Twitter, Facebook, YouTube, LinkedIn, WhatsApp) since January 1, 2015. In order for USCIS to conduct a reasonable search for these records our office needs more information.

These two requested items in their current form does not allow our office to conduct a reasonable search for records. Taking this request at face value, your request is asking for USCIS to conduct a search throughout the agency since January 1, 2015. A request such as this to too broad and our agency is not required to conduct a search such as this under the FOIA. See Weirich v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., No. CV-10-5031, 2010 WL 4717211, at *4 (E.D. Wash. Nov. 15, 2010) (determining that not only do requests for "'any documents'" by "'any members'" concerning "'emergency funds'" for "'commercial banks which were nearly insolvent'" lack specificity, but plaintiff's request would "unduly burden the FOI Office and significantly interfere with the Board's operations").

Case 3:19-cv-00290-EMC Document 98-6 Filed 01/28/21 Page 25 of 380

However, USCIS is willing to conduct a search for records if you would be willing to narrow the scope of these two items. Narrowing the scope could be such as specific USCIS employees or specific positions in a USCIS office or by other means would allow our office to conduct a reasonable search. If you would be willing to provide more information that would allow USCIS to search for records, please respond to this email or you may call me at my telephone number shown below.

T. Allen Jaynes
Senior Government Information Specialist
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services
150 Space Center Loop
Lee's Summit, MO 64064
(816) 350-5500, ext 5095

WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It contains information that may be exempt from public release under the Freedom of Information Act (5 U.S.C. 552). This document is to be controlled, handled, transmitted, distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to Sensitive But Unclassified (SBU) information and is not to be released to the public or other personnel who do not have a valid "need-to-know" without prior approval from the originator,

EXHIBIT D

National Records Center P.O. Box 648010 Lee's Summit, MO 64064-8010



July 10, 2019 COW2018000654

Hugh Handeyside American Civil Liberties Union 125 Broad St 18th Floor New York, NY 10004

Dear Hugh Handeyside:

This is in response to your Freedom of Information Act/Privacy Act (FOIA/PA) request dated May 24, 2018, which is currently at issue in *ACLU v. DOJ, et al*, 19-cv-290 (N.D. Cal.). The request sought records "pertaining to social media surveillance, including the monitoring and retention of immigrants' and visa applicants' social media information for the purpose of conducting 'extreme vetting."

We are providing records as part of a rolling production. Enclosed is the first production, which consists of 2060 pages. We are currently processing the remaining pages, which will be provided to you in a second production.

We have reviewed the enclosed pages and have determined to release all information except those portions that are exempt pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 552 (b)(5), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) and (b)(7)(E) of the FOIA.

Exemption (b)(5) provides protection for inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters, which would not be available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the agency. The types of documents and/or information that we have withheld under this exemption may consist of documents containing pre-decisional information, documents or other memoranda prepared in contemplation of litigation, or confidential communications between attorney and client.

Exemption (b)(6) permits the government to withhold all information about individuals in personnel, medical and similar files where the disclosure of such information would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy. The types of documents and/or information that we have withheld may consist of birth certificates, naturalization certificates, drivers' licenses, social security numbers, home addresses, dates of birth, or various other documents and/or information belonging to a third party that are considered personal.

Exemption (b)(7)(C) provides protection for personal information in law enforcement records, which could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy. We have withheld information relating to third-party individuals. The types of documents and/or information that we have withheld could consist of names, addresses, identification numbers, telephone numbers, fax numbers, or various other documents that are considered personal.

COW2018000654

Page 2

Exemption (b)(7)(E) of the FOIA provides protection for records or information for law enforcement purposes which would disclose techniques and procedures for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions, or would disclose guidelines for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions if such disclosure could reasonably be expected to risk circumvention of the law. The types of documents and/or information we have withheld could consist of law enforcement systems checks, manuals, checkpoint locations, surveillance techniques, and various other documents.

In accordance with Department of Homeland Security Regulations (6 C.F.R. § 5.4(a)), USCIS uses a "cut-off" date to delineate the scope of a FOIA request by treating records created after that date as not responsive to that request. Therefore, in determining which records are responsive to your request, we included only records in the possession of this agency as of March 26, 2018, the date we began the search for records.

The enclosed record consists of the best reproducible copies available. Certain pages contain marks that appear to be blacked-out information. The black marks were made prior to our receipt of the file and are not information we have withheld under the provisions of the FOIA or PA.

Sincerely,

Jill A. Eggleston

Director, FOIA Operations

Enclosure(s)

National Records Center P.O. Box 648010 Lee's Summit, MO 64064-8010



August 7, 2019

COW2018000654

Hugh Handeyside American Civil Liberties Union 125 Broad St 18th Floor New York, NY 10004

Dear Hugh Handeyside:

This is in response to your Freedom of Information Act/Privacy Act (FOIA/PA) request dated May 24, 2018, which is currently at issue in *ACLU v. DOJ*, *et al*, 19-cv-290 (N.D. Cal.). The request sought records "pertaining to social media surveillance, including the monitoring and retention of immigrants' and visa applicants' social media information for the purpose of conducting 'extreme vetting.'" This is the second and final release.

We are providing records as part of a rolling production. Enclosed is the second and final release, which consists of 585 pages. The two productions contain all of the records identified as responsive to your request. In total, we have identified 2645 pages that are responsive to your request, of which 306 were released in their entirety, 2234 released in part, and 64 pages withheld in full. In our review of these pages, we have determined that they contain no reasonably segregable portion(s) of non-exempt information. Additionally, we have referred 8 pages in their entirety to Department of Homeland Security and 33 pages to Immigration and Customs Enforcement for their direct response to you. We have reviewed and have determined to release all information except those portions that are exempt pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 552 (b)(5), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) and (b)(7)(E) of the FOIA.

Exemption (b)(5) provides protection for inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters, which would not be available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the agency. The types of documents and/or information that we have withheld under this exemption may consist of documents containing pre-decisional information, documents or other memoranda prepared in contemplation of litigation, or confidential communications between attorney and client.

Exemption (b)(6) permits the government to withhold all information about individuals in personnel, medical and similar files where the disclosure of such information would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy. The types of documents and/or information that we have withheld may consist of birth certificates, naturalization certificates, drivers' licenses, social security numbers, home addresses, dates of birth, or various other documents and/or information belonging to a third party that are considered personal.

Exemption (b)(7)(C) provides protection for personal information in law enforcement records, which could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy. We have withheld information relating to third-party individuals. The types of documents and/or information that we have withheld could consist of names, addresses, identification numbers, telephone numbers, fax numbers, or various other documents that are considered personal.

COW2018000654

Page 2

Exemption (b)(7)(E) of the FOIA provides protection for records or information for law enforcement purposes which would disclose techniques and procedures for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions, or would disclose guidelines for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions if such disclosure could reasonably be expected to risk circumvention of the law. The types of documents and/or information we have withheld could consist of law enforcement systems checks, manuals, checkpoint locations, surveillance techniques, and various other documents.

In accordance with Department of Homeland Security Regulations (6 C.F.R. § 5.4(a)), USCIS uses a "cut-off" date to delineate the scope of a FOIA request by treating records created after that date as not responsive to that request. Therefore, in determining which records are responsive to your request, we included only records in the possession of this agency as of March 26, 2018, the date we began the search for records.

The enclosed record consists of the best reproducible copies available. Certain pages contain marks that appear to be blacked-out information. The black marks were made prior to our receipt of the file and are not information we have withheld under the provisions of the FOIA or PA.

Sincerely,

Jill A. Eggleston

Director, FOIA Operations

Enclosure(s)

EXHIBIT E

From: Hugh Handeyside <hhandeyside@aclu.org>

Sent: Friday, November 06, 2020 5:50 PM

To: Tulis, Elizabeth (CIV) < etulis@CIV.USDOJ.GOV>

Cc: Matt Cagle < MCagle@aclunc.org>

Subject: RE: ACLU v. DOJ - follow-up re CBP b4 redactions

Hi Elizabeth,

It looks like we did inadvertently leave those b4 redactions in the CBP production (specifically: 251b, 251c, 253a, and 253b) off the list we previously sent. So you can consider this email as confirmation that we won't be challenging those.

We also checked the b7C redactions in the USCIS production, and we can confirm at this point that, other than the b7C redaction on page 1174 of the production, our position is the same as for the b6 redactions – i.e., we will not be litigating those. For the b7C redaction on page 1174, there's no way to distinguish the b7C redaction from the b5 redaction within which it is encompassed. Can you affirm that it is limited to a specific individual identity like the other b6/b7C redactions?

Let me know if you'd like to discuss further.

Best, Hugh

EXHIBIT F

American Civil Liberties Union Foundation et al v. Department of Justice et al, 19-00290-SK

VAUGHN INDEX

American Civil Liberties Union Foundation et al v. Department of Justice et al, Civil Action No. 19-00290-SK

VAUGHN INDEX1

Bates Number (top right corner)	Description of Document	Exemption(s) Applied	Document Type	Description of Withheld Information and Explanation(s) for Withholding
2	Email, RE: FINAL RAS/SM vetting memo, ISCPM, BISC and tableASY.NACARA203.BISC 7.10.17 (fillable).pdf	(b)(7)(E)	Email	Exemption (b)(7)(E) was used to redact portions of an email sent by employees in the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) Refugee, Asylum, and International Operations (RAIO) Directorate. The information withheld under (b)(7)(E) includes a list of document titles that relate to the social media vetting process. This information was compiled by USCIS employees as part of the review/revision process in finalizing the documents, and the titles contain law enforcement information and objectives. The titles also contain specific details focused on the agency's vetting initiatives, including the types of applications and applicants that would fall under this vetting process. This information, if disclosed, would reveal the types of factors considered when determining whether an application needs additional background

¹ This *Vaughn* Index contains descriptions of pages that Plaintiffs are contesting, which includes redactions under Exemptions (b)(5) and (b)(7)(E). By email dated November 6, 2020, Plaintiffs advised Defendants that they do not intend to challenge any redactions under (b)(6) or (b)(7)(C). Accordingly, descriptions of any redactions under Exemptions (b)(6) or (b)(7)(C) are not included in this *Vaughn* index.

American Civil Liberties Union Foundation et al v. Department of Justice et al, 19-00290-SK

VAUGHN INDEX

4-24	Supporting Statement for	(b)(5)	Draft document	checks or vetting, which is part of specific guidelines and procedures involved in the enforcement of certain immigration and national security laws and directives. It would also reveal specific factors and information that law enforcement is aware of pertaining to the types of asylum applications that may need additional screening. The release of this information would put individuals on notice as to what information is considered as part of the screening and vetting process and could result in them not disclosing that information to law enforcement or immigration officers. The disclosure of this information would reveal guidelines and procedures for the enforcement of certain immigration and national security laws and directives, and could reasonably be expected to risk the circumvention of law and render the guidelines for additional screening measures relevant to national security, public safety, and fraud prevention useless. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(7)(E). All other information within this document was segregated and determined non-exempt and disclosed. The information withheld under (b)(5) as
4-24	Paperwork Reduction Act, Generic Information Collection Submissions for "Generic	(0)(3)	Dian document	deliberative process privileged information consists of multiple draft comments, revisions, additions, re-wordings,
	Clearance for the Collection of			suggestions, clarifications, questions about

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	Social Media Information on Immigration and Foreign Travel Forms," Office of Management and Budget Control No. 1601-NEW			accuracy, statements of uncertainty, and requests for additional information. All of this information is part of the deliberative process related to the development of the process of collection of social media information on immigration and foreign travel forms. The material is also predecisional and includes information that is not reflected in the final version of the document.
				The information withheld under (b)(5) as attorney-client privileged information consists of comments and legal opinions added to this draft document by USCIS Office of Chief Counsel (OCC) attorneys that had been asked to provide legal review. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(5).
				All other information within this document was segregated and determined non-exempt and disclosed.
25-26	DHS Social Media Task Force, Social Media Use Teleconference, September 28, 2016	(b)(5)	Meeting Summary	The information withheld under (b)(5) as deliberative and attorney-client privileged information consists of a summary of a legal opinion that focused on the USCIS Fraud Detection and National Security Directorate (FDNS) and FDNS's authorities under the Privacy Act. FDNS is a directorate within USCIS, and is responsible for leading agency efforts aimed at enhancing the integrity of the

				legal immigration system. FDNS develops and maintains fraud and screening programs, leads information sharing and collaboration activities, and supports law enforcement and intelligence communities. The legal opinion was written by DHS's Office of General Counsel (OGC) and the summary of the opinion reflects OGC's legal opinions as well as facts and questions that DHS employees had provided to OGC. The summary also contains potential courses of actions being considered, and OGC's legal opinion as to the risks associated with these options. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(5). All other information within this document was segregated and determined non-exempt and disclosed.
27-28	Email, RE: social media searches for businesses/ entities	(b)(5)	Email	The information withheld under (b)(5) as attorney-client privileged information consists of a legal question related to whether businesses and other entities would be included in the social media search process, and if so, to what extent. The emails are between USCIS OCC attorneys and agency employees, and include OCC attorneys' legal opinions, as well as facts and questions that USCIS employees had provided to the attorneys. The emails also contain potential courses of actions being considered, and OCC's legal opinion as to the risks associated with these options. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from

				disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(5). All other information within this document was segregated and determined non-exempt and disclosed.
30-31	SM LIP Terms of Use Language - Second Review and Comment	(b)(5)	Email	The information withheld under (b)(5) as attorney-client privileged information consists of a legal opinion regarding potential legal liability for participating in USCIS social media operational activities. The legal opinion was written by a USCIS OCC attorney and provided to USCIS's social media working group (SMWG), at the request of the employees participating in the SMWG. The information also contains the attorney's legal opinions as well as facts and questions that USCIS employees had provided to the attorney. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(5). All other information within this document was segregated and determined non-exempt and disclosed.
32-36	Email, RE: Read-out of DHS, DOJ, DOS meeting re PRA package DOJ questions 12/15/17	(b)(5)	Email	The information withheld under (b)(5) as attorney-client privileged information consists of a legal question related to what information could be requested in specific immigration form types. The emails are between USCIS OCC attorneys and agency employees, and include OCC attorneys' legal opinions, a summary of legal questions from DOJ, as well as facts and questions that USCIS employees had provided to the attorneys. The emails also contain potential

				courses of actions being considered, outstanding issues and tasks, and OCC's legal opinion as to the risks associated with these options. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(5). All other information within this document was segregated and determined non-exempt and disclosed.
37	Email, RE: Pre-brief for call Email, RE: Sub-PCC SOC on screening/vetting enhancements	(b)(5)	Email	The information withheld under (b)(5) as attorney-client privileged information consists of a legal question related to what information could be requested in specific immigration form types, specifically in related to the OMB approval process. The emails are between USCIS OCC attorneys and agency employees, and include OCC attorneys' legal opinions. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(5). All other information within this document was segregated and determined non-exempt and disclosed.
41	Email, RE: Privacy Training (for SVPI FDNS IO Social Media access)	(b)(5), (b)(7)(E)	Email	The information withheld under (b)(5) includes deliberative and attorney-client privileged information related to privacy training, and the possibility of USCIS access to certain tools that could be used as part of the review of social media posts made by applicants. The emails are between USCIS OCC attorneys and agency employees, and include statements of uncertainty, and requests for additional information, which

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represents part of the deliberative process, as well as pre-decisional information being considered in this process. The information in the emails also contains a request for legal opinions related potential courses of actions being considered. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(5). All other information within this document was segregated and determined non-exempt and disclosed.
Exemption (b)(7)(E) was used to redact portions of an email sent by USCIS employees and OCC attorneys discussing privacy training for FDNS immigration officers involved in social media vetting and background investigations. The information withheld under (b)(7)(E) includes a
description of the specific technology that FDNS would be using to conduct social media research as part of the vetting process. This information, if disclosed, would reveal the technology resources currently being used
in the vetting process by law enforcement and immigration officers, which is part of specific techniques and procedures involved in the enforcement of certain immigration and national security laws and directives. It
would also reveal guidelines that could risk circumvention of the law, including the specific tools used by law enforcement as part of the vetting and screening process.

				The release of this information would put individuals on notice as to what technology is being used, so that individuals could research the technology to identify vulnerabilities and limitations, which could impact the effectiveness of the screening and vetting process. Releasing this information could reasonably be expected to risk the circumvention of law and render the guidelines for additional screening measures relevant to national security, public safety, and fraud prevention useless. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(7)(E). All other information within this document was segregated and determined non-exempt and disclosed.
42-43	Email, RE: Quick Question	(b)(5)	Email	The information withheld under (b)(5) as attorney-client privileged information consists of a legal question related to what information could be requested in specific immigration form types. The emails are between USCIS OCC attorneys and agency employees, and include OCC attorneys' legal opinions, a summary of legal questions from DOJ, as well as facts and questions that USCIS employees had provided to the attorneys. The emails also contain potential courses of actions being considered, outstanding issues and tasks, and OCC's legal opinion as to the risks associated with these options. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure

				pursuant to Exemption (b)(5). All other information within this document was segregated and determined non-exempt and disclosed.
46	Email, RE: Reminder: [Clearance Request] Latest draft of Consolidated DHS Social Media Talking Points (Due 5pm Wednesday, April 18th)	(b)(7)(E)	Email	Exemption (b)(7)(E) was used to redact portions of an email sent by USCIS employees discussing the review of a draft copy of DHS Social Media Talking Points. The information withheld under (b)(7)(E) includes the link to an internal intranet website that directs to the draft copy of the document being reviewed. This information, if disclosed, would reveal the technology resources currently being used in the government to review sensitive law enforcement documents that aid in the vetting process. This type of information is part of specific techniques and procedures involved the agency's enforcement of certain immigration and national security laws and directives. It would also reveal guidelines that could risk circumvention of the law, including the specific tools used by the agency to coordinate review of documents to support DHS's mission. The release of this information would put individuals on notice as to what technology is being used, so that individuals could research the technology to identify vulnerabilities and limitations, which could reasonably be expected to risk the circumvention of law and render the guidelines for additional screening measures relevant to national security, public safety,

				and fraud prevention useless. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(7)(E). All other information within this document was segregated and determined non-exempt and disclosed.
51	Email, RE: Request For Occ Clearance [DHS Congressional Correspondence] Rep. Jayapal+ 16, regarding SORN and Social Media, WF 1152115	(b)(5)	Email	The information withheld under (b)(5) includes deliberative and attorney-client privileged information related to the legal review of a draft response to Representative Jayapal regarding the USCIS social media review process. The emails are between USCIS OCC attorneys and agency employees, and include statements of uncertainty, and requests for additional information, which represents part of the deliberative process, as well as pre-decisional information being considered in this process. The information in the emails also contains a request for legal opinions related potential courses of actions being considered. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(5). All other information within this document was segregated and determined non-exempt and disclosed.
58-59	Email, RE: RTQ on DHS Social Media Collection	(b)(5)	Email	The information withheld under (b)(5) includes deliberative and attorney-client privileged information related to the review of draft responses to questions about the agency's social media monitoring. The emails are between USCIS OCC attorneys and agency leadership, and include

				statements of uncertainty, and requests for additional information, which represents part of the deliberative process, as well as predecisional information being considered in this process. The information in the emails also contains a request for legal opinions related potential courses of actions being considered. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(5). All other information within this document was segregated and determined non-exempt and disclosed.
61, 64	Email, RE: SM LIP Reorg v2 for final review	(b)(5): page 61 (b)(7)(E): page 64	Email	The information withheld under (b)(5) includes deliberative and attorney-client privileged information related to the review of a draft Social Media Limited Implementation Plan (SMLIP). The emails are between USCIS OCC attorneys and agency employees, and include statements of uncertainty, and requests for additional information, which represents part of the deliberative process, as well as pre-decisional information being considered in this process. The information in the emails also contains a request for legal opinions related potential courses of actions being considered. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(5). All other information within this document was segregated and determined non-exempt and disclosed.

65-67	Email, RE: SM LIP WG call	(b)(5)	Email	Exemption (b)(7)(E) was used to redact portions of an email sent by USCIS employees and OCC attorneys discussing the review of a draft SMLIP. The information withheld under (b)(7)(E) includes the link to an internal intranet website that directs to the draft copy of the document being reviewed. This information, if disclosed, would reveal the technology resources currently being used in the government to review sensitive law enforcement documents that aid in the vetting process. This type of information is part of specific techniques and procedures involved the agency's enforcement of certain immigration and national security laws and directives. It would also reveal guidelines that could risk circumvention of the law, including the specific tools used by the agency to coordinate review of documents to support DHS's mission. The release of this information would put individuals on notice as to what technology is being used, so that individuals could research the technology to identify vulnerabilities and limitations, which could reasonably be expected to risk the circumvention of law and render the guidelines for additional screening measures relevant to national security, public safety, and fraud prevention useless. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(7)(E).
03-07	2/12/18	(0)(3)	EIIIaII	includes deliberative and attorney-client

				privileged information related to the review of a draft Social Media Limited Implementation Plan (SMLIP), and the summary of a meeting of the SMWG. The emails are between USCIS OCC attorneys, and include statements summarizing current issues being considered as part of the SMWG, and which agency employees would have the authority to conduct social media pilot. This information represents part of the deliberative process, as well as pre-decisional information being considered in this process. The information in the emails also contains a request for legal opinions related potential courses of actions being considered. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(5). All other information within this document was segregated and determined non-exempt and disclosed.
68-71	Email, RE: Social media - FORMS project - LPRs	(b)(5)	Email	The information withheld under (b)(5) includes deliberative and attorney-client privileged information related to the collection of information on immigration forms. The emails are between USCIS OCC attorneys, and include statements summarizing current legal issues being considered, which represents part of the deliberative process, as well as pre-decisional information being considered in this process. The information in the emails also contains a request for legal opinions related potential courses of actions being considered.

				Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(5). All other information within this document was segregated and determined non-exempt and disclosed.
73, 75, 77-78	Email, RE: Social Media Compliance Documentation	(b)(5)	Email	The information withheld under (b)(5) includes deliberative and attorney-client privileged information related to the review of draft social media compliance documentation. The emails are between USCIS OCC attorneys and include statements of uncertainty, edits, comments, and requests for additional information, which represents part of the deliberative process, as well as pre-decisional information being considered in this process. The information in the emails also contains information related to a request for legal opinions and includes potential courses of actions being considered. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(5). All other information within this document was segregated and determined non-exempt and disclosed.
80	Email, RE: Social Media meeting between Jon Cantor and USCIS D2	(b)(5)	Email	The information withheld under (b)(5) includes deliberative and attorney-client privileged information related to the review of draft social media compliance documentation. The emails are between USCIS OCC attorneys and include statements of clarifications and edits, which represents part of the deliberative process, as

				well as pre-decisional information being considered in this process. The information in the emails also contains information related to a request for legal opinions and includes potential courses of actions being considered. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(5). All other information within this document was segregated and determined non-exempt and disclosed.
84-85	Email, RE: Social Media PRA - Follow-up	(b)(7)(E)	Email	Exemption (b)(7)(E) was used to redact portions of an email sent between USCIS employees and OCC attorneys related to the review of Paperwork Reduction Act (PRA) materials. The information withheld under (b)(7)(E) includes a summary of the updates that were being considered for two Department of State forms that were going to be used to collect social media information from applicants, and a list of the specific social media applications and websites that were approved for use by agency employees when conducting social media screening and vetting. This information, if disclosed, would reveal the specific websites, applications, and social media that is being reviewed by immigration officers for certain immigration applicants and petitioners that need additional background checks or vetting, which is part of specific techniques and procedures involved in the enforcement of certain immigration and national security laws and

				directives. The release of this information would also reveal guidelines that could risk circumvention of the law, because it would put individuals on notice as to what information is considered as part of the screening and vetting process and could result in individuals hiding the use of certain social media platforms or encouraging the use of platforms that the agency does not access to, which would impact the effectiveness of screening and vetting procedures used for the enforcement of certain immigration and national security laws and directives, and could reasonably be expected to risk the circumvention of law and render the guidelines for additional screening measures relevant to national security, public safety, and fraud prevention useless. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(7)(E). All other information within this document was segregated and determined non-exempt and disclosed.
86	Email, FORMS Project: Draft Social Media PRA – Seeking Input by 4.30.18 at 12 PM	(b)(5)	Email	The information withheld under (b)(5) includes deliberative and attorney-client privileged information related to the review of PRA materials. The emails are between USCIS OCC attorneys and USCIS employees and include clarifications, and requests for additional information, which represents part of the deliberative process, as well as predecisional information being considered in this process. The information in the emails

				also contains information related to a request for legal opinions and includes potential courses of actions being considered. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(5). All other information within this document was segregated and determined non-exempt and disclosed.
87, 92	Email, RE: Social Media Privacy Compliance Documentation	(b)(5)	Email	The information withheld under (b)(5) includes deliberative and attorney-client privileged information related to the review of draft social media compliance documentation. The emails are between USCIS OCC attorneys and include statements of clarifications and edits, which represents part of the deliberative process, as well as pre-decisional information being considered in this process. The information in the emails also contains information related to a request for legal opinions and includes potential courses of actions being considered. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(5). All other information within this document was segregated and determined non-exempt and disclosed.
93-95	U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, Fraud Detection and National Security Investigations, Rules of Behavior for the Operational Use of Social Media – Draft	(b)(5): pages 93-94 (b)(7)(E): pages 94- 95	Draft document	The information withheld under (b)(5) as deliberative process privileged information consists of multiple draft comments, revisions, additions, re-wordings, suggestions, clarifications, questions about accuracy, statements of uncertainty, and

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this inforprocess version must be are auth social m. The maincludes	of for additional information. All of permation is part of the deliberative related to the review of a draft of the Rules of Behavior Form that a signed by Immigration Officers who derized to access the Internet and media content for official purposes. Iterial is also pre-decisional and is information that is not reflected in a liversion of the document.
attorney consists added to attorney review. appropr	ormation withheld under (b)(5) as v-client privileged information of comments and legal opinions of this draft document by USCIS OCC vs that had been asked to provide legal Accordingly, this material is iately exempt from disclosure at to Exemption (b)(5).
portions Behavio Immigra access t for offic withhele	ion (b)(7)(E) was used to redact s of a draft version of the Rules of or Form that must be signed by ation Officers who are authorized to the Internet and social media content cial purposes. The information d under (b)(7)(E) includes draft the internet and comments
written attorney propose	by USCIS employees and OCC vs that contain summaries of the ed processes and courses of action considered for USCIS employees who

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would be authorized to access the internet
and social media content to support USCIS's
mission. The redacted language also contains
specifics as to what methods USCIS's
immigration officers are authorized to use as
part of social media vetting, and what
limitations are placed on their collection
methods. This information, if disclosed,
would reveal the specific methods and
procedures that immigration officers are able
to use to conduct social media research for
certain immigration applicants and petitioners
that need additional background checks or
vetting, which is part of specific techniques
and procedures involved in the enforcement
of certain immigration and national security
laws and directives. The release of this
information would also reveal guidelines that
could risk circumvention of the law, because
it would put individuals on notice as to what
information is considered as part of the
screening and vetting process and what the
limitations of access are. The release of this
information could result in individuals hiding
the use of certain information on social media
platforms or engaging in behavior to avoid
proper vetting, which would impact the
effectiveness of screening and vetting
procedures used for the enforcement of
certain immigration and national security
laws and directives, and could reasonably be

				expected to risk the circumvention of law and render the guidelines for additional screening measures relevant to national security, public safety, and fraud prevention useless. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(7)(E). All other information within this document was segregated and determined non-exempt and disclosed.
100-101	Email, RE: social media question	(b)(5): pages 100- 101 (b)(7)(E): page 100	Email	The information withheld under (b)(5) includes deliberative and attorney-client privileged information related to a request for legal guidance on how certain information should be treated in adjudicating immigration cases. The emails are between USCIS OCC attorneys and USCIS employees and include clarifications, and requests for additional information, which represents part of the deliberative process, as well as pre-decisional information being considered in this process. The information in the emails also contains information related to a request for legal opinions and includes potential courses of actions being considered. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(5). Exemption (b)(7)(E) was used to redact portions of an email sent between USCIS employees and OCC attorneys related to a request for legal guidance on how certain

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	information should be treated in adjudicating
	immigration cases. The information
	withheld under (b)(7)(E) includes summaries
	of the proposed processes and courses of
	action being considered as guidance on the
	use of social media by the adjudications
	officers at USCIS Service Centers. The
	redacted language also contains specifics as
	to what methods USCIS's immigration
	officers are authorized to use as part of social
	media vetting, and what limitations are
	placed on their collection methods. This
	information, if disclosed, would reveal the
	specific methods and procedures that
	immigration officers are able to use to
	conduct social media research for certain
	immigration applicants and petitioners that
	need additional background checks or
	vetting, which is part of specific techniques
	and procedures involved in the enforcement
	of certain immigration and national security
	laws and directives. The release of this
	information would also reveal guidelines that
	could risk circumvention of the law, because
	it would put individuals on notice as to what
	information is considered as part of the
	screening and vetting process and what the
	limitations of access are. The release of this
	information could result in individuals hiding
	the use of certain information on social media
	platforms or engaging in behavior to avoid
	plationing of engaging in ochavior to avoid

102				proper vetting, which would impact the effectiveness of screening and vetting procedures used for the enforcement of certain immigration and national security laws and directives, and could reasonably be expected to risk the circumvention of law and render the guidelines for additional screening measures relevant to national security, public safety, and fraud prevention useless. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(7)(E). All other information within this document was segregated and determined non-exempt and disclosed.
102	USCIS SOCIAL MEDIA	(b)(7)(E)	Meeting Agenda	Exemption (b)(7)(E) was used to redact portions of a meeting agenda, which was used as part of a DHS Social Media Working Group meeting. The information withheld under (b)(7)(E) includes summaries of the proposed processes and courses of action being considered for USCIS's use of social media as part of its operations, including the status of the current use, the impact on law enforcement operations and other national security issues, and outstanding decisions that need to be made. This information, if disclosed, would reveal the specific methods and procedures that immigration officers are able to use to conduct social media research for certain immigration applicants and

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petitioners that need additional background
checks or vetting, which is part of specific
techniques and procedures involved in the
enforcement of certain immigration and
national security laws and directives. The
release of this information would also reveal
guidelines that could risk circumvention of
the law, because it would put individuals on
notice as to what information is considered as
part of the screening and vetting process, how
that information is obtained, and what the
limitations of access are. The release of this
information could result in individuals hiding
the use of certain information on social media
platforms or engaging in behavior to avoid
proper vetting, which would impact the
effectiveness of screening and vetting
procedures used for the enforcement of
certain immigration and national security
laws and directives, and could reasonably be
expected to risk the circumvention of law and
render the guidelines for additional screening
measures relevant to national security, public
safety, and fraud prevention useless.
Accordingly, this material is appropriately
exempt from disclosure pursuant to
Exemption (b)(7)(E). All other information
within this document was segregated and
determined non-exempt and disclosed.

104-105	Email, RE: Social Media question for PRA Forms -look back period - seeking USCIS position by 5pm on 2.14.18	(b)(5)	Email	The information withheld under (b)(5) includes deliberative and attorney-client privileged information related to the collection of information on immigration forms. The emails are between USCIS OCC attorneys, and include statements summarizing current legal issues being considered, which represents part of the deliberative process, as well as pre-decisional information being considered in this process. The information in the emails also contains legal opinions related to potential courses of actions being considered. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(5). All other information within this document was segregated and determined non-exempt and disclosed.
106-109	Email, RE: Social Media question for PRA Forms - seeking feedback by Jan. 17th at noon	(b)(5): pages 106- 109 (b)(7)(E): pages 106-108	Email	The information withheld under (b)(5) includes deliberative and attorney-client privileged information related to the review of PRA materials. The emails are between USCIS OCC attorneys, USCIS employees, DHS OGC attorneys, and DHS employees. The emails include clarifications, and requests for additional information, which represents part of the deliberative process, as well as pre-decisional information being considered in this process. The information in the emails also contains information related to a request for legal opinions and includes potential courses of actions being considered. Accordingly, this material is

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pursuant to Exemption (b)(5).
Exemption (b)(7)(E) was used to redact
portions of an email sent between USCIS
OCC attorneys, USCIS employees, DHS
OGC attorneys, and DHS employees related
to the review of PRA materials. The
information withheld under (b)(7)(E)
includes a summary of the current
outstanding decisions to be made regarding
the updates to Department of State forms that
were going to be used to collect social media
information from applicants, including details
about what information the Department of
State wanted to collect on the form, what
USCIS wanted to collect on the form, and the
reasons that each agency had for the
proposed changes. The document also
contains specific time frames that are
considered, what information is collected,
and how it will be used when conducting
social media screening and vetting. This
information, if disclosed, would reveal the
specific websites, applications, and social
media that is being reviewed by immigration
officers for certain immigration applicants
and petitioners that need additional
background checks or vetting, which is part
of specific techniques and procedures
involved in the enforcement of certain

				immigration and national security laws and directives. The release of this information would also reveal guidelines that could risk circumvention of the law, because it would put individuals on notice as to what information is considered as part of the screening and vetting process and could result in individuals hiding the use of certain social media platforms or encouraging the use of platforms that the agency does not access to, which would impact the effectiveness of screening and vetting procedures used for the enforcement of certain immigration and national security laws and directives, and could reasonably be expected to risk the circumvention of law and render the guidelines for additional screening measures relevant to national security, public safety, and fraud prevention useless. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(7)(E). All other information within this document was segregated and determined non-exempt and disclosed.
110-113	Email, RE: Social Media Screening	(b)(5)	Email	The information withheld under (b)(5) includes deliberative and attorney-client privileged information related to the review of draft legislative language that impacted the use of social media screening. The emails

				are between USCIS OCC attorneys and include edits, comments, clarifications, and requests for additional information, which represents part of the deliberative process, as well as pre-decisional information being considered in this process. The information in the emails also contains information related to a request for legal opinions and includes potential courses of actions being considered. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(5). All other information within this document was segregated and determined non-exempt and disclosed.
114-118	Email, RE: Social Media Talking Points	(b)(5)	Email	The information withheld under (b)(5) includes deliberative and attorney-client privileged information related to the review of draft talking points related to the use of social media screening. The emails are between USCIS OCC attorneys and include edits, comments, clarifications, and requests for additional information, which represents part of the deliberative process, as well as pre-decisional information being considered in this process. The information in the emails also contains information related to a request for legal opinions and includes potential courses of actions being considered. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(5). All other information

				within this document was segregated and determined non-exempt and disclosed.
119-120	Email, RE: Social Media Update session for Managers training	(b)(5) (b)(7)(E)	Email	The information withheld under (b)(5) includes deliberative and attorney-client privileged information, and consists of an email that contains portions of a meeting agenda, which includes summaries of key issues for clarifications, questions about accuracy, statements of uncertainty, and requests for additional information. All of this predecisional information is part of the deliberative and process related to the development of the process of collection of social media information as part of the immigration adjudication process. The information in the emails also contains information related to a request for legal opinions and includes potential courses of actions being considered. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(5). Exemption (b)(7)(E) was used to redact portions of a meeting agenda sent in emails between OCC attorneys, which was used as part of a DHS Social Media Working Group meeting. The information withheld under (b)(7)(E) includes summaries of the proposed
				processes and courses of action being considered for USCIS's use of social media as part of its operations, including the status of the current use, the impact on law enforcement operations and other national

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	security issues, and outstanding decisions that
	need to be made. This information, if
	disclosed, would reveal the specific methods
	and procedures that immigration officers are
	able to use to conduct social media research
	for certain immigration applicants and
	petitioners that need additional background
	checks or vetting, which is part of specific
	techniques and procedures involved in the
	enforcement of certain immigration and
	national security laws and directives. The
	release of this information would also reveal
	guidelines that could risk circumvention of
	the law, because it would put individuals on
	notice as to what information is considered as
	part of the screening and vetting process, how
	that information is obtained, and what the
	limitations of access are. The release of this
	information could result in individuals hiding
	the use of certain information on social media
	platforms or engaging in behavior to avoid
	proper vetting, which would impact the
	effectiveness of screening and vetting
	procedures used for the enforcement of
	certain immigration and national security
	laws and directives, and could reasonably be
	expected to risk the circumvention of law and
	render the guidelines for additional screening
	measures relevant to national security, public
	safety, and fraud prevention useless.
	Accordingly, this material is appropriately
	exempt from disclosure pursuant to
	Exemption (b)(7)(E). All other information
	Exemption (b)(7)(E). An other information

				within this document was segregated and determined non-exempt and disclosed.
139	Email, RE: USCIS internal touch base on collection of social media before call with CRCL and OGC	(b)(5)	Email	The information withheld under (b)(5) includes deliberative and attorney-client privileged information related to the review of PRA materials. The emails are between USCIS OCC attorneys and include a summary of OCC's interpretation of key legal issues prior to a scheduled call with DHS Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties (CRCL) and DHS OGC, which represents part of the deliberative process, as well as pre-decisional information being considered in this process. The information in the emails also contains information related to a request for legal opinions and includes potential courses of actions being considered. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(5). All other information within this document was segregated and determined non-exempt and disclosed.
140	Email, FW: Social Media Memorandum Revised 10- 31.docx	(b)(5) (b)(7)(E)	Email	The information withheld under (b)(5) includes deliberative and attorney-client privileged information related to the review of a draft Social Media Memorandum. The emails are between USCIS OCC attorneys and DHS OGC attorneys. The emails include comments and suggested edits for the draft memorandum, which represents part of the deliberative process, as well as pre-decisional information being considered in this process.

				The information in the emails also contains information related to a request for legal opinions and includes potential courses of actions being considered. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(5). All other information within this document was segregated and determined non-exempt and disclosed.
141-148	FDNS Use of Social Media Draft Memorandum	(b)(5) (b)(7)(E)	Draft Memorandum	The information withheld under (b)(5) as deliberative process privileged information consists of multiple draft comments, revisions, additions, re-wordings, suggestions, clarifications, questions about accuracy, statements of uncertainty, and requests for additional information. All of this information is part of the deliberative process related to the development of the memorandum on FDNS's use of social media as part of immigration adjudication. The material is also pre-decisional and includes information that is not reflected in the final version of the document. The information withheld under (b)(5) as attorney-client privileged information consists of comments and legal opinions added to this draft document by USCIS OCC attorneys that had been asked to provide legal review. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(5).

Exemption (b)(7)(E) was used to redact
portions of a draft version of a memorandum
on FDNS's use of social media as part of
immigration adjudication. The information
withheld under (b)(7)(E) includes draft
language in the document and comments
written by USCIS employees and OCC
attorneys that contain summaries of the
proposed processes and courses of action
being considered for FDNS employees who
would be authorized to access the internet
and social media content to support USCIS's
mission. The redacted language also contains
specifics as to what actions should be taken
for certain cases where there is suspected
fraud or concerns regarding public safety or
national security, the specific methods
USCIS's immigration officers are authorized
to use as part of social media vetting, and
what limitations are placed on their collection
methods. This information, if disclosed,
would reveal the specific methods and
procedures that immigration officers are able
to use to conduct social media research for
certain immigration applicants and petitioners
that need additional background checks or
vetting, which is part of specific techniques
and procedures involved in the enforcement
of certain immigration and national security
laws and directives. The release of this
information would also reveal guidelines that

				could risk circumvention of the law, because it would put individuals on notice as to what information is considered as part of the screening and vetting process and what the limitations of access are. The release of this information could result in individuals hiding the use of certain information on social media platforms or engaging in behavior to avoid proper vetting, which would impact the effectiveness of screening and vetting procedures used for the enforcement of certain immigration and national security laws and directives, and could reasonably be expected to risk the circumvention of law and render the guidelines for additional screening measures relevant to national security, public safety, and fraud prevention useless. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(7)(E). All other information within this document was segregated and determined non-exempt and disclosed.
151	Email, FW: social media 552a(e)(7) memo October 19 draft USCIS OPS_AWW.DOC	(b)(5) (b)(7)(E)	Email	The information withheld under (b)(5) includes deliberative and attorney-client privileged information related to the review of a draft Social Media Use memorandum. The emails are between USCIS OCC attorneys, USCIS employees, DHS OGC attorneys, and DHS employees. The emails include clarifications, and requests for

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additional information, which represents part
of the deliberative process, as well as pre-
decisional information being considered in
this process. The information in the emails
also contains information related to a request
for legal opinions and includes potential
courses of actions being considered.
Accordingly, this material is appropriately
exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(5).
Exemption (b)(3).
Exemption (b)(7)(E) was used to redact
portions of an email sent between USCIS
employees and attorneys, and DHS
employees and attorneys related to the review
of a draft Social Media Use memorandum.
The information withheld under $(b)(7)(E)$
includes summaries of the proposed
processes and courses of action being
considered as DHS's policies on the use of
social media. The redacted language also
contains specifics as to what methods
USCIS's immigration officers are authorized
to use as part of social media vetting, and
what limitations are placed on their collection
methods. This information, if disclosed,
would reveal the specific methods and
procedures that immigration officers are able
to use to conduct social media research for
certain immigration applicants and petitioners
that need additional background checks or
vetting, which is part of specific techniques

152	Email DE, USCIS internal	(h)(5)	Email	and procedures involved in the enforcement of certain immigration and national security laws and directives. The release of this information would also reveal guidelines that could risk circumvention of the law, because it would put individuals on notice as to what information is considered as part of the screening and vetting process and what the limitations of access are. The release of this information could result in individuals hiding the use of certain information on social media platforms or engaging in behavior to avoid proper vetting, which would impact the effectiveness of screening and vetting procedures used for the enforcement of certain immigration and national security laws and directives, and could reasonably be expected to risk the circumvention of law and render the guidelines for additional screening measures relevant to national security, public safety, and fraud prevention useless. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(7)(E). All other information within this document was segregated and determined non-exempt and disclosed.
153	Email, RE: USCIS internal touch base on collection of	(b)(5)	Email	The information withheld under (b)(5) includes deliberative and attorney-client privileged information related to the review

	social media before call with CRCL and OGC			of PRA materials. The emails are between USCIS OCC attorneys and include a summary of OCC's interpretation of key legal issues prior to a scheduled call with DHS CRCL and DHS OGC, which represents part of the deliberative process, as well as pre-decisional information being considered in this process. The information in the emails also contains information related to a request for legal opinions and includes potential courses of actions being considered. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(5). All other information within this document was segregated and determined non-exempt and disclosed.
159-161, 164	Email, RE: Weekly SMWG Meeting	(b)(5)	Email	The information withheld under (b)(5) includes deliberative and attorney-client privileged information related to a weekly SMWG meeting. The emails are between USCIS OCC attorneys and include working group process changes, as well as a summary of OCC's interpretation of key legal issues prior to a scheduled working group meeting, which represents part of the deliberative process, as well as pre-decisional information being considered in this process. The information in the emails also contains information related to a request for legal opinions and includes potential courses of actions being considered. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from

				disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(5). All other information within this document was segregated and determined non-exempt and disclosed.
170	Email, RE: D2 - Social Media meeting	(b)(5)	Email	The information withheld under (b)(5) includes deliberative and attorney-client privileged information related to the review of social media pilot documents. The emails are between USCIS OCC attorneys and include a summary of OCC's interpretation of key legal issues in the pilot documents, which represents part of the deliberative process, as well as pre-decisional information being considered in this process. The information in the emails also contains information related to a request for legal opinions and includes potential courses of actions being considered. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(5). All other information within this document was segregated and determined non-exempt and disclosed.
171, 174	Email, FW: Social Media WG - Finalization of Pilot Documents	(b)(5)	Email	The information withheld under (b)(5) includes deliberative and attorney-client privileged information related to the review of social media pilot documents. The emails are between USCIS OCC attorneys and include a summary of OCC's interpretation of key legal issues in the pilot documents, which represents part of the deliberative process, as well as pre-decisional information being considered in this process. The

				information in the emails also contains information related to a request for legal opinions and includes potential courses of actions being considered. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(5). All other information within this document was segregated and determined non-exempt and disclosed.
177	Collection, Use, And Retention of Publicly Available Social Media Information in Personnel Security Background Investigations and Adjudications (Version: 5.1-14 March 2016)	(b)(5)	Draft Directive	The information withheld under (b)(5) as deliberative process privileged information consists of multiple draft comments, revisions, additions, re-wordings, suggestions, clarifications, questions about accuracy, statements of uncertainty, and requests for additional information. All of this information is part of the deliberative process related to the draft Directive guiding the collection, use, and retention of social media information for background investigations and immigration adjudications. The withheld material is also pre-decisional and includes information that is not reflected in the final version of the document. All other information within this document was segregated and determined non-exempt and disclosed.
183-184, 187	Email, RE: DHS Social Media Task Force Action Plan	(b)(5)	Email	The information withheld under (b)(5) includes deliberative and attorney-client privileged information related to the review of the draft DHS Social Media Task Force Action Plan, and draft Social Media Operational Use Templates (SMOUT), which

				are reviewed to ensure all privacy concerns are addressed. The emails are between USCIS OCC attorneys and USCIS employees and include clarifications, and requests for additional information, which represents part of the deliberative process, as well as predecisional information being considered in this process. The information in the emails also contains information related to a request for legal opinions and includes potential courses of actions being considered. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(5). All other information within this document was segregated and determined non-exempt and disclosed.
188-190, 194- 195	Email, RE: Social media	(b)(5)	Email	The information withheld under (b)(5) includes deliberative and attorney-client privileged information related to the review of the draft DHS Social Media Task Force Action Plan, and draft SMOUTs. The emails are between USCIS OCC attorneys and USCIS employees and include clarifications, and requests for additional information, which represents part of the deliberative process, as well as pre-decisional information being considered in this process. The information in the emails also contains information related to a request for legal opinions and includes potential courses of actions being considered. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(5). All

				other information within this document was segregated and determined non-exempt and disclosed.
197	Email, RE: DHS Social Media Task Force Action Plan	(b)(5)	Email	The information withheld under (b)(5) includes deliberative and attorney-client privileged information related to the review of the draft DHS Social Media Task Force Action Plan, and draft SMOUTs. The emails are between USCIS OCC attorneys and USCIS employees and include clarifications, and requests for additional information, which represents part of the deliberative process, as well as pre-decisional information being considered in this process. The information in the emails also contains information related to a request for legal opinions and includes potential courses of actions being considered. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(5). All other information within this document was segregated and determined non-exempt and disclosed.
204	Email, RE: FDNS SMOUT and Rules of Behavior Updates for Clearance	(b)(5) (b)(7)(E)	Email	The information withheld under (b)(5) includes deliberative and attorney-client privileged information related to the review of the draft DHS Social Media Task Force Action Plan, draft SMOUTs, and draft updates to the Rules of Behavior. The emails are between USCIS OCC attorneys and USCIS employees and include clarifications, and requests for additional information, which represents part of the deliberative

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	process, as well as pre-decisional information being considered in this process. The
	information in the emails also contains
	information related to a request for legal
	opinions and includes potential courses of
	actions being considered. Accordingly, this
	material is appropriately exempt from
	disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(5).
	Exemption (b)(7)(E) was used to redact
	portions of an email sent between USCIS
	employees and OCC attorneys related to the
	review of the draft DHS Social Media Task
	Force Action Plan, draft SMOUTs, and draft
	updates to the Rules of Behavior. The
	information withheld under (b)(7)(E)
	includes specifics as to what methods
	USCIS's immigration officers are authorized
	to use as part of social media vetting, and
	what limitations are placed on their collection
	methods. This information, if disclosed,
	would reveal the specific methods and
	procedures that immigration officers are able
	to use to conduct social media research for
	certain immigration applicants and petitioners
	that need additional background checks or
	vetting, which is part of specific techniques
	and procedures involved in the enforcement
	of certain immigration and national security laws and directives. The release of this
	information would also reveal guidelines that
	could risk circumvention of the law, because
	it would put individuals on notice as to what

				information is considered as part of the screening and vetting process and what the limitations of access are. The release of this information could result in individuals hiding the use of certain information on social media platforms or engaging in behavior to avoid proper vetting, which would impact the effectiveness of screening and vetting procedures used for the enforcement of certain immigration and national security laws and directives, and could reasonably be expected to risk the circumvention of law and render the guidelines for additional screening measures relevant to national security, public safety, and fraud prevention useless. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(7)(E). All other information within this document was segregated and determined non-exempt and disclosed.
208-214, 219	DHS Operational Use of Social Media, Specific Questions	(b)(5): pages 208- 214, 219 (b)(7)(E): pages 209, 212-214	Privacy Compliance Draft Document	The information withheld under (b)(5) as deliberative process privileged information consists of multiple draft comments, revisions, additions, re-wordings, suggestions, clarifications, questions about accuracy, statements of uncertainty, and requests for additional information. All of this information is part of the deliberative process related to the review of a draft version of the Operational Use of Social Media template that must be completed in

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	order for the DHS Privacy Office to review and determine privacy compliance. The document includes draft responses to questions from the DHS Privacy Office about the collection of social media information, which includes pre-decisional and deliberative information. The information withheld under (b)(5) as attorney-client privileged information consists of comments and legal opinions added to this draft document by USCIS OCC attorneys that had been asked to provide legal review. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(5).
	Exemption (b)(7)(E) was used to redact portions of a draft version of the Operational Use of Social Media template memorandum. The information withheld under (b)(7)(E) includes draft language in the document and comments written by USCIS employees and OCC attorneys that contain summaries of the proposed processes and courses of action being considered for the use of social media screening for specific cases identified as having national security, fraud, or public safety concerns. The redacted language also contains specifics as to what actions should be taken for certain cases, which employees

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are authorized to handle certain cases, and
what limitations are placed on their collection
methods. This information, if disclosed,
would reveal the specific methods and
procedures that immigration officers are able
to use to conduct social media research for
certain immigration applicants and petitioners
that need additional background checks or
vetting, which is part of specific techniques
and procedures involved in the enforcement
of certain immigration and national security
laws and directives. The release of this
information would also reveal guidelines that
could risk circumvention of the law, because
it would put individuals on notice as to what
information is considered as part of the
screening and vetting process and what the
limitations of access are. The release of this
information could result in individuals hiding
the use of certain information on social media
platforms or engaging in behavior to avoid
proper vetting, which would impact the
effectiveness of screening and vetting
procedures used for the enforcement of
certain immigration and national security
laws and directives, and could reasonably be
expected to risk the circumvention of law and
render the guidelines for additional screening
measures relevant to national security, public
safety, and fraud prevention useless.
Accordingly, this material is appropriately

				exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(7)(E). All other information within this document was segregated and determined non-exempt and disclosed.
220-221, 225, 227-228	Email, RE: Review of Social Media Memo	(b)(5): pages 220- 221, 225, 227-228 (b)(7)(E): page 221	Email	The information withheld under (b)(5) as deliberative process privileged information related to the review of a draft Social Media memorandum. The emails are between USCIS OCC and USCIS employees and contain pre-decisional and deliberative information, including multiple draft comments, revisions, additions, re-wordings, suggestions, clarifications, questions about accuracy, statements of uncertainty, and requests for additional information. All of this information is part of the deliberative process. The information withheld under (b)(5) as attorney-client privileged information consists of comments and legal opinions about the draft memorandum, which were provided by USCIS OCC attorneys that had been asked to provide legal review. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(5). Exemption (b)(7)(E) was used to redact portions of an email sent between USCIS

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	OCC attorneys and USCIS employees related
	to the review of a draft Social Media
	memorandum regarding social media
	screening as part of adjudicating pending K-1
	visa adjustments. The information withheld
	under (b)(7)(E) includes a summary of the
	current outstanding decisions to be made
	regarding the K-1 process and which
	applications would be subject to social media
	review, and the potential legal considerations
	that were being reviewed. This information,
	if disclosed, would reveal the specific
	applications types that may be subject to
	social media screening and what actions to
	take in certain cases, which is part of specific
	techniques and procedures involved in the
	enforcement of certain immigration and
	national security laws and directives. The
	release of this information would also reveal
	guidelines that could risk circumvention of
	the law, because it would put individuals on
	notice as to what applicants face social media
	screening, which would impact the
	effectiveness of screening and vetting
	procedures used for the enforcement of
	certain immigration and national security
	laws and directives, and could reasonably be
	expected to risk the circumvention of law and
	render the guidelines for additional screening
	measures relevant to national security, public
	safety, and fraud prevention useless.
	surety, and made prevention asciess.

				Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(7)(E). All other information within this document was segregated and determined non-exempt and disclosed.
231	Email, RE: Social Media Delegation Discussion - Follow Up Meeting	(b)(5)	Email	The information withheld under (b)(5) as deliberative process privileged information related to the review of a draft Social Media Delegation. The emails are between USCIS OCC and USCIS employees and contain predecisional and deliberative information, including multiple draft comments, revisions, additions, re-wordings, suggestions, clarifications, questions about accuracy, statements of uncertainty, and requests for additional information. All of this information is part of the deliberative process. The information withheld under (b)(5) as attorney-client privileged information consists of comments and legal opinions about the review of a draft Social Media Delegation, which were provided by USCIS OCC attorneys that had been asked to provide legal review. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(5).

				All other information within this document was segregated and determined non-exempt and disclosed.
240-244	Email, RE: [Social Media SORN] Coordinated response	(b)(5)	Email	The information withheld under (b)(5) as deliberative process privileged information related to the agency-wide coordinated review of the Social Media System of Records Notice (SORN). The emails are between USCIS OCC and USCIS employees and contain pre-decisional and deliberative information, including multiple draft comments, revisions, additions, re-wordings, suggestions, clarifications, questions about accuracy, statements of uncertainty, and requests for additional information. All of this information is part of the deliberative process.
				The information withheld under (b)(5) as attorney-client privileged information consists of comments and legal opinions about the draft SORN, which were provided by USCIS OCC attorneys that had been asked to provide legal review. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(5).
				All other information within this document was segregated and determined non-exempt and disclosed.
246	Email, FW: Social Media Delegation Templates	(b)(5)	Email	The information withheld under (b)(5) includes deliberative and attorney-client privileged information related to the review

				of the draft Social Media Delegation. The emails are between USCIS OCC attorneys and include two versions of a portion of the Delegation, highlighting the differences between the two versions, and clarifying the options involved, which represents part of the deliberative process, as well as pre-decisional information being considered in this process. The information in the emails also contains information related to a request for legal opinions and includes potential courses of actions being considered. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(5). All other information within this document was segregated and determined non-exempt and disclosed.
248	Email, Query re: signed Delegation 15002 (WF1137322)	(b)(5)	Email	The information withheld under (b)(5) as deliberative process privileged information related to the review of a draft Social Media Delegation. The emails are between USCIS employees and DHS employees and contain pre-decisional and deliberative information, including a specific edit to a portion of the draft. All other information within this document was segregated and determined non-exempt and disclosed.
250-251	Social Media PRA Submission- DHS Policy Seeking Input by Noon Monday	(b)(5): page 251 (b)(7)(E): page 250	Email	The information withheld under (b)(5) includes deliberative and attorney-client privileged information related to the review of PRA materials. The emails are between USCIS OCC attorneys and USCIS employees and include clarifications, and requests for

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	additional information, which represents part of the deliberative process, as well as predecisional information being considered in this process. The information in the emails also contains information related to a request for legal opinions and includes potential courses of actions being considered. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(5). Exemption (b)(7)(E) was used to redact a link to an internal intranet website that directs to the draft copy of the document being reviewed. This information, if disclosed, would reveal the technology resources currently being used in the government to review sensitive law enforcement documents that aid in the vetting process. This type of information is part of specific techniques and procedures involved the agency's enforcement of certain immigration and national security laws and directives. It would also reveal guidelines that could risk circumvention of the law, including the specific tools used by the agency to coordinate review of documents to support DHS's mission. The release of this information would put individuals on notice as to what technology is being used, so that individuals could research the technology to identify vulnerabilities and limitations, which
	could reasonably be expected to risk the

				circumvention of law and render the guidelines for additional screening measures relevant to national security, public safety, and fraud prevention useless. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(7)(E). All other information within this document was segregated and determined non-exempt and disclosed.
252	Email, Social Media Privacy Compliance Documentation	(b)(5)	Email	The information withheld under (b)(5) includes deliberative and attorney-client privileged information related to the review of the draft SMOUTs. The emails are between USCIS OCC attorneys and include suggested concerns with language in the SMOUTs, which represents part of the deliberative process, as well as pre-decisional information being considered in this process. The information in the emails also contains information related to a request for legal opinions and includes potential courses of actions being considered. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(5). All other information within this document was segregated and determined non-exempt and disclosed.
253	Social Media Talking Points	(b)(5)	Email	The information withheld under (b)(5) includes deliberative and attorney-client privileged information related to the review of the draft Social Media Talking Points. The emails are between USCIS OCC

				attorneys and include suggested concerns with language in the talking points, which represents part of the deliberative process, as well as pre-decisional information being considered in this process. The information in the emails also contains information related to a request for legal opinions and includes potential courses of actions being considered. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(5). All other information within this document was segregated and determined non-exempt and disclosed.
255	Social Media Task Force	(b)(5)	Email	The information withheld under (b)(5) includes deliberative and attorney-client privileged information related to an upcoming meeting of the DHS Social Media Task Force. The emails are between USCIS OCC attorneys and DHS OGC attorneys, and include specific issues that DHS employees had requested DHS OGC consider, which represents part of the deliberative process, as well as pre-decisional information being considered in this process. The information in the emails also contains information related to a request for legal opinions and includes potential courses of actions being considered. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(5). All other information within this document was

				segregated and determined non-exempt and disclosed.
260-261, 263-264	UPDATE: Delegation 15002, Revision 01, Delegation to the Director of U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services to Conduct Certain Law Enforcement Activities	(b)(5)	Email	The information withheld under (b)(5) includes deliberative and attorney-client privileged information related to the review of the draft Delegation 15002, which involves the delegation to USCIS to conduct certain law enforcement activities, including searches of social media as part of immigration adjudications. The emails are between USCIS OCC attorneys and were sent to USCIS OCC leadership to provide a summary of the draft delegation and multiple concerns, edits, revisions, and comments that USCIS had received from ICE, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), Privacy, and CRCL. This information represents part of the deliberative process, as well as predecisional information being considered in this process. The information in the emails also contains legal opinions from USCIS OCC, ICE Office of the Principal Legal Advisor (OPLA), and CBP legal counsel, and includes potential courses of actions being considered. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(5). All other information within this document was segregated and determined non-exempt and disclosed.
268	Email, RE: DHS social media policy	(b)(5)	Email	The information withheld under (b)(5) includes deliberative and attorney-client privileged information related to USCIS's

				social media activities in relation to ICE and CBP's operations. The emails are between attorneys from USCIS OCC, ICE OPLA, and CBP legal counsel, and include a summary of requested edits to the draft Social Media Delegation. This information represents part of the deliberative process, as well as predecisional information being considered in this process. The information also contains legal opinions from USCIS OCC and ICE OPLA, and includes potential courses of actions being considered. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(5). All other information within this document was segregated and determined non-exempt and disclosed.
270	Weekly SMWG Meeting Minutes	(b)(7)(E)	Email	Exemption (b)(7)(E) was used to redact portions of an email sent by USCIS employees discussing the minutes of the DHS Social Media Working Group meeting. The information withheld under (b)(7)(E) includes the link to an internal intranet website that directs to the meeting minutes. This information, if disclosed, would reveal the technology resources currently being used in the government to review sensitive law enforcement documents that aid in the vetting process. This type of information is part of specific techniques and procedures involved the agency's enforcement of certain immigration and national security laws and directives. It would also reveal guidelines

273-275	DHS's 90 Day Letter to Office of Inspector General (OIG) 17-40Final Report: DHS' Pilots for Social Media Screening Need Increased Rigor to Ensure Scalability and Long-term Success (OIG Project No. 16-079-ISP-USCIS)	(b)(5) (b)(7)(E)	Draft Memorandum	that could risk circumvention of the law, including the specific tools used by the agency to coordinate review of documents to support DHS's mission. The release of this information would put individuals on notice as to what technology is being used, so that individuals could research the technology to identify vulnerabilities and limitations, which could reasonably be expected to risk the circumvention of law and render the guidelines for additional screening measures relevant to national security, public safety, and fraud prevention useless. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(7)(E). The information withheld under (b)(5) as deliberative process privileged information consists of multiple draft comments, revisions, additions, re-wordings, suggestions, clarifications, questions about accuracy, statements of uncertainty, and requests for additional information. All of this information is part of the deliberative process related to the drafting of a Memorandum from DHS to the Inspector General regarding DHS' pilots for social media screening. The draft memorandum contains draft recommendations and responses, which are pre-decisional and include information that is not reflected in the final version of the document.
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The information with 11 1 (1)(5)
The information withheld under (b)(5) as
attorney-client privileged information
consists of comments and legal opinions
added to this draft document by USCIS OCC
attorneys that had been asked to provide legal
review. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure
pursuant to Exemption (b)(5).
pursuant to Exemption (b)(3).
Exemption (b)(7)(E) was used to redact
portions of a draft version of a Memorandum
from DHS to the Inspector General regarding
DHS' pilots for social media screening. The
information withheld under (b)(7)(E)
includes draft language in the document and
comments written by USCIS employees and
OCC attorneys that contain summaries of the
proposed processes and courses of action
being considered for DHS's pilots for social
media screening. The redacted language also
contains specifics as to what actions should
be taken by different DHS components,
including USCIS, CBP, and ICE, and details
as to how each component was involved in
the social media pilots. This information, if
disclosed, would reveal the specific methods
and procedures that law enforcement and
immigration officers are able to use to
conduct social media research, which is part
of specific techniques and procedures
involved in the enforcement of certain
immigration and national security laws and

				directives. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(7)(E). All other information within this document was segregated and determined non-exempt and disclosed.
277-288	Refugee Screening Review: The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency 2.0 Pilot	(b)(7)(E)	Pilot Project Summary	Exemption (b)(7)(E) was used to redact portions of a document titled Refugee Screening Review: The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency 2.0 Pilot, which was compiled by FDNS, and dated June 2, 2016. The document contains a summary of the social media pilot project to assess the feasibility of using social media to screen refugee applicants. The information withheld under (b)(7)(E) includes a description of the specific technology that USCIS and DHS would be using to conduct social media research as part of the vetting process, the specific cases and applicants that would be screened, and the challenges and limitations in the process. This information, if disclosed, would reveal the technology resources currently being used in the vetting process by law enforcement and immigration officers, which is part of specific techniques and procedures involved in the enforcement of certain immigration and national security laws and directives. It would also reveal guidelines that could risk circumvention of the law, including the specific tools used by law enforcement as part of the vetting and

				screening process. The release of this information would put individuals on notice as to what technology is being used, so that individuals could research the technology to identify vulnerabilities and limitations, which could impact the effectiveness of the screening and vetting process. Releasing this information could reasonably be expected to risk the circumvention of law and render the guidelines for additional screening measures relevant to national security, public safety, and fraud prevention useless. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(7)(E). All other information within this document was segregated and determined non-exempt
289-292	USCIS/State Social Media Elicitation Plan - Refugee Applicant Pilot	(b)(7)(E)	Concept of Operations	and disclosed. Exemption (b)(7)(E) was used to redact portions of a document prepared by USCIS and the Department of State on the Social Media Elicitation Plan as part of the Refugee Applicant Pilot. The document contains a summary of the social media pilot project to assess the feasibility of using social media to screen refugee applicants. The information withheld under (b)(7)(E) includes a description of the specific technology that USCIS and DOS would be using to conduct social media research as part of the vetting process, the specific cases and applicants that would be screened, the specific social media applications reviewed, and which employees and offices were involved in the process.

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This information, if disclosed, would reveal
the technology resources currently being used
in the vetting process by law enforcement
and immigration officers, and the specific
websites, applications, and social media that
is being reviewed by immigration officers for
certain immigration applicants and petitioners
that need additional background checks or
vetting, which is part of specific techniques
and procedures involved in the enforcement
of certain immigration and national security
laws and directives. The release of this
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could risk circumvention of the law, because
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that the agency does not access to, which
would impact the effectiveness of screening
and vetting procedures used for the
enforcement of certain immigration and
national security laws and directives, and

				could reasonably be expected to risk the circumvention of law and render the guidelines for additional screening measures relevant to national security, public safety, and fraud prevention useless. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(7)(E). All other information within this document was segregated and determined non-exempt and disclosed.
294-300	Review of Refugee Screening Social Media Pilot	(b)(7)(E)	Pilot Project Summary	Exemption (b)(7)(E) was used to redact portions of a document prepared by FDNS titled "Review of Refugee Screening Social Media Pilot," dated March 16, 2016. The information redacted under Exemption (b)(7)(E) consists of a description of the specific technology that USCIS would be using to conduct social media research as part of the vetting process, the specific cases and applicants that would be screened, detailed information about some applicants that had been screened and the results of that screening, the specific social media applications reviewed, and which key words were used to search those social media applications. This information, if disclosed, would reveal the technology resources currently being used in the vetting process by law enforcement and immigration officers, and the specific websites, applications, and social media that is being reviewed by immigration officers for certain immigration applicants and petitioners that need additional

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1	background checks or vetting, which is part
	of specific techniques and procedures
	involved in the enforcement of certain
	immigration and national security laws and
	directives. The release of this information
	would also reveal guidelines that could risk
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	and vetting procedures used for the
	enforcement of certain immigration and
	national security laws and directives, and
	could reasonably be expected to risk the
	circumvention of law and render the
	guidelines for additional screening measures
	relevant to national security, public safety,
	and fraud prevention useless. Accordingly,
	this material is appropriately exempt from
	disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(7)(E).
	anseresare parameter (a)(1)(E).

				All other information within this document was segregated and determined non-exempt and disclosed.
302-303, 305-318	Review of K-1 Adjustment of Status Social Media Pilots	(b)(7)(E)	Pilot Project Summary	Exemption (b)(7)(E) was used to redact portions of a document prepared by USCIS titled "Review of K-1 Adjustment of Status Social Media Pilots." The information redacted under Exemption (b)(7)(E) consists of a description of the specific technology that USCIS would be using to conduct social media research as part of the vetting process, the specific cases and applicants that would be screened, detailed information about some applicants that had been screened and the results of that screening, the specific social media applications reviewed, and which key words were used to search those social media applications. This information, if disclosed, would reveal the technology resources currently being used in the vetting process by law enforcement and immigration officers, and the specific websites, applications, and social media that is being reviewed by immigration officers for certain immigration applicants and petitioners that need additional background checks or vetting, which is part of specific techniques and procedures involved in the enforcement of certain immigration and national security laws and directives. The release of this information would also reveal guidelines that could risk circumvention of the law, because it would put individuals on notice as to what

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319-324	Briefing Paper/Way Forward - Refugee Social Media Screening	(b)(7)(E)	Briefing Paper	Exemption (b)(7)(E) was used to redact portions of a briefing paper prepared by FDNS and RAIO regarding Refugee Social Media screening. The information redacted under Exemption (b)(7)(E) consists of a

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	summary of the social media screening
	efforts to date, the timeline for proposed pilot
	projects, optional courses of action and
	recommendations, and summaries of the
	limitations and resource constraints. The
	document also contains detailed information
	about some applicants that had been screened
	and the results of that screening, the specific
	social media applications reviewed, and
	which key words were used to search those
	social media applications. This information,
	if disclosed, would reveal the technology
	resources currently being used in the vetting
	process by law enforcement and immigration
	officers, and the specific websites,
	applications, and social media that is being
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326-328, 330	FDNS PowerPoint, "USCIS Social Media Update	(b)(7)(E)	PowerPoint	Exemption (b)(7)(E) was used to redact portions of a PowerPoint presentation titled "USCIS Social Media Update," which was prepared by FDNS, and dated January 18, 2017. The information redacted under Exemption (b)(7)(E) consists of a summary of the social media screening efforts as part of USCIS refugee pilots, detailed information about some applicants that had been screened and the results of that screening, the specific social media applications reviewed, which key words were used to search those social

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		and vetting procedures used for the

				enforcement of certain immigration and national security laws and directives, and could reasonably be expected to risk the circumvention of law and render the guidelines for additional screening measures relevant to national security, public safety, and fraud prevention useless. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(7)(E). All other information within this document was segregated and determined non-exempt and disclosed.
331-334	USCIS Social Media & Vetting: Overview and Efforts to Date	(b)(7)(E)	Briefing Overview	Exemption (b)(7)(E) was used to redact portions of a briefing overview for USCIS leadership dated March 2, 2017, which summarizes USCIS's social media vetting efforts to date. The information redacted under Exemption (b)(7)(E) consists of a summary of the social media screening efforts to date, optional courses of action and recommendations, detailed information about some applicants that had been screened and the results of that screening, the specific social media applications reviewed, and which key words were used to search those social media applications. This information, if disclosed, would reveal the technology resources currently being used in the vetting process by law enforcement and immigration officers, and the specific websites, applications, and social media that is being reviewed by immigration officers for certain immigration applicants and petitioners that

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	need additional background checks or vetting, which is part of specific techniques and procedures involved in the enforcement of certain immigration and national security laws and directives. The release of this information would also reveal guidelines that could risk circumvention of the law, because it would put individuals on notice as to what information is considered as part of the screening and vetting process, what words and images are being searched for, and the specific tools used by law enforcement. The release of this information would put individuals on notice as to what technology is being used, so that individuals could research the technology to identify vulnerabilities and limitations, which could impact the effectiveness of the screening and vetting process. It could also result in individuals hiding the use of certain social media platforms or encouraging the use of platforms that the agency does not access to, which would impact the effectiveness of screening and vetting procedures used for the enforcement of certain immigration and national security laws and directives, and could reasonably be expected to risk the circumvention of law and render the guidelines for additional screening measures
	guidelines for additional screening measures relevant to national security, public safety, and fraud prevention useless. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(7)(E).

				All other information within this document was segregated and determined non-exempt and disclosed.
335-338	DHS Secretary Briefing Binder; Social Media	(b)(7)(E)	Briefing Paper	Exemption (b)(7)(E) was used to redact portions of a DHS Secretary Briefing Binder on USCIS's use of social media. The information redacted under Exemption (b)(7)(E) consists of specific techniques and procedures involved in the operational use of social media to conduct screening for certain applicants, including detailed information about some applicants that had been screened and the results of that screening, the specific social media applications reviewed, which words and phrases were used to search those social media applications, and the challenges identified in the process of social media screening and vetting. This information, if disclosed, would reveal the technology resources currently being used in the vetting process by law enforcement and immigration officers and the specific words and photos being searched for as possible indicators of fraud, public safety, or national security concerns, which is part of specific techniques and procedures involved in the enforcement of certain immigration and national security laws and directives. The release of this information would also reveal guidelines that could risk circumvention of the law, because it would put individuals on notice as to what information is considered as part of the screening and vetting process, what words

241 242				and images are being searched for, and the specific factors being considered by law enforcement during the vetting process. The release of this information would put individuals on notice as to what technology is being used, so that individuals could research the technology to identify vulnerabilities and limitations, which could impact the effectiveness of the screening and vetting process. It could also result in individuals hiding the use of certain social media platforms or encouraging the use of platforms that the agency does not access to, which would impact the effectiveness of screening and vetting procedures used for the enforcement of certain immigration and national security laws and directives, and could reasonably be expected to risk the circumvention of law and render the guidelines for additional screening measures relevant to national security, public safety, and fraud prevention useless. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(7)(E). All other information within this document was segregated and determined non-exempt and disclosed.
341-343	USCIS Social Media Use Cases	(b)(7)(E)	Use Case Scenarios Summary	Exemption (b)(7)(E) was used to redact a copy of a document containing USCIS Social Media Use Cases. The document was compiled by USCIS and DHS Science & Technology as part of the effort to obtain technological tools for operational use of

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	social media. The information redacted
	under Exemption (b)(7)(E) consists of
	multiple use-case scenarios for various
	private sector social media vendors that
	contain the techniques and procedures
	involved in the operational use of social
	media to conduct screening for certain
	applicants, which will allow vendors to
	determine whether they can offer the agency
	a technological tool that would fit operational
	needs. Each scenario contains detailed
	information about how the search is
	conducted, what information is screened, the
	factors that may indicate potential national
	security or criminal concerns, technological
	challenges that need to be addressed, and
	other specific techniques and procedures that
	are part of the vetting process. This
	information, if disclosed, would reveal the
	technology resources currently being used in
	the vetting process by law enforcement and
	immigration officers, the tools that may be
	used in future screening, and the specific
	words and patterns that are reviewed and
	flagged as possible indicators of fraud, public
	safety, or national security concerns, which is
	part of specific techniques and procedures
	involved in the enforcement of certain
	immigration and national security laws and
	directives. The release of this information
	would also reveal guidelines that could risk
	circumvention of the law, because it would
	put individuals on notice as to what
	put marviduais on notice as to what

				information is considered as part of the screening and vetting process, what patterns immigration officers look for, and the specific factors being considered by law enforcement during the vetting process. Disclosure of this information would also put individuals on notice as to what technology is being used, so that individuals could research the technology to identify vulnerabilities and limitations, which could impact the effectiveness of the screening and vetting process, and could reasonably be expected to risk the circumvention of law and render the guidelines for additional screening measures relevant to national security, public safety, and fraud prevention useless. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(7)(E). All other information within this document was segregated and determined non-exempt and disclosed.
346-348	S&T HSARPA DA-E, USCIS Social Media Analytics	(b)(7)(E)	PowerPoint	Exemption (b)(7)(E) was used to redact portions of a PowerPoint document, which was compiled by DHS Science and Technology, titled "USCIS Social Media Analytics," dated October 12, 2016. The PowerPoint summarizes the current social media pilot plans in progress, and discusses proposed processes and courses of action being considered. The redacted information consists of specific technology platforms being used to conduct social media searches and analyze data. This information, if

				disclosed, would reveal the technology resources currently being used in the vetting process by law enforcement and immigration officers, which is part of specific techniques and procedures involved in the enforcement of certain immigration and national security laws and directives. It would also reveal guidelines that could risk circumvention of the law, including the specific tools used by law enforcement as part of the vetting and screening process. The release of this information would put individuals on notice as to what technology is being used, so that individuals could research the technology to identify vulnerabilities and limitations, which could impact the effectiveness of the screening and vetting process. Releasing this information could reasonably be expected to risk the circumvention of law and render the guidelines for additional screening measures relevant to national security, public safety, and fraud prevention useless. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(7)(E). All other information within this document was segregated and determined non-exempt and disclosed.
360-363, 365- 370, 372-380, 382, 384, 386, 390	FDNS PowerPoint, "Open- Source and Social Media Research Standard Operating Procedures" dated November 24, 2015	(b)(7)(E)	PowerPoint	Exemption (b)(7)(E) was used to redact portions of an FDNS PowerPoint, "Open-Source and Social Media Research Standard Operating Procedures" dated November 24, 2015. The PowerPoint summarizes the types of open source and social media information

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	available, what information may be searched
	for by FDNS Immigration Officers, what the
	information may be used for in adjudications,
	and the limits and restrictions on searches
	and information that can be used. The
	redacted information consists of specific
	technology platforms being used to conduct
	social media searches and analyze data, how
	it should be accessed and used, the benefits to
	the use of these platforms, how to evaluate
	information collected, what information
	should be deemed credible or significant,
	what information should be saved and
	documented, what techniques should be used
	when accessing user accounts, which specific
	social media platforms are required to be
	searched, and specific activities that are
	prohibited. This information, if disclosed,
	would reveal the technology resources
	currently being used in the vetting process by
	law enforcement and immigration officers,
	and the specific websites, applications, and
	social media platforms that are being
	reviewed by immigration officers for certain
	immigration applicants and petitioners that
	need additional background checks or
	vetting, which is part of specific techniques
	and procedures involved in the enforcement
	of certain immigration and national security
	laws and directives. The release of this
	information would also reveal guidelines that
	could risk circumvention of the law, because
	it would put individuals on notice as to what
	it would put individuals on notice as to what

				information is considered as part of the screening and vetting process, what types of patterns, actions, and words are being searched for, and the specific tools used by law enforcement. The release of this information would put individuals on notice as to what technology is being used, so that individuals could research the technology to identify vulnerabilities and limitations, which could impact the effectiveness of the screening and vetting process. It could also result in individuals hiding the use of certain social media platforms or encouraging the use of platforms that the agency does not access to, which would impact the effectiveness of screening and vetting procedures used for the enforcement of certain immigration and national security laws and directives, and could reasonably be expected to risk the circumvention of law and render the guidelines for additional screening measures relevant to national security, public safety, and fraud prevention useless. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(7)(E). All other information within this document was segregated and determined non-exempt and disclosed.
395-405	Social Media Expansion Plan, Concept of Operations	(b)(7)(E)	Concept of Operations	Exemptions (b)(7)(E) was used to withhold information within a draft Concept of Operations (CONOP) document which focused on the Social Media Expansion Plan for Refugee Applicants. The CONOP draft

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focused on certain key elements of the plan
including the categories of applicants that
will be part of the social media vetting
process, the social media platforms to access,
staffing requirements, and the process for
reviewing results and incorporating them into
the adjudicative process. The information
redacted under Exemption (b)(7)(E) consists
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of specific techniques and procedures
involved in the operational use of social
media to conduct screening for certain
applicants, including detailed information
about some applicants that had been screened
and the results of that screening, the specific
social media applications reviewed, and the
factors, patterns, words, and phrases that are
used to search those social media
applications. The redacted information also
contains summaries of the program that detail
which applicants will be flagged for
enhanced review that includes social media
screening, which areas the pilot will be taking
place, the indicators that will be looked for
and on which social media applications, and
the challenges identified in the process of
social media screening and vetting. This
information, if disclosed, would reveal the
technology resources currently being used in
the vetting process by law enforcement and
immigration officers, the methods used to
conduct searches, and the specific factors that
immigration officers are looking for to
indicate possible indicators of fraud, public

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safety, or national security concerns, which is
part of specific techniques and procedures
involved in the enforcement of certain
immigration and national security laws and
directives. The release of this information
would also reveal guidelines that could risk
circumvention of the law, because it would
put individuals on notice as to what
information is considered as part of the
screening and vetting process, which areas
and applicants will be searched during which
time periods, and the specific factors being
considered by law enforcement during the
vetting process. The release of this
information would put individuals on notice
as to what technology is being used, so that
individuals could research the technology to
identify vulnerabilities and limitations, which
could impact the effectiveness of the
screening and vetting process. It could also
result in individuals hiding the use of certain
social media platforms or encouraging the
use of platforms that the agency does not
access to, which would impact the
effectiveness of screening and vetting
procedures used for the enforcement of
certain immigration and national security
laws and directives, and could reasonably be
expected to risk the circumvention of law and
render the guidelines for additional screening
measures relevant to national security, public
safety, and fraud prevention useless.
Accordingly, this material is appropriately

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				exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(7)(E). All other information within this document was segregated and determined non-exempt and disclosed.
407-415	FDNS Training PowerPoint, "Social Media Screening," dated September 19, 2017	(b)(7)(E)	PowerPoint	Exemption (b)(7)(E) was used to redact portions of an FDNS PowerPoint, "Social Media Screening," dated September 19, 2017. The PowerPoint summarizes the FDNS Social Media Screening team, the status of the pilots for social media review, and the results of the pilots. The information withheld under (b)(7)(E) consists of detailed information regarding the screening that took place during the pilots, which applicants were screened, and the screening results and the impact on those applications. The withheld information also includes screenshots of actual words and images found on social media depicting potential indicators of national security or public safety concerns. This information, if disclosed, would reveal the methods used to conduct searches, and the specific factors that immigration officers are looking for to indicate possible indicators of fraud, public safety, or national security concerns, which is part of specific techniques and procedures involved in the enforcement of certain immigration and national security laws and directives. The release of this information would also reveal guidelines that could risk circumvention of the law, because it would put individuals on notice as to what information is considered as part of the

				screening and vetting process, which areas and applicants will be subject to screening, and the specific factors being considered by law enforcement during the vetting process. The release of this information could result in individuals hiding certain images, words, or other indicators that law enforcement is looking for, which would impact the effectiveness of screening and vetting procedures used for the enforcement of certain immigration and national security laws and directives, and could reasonably be expected to risk the circumvention of law and render the guidelines for additional screening measures relevant to national security, public safety, and fraud prevention useless. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(7)(E). All other information within this document was segregated and determined non-exempt and disclosed.
417-423, 425, 426	FDNS Training PowerPoint, "Social Media Screening," dated August 8, 2017	(b)(7)(E)	PowerPoint	Exemption (b)(7)(E) was used to redact portions of an FDNS PowerPoint, "Social Media Screening," dated August 8, 2017. The PowerPoint summarizes the FDNS Social Media Screening team, the status of the pilots for social media review, and the results of the pilots. The information withheld under (b)(7)(E) consists of detailed information regarding the screening that took place during the pilots, which applicants were screened, and the screening results and the impact on those applications. The withheld

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	information also includes screenshots of
	actual words and images found on social
	media depicting potential indicators of
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	national security or public safety concerns.
	This information, if disclosed, would reveal
	the methods used to conduct searches, and
	the specific factors that immigration officers
	are looking for to indicate possible indicators
	of fraud, public safety, or national security
	concerns, which is part of specific techniques
	and procedures involved in the enforcement
	of certain immigration and national security
	laws and directives. The release of this
	information would also reveal guidelines that
	could risk circumvention of the law, because
	it would put individuals on notice as to what
	information is considered as part of the
	screening and vetting process, which areas
	and applicants will be subject to screening,
	and the specific factors being considered by
	law enforcement during the vetting process.
	The release of this information could result in
	individuals hiding certain images, words, or
	other indicators that law enforcement is
	looking for, which would impact the
	effectiveness of screening and vetting
	procedures used for the enforcement of
	certain immigration and national security
	laws and directives, and could reasonably be
	expected to risk the circumvention of law and
	render the guidelines for additional screening
	measures relevant to national security, public
	safety, and fraud prevention useless.
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				Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(7)(E). All other information within this document was segregated and determined non-exempt and disclosed.
431-442	Social Media Assessment form - training form dated 9/30/2016 containing real examples from specific applicant's profiles	(b)(7)(E)	Form	Exemption (b)(7)(E) was used to redact portions of a Social Media Assessment form dated September 30, 2016. The form was provided in a training session of FDNS immigration officers, and contains real examples from specific applicants' profiles. The information withheld under (b)(7)(E) consists of detailed information regarding actual social media searches that were conducted on real applicants, including their names and A-numbers, the social media applications that were searched, screenshots of actual words and images found on social media depicting potential indicators of national security or public safety concerns, and the immigration officers' assessment and notes. This information, if disclosed, would reveal the methods used to conduct searches, and the specific factors that immigration officers are looking for to indicate possible indicators of fraud, public safety, or national security concerns, which is part of specific techniques and procedures involved in the enforcement of certain immigration and national security laws and directives. The release of this information would also reveal guidelines that could risk circumvention of the law, because it would put individuals on

				notice as to what information is considered as part of the screening and vetting process, which areas and applicants will be subject to screening, and the specific factors being considered by law enforcement during the vetting process. The release of this information could result in individuals hiding certain images, words, or other indicators that law enforcement is looking for, which would impact the effectiveness of screening and vetting procedures used for the enforcement of certain immigration and national security laws and directives, and could reasonably be expected to risk the circumvention of law and render the guidelines for additional screening measures relevant to national security, public safety, and fraud prevention useless. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(7)(E). All other information within this document was segregated and determined non-exempt and disclosed.
443-444	Memorandum from DHS Undersecretary for Intelligence and Analysis to the USCIS Deputy Secretary, "U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services Social Media Vetting Expansion," dated April 1, 2016	(b)(7)(E)	Memorandum	Exemption (b)(7)(E) was used to redact portions of a memorandum from DHS Undersecretary for Intelligence and Analysis to the USCIS Deputy Secretary, "U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services Social Media Vetting Expansion," dated April 1, 2016. The memorandum contains updates for DHS on USCIS's efforts to expand social meeting vetting for certain applicants, and identifies options to optimize DHS's use of social media across the Department. The

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	information withheld under (b)(7)(E) includes a summary of the pilots taking place, the countries and application types that were part of the screening efforts and the time period that those screening efforts took place, coordination information regarding other law enforcement agencies that were working with USCIS on its social media vetting process, and the current outstanding decisions to be made for future expansion of the agency's use of social media screening. This information, if disclosed, would reveal the specific individuals that are likely to be subject to social media screening and the methods used by the agency, which is part of specific techniques and procedures involved in the enforcement of certain immigration and national security laws and directives. The release of this information would also reveal guidelines that could risk circumvention of the law, because it would
	information is considered as part of the screening and vetting process, which areas and applicants will be subject to screening,
	and the specific factors being considered by law enforcement during the vetting process and could result in individuals hiding the use of certain social media platforms or
	encouraging the use of platforms that the agency does not access to, which would impact the effectiveness of screening and
	vetting procedures used for the enforcement

				of certain immigration and national security laws and directives, and could reasonably be expected to risk the circumvention of law and render the guidelines for additional screening measures relevant to national security, public safety, and fraud prevention useless. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(7)(E).
445-446	Browser setup guide	(b)(7)(E)	Procedures List	Exemption (b)(7)(E) was used to redact portions of a browser setup guide for a specific browser that agency employees were required to use when conducting social media checks. The information withheld under (b)(7)(E) includes specifics on the name of the browser, how it works, how to set it up, which specific social media applications were listed within the browser to search, and screenshots of a search conducted using the browser. This information, if disclosed, would reveal the technology resources currently being used in the vetting process by law enforcement and immigration officers, and the specific websites, applications, and social media platforms that are being reviewed by immigration officers for certain immigration applicants and petitioners that need additional background checks or vetting, which is part of specific techniques and procedures involved in the enforcement of certain immigration and national security laws and directives. The release of this information would also reveal guidelines that

				could risk circumvention of the law, because it would put individuals on notice as to what technology is being used, so that individuals could research the technology to identify vulnerabilities and limitations, which could impact the effectiveness of the screening and vetting process, and could reasonably be expected to risk the circumvention of law and render the guidelines for additional screening measures relevant to national security, public safety, and fraud prevention useless. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(7)(E). All other information within this document was segregated and determined non-exempt and disclosed.
447	Key Word Count, dated Jan 6, 2016 and Feb 2, 2016	(b)(7)(E)	Spreadsheet	Exemption (b)(7)(E) was used to redact portions of a Key Word Count spreadsheet dated Jan 6, 2016 and Feb 2, 2016, which documents the results of actual social media screening. The information withheld under (b)(7)(E) consists of a list of key words used by immigration officers to search social media profiles of applicants and the total number of profiles located using those terms. This information, if disclosed, would reveal the methods used to conduct searches, and the specific words that immigration officers are using to search social media information for indications of possible fraud, public safety, or national security concerns, which is part of specific techniques and procedures involved in the enforcement of certain

				immigration and national security laws and directives. The release of this information would also reveal guidelines that could risk circumvention of the law, because it would put individuals on notice as to what information is considered as part of the screening and vetting process and what terms are considered as important factors by law enforcement during the vetting process. The release of this information could result in individuals avoiding the use of these terms and using other ways to describe things without using words searched for by immigration officers, which would impact the effectiveness of screening and vetting procedures used for the enforcement of certain immigration and national security laws and directives, and could reasonably be expected to risk the circumvention of law and render the guidelines for additional screening measures relevant to national security, public safety, and fraud prevention useless. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(7)(E). All other information within this document was segregated and determined non-exempt and disclosed.
448-451	U.S. Refugee Admission process: Interagency Overview	(b)(5)	Process Flowchart	The information withheld under (b)(5) as deliberative process privileged information consists of a draft version of a flowchart which details the proposed process for refugee admission, and how social media screening will be used in that process. The

				draft flowchart is predecisional and is pending determinations on the overall process of social media screening. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(5). All other information within this document was segregated and determined non-exempt and disclosed.
452	FDNS-DS Mandatory Minimums outline	(b)(7)(E)	Procedures List	Exemption (b)(7)(E) was used to redact portions of a procedures list used by FDNS when conducting social media checks. The information withheld under (b)(7)(E) includes specifics on the name of the platform used by the immigration officers, how to document the social media checks, and what information should be stored on applicants. This information, if disclosed, would reveal the technology resources currently being used in the vetting process by law enforcement and immigration officers, and the types of information being collected, which is part of specific techniques and procedures involved in the enforcement of certain immigration and national security laws and directives. The release of this information would also reveal guidelines that could risk circumvention of the law, because it would put individuals on notice as to what technology is being used, so that individuals could research the technology to identify vulnerabilities and limitations, which could impact the effectiveness of the screening and vetting process, and could reasonably be

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				expected to risk the circumvention of law and render the guidelines for additional screening measures relevant to national security, public safety, and fraud prevention useless. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(7)(E). All other information within this document was segregated and determined non-exempt and disclosed.
453	Email, "Agenda," dated October 20, 2016	(b)(7)(E)	Email	Exemption (b)(7)(E) was used to redact portions of an email dated October 20, 2016 sent between FDNS employees, which contained items for discussion at an upcoming USCIS leadership meeting. The information withheld under (b)(7)(E) includes summaries of the proposed processes and courses of action being considered for USCIS's use of social media as part of its operations, and the names of the specific technology and platforms that USCIS uses to conduct social media checks. This information, if disclosed, would reveal the technology resources currently being used in the vetting process by law enforcement and immigration officers, which is part of specific techniques and procedures involved in the enforcement of certain immigration and national security laws and directives. The release of this information would also reveal guidelines that could risk circumvention of the law, because it would put individuals on notice as to what technology is being used, so that individuals

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				could research the technology to identify vulnerabilities and limitations, which could impact the effectiveness of the screening and vetting process, and could reasonably be expected to risk the circumvention of law and render the guidelines for additional screening measures relevant to national security, public safety, and fraud prevention useless. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(7)(E). All other information within this document was segregated and determined non-exempt and disclosed.
454-532, 537, 540-541	Spreadsheet report filtering social media information by geolocation and key words	(b)(7)(E)	Spreadsheet	Exemption (b)(7)(E) was used to redact a spreadsheet that contains a report of filtered social media information by geolocation and key words, which was obtained through actual searches of applicants' social media information. The information withheld under (b)(7)(E) consists of a list of key words, acronyms, and filters used by immigration officers to search social media profiles of applicants and the total number of profiles located using those terms. The spreadsheet also contains the name, A-numbers, and receipt numbers of the applicants that had social media information that included some of the key words used during the social media searches. This information, if disclosed, would reveal the methods used to conduct searches, and the specific words that immigration officers are using to search social media information for indications of

340-373 Dito Systems and Engineering (0)(7)(E) Interface Control Document Exemptions (0)(3) and (0)(7)(E) were used to	548-575 I	DHS Systems and Engineering	(b)(7)(E)	Interface Control Document	security concerns, which is part of specific techniques and procedures involved in the enforcement of certain immigration and national security laws and directives. The release of this information would also reveal guidelines that could risk circumvention of the law, because it would put individuals on notice as to what information is considered as part of the screening and vetting process and what terms are considered as important factors by law enforcement during the vetting process. The release of this information could result in individuals avoiding the use of these terms and using other ways to describe things without using words searched for by immigration officers, which would impact the effectiveness of screening and vetting procedures used for the enforcement of certain immigration and national security laws and directives, and could reasonably be expected to risk the circumvention of law and render the guidelines for additional screening measures relevant to national security, public safety, and fraud prevention useless. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(7)(E). All other information within this document was segregated and determined non-exempt and disclosed.
& Development Institute, withhold portions of DHS Systems and					

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Interface Control Document,	"Social Media Analytics Interface Control
dated October 21, 2016	Document," dated October 21, 2016. The
	document was developed by the Homeland
	Security Systems Engineering and
	Development Institute (HSSEDI), which is a
	federally funded research and development
	center (FFRDC) established by the Secretary
	of Homeland Security under Section 305 of
	the Homeland Security Act of
	2002. HSSEDI's mission is to assist the
	Secretary of Homeland Security, the Under
	Secretary for Science and Technology, and
	the DHS operating elements in addressing
	national homeland security system
	development issues where technical and
	systems engineering expertise is required.
	This Interface Control Document aids the
	development of future DHS social media
	analytics to allow the agency to identify
	potential national security risks. The
	information withheld under Exemption
	(b)(7)(E) includes a description of the
	specific technology that USCIS and DHS
	would be using to conduct social media
	research as part of the vetting process, the
	specific cases and applicants that would be
	screened, the specific social media
	applications reviewed, which employees and
	offices were involved in the process, how that
	information is used, how it will be analyzed,
	real data scripts and data files, and detailed
	process information regarding how
	information will be stored and shared. This

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information, if disclosed, would reveal the
technology resources currently being used in
the vetting process by law enforcement and
immigration officers, and the specific
websites, applications, and social media
platforms that are being reviewed by
immigration officers for certain immigration
applicants and petitioners that need additional
background checks or vetting, which is part
of specific techniques and procedures
involved in the enforcement of certain
immigration and national security laws and
directives. The release of this information
would also reveal guidelines that could risk
circumvention of the law, because it would
put individuals on notice as to what
information is considered as part of the
screening and vetting process and what
technology is being used, so that individuals
could research the technology to identify
vulnerabilities and limitations, which could
impact the effectiveness of the screening and
vetting process. It could also result in
individuals hiding the use of certain social
media platforms or encouraging the use of
platforms that the agency does not access to,
which would impact the effectiveness of
screening and vetting procedures used for the
enforcement of certain immigration and
national security laws and directives, and
could reasonably be expected to risk the
circumvention of law and render the
guidelines for additional screening measures

				relevant to national security, public safety, and fraud prevention useless. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(7)(E). All other information within this document was segregated and determined non-exempt and disclosed.
577	U.S. Refugee Admission process: Interagency Overview, flowchart	(b)(7)(E)	Process Flowchart	Exemption (b)(7)(E) was used to redact a draft of a process flowchart which details the process of reviewing certain immigration applicants and benefits that require enhanced review and social media screening. The information withheld under (b)(7)(E) includes the proposed coordination processes and courses of action that can be taken during the adjudication of certain benefits, what factors trigger enhanced screening, the employees that are responsible for each part of the process, and how to make a determination on an application or petition based on the factors identified during screening. This information, if disclosed, would reveal the specific methods and procedures that immigration officers adhere to when determining whether a petition or application should go through enhanced screening, which is part of specific techniques and procedures involved in the enforcement of certain immigration and national security laws and directives. The release of this information would also reveal guidelines that could risk circumvention of the law, because it would put individuals on

				notice as to what information is considered as
				part of the screening and vetting process,
				what triggers enhanced screening, and
				whether their application or petition was part
				of enhanced screening due to specific teams
				that may have been involved in the review.
				The release of this information could result in
				individuals avoiding certain actions to avoid
				triggering enhanced review, which would
				impact the effectiveness of screening and
				vetting procedures used for the enforcement
				of certain immigration and national security
				laws and directives, and could reasonably be
				expected to risk the circumvention of law and
				render the guidelines for additional screening
				measures relevant to national security, public
				safety, and fraud prevention useless.
				Accordingly, this material is appropriately
				exempt from disclosure pursuant to
				Exemption (b)(7)(E). All other information
				within this document was segregated and
				determined non-exempt and disclosed.
578-754, 762-	Key Word Spreadsheet	(b)(7)(E)	Spreadsheet	Exemption (b)(7)(E) was used to redact a
763, 771-772,	associated with applicants			spreadsheet that contains a report of social
793-794,				media information filtered by key words,
797,799, 801-				languages, and other search filters. This
802, 809-810,				information was obtained through actual
813-1023,				searches of applicants' social media
1031-1032,				information. The information withheld under
1040-1041,				(b)(7)(E) consists of a list of key words,
1062-1063,				acronyms, and filters used by immigration
1066, 1068,				officers to search social media profiles of
1070-1071,				applicants and the total number of profiles

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1078-1079,	located using those terms. The spreadsheet
1081-1082,	also contains the name, A-numbers, and
1084-1086,	receipt numbers of the applicants that had
1088-1120	social media information that included some
	of the key words used during the social media
	searches. This information, if disclosed,
	would reveal the methods used to conduct
	searches, and the specific words that
	immigration officers are using to search
	social media information for indications of
	possible fraud, public safety, or national
	security concerns, which is part of specific
	techniques and procedures involved in the
	enforcement of certain immigration and
	national security laws and directives. The
	release of this information would also reveal
	guidelines that could risk circumvention of
	the law, because it would put individuals on
	notice as to what information is considered as
	part of the screening and vetting process and
	what terms are considered as important
	factors by law enforcement during the vetting
	process. The release of this information
	could result in individuals avoiding the use of
	these terms and using other ways to describe
	things without using words searched for by
	immigration officers, which would impact the
	effectiveness of screening and vetting
	procedures used for the enforcement of
	certain immigration and national security
	laws and directives, and could reasonably be
	expected to risk the circumvention of law and
	render the guidelines for additional screening

				measures relevant to national security, public safety, and fraud prevention useless. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(7)(E). All other information within this document was segregated and determined non-exempt and disclosed.
1122-1123	Meeting agenda, FDNS and DHS Science and Technology Contracting Team, Reoccurring weekly on Tuesdays, includes spreadsheet	(b)(7)(E)	Meeting Agenda and Spreadsheet	Exemption (b)(7)(E) was used to redact portions of a meeting agenda, which was a reoccurring weekly meeting between FDNS and the DHS Science and Technology Contracting Team. The information withheld under (b)(7)(E) includes the names of the specific technology and platforms that DHS and USCIS use to conduct social media checks and analyze data, along with a spreadsheet detailing how many cases were part of the FDNS Controlled Application Review and Resolution Program (CARRP) process, which is used to adjudicate applications and petitions with possible national security concerns. This information, if disclosed, would reveal the technology resources currently being used in the vetting process by law enforcement and immigration officers and the current FDNS workload, which is part of specific techniques and procedures involved in the enforcement of certain immigration and national security laws and directives. The release of this information would also reveal guidelines that could risk circumvention of the law, because it would put individuals on notice as to what

				technology is being used, so that individuals could research the technology to identify vulnerabilities and limitations, which could impact the effectiveness of the screening and vetting process, and could reasonably be expected to risk the circumvention of law and render the guidelines for additional screening measures relevant to national security, public safety, and fraud prevention useless. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(7)(E). All other information within this document was segregated and determined non-exempt and disclosed.
1126	Email, [3RD ROUND COMPONENT CLEARANCE REQUEST]: Latest draft of Consolidated DHS Social Media Talking Points, dated March 28, 2018	(b)(5)	Email	The information withheld under (b)(5) includes deliberative and attorney-client privileged information related to the review of the draft DHS Social Media Talking Points. The emails are between USCIS OCC attorneys and USCIS employees, and contain suggested edits received by ICE employees and ICE OPLA. This information represents part of the deliberative process, as well as pre-decisional information being considered in this process. The information in the emails also contains legal opinions from ICE OPLA, and includes potential courses of actions being considered. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(5). All other information within this document was segregated and determined non-exempt and disclosed.

1128-1134	Department of Homeland Security Social Media Talking Points and Issue Paper	(b)(5): pages 1128- 1134 (b)(7)(E): pages 1128, 1130-1134	Draft Talking Points and Issue Paper	The information withheld under (b)(5) as deliberative process privileged information consists of multiple draft comments, revisions, additions, re-wordings, suggestions, clarifications, questions about accuracy, statements of uncertainty, and requests for additional information. All of this information is part of the deliberative process related to the draft DHS Social Media Talking Points and Issue Paper, which contains pre-decisional information that is not reflected in the final version of the document. The information withheld under (b)(5) as attorney-client privileged information consists of comments and legal opinions added to this draft document by USCIS OCC attorneys that had been asked to provide legal review. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure
				appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(5). Exemption (b)(7)(E) was used to redact comments and edits that contain specifics as to what methods CBP, ICE, and USCIS's law enforcement and immigration officers are authorized to use as part of social media vetting, what information may be used for, and the limitations that are placed on the use and collection methods. This information, if disclosed, would reveal the specific methods and procedures that immigration officers are

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		able to use to conduct social media research
		for certain immigration applicants and
		petitioners that need additional background
		checks or vetting, which is part of specific
		techniques and procedures involved in the
		enforcement of certain immigration and
		national security laws and directives. The
		release of this information would also reveal
		guidelines that could risk circumvention of
		the law, because it would put individuals on
		notice as to what information is considered as
		part of the screening and vetting process and
		what the limitations of access are. The
		release of this information could result in
		individuals hiding the use of certain
		information on social media platforms or
		engaging in behavior to avoid proper vetting,
		which would impact the effectiveness of
		screening and vetting procedures used for the
		enforcement of certain immigration and
		national security laws and directives, and
		could reasonably be expected to risk the
		circumvention of law and render the
		guidelines for additional screening measures
		relevant to national security, public safety,
		and fraud prevention useless. Accordingly,
		this material is appropriately exempt from
		disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(7)(E).
		1(-)(-)(-)
		All other information within this document
		was segregated and determined non-exempt
		and disclosed.
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1148, 1150-	Email, Call to discuss social	(b)(5): pages 1150-	Email	The information withheld under (b)(5)
1151	media collection, dated March			includes deliberative and attorney-client
	14, 2018	1151		privileged information related to an
		(b)(7)(E): page		upcoming call between USCIS Privacy and
				OCC to discuss oversight of social media
		1148		collection. The emails are between USCIS
				OCC attorneys and include a summary of
				OCC's interpretation of key legal issues prior
				to the scheduled call, which represents part of
				the deliberative process, as well as pre-
				decisional information being considered in
				this process. The information in the emails
				also contains information related to a request
				for legal opinions and includes potential
				courses of actions being considered.
				Accordingly, this material is appropriately
				exempt from disclosure pursuant to
				Exemption (b)(5).
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				Exemption (b)(7)(E) was used to redact a
				portion of page 1148, which was an email
				between OCC attorneys and FDNS employees. The information withheld under
				(b)(7)(E) includes an internal USCIS
				conference number and passcode. This
				information, if disclosed, would reveal the
				technology resources currently being used in
				the government to host conference calls and
				to discuss sensitive law enforcement
				<u> </u>
				to discuss sensitive law enforcement information. The release of this information would put individuals on notice as to how to access internal DHS phone calls, and could reasonably be expected to risk the

				circumvention of law and render the guidelines for additional screening measures relevant to national security, public safety, and fraud prevention useless. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(7)(E). All other information within this document was segregated and determined non-exempt and disclosed.
1153-1163	Department of Homeland Security Social Media Talking Points and Issue Paper	(b)(5): pages 1153- 1163 (b)(7)(E): pages 1153-1161, 1163	Draft Talking Points and Issue Paper	The information withheld under (b)(5) as deliberative process privileged information consists of multiple draft comments, revisions, additions, re-wordings, suggestions, clarifications, questions about accuracy, statements of uncertainty, and requests for additional information. All of this information is part of the deliberative process related to the draft DHS Social Media Talking Points and Issue Paper, which contains pre-decisional information that is not reflected in the final version of the document. The information withheld under (b)(5) as attorney-client privileged information consists of comments and legal opinions added to this draft document by attorneys from USCIS OCC and ICE OPLA that had been asked to provide legal review. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(5).

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national security laws and directives, and					Exemption (b)(7)(E) was used to redact comments and edits that contain specifics as to what methods CBP, ICE, and USCIS's law enforcement and immigration officers are authorized to use as part of social media vetting, what information may be used for, and the limitations that are placed on the use and collection methods. This information, if disclosed, would reveal the specific methods and procedures that immigration officers are able to use to conduct social media research for certain immigration applicants and petitioners that need additional background checks or vetting, which is part of specific techniques and procedures involved in the enforcement of certain immigration and national security laws and directives. The release of this information would also reveal guidelines that could risk circumvention of the law, because it would put individuals on notice as to what information is considered as part of the screening and vetting process and what the limitations of access are. The release of this information could result in individuals hiding the use of certain information on social media platforms or engaging in behavior to avoid proper vetting, which would impact the effectiveness of screening and vetting procedures used for the enforcement of certain immigration and national security laws and directives, and
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				circumvention of law and render the guidelines for additional screening measures relevant to national security, public safety, and fraud prevention useless. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(7)(E). All other information within this document was segregated and determined non-exempt and disclosed.
1165, 1167- 1168	Email, Delegation 15002, Revision 01, Delegation to the Director of U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services to Conduct Certain Law Enforcement Activities, dated April 19, 2018	(b)(5): pages 1167- 1168 (b)(7)(E): page 1165	Email	The information withheld under (b)(5) includes deliberative and attorney-client privileged information related to an upcoming meeting between USCIS OCC and FDNS to discuss the draft Delegation and concerns raised by CBP, ICE, CRCL, and DHS Privacy. The emails are between USCIS OCC attorneys and USCIS employees and include a summary of specific operational and legal issues concerns that would be discussed during the meeting, which represents part of the deliberative process, as well as pre-decisional information being considered in this process. The information in the emails also contains information related to a request for legal opinions and includes potential courses of actions being considered. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(5). Exemption (b)(7)(E) was used to redact a portion of page 1148, which was an email

				between OCC attorneys and FDNS employees. The information withheld under (b)(7)(E) includes an internal USCIS conference number and passcode. This information, if disclosed, would reveal the technology resources currently being used in the government to host conference calls and to discuss sensitive law enforcement information. The release of this information would put individuals on notice as to how to access internal DHS phone calls, and could reasonably be expected to risk the circumvention of law and render the guidelines for additional screening measures relevant to national security, public safety, and fraud prevention useless. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(7)(E). All other information within this document was segregated and determined non-exempt and disclosed.
1172-1177	DHS Delegation Number 15002, "Delegation 15002, Revision 01, Delegation to the Director of U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services to Conduct Certain Law Enforcement Activities", Review Workflow	(b)(5)	Review Workflow	The information withheld under (b)(5) as deliberative process privileged information related to the department-wide coordinated review of the draft Delegation 15002. The information is contained in a review workflow spreadsheet, which lists specific details as to which agencies concurred and non-concurred with the draft version of the Delegation, and the specific comments, edits, revisions, and questions made by each

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1181-1182,	Email, FINAL REVIEW:	(b)(5): pages 1181-	Email	agency. All of this information is part of the deliberative process. The information withheld under (b)(5) as attorney-client privileged information consists of comments and legal opinions about the draft delegation, which were provided by attorneys within USCIS OCC, ICE OPLA, CBP OCC, and DHS OGC who had been asked to provide legal review. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(5). All other information within this document was segregated and determined non-exempt and disclosed. The information withheld under (b)(5)
1184-1185	ACTION REQUIRED: Weekly SMWG Meeting - 1.8.18 [1.22.18], dated January 22, 2018	1182, 1184-1185 (b)(7)(E): page 1184		includes deliberative and attorney-client privileged information related to the review of the draft USCIS Social Media Implementation Plan (SMLIP). The emails are between USCIS OCC attorneys and USCIS employees and include clarifications, and requests for additional information, which represents part of the deliberative process, as well as pre-decisional information being considered in this process. The information in the emails also contains information related to a request for legal opinions and includes potential courses of actions being considered. Accordingly, this

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		material is appropriately exempt from
		disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(5).
		The information withheld under (b)(7)(E)
		includes the link to an internal intranet
		website that directs to the draft copy of the
		document being reviewed. This information,
		if disclosed, would reveal the technology
		resources currently being used in the
		government to review sensitive law
		enforcement documents that aid in the vetting
		process. This type of information is part of
		specific techniques and procedures involved
		the agency's enforcement of certain
		immigration and national security laws and
		directives. It would also reveal guidelines
		that could risk circumvention of the law,
		including the specific tools used by the
		agency to coordinate review of documents to
		support DHS's mission. The release of this
		information would put individuals on notice
		as to what technology is being used, so that
		individuals could research the technology to
		identify vulnerabilities and limitations, which
		could reasonably be expected to risk the circumvention of law and render the
		guidelines for additional screening measures
		relevant to national security, public safety,
		and fraud prevention useless. Accordingly,
		this material is appropriately exempt from
		disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(7)(E).
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				All other information within this document was segregated and determined non-exempt and disclosed.
1187-1203, 1205-1208	Office of Policy & Strategy (OP&S) National Security & Benefits Integrity Division (NSBI) & The Social Media Working Group (SMWG) Social Media Limited Implementation Plan (SMLIP), dated November 17, 2017	(b)(5)	Draft Document	The information withheld under (b)(5) includes deliberative and attorney-client privileged information related to the review of the draft USCIS SMLIP, which was drafted by USCIS's Office of Policy and Strategy, National Security and Benefits Integrity Division, and the SMWG. The draft SMLIP defines and tests the requirements and process for the operational use of social media as part of the immigration adjudication process. The draft contains comments, revisions, additions, re-wordings, suggestions, clarifications, questions about accuracy, statements of uncertainty, and requests for additional information. This information is part of the deliberative process and contains pre-decisional information that is not reflected in the final version of the document. The draft also contains edits and comments made by OCC attorneys which contain their legal opinions. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(5). All other information within this document was segregated and determined non-exempt and disclosed.
1211	Email, FW: [Clearance Request] Social Media Talking Points, dated January 29, 2018	(b)(5)	Email	The information withheld under (b)(5) includes deliberative and attorney-client privileged information related to the review of draft talking points related to the use of

1213	Email, FW: [REMINDER]	(b)(5)	Email	social media screening. The emails are between USCIS OCC attorneys, and include comments and requests for additional information, which represents part of the deliberative process, as well as pre-decisional information being considered in this process. The information in the emails also contains information related to a request for legal opinions and includes potential courses of actions being considered. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(5). All other information within this document was segregated and determined non-exempt and disclosed. The information withheld under (b)(5)
1213	[URGENT CLEARANCE REQUEST] UN Inquiry re DOS social media, dated June 6, 2018	(0)(3)	Eman	includes deliberative and attorney-client privileged information related to the review of a draft Department of State (DOS) response to a United Nations (UN) inquiry related to DOS's collection of social media information for visa applicants. The emails are between USCIS OCC attorneys and USCIS employees, and include comments and requests for additional information, which represents part of the deliberative process, as well as pre-decisional information being considered in this process. The information in the emails also contains information related to a request for legal opinions and includes potential courses of actions being considered. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from

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				disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(5). All other information within this document was segregated and determined non-exempt and disclosed.
1215	Email, Draft response to Congresswomen Krishnamoorthi and Jayapal, dated February 9, 2018	(b)(5)	Email	The information withheld under (b)(5) includes deliberative and attorney-client privileged information related to the review of a draft response to Congresswomen Krishnamoorthi and Jayapal regarding the collection of social media information. The emails are between USCIS OCC attorneys, and include comments and requests for additional information, which represents part of the deliberative process, as well as predecisional information being considered in this process. The information in the emails also contains information related to a request for legal opinions and includes potential courses of actions being considered. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(5). All other information within this document was segregated and determined non-exempt and disclosed.
1223	Email, RE: AILA questions, dated April 24, 2018	(b)(5)	Email	The information withheld under (b)(5) includes deliberative and attorney-client privileged information related to the review of draft responses to questions sent to USCIS by the American Immigration Lawyers Association (AILA), which were sent prior to a scheduled luncheon meeting between USCIS and AILA employees. The emails are between USCIS OCC attorneys, and include

1225-1227	Email, RE: AILA questions for	(b)(5)	Email	comments and requests for additional information, which represents part of the deliberative process, as well as pre-decisional information being considered in this process. The information in the emails also contains information related to a request for legal opinions and includes potential courses of actions being considered. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(5). All other information within this document was segregated and determined non-exempt and disclosed. The information withheld under (b)(5)
	April 26th Richmond luncheon meeting, dated April 24, 2018			includes deliberative and attorney-client privileged information related to the review of draft responses to questions sent to USCIS by AILA, which were sent prior to a scheduled luncheon meeting between USCIS and AILA employees. The emails are between USCIS OCC attorneys, and include comments and requests for additional information, which represents part of the deliberative process, as well as pre-decisional information being considered in this process. The information in the emails also contains information related to a request for legal opinions and includes potential courses of actions being considered. Accordingly, this
				material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(5). All other information within this document was

				segregated and determined non-exempt and disclosed.
1229	Questions for the April 26, 2018, AILA Richmond meeting - draft responses	(b)(5)	Draft Meeting Questions and Responses	The information withheld under (b)(5) includes deliberative and attorney-client privileged information related to the review of USCIS draft responses to questions sent to USCIS by AILA, which were sent prior to a scheduled luncheon meeting between USCIS and AILA employees. The draft responses to AILA's questions include edits, comments, revisions, and clarifications, all of which represents part of the deliberative process, as well as pre-decisional information being considered in this process. The information in the draft responses also contains USCIS OCC's legal opinions and comments related to legal issues. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(5). All other information within this document was segregated and determined non-exempt and disclosed.
1232, 1234- 1235	Email, FW: AILA questions, dated April 26, 2018	(b)(5)	Email	The information withheld under (b)(5) includes deliberative and attorney-client privileged information related to the review of draft responses to questions sent to USCIS by AILA, which were sent prior to a scheduled luncheon meeting between USCIS and AILA employees. The emails are between USCIS OCC attorneys and USCIS employees, and include comments and requests for additional information, which represents part of the deliberative process, as

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				well as pre-decisional information being considered in this process. The information in the emails also contains information related to a request for legal opinions and includes potential courses of actions being considered. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(5). All other information within this document was segregated and determined non-exempt and disclosed.
1236	Email, FW: CLEARANCE REQUEST: Latest draft of Consolidated DHS Social Media Talking Points, dated April 26, 2018	(b)(5)	Email	The information withheld under (b)(5) includes deliberative process privileged information related to the review of draft talking points related to the use of social media screening. The emails are between USCIS OCC attorneys and USCIS employees and detail specific concurrence or nonconcurrence with the draft Talking Points, which represents part of the deliberative process, as well as pre-decisional information being considered in this process. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(5). All other information within this document was segregated and determined non-exempt and disclosed.
1241-1244, 1246-1247	Email, FW: Delegation 15002, Revision 01, Delegation to the Director of U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services to Conduct Certain Law	(b)(5)	Email	The information withheld under (b)(5) includes deliberative and attorney-client privileged information related to an upcoming meeting between USCIS OCC and ICE OPLA to discuss the draft Delegation and concerns raised by ICE OPLA. The

	Enforcement Activities, dated May 2, 2018			emails are between USCIS OCC and ICE OPLA attorneys and USCIS employees and include a summary of specific operational and legal issues concerns that would be discussed during the meeting, which represents part of the deliberative process, as well as pre-decisional information being considered in this process. The information in the emails also contains information related to a request for legal opinions and includes potential courses of actions being considered. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(5). All other information within this document was segregated and determined non-exempt and disclosed.
1251-1252	Email, FW: DHS COMPONENT PASSBACKS [DHS Congressional Correspondence] Sen. Menendez+ 5 to AS1, FRN/Privacy Concerns with retaining Social Media information, WF 1154028, dated February 27, 2018	(b)(5)	Email	The information withheld under (b)(5) includes deliberative and attorney-client privileged information related to the review of draft responses to questions received by DHS from Senator Menendez related to concerns with retaining social media information. The emails are between USCIS OCC and USCIS employees and include a summary of specific operational and legal issues and responses to the questions, which represents part of the deliberative process, as well as pre-decisional information being considered in this process. The information in the emails also contains information related to a request for legal opinions and includes potential courses of actions being

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				considered. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(5). All other information within this document was segregated and determined non-exempt and disclosed.
1255	Email, FW: Draft LEA Memo, dated January 10, 2018	(b)(5)	Email	The information withheld under (b)(5) includes deliberative privileged information related to the title of a draft document that details a proposed plan as part of the social media collection process. This information is predecisional and is not finalized, and is part of the deliberative process. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(5). All other information within this document was segregated and determined non-exempt and disclosed.
1256-1265	Memorandum to USCIS's Chief Counsel, "Delegation of Law Enforcement Authority to U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services," dated August 7, 2017	(b)(5)	Legal Memorandum	The information withheld under (b)(5) as attorney-client privileged information consists of legal opinions contained in this legal memorandum. The memorandum explores law enforcement authority as it relates to USCIS, and limits its focus to legal issues related to USCIS obtaining law enforcement authority. It is written by multiple OCC attorneys, who have not finalized the draft yet. It is directed to USCIS's Chief Counsel, who had requested the legal opinion. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(5). All other information within this document was

				segregated and determined non-exempt and disclosed.
1268, 1274-1278	Draft Guidance for Use of Social Media in Field Operations Directorate Adjudications, dated October 27, 2017	(b)(5): pages 1275- 1278 (b)(7)(E): pages 1268, 1274-1275, 1277-1278	Draft Guidance Document	The information withheld under (b)(5) as deliberative process privileged information consists of a draft version of a document that details Guidance for Use of Social Media in Field Operations Directorate Adjudications. The withheld information focuses on the types of questions and issues that adjudicators may want to look for when reviewing an application or interviewing an applicant related to social media information. The material is also pre-decisional and includes information that is not reflected in the final version of the document. The information withheld under (b)(7)(E) includes draft language in the document and comments written by USCIS employees that contain summaries of the proposed processes and courses of action being considered for FDNS employees who would be authorized to access the internet and social media content to support USCIS's mission, as well as details about the CARRP process and how to handle social media results involve potential national security concerns. The redacted language also contains specifics as to what specific questions can be used by immigration officers to question applicants to verify social media results as part of social media vetting. This information, if disclosed, would reveal the specific methods

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		and procedures that immigration officers are able to use to conduct social media research for certain immigration applicants and petitioners that need additional background checks or vetting, which is part of specific techniques and procedures involved in the enforcement of certain immigration and national security laws and directives. The release of this information would also reveal guidelines that could risk circumvention of the law, because it would put individuals on notice as to what information is considered as part of the screening and vetting process and what questions may be asked, which would tip off the individuals that the immigration officer was investigating possible national security or public safety concerns. The release of this information could result in individuals hiding the use of certain information on social media platforms or engaging in behavior to avoid proper vetting, which would impact the effectiveness of screening and vetting procedures used for the enforcement of certain immigration and national security laws and directives, and could reasonably be expected to risk the circumvention of law and render the guidelines for additional screening measures relevant to national security, public safety, and fraud prevention useless. Accordingly,
		relevant to national security, public safety,

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				All other information within this document was segregated and determined non-exempt and disclosed.
1279	Email, FW: Draft Social Media Guidance, dated October 27, 2017	(b)(5)	Email	The information withheld under (b)(5) includes attorney-client privileged information related to the review of draft guidance that details how USCIS's Field Office planned to implement the use of social media in adjudications. The emails are between USCIS OCC and USCIS employees and include specific request for a legal opinion. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(5). All other information within this document was segregated and determined non-exempt and disclosed.
1280-1281	Email, FW: FDNS Social Media Documents for Review, dated May 23, 2018	(b)(5): pages 1280- 1281 (b)(7)(E): page 1281	Email	The information withheld under (b)(5) includes deliberative and attorney-client privileged information related to the review of draft social media documents. The emails are sent between USCIS OCC and USCIS employees, and include comments, questions, clarifications, and options being considered, all of which represents part of the deliberative process, as well as pre-decisional information being considered in this process. The information in the draft responses also contains USCIS OCC's legal opinions and comments related to legal issues. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(5).

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		The information withheld under (b)(7)(E) includes the link to an internal intranet website that directs to a DHS policy, and a concern raised by FDNS in regard to a proposed course of action and potential conflicts with the policy. This information, if disclosed, would reveal the technology resources currently being used in the government to review sensitive law enforcement documents that aid in the vetting process. This type of information is part of specific techniques and procedures involved the agency's enforcement of certain immigration and national security laws and directives. It would also reveal guidelines that could risk circumvention of the law, including the specific tools used by the agency to coordinate review of documents to support DHS's mission. The release of this information would put individuals on notice as to what technology is being used, so that individuals could research the technology to identify vulnerabilities and limitations, which could reasonably be expected to risk the circumvention of law and render the guidelines for additional screening measures relevant to national security, public safety, and fraud prevention useless. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from
		disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(7)(E).

			All other information within this document was segregated and determined non-exempt and disclosed.
Fraud Detection and National Security Directorate, Social Media Division - Implementation of DHS Delegation Number 15002, Standard Operating Procedure, dated April 19, 2018	(b)(5) (b)(7)(E)	Draft Standard Operating Procedure	The information withheld under (b)(5) as deliberative process privileged information consists of multiple draft comments, revisions, additions, re-wordings, suggestions, clarifications, questions about accuracy, statements of uncertainty, and requests for additional information. All of this information is part of the deliberative process related to the development of the draft Standard Operating Procedure for FDNS's Social Media Division, and focuses on the implementation of Delegation 15002 and the possible process options being considered. The material is both deliberative and pre-decisional and includes information that is not reflected in the final version of the document. The information withheld under (b)(5) as attorney-client privileged information consists of comments and legal opinions added to this draft document by USCIS Office of Chief Counsel (OCC) attorneys that had been asked to provide legal review. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(5). The information withheld under (b)(7)(E) includes draft language in the document and

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	comments written by USCIS employees and
	OCC attorneys that contain summaries of the
	proposed processes and courses of action
	being considered for FDNS employees who
	would be authorized to access the internet
	and social media content to support USCIS's
	mission. The redacted language also contains
	specifics as to what actions should be taken
	for certain cases, the oversight and audit
	process, the specific methods USCIS's
	immigration officers are authorized to use as
	part of social media vetting, and what
	limitations are placed on their collection
	methods. This information, if disclosed,
	would reveal the specific methods and
	procedures that immigration officers are able
	to use to conduct social media research for
	certain immigration applicants and petitioners
	that need additional background checks or
	vetting, which is part of specific techniques
	and procedures involved in the enforcement
	of certain immigration and national security
	laws and directives. The release of this
	information would also reveal guidelines that
	could risk circumvention of the law, because
	it would put individuals on notice as to what
	information is considered as part of the
	screening and vetting process and what the
	limitations of access are. The release of this
	information could result in individuals hiding
	the use of certain information on social media
	platforms or engaging in behavior to avoid
	proper vetting, which would impact the
	proper vetting, which would impact the

				effectiveness of screening and vetting procedures used for the enforcement of certain immigration and national security laws and directives, and could reasonably be expected to risk the circumvention of law and render the guidelines for additional screening measures relevant to national security, public safety, and fraud prevention useless. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(7)(E).
				All other information within this document was segregated and determined non-exempt and disclosed.
1293-1304	Draft Privacy Impact Assessment Update for the Fraud Detection and National Security Directorate, DHS/USCIS/PIA-013-01(a), dated May XX, 2018	(b)(5)	Draft Privacy Impact Assessment Update	The information withheld under (b)(5) as deliberative process privileged information consists of comments, revisions, additions, re-wordings, suggestions, clarifications, questions about accuracy, statements of uncertainty, and requests for additional information. All of this information is part of the deliberative process related to the review of the draft Privacy Impact Assessment Update, which details the changes to the process for FDNS access to social media information when conducting certain background, identity and security checks. The material is both deliberative and predecisional and includes information that is not reflected in the final version of the document.

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				The information withheld under (b)(5) as attorney-client privileged information consists of comments and legal opinions added to this draft document by USCIS Office of Chief Counsel (OCC) attorneys that had been asked to provide legal review. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(5). All other information within this document was segregated and determined non-exempt and disclosed.
1311-1321	DHS Operational Use of Social Media, Privacy Compliance memorandum, dated January 25, 2017	(b)(5): page 1313 (b)(7)(E): pages 1311-1321	Privacy Compliance Draft Document	The information withheld under (b)(5) as deliberative process privileged information consists of multiple draft comments, revisions, additions, re-wordings, suggestions, clarifications, questions about accuracy, statements of uncertainty, and requests for additional information. All of this information is part of the deliberative process related to the review of a draft version of the Operational Use of Social Media template that must be completed in order for the DHS Privacy Office to review and determine privacy compliance. The document includes draft responses to questions from the DHS Privacy Office about the collection of social media information, which includes pre-decisional and deliberative information.

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The information withheld under (b)(5) as attorney-client privileged information consists of comments and legal opinions added to this draft document by USCIS OCC attorneys that had been asked to provide legal review. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(5).
The information withheld under (b)(7)(E) includes draft language in the document and comments written by USCIS employees and OCC attorneys that contain summaries of the proposed processes and courses of action being considered for DHS's operational use of social media, including how USCIS's FDNS would use the information as part of the background check and screening process. The redacted language also contains specifics as to FDNS's methods for handling cases involving potential fraud, criminal, public safety, or national security concerns, and specific examples of information that DHS and FDNS would be gathering through social media searches. This information, if disclosed, would reveal the specific methods and procedures that immigration officers are
able to use to conduct social media research for certain immigration applicants and petitioners that need additional background checks or vetting, which is part of specific techniques and procedures involved in the enforcement of certain immigration and

1222 1225	Droft Dular of Dularian for the	(L)(5), magaz 1222	Droft Dulas of Dulassian	national security laws and directives. The release of this information would also reveal guidelines that could risk circumvention of the law, because it would put individuals on notice as to what information is considered as part of the screening and vetting process and what the limitations of access are. The release of this information could result in individuals hiding the use of certain information on social media platforms or engaging in behavior to avoid proper vetting, which would impact the effectiveness of screening and vetting procedures used for the enforcement of certain immigration and national security laws and directives, and could reasonably be expected to risk the circumvention of law and render the guidelines for additional screening measures relevant to national security, public safety, and fraud prevention useless. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(7)(E). All other information within this document was segregated and determined non-exempt and disclosed.
1322-1325	Draft Rules of Behavior for the Operational Use of Social Media	(b)(5): pages 1322- 1323 (b)(7)(E): pages 1322-1325	Draft Rules of Behavior	The information withheld under (b)(5) as deliberative process privileged information consists of multiple draft comments, revisions, additions, re-wordings, suggestions, clarifications, questions about accuracy, statements of uncertainty, and requests for additional information. All of

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this information is part of the deliberative process related to the review of a draft
version of the Rules of Behavior Form that
must be signed by Immigration Officers who
are authorized to access the Internet and
social media content for official purposes.
The material is also pre-decisional and includes information that is not reflected in
the final version of the document.
the final version of the document.
The information withheld under (b)(5) as
attorney-client privileged information
consists of comments and legal opinions
added to this draft document by USCIS OCC
attorneys that had been asked to provide legal
review. Accordingly, this material is
appropriately exempt from disclosure
pursuant to Exemption (b)(5).
The information withheld under (b)(7)(E)
includes draft language in the document and
comments written by USCIS employees and OCC attorneys that contain summaries of the
proposed processes and courses of action
being considered for DHS's operational use
of social media, including what specific
activities USCIS's FDNS employees were
authorized or prohibited from conducting as
part of the background check and screening
process. This information, if disclosed,
would reveal the specific methods and
procedures that immigration officers are able
to use to conduct social media research and

				what the limitations of access are. The release of this information could result in individuals being able to determine what can and can't be searched on social media platforms, which would allow them to ascertain alternate ways to avoid proper vetting, which would impact the effectiveness of screening and vetting procedures used for the enforcement of certain immigration and national security laws and directives, and could reasonably be expected to risk the circumvention of law and render the guidelines for additional screening measures relevant to national security, public safety, and fraud prevention useless. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(7)(E). All other information within this document was segregated and determined non-exempt and disclosed.
1346, 1348, 1359, 1367- 1368	PowerPoint training presentation, "Privacy Requirements for Operational Use of Social Media"	(b)(7)(E)	PowerPoint	Exemption (b)(7)(E) was used to redact portions of a PowerPoint training presentation, "Privacy Requirements for Operational Use of Social Media." The PowerPoint summarizes the privacy requirements and rules of behavior for employees involved in social media searches to support USCIS's mission. The redacted information consists of specific details regarding what information can be used and what prohibitions are placed on searches, as well as direct phone numbers and email

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	address for USCIS internal IT offices. This information, if disclosed, would reveal the technology resources currently being used in the vetting process by law enforcement and immigration officers, and the limitations on access to certain information, which is part of specific techniques and procedures involved in the enforcement of certain immigration and national security laws and directives.
	The release of this information would also reveal guidelines that could risk circumvention of the law, because it would put individuals on notice as to what information can and can't be searched on social media platforms, which would allow them to ascertain alternate ways to avoid proper vetting, which would impact the effectiveness of screening and vetting procedures used for the enforcement of certain immigration and national security laws and directives, and could reasonably be expected to risk the circumvention of law and render the guidelines for additional screening measures relevant to national security, public safety, and fraud prevention useless.
	Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(7)(E). All other information within this document was segregated and determined non-exempt and disclosed.

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1375	Email, FW: FDNS Social	(b)(5)	Email	The information withheld under (b)(5)
	Media Documents for Review,			includes deliberative and attorney-client
	dated May 23, 2018	(b)(7)(E)		privileged information related to the review
	dated 111ay 23, 2010			of FDNS Social Media documents. The
				emails are between USCIS OCC and USCIS
				employees and include a summary of specific
				legal issues and concerns that should be
				noted when reviewing the documents. This
				information represents part of the deliberative
				process, as well as pre-decisional information
				being considered in this process. The
				information in the emails also contains a
				summary of USCIS OCC attorneys' legal
				position on courses of actions being
				considered. Accordingly, this material is
				appropriately exempt from disclosure
				pursuant to Exemption (b)(5).
				Exemption (b)(7)(E) was used to redact a
				summary of the compliance documents being
				reviewed, and the process issues related to
				methods used by FDNS to support social
				media information collection. This
				information, if disclosed, would reveal the
				specific methods and procedures that
				immigration officers are able to use to
				conduct social media research for certain
				immigration applicants and petitioners that
				need additional background checks or
				vetting, which is part of specific techniques
				and procedures involved in the enforcement
				of certain immigration and national security
				laws and directives. Accordingly, this

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				material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(7)(E). All other information within this document was segregated and determined non-exempt and disclosed.
1377	Email, FW: Fictitious Account Social Media Privacy Compliance Documentation, dated May 21, 2018	(b)(5)	Email	The information withheld under (b)(5) includes deliberative and attorney-client privileged information related to the review of social media privacy compliance documentation. The emails are between USCIS OCC and USCIS employees and include a summary of OCC's legal opinion regarding the definition of the term "fictitious accounts" in relation to the development of the agency's social media policies. This information represents part of the deliberative process, as well as pre-decisional information being considered in this process. The information in the emails also contains a summary of USCIS OCC attorneys' legal position on defining certain terms and how that may impact the process. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(5). All other information within this document was segregated and determined non-exempt and disclosed.
1380-1390, 1392-1395	Draft Department of Homeland Security Social Media Talking Points and Issue Paper	(b)(5): pages 1380- 1390, 1392-1395	Draft Talking Points and Issue Paper	The information withheld under (b)(5) as deliberative process privileged information consists of multiple draft comments, revisions, additions, re-wordings, suggestions, clarifications, questions about

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	(b)(7)(E): pages 1380-1389, 1392, 1394-1395	accuracy, statements of uncertainty, and requests for additional information. All of this information is part of the deliberative process related to the review of the draft DHS Social Media Talking Points and Issue Paper, which contains pre-decisional information that is not reflected in the final version of the document. The information withheld under (b)(5) as attorney-client privileged information consists of comments and legal opinions added to this draft document by ICE OPLA and USCIS OCC attorneys that had been asked to provide legal review. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(5). Exemption (b)(7)(E) was used to redact comments and edits that contain specifics as to what methods CBP, ICE, and USCIS's law enforcement and immigration officers are authorized to use as part of social media vetting, what information may be used for, and the limitations that are placed on the use and collection methods. This information, if disclosed, would reveal the specific methods and procedures that immigration officers are able to use to conduct social media research for certain immigration applicants and petitioners that need additional background checks or vetting, which is part of specific techniques and procedures involved in the
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				enforcement of certain immigration and national security laws and directives. The release of this information would also reveal guidelines that could risk circumvention of the law, because it would put individuals on notice as to what information is considered as part of the screening and vetting process and what the limitations of access are. The release of this information could result in individuals hiding the use of certain information on social media platforms or engaging in behavior to avoid proper vetting, which would impact the effectiveness of screening and vetting procedures used for the enforcement of certain immigration and national security laws and directives, and could reasonably be expected to risk the circumvention of law and render the guidelines for additional screening measures relevant to national security, public safety, and fraud prevention useless. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(7)(E). All other information within this document was segregated and determined non-exempt and disclosed.
1397	Email, FW: [URGENT CLEARANCE REQUEST] UN Inquiry re DOS social media collection -visa applications, dated June 5, 2018	(b)(5)	Email	The information withheld under (b)(5) includes deliberative and attorney-client privileged information related to the review of a draft DOS response to a United Nations inquiry related to DOS's collection of social media information for visa applicants. The

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				emails are between USCIS OCC attorneys and USCIS employees, and include comments and requests for additional information, which represents part of the deliberative process, as well as pre-decisional information being considered in this process. The information in the emails also contains information related to a request for legal opinions and includes potential courses of actions being considered. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(5). All other information within this document was segregated and determined non-exempt and disclosed.
1404-1405	Draft response from the United States to the United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commission	(b)(5)	Draft letter	The information withheld under (b)(5) as deliberative process privileged information consists of multiple draft comments, revisions, additions, re-wordings, suggestions, clarifications, questions about accuracy, statements of uncertainty, and requests for additional information. All of this information is part of the deliberative process related to the review of a draft response from the United States to the United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commission, which related to the Department of State's proposed update of visa application forms and the collection of social media information from visa applicants. The withheld portions of the document contain pre-decisional information

1407-1410	Email, FW: Meeting Summary	(b)(5): pages 1407-	Email	that is not reflected in the final version of the document. The information withheld under (b)(5) as attorney-client privileged information consists of comments and legal opinions added to this draft document by USCIS OCC attorneys that had been asked to provide legal review. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(5). All other information within this document was segregated and determined non-exempt and disclosed. The information withheld under (b)(5)
	and Status of Draft Delegation, dated February 2, 2018	1410 (b)(7)(E): page 1408		includes deliberative and attorney-client privileged information related to the review of the draft delegation. The emails are between USCIS OCC attorneys and include a summary of a recent meeting between USCIS and DHS privacy regarding USCIS's planned use of fictitious accounts when conducting social media searches in certain cases. The withheld information includes specific legal issues and concerns that OCC attorneys wanted to highlight for leadership, as well as a list of some of the potential courses of actions. This information represents part of the deliberative process, as well as predecisional information being considered in this process. The information in the emails also contains a summary of USCIS OCC

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attorneys' legal position on courses of	
being considered. Accordingly, this	
is appropriately exempt from disclos	ure
pursuant to Exemption (b)(5).	
The information withheld under (b)('	7)(E)
includes summaries of the proposed	
processes and courses of action being	
considered as part of draft the Delega	
allowing USCIS's use of social medi	
of its operations, coordination inform	
regarding when an application or pet	
should be referred to FDNS for deter	_
whether a fraud investigation is warr	
and the outstanding issues involved v	
implementation. This information, it	
disclosed, would reveal the specific i	
and procedures that immigration offi	
able to use to conduct social media re	
for certain immigration applicants an	
petitioners that need additional backs	
checks or vetting, which is part of sp	
techniques and procedures involved	
enforcement of certain immigration a	
national security laws and directives.	
release of this information would also	
guidelines that could risk circumvent	
the law, because it would put individ	
notice as to what information is cons	
part of the screening and vetting production	
that information is obtained, and what	
limitations of access are. The release	e of this
information could result in individua	ls hiding

1414-1416	Email, RE: Outstanding issues	(b)(5): pages 1414-	Email	the use of certain information on social media platforms or engaging in behavior to avoid proper vetting, which would impact the effectiveness of screening and vetting procedures used for the enforcement of certain immigration and national security laws and directives, and could reasonably be expected to risk the circumvention of law and render the guidelines for additional screening measures relevant to national security, public safety, and fraud prevention useless. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(7)(E). All other information within this document was segregated and determined non-exempt and disclosed. The information withheld under (b)(5)
	re the use of fictitious social media accounts when fraud is suspected, dated October 13, 2017	1416 (b)(7)(E): page 1416		includes deliberative and attorney-client privileged information related to outstanding issues involved in the use of fictitious social media accounts when adjudicating immigration cases involving suspected fraud. The emails are between USCIS OCC attorneys and include a summary specific legal issues and concerns that OCC attorneys wanted to highlight for leadership, as well as a list of some of the potential courses of actions. This information represents part of the deliberative process, as well as predecisional information being considered in this process. The information in the emails

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also contains a summary of USCIS OCC attorneys' legal position on courses of actions being considered. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(5).
The information withheld under (b)(7)(E) includes summaries of the proposed processes and courses of action being considered as part of draft the Delegation allowing USCIS's use of social media as part of its operations, coordination information regarding when an application or petition should be referred to FDNS for determining
whether a fraud investigation is warranted, and the outstanding issues involved with implementation. This information, if disclosed, would reveal the specific methods and procedures that immigration officers are able to use to conduct social media research for certain immigration applicants and
petitioners that need additional background checks or vetting, which is part of specific techniques and procedures involved in the enforcement of certain immigration and national security laws and directives. The release of this information would also reveal guidelines that could risk circumvention of
the law, because it would put individuals on notice as to what information is considered as part of the screening and vetting process, how that information is obtained, and what the limitations of access are. The release of this

				information could result in individuals hiding the use of certain information on social media platforms or engaging in behavior to avoid proper vetting, which would impact the effectiveness of screening and vetting procedures used for the enforcement of certain immigration and national security laws and directives, and could reasonably be expected to risk the circumvention of law and render the guidelines for additional screening measures relevant to national security, public safety, and fraud prevention useless. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(7)(E). All other information within this document was segregated and determined non-exempt
1420-1421	Email, RE: Outstanding issues re the use of fictitious social media accounts when fraud is suspected, dated October 6, 2017	(b)(5)	Email	and disclosed. The information withheld under (b)(5) includes deliberative and attorney-client privileged information related to outstanding issues involved in the use of fictitious social media accounts when adjudicating immigration cases involving suspected fraud. The emails are between USCIS OCC attorneys and include a summary specific legal issues and concerns that OCC attorneys wanted to highlight for leadership, as well as a list of some of the potential courses of actions. This information represents part of the deliberative process, as well as predecisional information being considered in

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				this process. The information in the emails also contains a summary of USCIS OCC attorneys' legal position on courses of actions being considered. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(5). All other information within this document was segregated and determined non-exempt and disclosed.
1423	Draft DHS Delegation Number 15002, "Delegation 15002, Revision 01, Delegation to the Director of U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services to Conduct Certain Law Enforcement Activities"	(b)(5)	Draft Document	The information withheld under (b)(5) includes deliberative and attorney-client privileged information related to a draft copy of DHS Delegation Number 15002, "Delegation 15002, Revision 01, Delegation to the Director of U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services to Conduct Certain Law Enforcement Activities." The Delegation, once finalized, would reaffirm the authority of the Director of USCIS to conduct specific law enforcement activities, which include the use of social media content as part of immigration adjudications. The draft contains comments, revisions, additions, re-wordings, clarifications, and legal opinion. This information is part of the deliberative process and contains pre-decisional information that is not reflected in the final version of the document. The draft also contains edits and comments made by OCC attorneys which contain their legal opinions. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(5). All other information

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				within this document was segregated and determined non-exempt and disclosed.
1426	Email, FW: Privacy Training (for SVPI FDNS IO Social Media access), dated September 27, 2017	(b)(7)(E)	Email	Exemption (b)(7)(E) was used to withhold a portion of emails between USCIS OCC attorneys and USCIS employees, which include a summary of an upcoming Privacy Training scheduled for employees who will be involved in the social media process, as well as a list of next steps that need to be taken and decisions that need to be made. The information withheld under (b)(7)(E) includes a description of the specific browser that agency employees were required to use when conducting social media checks, and the agency employees authorized to conduct social media searches. This information, if disclosed, would reveal the technology resources currently being used in the vetting process by law enforcement and immigration officers, and the role that USCIS employees have in this process, which is part of specific techniques and procedures involved in the enforcement of certain immigration and national security laws and directives. The release of this information would also reveal guidelines that could risk circumvention of the law, because it would put individuals on notice as to what technology is being used, so that individuals could research the technology to identify vulnerabilities and limitations, which could impact the effectiveness of the screening and vetting process, and could reasonably be expected to

				risk the circumvention of law and render the guidelines for additional screening measures relevant to national security, public safety, and fraud prevention useless. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(7)(E). All other information within this document was segregated and determined non-exempt and disclosed.
1428-1434	Email, FW: Proposal to Revise Delegation to the Director of USCIS to Conduct Certain LE Activities - S: 3:00pm today, dated November 15, 2017	(b)(5)	Email	The information withheld under (b)(5) includes deliberative and attorney-client privileged information related to the proposed plan to revise the delegation to allow USCIS to conduct social media review as part of its law enforcement activities. The emails are between USCIS OCC and USCIS employees and include a summary of OCC's legal opinion regarding the definition of specific terms in the delegation, as well as questions and responses related to the scope of the delegation and certain levels of authority that it covered. This information represents part of the deliberative process, as well as pre-decisional information being considered in this process. The information in the emails also contains a summary of USCIS OCC attorneys' legal position on defining certain terms and how that may impact the process, as well as specific requests for legal opinions on certain issues. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to

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				Exemption (b)(5). All other information within this document was segregated and determined non-exempt and disclosed.
1436-1437, 1444	Email, FW: REQUEST FOR OCC CLEARANCE [DHS Congressional Correspondence] Rep. Jayapal +16, regarding SORN and Social Media, WF 1152115, dated November 6, 2017	(b)(5)	Email	The information withheld under (b)(5) includes deliberative and attorney-client privileged information related to the legal review of a draft response to Representative Jayapal regarding the USCIS social media review process and the draft SORN. The emails are between USCIS OCC attorneys, and include statements of uncertainty, specific details regarding courses of action being considered and recommendations for those options. This information represents part of the deliberative process, as well as pre-decisional information being considered in this process. The information in the emails also contains multiple legal opinions related the potential courses of actions being considered. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(5). All other information within this document was segregated and determined non-exempt and disclosed.
1458-1462, 1469-1470	DHS Privacy Summary, Operational Use of Social Media, dated January 25, 2017	(b)(5): pages 1458- 1459, 1462, 1469- 1470 (b)(7)(E): pages 1460-1461	Privacy Compliance Draft Document	The information withheld under (b)(5) as deliberative process privileged information consists of multiple draft comments, revisions, additions, re-wordings, suggestions, clarifications, questions about accuracy, statements of uncertainty, and requests for additional information. All of this information is part of the deliberative

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process related to the review of a draft
version of the Operational Use of Social
Media template that must be completed in
order for the DHS Privacy Office to review
and determine privacy compliance. The
document includes draft responses to
questions from the DHS Privacy Office about
the collection of social media information,
which includes pre-decisional and
deliberative information.
The information withheld under (b)(5) as
attorney-client privileged information
consists of comments and legal opinions
added to this draft document by USCIS OCC
attorneys that had been asked to provide legal
review. Accordingly, this material is
appropriately exempt from disclosure
pursuant to Exemption (b)(5).
The information withheld under $(b)(7)(E)$
includes draft language in the document and
comments written by USCIS employees and
OCC attorneys that contain summaries of the
proposed processes and courses of action
being considered for DHS's operational use
of social media, including how USCIS's
FDNS would use the information as part of
the background check and screening process.
The redacted language also contains specifics
as to FDNS's methods for handling cases
involving potential fraud, criminal, public
safety, or national security concerns, and

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and if a second as a finfarm of a DIIC
specific examples of information that DHS
and FDNS would be gathering through social
media searches. This information, if
disclosed, would reveal the specific methods
and procedures that immigration officers are
able to use to conduct social media research
for certain immigration applicants and
petitioners that need additional background
checks or vetting, which is part of specific
techniques and procedures involved in the
enforcement of certain immigration and
national security laws and directives. The
release of this information would also reveal
guidelines that could risk circumvention of
the law, because it would put individuals on
notice as to what information is considered as
part of the screening and vetting process and
what the limitations of access are. The
release of this information could result in
individuals hiding the use of certain
information on social media platforms or
engaging in behavior to avoid proper vetting,
which would impact the effectiveness of
screening and vetting procedures used for the
enforcement of certain immigration and
national security laws and directives, and
could reasonably be expected to risk the
circumvention of law and render the
guidelines for additional screening measures
relevant to national security, public safety,
and fraud prevention useless. Accordingly,
this material is appropriately exempt from
disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(7)(E).
disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(7)(E).

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				All other information within this document was segregated and determined non-exempt and disclosed.
1471, 1473	Email, FW: Social media - FORMS project - LPRs, dated May 21, 2018	(b)(5)	Email	The information withheld under (b)(5) includes deliberative and attorney-client privileged information related to the collection of information on immigration forms. The emails are between USCIS OCC attorneys, USCIS employees, and DHS employees, and include statements summarizing current legal issues being considered related to the legal authority to collect social media handles on immigration forms. This information represents part of the deliberative process, as well as predecisional information being considered in this process. The information in the emails also contains a request for legal opinions related potential courses of actions being considered. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(5). All other information within this document was segregated and determined non-exempt and disclosed.
1475-1477	Impediments to Proposed Expanded Immigration Vetting of Aliens in the United States	(b)(5)	DOJ Summary Paper	The information withheld under (b)(5) as attorney-client privileged information consists of legal opinions contained in this Summary Paper, which was drafted by Department of Justice (DOJ) attorneys. The Summary Paper details specific impediments to proposed expanded immigration vetting of

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				aliens in the United States. It contains legal analysis and opinion on these issues. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(5). All other information within this document was segregated and determined non-exempt and disclosed.
1478-1491, 1493-1495	Draft Supporting Statement for Paperwork Reduction Act Generic Information Collection Submissions for "Generic Clearance for the Collection of Social Media Information on Immigration and Foreign Travel Forms," Office of Management and Budget Control No. 1601-NEW, dated April 26, 2018	(b)(5)	Draft Document	The information withheld under (b)(5) as deliberative process privileged information consists of multiple draft comments, revisions, additions, re-wordings, suggestions, clarifications, questions about accuracy, statements of uncertainty, and requests for additional information. All of this information is part of the deliberative process related to the development of a Supporting Statement for PRA requirements in connection with the collection of social media information on immigration and foreign travel forms. The material is predecisional and includes information that is not reflected in the final version of the document. The information withheld under (b)(5) as attorney-client privileged information consists of comments and legal opinions added to this draft document by USCIS OCC attorneys that had been asked to provide legal review. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(5). All other information within this document was segregated and determined non-exempt and disclosed.

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1497	Email, FW: Social Media Compliance Documentation, dated April 16, 2018	(b)(5)	Email	The information withheld under (b)(5) includes deliberative and attorney-client privileged information related to the review of draft social media compliance documentation. The emails are between USCIS OCC attorneys and USCIS employees and include requests for a legal opinion and feedback, and requests for additional information, which represents part of the deliberative process, as well as pre-decisional information being considered in this process. The information in the emails also contains a request for legal opinions on two specific issues. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(5). All other information within this document was segregated and determined non-exempt and disclosed.
1499-1503, 1505-1506	Draft - U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services Fraud Detection and National Security Investigations, Rules of Behavior for the Operational Use of Social Media	(b)(5): pages 1499- 1501, 1506 (b)(7)(E): pages 1502-1506	Privacy Compliance Draft Document	The information withheld under (b)(5) as deliberative process privileged information consists of multiple draft comments, revisions, additions, re-wordings, suggestions, clarifications, questions about accuracy, statements of uncertainty, and requests for additional information. All of this information is part of the deliberative process related to the review of a draft version of the Rules of Behavior Form that must be signed by Immigration Officers who are authorized to access the Internet and social media content for official purposes. The material is also pre-decisional and

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	includes information that is not reflected in
	the final version of the document.
	The information withheld under (b)(5) as
	attorney-client privileged information
	consists of comments and legal opinions
	added to this draft document by USCIS OCC
	attorneys that had been asked to provide legal
	review. Accordingly, this material is
	appropriately exempt from disclosure
	pursuant to Exemption (b)(5).
	pursuant to Exemption (0)(3).
	The information withheld under (b)(7)(E)
	includes draft language in the document and
	comments written by USCIS employees and
	OCC attorneys that contain summaries of the
	proposed processes and courses of action
	being considered for DHS's operational use
	of social media, including what specific
	activities USCIS's FDNS employees were
	authorized or prohibited from conducting as
	part of the background check and screening
	process. This information, if disclosed,
	would reveal the specific methods and
	procedures that immigration officers are able
	to use to conduct social media research and
	what the limitations of access are. The
	release of this information could result in
	individuals being able to determine what can
	and can't be searched on social media
	platforms, which would allow them to
	ascertain alternate ways to avoid proper
	vetting, which would impact the effectiveness
	vennig, which would impact the chectiveness

				of screening and vetting procedures used for the enforcement of certain immigration and national security laws and directives, and could reasonably be expected to risk the circumvention of law and render the guidelines for additional screening measures relevant to national security, public safety, and fraud prevention useless. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(7)(E). All other information within this document was segregated and determined non-exempt and disclosed.
1508	Email, FW: Social Media Compliance Documentation, dated April 16, 2018	(b)(5)	Email	The information withheld under (b)(5) includes deliberative and attorney-client privileged information related to the review of draft social media compliance documentation. The emails are between USCIS OCC attorneys and USCIS employees and include requests for a legal opinion and feedback, and requests for additional information, which represents part of the deliberative process, as well as pre-decisional information being considered in this process. The information in the emails also contains a request for legal opinions on two specific issues. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(5). All other information within this document was segregated and determined non-exempt and disclosed.

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1511-1512	Email, Social Media Next	(b)(5)	Email	The information withheld under (b)(5)
1311-1312	Steps, dated November 30,		Lillall	includes deliberative and attorney-client
	2017	(b)(7)(E)		_
	2017			privileged information related to the process
				of evaluating the plan to allow certain access
				to social media as part of immigration
				adjudication. The emails are between USCIS
				OCC attorneys, USCIS employees and
				leadership, and the DHS Privacy Office, and
				include summaries of DHS, CBP, ICE
				policies and legal opinions, and questions
				regarding options for next steps in USCIS's
				process. This information represents part of
				the deliberative process, as well as pre-
				decisional information being considered in
				this process. The information in the emails
				also contains summaries of legal opinions
				provided by DHS, CBP, and ICE, and
				questions related to USCIS's legal
				interpretations of certain issues.
				Accordingly, this material is appropriately
				exempt from disclosure pursuant to
				1
				Exemption (b)(5).
				The information withheld under (b)(7)(E)
				includes a description of the specific browser
				that agency employees were required to use
				when conducting social media checks, and
				the authorization for certain methods used by
				CBP, ICE, and USCIS employees to conduct
				social media searches. This information, if
				disclosed, would reveal the technology
				resources currently being used in the vetting
				process by law enforcement and immigration
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				officers, and the role that USCIS employees have in this process, which is part of specific techniques and procedures involved in the enforcement of certain immigration and national security laws and directives. The release of this information would also reveal guidelines that could risk circumvention of the law, because it would put individuals on notice as to what technology is being used, so that individuals could research the technology to identify vulnerabilities and limitations, which could impact the effectiveness of the screening and vetting process, and could reasonably be expected to risk the circumvention of law and render the guidelines for additional screening measures relevant to national security, public safety, and fraud prevention useless. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(7)(E). All other information within this document was segregated and determined non-exempt and disclosed.
1513-1517	Interim SOP for CBP Access to Social Media 20150608	(b)(7)(E)	Standard Operating Procedure	Exemption (b)(7)(E) was used to redact a copy of an Interim Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) for CBP Access to Social Media, dated June 8, 2015. The SOP establishes the procedure for CBP's access to operational use of social media and the implementation process. The redacted information consists of specific technology platforms being used to conduct social media

1518-1529	U.S. Customs and Border	(b)(7)(E)	Directive	searches and analyze data, methods that CBP uses to conduct research and monitoring, and the procedures for accessing the platform to conduct social media searches. This information, if disclosed, would reveal the technology resources and methods currently being used in the vetting process by CBP law enforcement and immigration officers, which is part of specific techniques and procedures involved in the enforcement of certain immigration and national security laws and directives. The release of this information would also reveal guidelines that could risk circumvention of the law, because it would put individuals on notice as to the specific tools used by law enforcement, the level of access available, and what technology is being used, so that individuals could research the technology to identify vulnerabilities and limitations, which could impact the effectiveness of the screening and vetting process, and could reasonably be expected to risk the circumvention of law and render the guidelines for additional screening measures relevant to national security, public safety, and fraud prevention useless. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(7)(E). All other information within this document was segregated and determined non-exempt and disclosed.
1310-1329	Protection Directive, CBP	(U)(7)(E)	Directive	copy of a CBP Directive No. 5410-003,

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Directive No. 5410-003,	"Operational Use of Social Media," dated
"Operational Use of Social	January 2, 2015. The Directive assigns
Media," dated January 2, 2015	responsibilities and general rules of behavior
	for the operational uses of social media by
	CBP employees. The redacted information
	consists of specific technology platforms
	being used to conduct social media searches
	and analyze data, methods that CBP uses to
	conduct research and monitoring, and the
	procedures for accessing the platform to
	conduct social media searches. This
	information, if disclosed, would reveal the
	technology resources and methods currently
	being used in the vetting process by CBP law
	enforcement and immigration officers, which
	is part of specific techniques and procedures
	involved in the enforcement of certain
	immigration and national security laws and
	directives. The release of this information
	would also reveal guidelines that could risk
	circumvention of the law, because it would
	put individuals on notice as to the specific
	tools used by law enforcement, the level of
	access available, and what technology is
	being used, so that individuals could research
	the technology to identify vulnerabilities and
	limitations, which could impact the
	effectiveness of the screening and vetting
	process, and could reasonably be expected to
	risk the circumvention of law and render the
	guidelines for additional screening measures
	relevant to national security, public safety,
	and fraud prevention useless. Accordingly,

				this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(7)(E). All other information within this document was segregated and determined non-exempt and disclosed.
1530-1534	U.S. Customs and Border Protection Operational Use of Social Media Rules of Behavior	(b)(7)(E)	Rules of Behavior	Exemption (b)(7)(E) was used to redact a copy of a CBP Operational Use of Social Media Rules of Behavior. The redacted information consists of specific methods that are authorized or prohibited as part of the operational use of social media to conduct research and monitoring. This information, if disclosed, would reveal the technology resources and methods currently being used in the vetting process by CBP law enforcement and immigration officers, which is part of specific techniques and procedures involved in the enforcement of certain immigration and national security laws and directives. The release of this information would also reveal guidelines that could risk circumvention of the law, because it would put individuals on notice as to the specific tools used by law enforcement, the level of access available, and what technology is being used, so that individuals could research the technology to identify vulnerabilities and limitations, which could impact the effectiveness of the screening and vetting process, and could reasonably be expected to risk the circumvention of law and render the guidelines for additional screening measures relevant to national security, public safety,

				and fraud prevention useless. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(7)(E). All other information within this document was segregated and determined non-exempt and disclosed.
1541-1543	IP - USCIS Screening and Vetting	(b)(5): page 1543 (b)(7)(E): pages 1541-1542	Briefing Summary	The information withheld under (b)(5) consists of deliberative and attorney-client privileged information related to the review of the draft Issue Paper (IP) related to USCIS Screening and Vetting. The withheld information includes comments and recommendations for revision and rewording, which is part of the deliberative and pre-decisional process. The information withheld under (b)(5) as attorney-client privileged information consists of comments and legal opinions added to this draft document by USCIS OCC attorneys that had been asked to provide legal review. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(5). The information redacted under Exemption (b)(7)(E) consists of specific techniques and procedures involved in the operational use of social media to conduct screening for certain applicants, including detailed information about which applications and petitions could be subject to this screen, summaries of future plans for expanding the process, and the

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	outstanding issues to be resolved for the
	process of social media screening and
	vetting. This information, if disclosed, would
	reveal the methods currently being used in
	the vetting process by law enforcement and
	immigration officers, and the types of
	applications that may be subject to screening
	for possible indicators of fraud, public safety,
	or national security concerns, which is part of
	specific techniques and procedures involved
	in the enforcement of certain immigration
	and national security laws and directives.
	The release of this information would also
	reveal guidelines that could risk
	circumvention of the law, because it would
	put individuals on notice as to what
	information is considered as part of the
	screening and vetting process and what types
	of applications are likely to be considered for
	enhanced screening, which could impact the
	effectiveness of the screening and vetting
	process and could reasonably be expected to
	risk the circumvention of law and render the
	guidelines for additional screening measures
	relevant to national security, public safety,
	and fraud prevention useless. Accordingly,
	this material is appropriately exempt from
	disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(7)(E).
	All other information within this document
	was segregated and determined non-exempt
	and disclosed.

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1544-1545	Email, FW: Social Media Talking Points, dated April 3, 2018	(b)(5)	Email	The information withheld under (b)(5) includes deliberative and attorney-client privileged information related to the review of draft talking points for the use of social media screening. The emails are between USCIS OCC attorneys, and include comments and requests for additional information, which represents part of the deliberative process, as well as pre-decisional information being considered in this process. The information in the emails also contains information related to a request for legal opinions, as well as legal definitions of certain terms, and suggested recommendations for addressing legal concerns. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(5). All other information within this document was segregated and determined non-exempt and disclosed.
1547-1549	Email, FW: UPDATE - Email, RE: Delegation 15002, Revision 01, Delegation to the Director of U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services to Conduct Certain Law Enforcement Activities, dated May 16, 2018	(b)(5)	Email	The information withheld under (b)(5) includes deliberative and attorney-client privileged information related to the review of the draft Delegation 15002, which involves the delegation to USCIS to conduct certain law enforcement activities, including searches of social media as part of immigration adjudications. The emails are between USCIS OCC attorneys and were sent to USCIS OCC leadership to provide a summary of the draft delegation and multiple concerns, edits, revisions, and comments that

1551-1558	Email, FW: USCIS SMWG -	(b)(5)	Email	USCIS had received from ICE, CBP, Privacy, and CRCL. This information represents part of the deliberative process, as well as pre-decisional information being considered in this process. The information in the emails also contains summaries of specific legal opinions from USCIS OCC, ICE OPLA, and CBP legal counsel, and includes potential courses of actions being considered. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(5). All other information within this document was segregated and determined non-exempt and disclosed. The information withheld under (b)(5)
	Request for legal guidance regarding potential civil liability for violations of social media providers, dated April 24, 2018			includes deliberative and attorney-client privileged information related to a request from the SMWG for guidance regarding potential legal liability for participating in USCIS social media operational activities. The emails are between USCIS OCC attorneys and contain a discussion of certain proposed actions involved in the social media process, and the various potential legal risks associated with those courses of action. This information represents part of the deliberative process, as well as pre-decisional information being considered in this process. The information in the emails also include summaries of specific legal opinions regarding liability for various courses of actions being considered. Accordingly, this

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				material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(5). All other information within this document was segregated and determined non-exempt and disclosed.
1571	Email, FW: USCIS authority to collect/use social media information relating to the exercise of First Amendment protected activities (draft), dated June 22, 2016	(b)(5)	Email	The information withheld under (b)(5) includes deliberative and attorney-client privileged information related to a request for legal guidance regarding USCIS's authority to collect and use social media information, specifically in relation to First Amendment protected activities. The emails are between USCIS OCC attorneys and include a summary of the legal issues and draft responses, which represents part of the deliberative and pre-decisional process. The information in the emails also contains the detailed legal opinions on two specific issues. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(5). All other information within this document was segregated and determined non-exempt and disclosed.
1575	Quick Question, dated October 4, 2017	(b)(5)	Email	The information withheld under (b)(5) includes deliberative and attorney-client privileged information related to a request for legal review of document related to social media screening. The emails are between USCIS OCC attorneys and include a summary of the legal issues and draft responses, which represents part of the deliberative and pre-decisional process. The information in the emails also contains

				OCC's legal opinion on a specific issue related to screening. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(5). All other information within this document was segregated and determined non-exempt and disclosed.
1577-1578, 1580	Email, RE: [3RD ROUND COMPONENT CLEARANCE REQUEST]: Latest draft of Consolidated DHS Social Media Talking Points, dated March 30, 2018	(b)(5)	Email	The information withheld under (b)(5) includes deliberative and attorney-client privileged information related to the review of draft talking points related to the use of social media screening. The emails are between USCIS OCC attorneys and USCIS employees, and include comments and requests for additional information, which represents part of the deliberative process, as well as pre-decisional information being considered in this process. The information in the emails also contains specific legal opinions from ICE OPLA and USCIS OCC and includes potential courses of actions being considered. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(5). All other information within this document was segregated and determined non-exempt and disclosed.
1586, 1588	Email, RE: [Clearance Request] Person-Centric Vetting and Person-Centric View Definition, dated February 8, 2018	(b)(5)	Email	The information withheld under (b)(5) includes deliberative and attorney-client privileged information related to the review of proposed changes to the "person-centric vetting and person-centric view" definitions. The emails are between USCIS OCC and

				USCIS employees and include a summary of OCC's legal opinion regarding the definition of the terms, and analysis regarding the difference in definitions. This information represents part of the deliberative process, as well as pre-decisional information being considered in this process. The information in the emails also contains a summary of USCIS OCC attorneys' legal position on defining certain terms and how that may impact the process. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(5). All other information within this document was segregated and determined non-exempt and disclosed.
1597-1600	Email, RE: [Social Media SORN] Clearance request for responses to HSGAC, dated October 23, 2017	(b)(5)	Email	The information withheld under (b)(5) includes deliberative and attorney-client privileged information related to the review of draft response to the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee (HSGAC) regarding the collection of social media information and SORN. The emails are between USCIS OCC attorneys and USCIS employees, and include comments and requests for additional information, which represents part of the deliberative process, as well as pre-decisional information being considered in this process. The information in the emails also contains OCC's legal opinions and draft responses to the questions. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure

				pursuant to Exemption (b)(5). All other information within this document was segregated and determined non-exempt and disclosed.
1603-1609, 1611	Email, RE: [Social Media SORN] Coordinated response, dated October 11, 2017	(b)(5)	Email	The information withheld under (b)(5) as deliberative process privileged information related to the agency-wide coordinated review of responses to Congressional Inquiries and other inquires received related to USCIS's plan to collect social media information on certain immigration applicants. The emails are between USCIS OCC and USCIS employees and contain predecisional and deliberative information, including draft responses, revisions, additions, re-wordings, suggestions, clarifications, and requests for additional information. All of this information is part of the deliberative process. The information withheld under (b)(5) as attorney-client privileged information consists of comments and legal opinions about the draft responses, which were provided by USCIS OCC attorneys that had been asked to provide legal review. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(5). All other information within this document was segregated and determined non-exempt and disclosed.

1616, 1618	Email, RE: AILA questions, dated April 25, 2018	(b)(5)	Email	The information withheld under (b)(5) includes deliberative and attorney-client privileged information related to the review of draft responses to questions sent to USCIS by AILA, which were sent prior to a scheduled luncheon meeting between USCIS and AILA employees. The emails are between USCIS OCC attorneys, and include comments and requests for additional information, which represents part of the deliberative process, as well as pre-decisional information being considered in this process. The information in the emails also contains information related to a request for legal opinions and includes potential courses of actions being considered. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(5). All other information within this document was segregated and determined non-exempt and
1621	Email, RE: AILA questions for April 26th Richmond luncheon meeting, dated April 24, 2018	(b)(5)	Email	disclosed. The information withheld under (b)(5) includes deliberative and attorney-client privileged information related to the review of draft responses to questions sent to USCIS by AILA, which were sent prior to a scheduled luncheon meeting between USCIS and AILA employees. The emails are between USCIS OCC attorneys, and include comments and suggested language for the draft responses, which represents part of the deliberative process, as well as pre-decisional information being considered in this process.

				The information in the emails also contains OCC's legal opinion regarding the draft responses. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(5). All other information within this document was segregated and determined non-exempt and disclosed.
1623	Email, RE: AILA questions, dated April 24, 2018	(b)(5)	Email	The information withheld under (b)(5) includes deliberative and attorney-client privileged information related to the review of draft responses to questions sent to USCIS by AILA, which were sent prior to a scheduled luncheon meeting between USCIS and AILA employees. The emails are between USCIS OCC attorneys, and include comments and suggested language for the draft responses, which represents part of the deliberative process, as well as pre-decisional information being considered in this process. The information in the emails also contains OCC's legal opinion regarding the draft responses. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(5). All other information within this document was segregated and determined non-exempt and disclosed.
1624	Email, RE: Are you attending the 2 Social Media meeting, dated January 31, 2018	(b)(5) (b)(7)(E)	Email	The information withheld under (b)(5) includes deliberative and attorney-client privileged information within emails related to a meeting between OCC, USCIS Privacy, and the USCIS Social Media Working Group

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social media information. This information, if disclosed, would reveal the methods that immigration officers are authorized and prohibited from using to collect social media information to be used in the vetting process by law enforcement and immigration officers, and the role that USCIS employees have in this process, which is part of specific techniques and procedures involved in the

		(SMWG) to discuss the issue of oversight of
		social media collection activities. The emails
		are between USCIS OCC attorneys, and
		include statements summarizing the meeting
		and current issues being considered as part of
		the SMWG. This information represents part
		of the deliberative process, as well as pre-
		decisional information being considered in
		this process. The information in the emails
		also contains a summary of certain legal
		issues that are outstanding and being
		considered. Accordingly, this material is
		appropriately exempt from disclosure
		pursuant to Exemption (b)(5).
		Exemption (b)(7)(E) was used to withhold an
		attorney's summary of the meeting held
		between OCC, USCIS Privacy, and the
		USCIS Social Media Working Group to
		discuss the issue of oversight of social media
		collection activities, and the attorney's
		opinion as to the legal issues that needed to
		be addressed in regards to proposed options
		for methods of conducting and collecting
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				enforcement of certain immigration and national security laws and directives. The release of this information would also reveal guidelines that could risk circumvention of the law, because it would put individuals on notice as to what limitations the agency's searches have and what methods may be used to collect information, which could impact the effectiveness of the screening and vetting process, and could reasonably be expected to risk the circumvention of law and render the guidelines for additional screening measures relevant to national security, public safety, and fraud prevention useless. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(7)(E).
				was segregated and determined non-exempt and disclosed.
1631	Email, Call with USCIS Privacy to discuss oversight of social media collection, dated March 12, 2018	(b)(5)	Email	The information withheld under (b)(5) includes deliberative and attorney-client privileged information related to an upcoming meeting between the SMWG, USIS OCC, and USCIS Privacy regarding the oversight of social media collection activities. The emails are between USCIS OCC attorneys, and include statements summarizing the meeting agenda and current issues being considered as part of the SMWG involving privacy issues. This information represents part of the deliberative process, as well as pre-decisional information being

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				considered in this process. The information in the emails also contains a summary of certain legal issues that are outstanding and being considered. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(5). All other information within this document was segregated and determined non-exempt and disclosed.
1635-1637	Email, RE: Call with the FBI, dated April 12, 2018	(b)(5): pages 1635- 1637 (b)(7)(E): pages 1636-1637	Email	The information withheld under (b)(5) includes deliberative and attorney-client privileged information related to a meeting between the SMWG, USCIS OCC, USCIS's Immigration Records and Identity Services Directorate (IRIS), and the FBI National Security Law Branch regarding the issue of what types of information maintained by USCIS that the FBI is permitted to access. The emails are between USCIS OCC attorneys, and include statements summarizing the meeting and current issues being considered as part of the SMWG. This information represents part of the deliberative process, as well as pre-decisional information being considered in this process. The information in the emails also contains a summary of certain legal issues that are outstanding and being considered. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(5).

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		Exemption (b)(7)(E) was used to withhold an attorney's summary of the meeting and the issues raised by the FBI regarding information access requests and coordination to support law enforcement efforts, and whether FBI would have access to information collected by USCIS. The options discussed consist of information that reveals the type of information collected by USCIS and what is available to law enforcement agencies like the FBI, which is part of specific techniques and procedures involved in the enforcement of certain immigration and national security laws and directives. The release of this information would also reveal guidelines that could risk circumvention of the law, because it would put individuals on notice as to whether their information has or has not been provided to the FBI for law enforcement investigations, which may tip off individuals who otherwise would not have been aware of an ongoing investigation, which could reasonably be expected to risk the circumvention of law and render the guidelines for additional screening measures relevant to national security, public safety, and fraud prevention useless. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(7)(E).
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				All other information within this document was segregated and determined non-exempt and disclosed.
1638-1639	Email, RE: Children's Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998 (COPPA), dated January 29, 2018	(b)(5)	Email	The information withheld under (b)(5) includes deliberative and attorney-client privileged information related to whether the Children's Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998 (COPPA) impacts USCIS's social media policy. The emails are between USCIS OCC attorneys, and include statements summarizing the various options being considered and the legal implications associated with these options. This information represents part of the deliberative process, as well as pre-decisional information being considered in this process. The information in the emails also contains legal opinions regarding how COPPA would impact USCIS's proposed plans, and legal recommendations to the client. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(5). All other information within this document was segregated and determined non-exempt and disclosed.
1643-1646	Email, RE: Congressional Inquiry - USCIS Rule re. Social Media, dated October 2, 2017	(b)(5)	Email	The information withheld under (b)(5) includes deliberative and attorney-client privileged information related to the review of draft responses to congressional inquiries on topics related to DHS's authority to conduct social media checks on certain populations. The emails are between USCIS OCC attorneys and USCIS employees, and

				include comments and requests for additional information, which represents part of the deliberative process, as well as pre-decisional information being considered in this process. The information in the emails also contains OCC's legal opinions and draft responses to the questions. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(5). All other information within this document was segregated and determined non-exempt and disclosed.
1648	Email, RE: Congressional Inquiry - USCIS Rule re. Social Media, dated October 30, 2017	(b)(7)(E)	Email	Exemption (b)(7)(E) was used to redact portions of an email sent between USCIS OCC attorneys discussing the review of a draft response to a congressional inquiry. The information withheld under (b)(7)(E) includes the link to an internal intranet website that directs to the draft copy of the document being reviewed. This information, if disclosed, would reveal the technology resources currently being used in the government to review sensitive law enforcement documents that aid in the vetting process. This type of information is part of specific techniques and procedures involved the agency's enforcement of certain immigration and national security laws and directives. It would also reveal guidelines that could risk circumvention of the law, including the specific tools used by the agency to coordinate review of documents to support USCIS's mission. The release of this

				information would put individuals on notice as to what technology is being used, so that individuals could research the technology to identify vulnerabilities and limitations, which could reasonably be expected to risk the circumvention of law and render the guidelines for additional screening measures relevant to national security, public safety, and fraud prevention useless. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(7)(E).
1650-1652	Email, RE: Delegation 15002, Revision 01, Delegation to the Director of U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services to Conduct Certain Law Enforcement Activities, dated May 30, 2018	(b)(5)	Email	The information withheld under (b)(5) includes deliberative and attorney-client privileged information related to the review of the draft Delegation 15002, which involves the delegation to USCIS to conduct certain law enforcement activities, including searches of social media as part of immigration adjudications. The emails are between USCIS OCC attorneys and were sent to USCIS OCC leadership to provide a summary of the draft delegation and multiple concerns, edits, revisions, and comments that USCIS had received from ICE, CBP, Privacy, and CRCL. This information represents part of the deliberative process, as well as pre-decisional information being considered in this process. The information in the emails also contains legal opinions from USCIS OCC, ICE OPLA, and CBP legal counsel, and includes potential courses of actions being considered. Accordingly,

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				this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(5). All other information within this document was segregated and determined non-exempt and disclosed.
1655-1658	Subject: Delegation 15002, Revision 01, Delegation to the Director of U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services to Conduct Certain Law Enforcement Activities, dated May 24, 2018	(b)(5)	Draft email response with OCC comments and edits	The information withheld under (b)(5) includes deliberative and attorney-client privileged information related to a draft copy of DHS Delegation Number 15002, "Delegation 15002, Revision 01, Delegation to the Director of U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services to Conduct Certain Law Enforcement Activities." The document is a draft email which OCC leadership planned to send to James McCament to summarize OCC's legal recommendations regarding the revised delegation. This information is part of the deliberative and pre-decisional process. The draft email also contains summaries of various legal opinions from USCIS OCC, ICE OPLA, and CBP attorneys related to the revised delegation. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(5). All other information within this document was segregated and determined non-exempt and disclosed.
1676-1678	Email, RE: Delegation 15002, Revision 01, Delegation to the Director of U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services to Conduct Certain Law	(b)(5)	Email	The information withheld under (b)(5) includes deliberative and attorney-client privileged information related to the review of the draft Delegation 15002, which involves the delegation to USCIS to conduct certain law enforcement activities, including

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	Enforcement Activities, dated June 5, 2018			searches of social media as part of immigration adjudications. The emails are between USCIS OCC attorneys and include a summary of the draft delegation and multiple concerns, edits, revisions, and comments that USCIS had received from ICE, CBP, Privacy, and CRCL. This information represents part of the deliberative process, as well as pre-decisional information being considered in this process. The information in the emails also contains legal opinions from USCIS OCC, ICE OPLA, and CBP legal counsel, and includes potential courses of actions being considered. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(5). All other information within this document was segregated and determined non-exempt and disclosed.
1681, 1684, 1686	Email, RE: Delegation to the Director of U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services to Conduct Certain Law Enforcement Activities ESEC Workflow # 1159363, dated May 16, 2018	(b)(5)	Email	The information withheld under (b)(5) includes deliberative and attorney-client privileged information related to the review of the draft Delegation 15002, which involves the delegation to USCIS to conduct certain law enforcement activities, including searches of social media as part of immigration adjudications. The emails are between USCIS OCC, ICE OPLA, and CBP attorneys and include various statements summarizing concerns, edits, revisions, and comments related to the revised delegation. This information represents part of the deliberative process, as well as pre-decisional

1689-1693	Email, RE: DHS COMPONENT PASSBACKS [DHS Congressional Correspondence] Sen. Menendez+ 5 to AS1, FRN/Privacy Concerns with retaining Social Media information, WF 1154028, dated February 27, 2018	(b)(5)	Email	information being considered in this process. The information in the emails also contains legal opinions from USCIS OCC, ICE OPLA, and CBP legal counsel, and includes potential courses of actions being considered. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(5). All other information within this document was segregated and determined non-exempt and disclosed. The information withheld under (b)(5) includes deliberative and attorney-client privileged information related to the review of draft responses to questions received by DHS from Senator Menendez related to concerns with retaining social media information. The emails are between USCIS OCC and USCIS employees and include a summary of specific legal issues and responses to the questions, which represents part of the deliberative process, as well as pre-decisional information being considered in this process. The information in the emails also contains information related to a request for legal opinions and includes potential courses of actions being considered. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(5). All other information
1694-1695	Email, RE: DHS PLCY	(b)(5)	Email	within this document was segregated and determined non-exempt and disclosed. The information withheld under (b)(5)
	REQUEST FOR			includes deliberative and attorney-client

	COMPONENT CLEARANCE - Chairman McCaul (R-TX) Letter on Social Media, WF 1160173, dated April 18, 2018			privileged information related to the review of draft responses to questions from Chairman McCaul relating to potential restrictions placed on DHS use of publicly available social media information. The emails are between USCIS OCC and USCIS employees and include a summary of specific operational and legal issues and responses to the questions, which represents part of the deliberative process, as well as pre-decisional information being considered in this process. The information in the emails also contains information related to a request for legal opinions and includes potential courses of actions being considered. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(5). All other information within this document was segregated and determined non-exempt and disclosed.
1711-1712	Email, RE: DHS procurement of SM services in Enhanced Vetting initiative, dated April 9, 2018	(b)(5)	Email	The information withheld under (b)(5) includes deliberative and attorney-client privileged information related to questions USCIS received regarding DHS's potential procurement of social media services as part of the Enhanced Vetting initiative. The emails are between USCIS OCC and include a summary of specific operational and legal issues and thoughts about pending process decisions, which represents part of the deliberative process, as well as pre-decisional information being considered in this process. The information in the emails also contains

				information related to OCC's legal opinions regarding the potential courses of actions being considered. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(5). All other information within this document was segregated and determined non-exempt and disclosed.
1713-1715	Email, RE: DHS-USCIS Social Media call, dated October 4, 2017	(b)(5)	Email	The information withheld under (b)(5) includes deliberative and attorney-client privileged information related to the summary of a meeting between the SMWG and DHS Privacy. The emails are between USCIS OCC attorneys, and include statements summarizing current issues being considered as part of the SMWG, and DHS Privacy's concerns with certain aspects of the use of fictitious accounts for fraud purposes, which was still an outstanding issue. This information represents part of the deliberative process, as well as pre-decisional information being considered in this process. The information in the emails also contains legal opinions related to the potential courses of actions being considered. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(5). All other information within this document was segregated and determined non-exempt and disclosed.
1719-1726,	Guidance for Use of Social	(b)(5): pages 1719-	Draft Guidance Document	The information withheld under (b)(5) as
1728-1729	Media in Field Operations Directorate Adjudications,	1726, 1728-1729		deliberative process privileged information consists of a draft version of a document that

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Draft copy, 2017	dated August 7, (b)(7)(E): pages 1720-1726, 1728- 1729	details Guidance for Use of Social Media in Field Operations Directorate Adjudications. The withheld information focuses on the types of questions and issues that adjudicators may want to look for when reviewing an application or interviewing an applicant related to social media information. The material is also pre-decisional and includes information that is not reflected in the final version of the document. The information withheld under (b)(7)(E) includes draft language in the document and comments written by USCIS employees and OCC attorneys that contain summaries of the proposed processes and courses of action being considered for FDNS employees who would be authorized to access the internet and social media content to support USCIS's mission, as well as details about the CARRP process and how to handle social media results involve potential national security concerns. The redacted language also contains specifics as to what specific questions can be used by immigration officers to question applicants to verify social media results as part of social media vetting. This information, if disclosed, would reveal the specific methods and procedures that immigration officers are able to use to
		the specific methods and procedures that

and pro of certa laws an informa could ri it would informa screenin question the indi was inv or publi informa the use platforn proper v effectiv procedv certain laws an expecte render t measur safety, a Accord exempt	which is part of specific techniques reedures involved in the enforcement in immigration and national security differences. The release of this ration would also reveal guidelines that ask circumvention of the law, because differences and put individuals on notice as to what ration is considered as part of the regard vetting process and what has may be asked, which would tip off viduals that the immigration officer restigating possible national security is safety concerns. The release of this ration could result in individuals hiding of certain information on social media runs or engaging in behavior to avoid resulting, which would impact the reness of screening and vetting rures used for the enforcement of immigration and national security differences, and could reasonably be read to risk the circumvention of law and the guidelines for additional screening results relevant to national security, public and fraud prevention useless. Singly, this material is appropriately from disclosure pursuant to the tion (b)(7)(E).
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1730-1732	Email, RE: Fictious Account definition, dated April 2, 2018	(b)(5)	Email	The information withheld under (b)(5) includes deliberative and attorney-client privileged information related to the review of social media privacy compliance documentation. The emails are between USCIS OCC and USCIS employees and include a summary of OCC's legal opinion regarding the definition of the term "fictitious accounts" in relation to the development of the agency's social media policies. This information represents part of the deliberative process, as well as pre-decisional information being considered in this process. The information in the emails also contains a summary of USCIS OCC attorneys' legal position on defining certain terms and how that may impact the process. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(5). All other information within this document was segregated and determined non-exempt and
1733-1734	Email, RE: Fictitious Account Privacy Compliance Documentation, dated June 6, 2018	(b)(5): pages 1733- 1734 (b)(7)(E): page 1733	Email	disclosed. The information withheld under (b)(5) includes deliberative and attorney-client privileged information related to the review of social media privacy compliance documentation, the SMOUT, ROB, PIA, and training documents. The emails are between USCIS OCC and USCIS employees and include a summary of various outstanding issues and proposed options and concerns. This information represents part of the deliberative process, as well as pre-decisional

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information being considered in this process. The information in the emails also contains a summary of USCIS OCC attorneys' legal
opinions on the issues raised and
recommendations to the client. Accordingly,
this material is appropriately exempt from
disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(5).
The information withheld under (b)(7)(E)
includes OCC attorneys' summaries of two
legal issues raised as part of reviewing
privacy compliance documentation. The
issues relate to proposed methods being
considered for collection of social media, and
what methods would be permitted and
prohibited. This information, if disclosed,
would reveal the methods used by immigration officers for conducting social
media screening, which is part of specific
techniques and procedures involved in the
enforcement of certain immigration and
national security laws and directives. The
release of this information would also reveal
guidelines that could risk circumvention of
the law, because it would put individuals on
notice as to what information can and cannot
be collected, and what methods are permitted
and prohibited, which could result in
individuals hiding the use of certain social
media platforms or encouraging the use of
platforms that the agency does not access to,
which would impact the effectiveness of
screening and vetting procedures used for the

				enforcement of certain immigration and national security laws and directives, and could reasonably be expected to risk the circumvention of law and render the guidelines for additional screening measures relevant to national security, public safety, and fraud prevention useless. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(7)(E). All other information within this document was segregated and determined non-exempt and disclosed.
1735	Email, RE: Fictitious Account Privacy Compliance Documentation, dated May 22, 2018	(b)(5)	Email	The information withheld under (b)(5) includes deliberative and attorney-client privileged information related to the review of social media privacy compliance documentation, the SMOUT, ROB, PIA, and training documents. The emails are between USCIS OCC attorneys, and include a summary of the draft documents being reviewed, various outstanding issues and proposed options and concerns. This information represents part of the deliberative process, as well as pre-decisional information being considered in this process. The information in the emails also contains a summary of USCIS OCC attorneys' legal opinions on the issues raised and recommendations to the client. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(5). All other information within this document was

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				segregated and determined non-exempt and disclosed.
1738-1740	Email, RE: FOR DECISION: USCIS SMWG - Request for legal guidance regarding potential civil liability for violations of social media providers, dated April 25, 2018	(b)(5)	Email	The information withheld under (b)(5) includes deliberative and attorney-client privileged information related to a request from the SMWG for guidance regarding whether employees face any potential personal legal liability for participating in USCIS social media operational activities. The emails and were written by USCIS OCC attorneys and are directed to USCIS OCC leadership, and contain a discussion of certain proposed actions involved in the social media process, and the various potential legal risks associated with those courses of action. This information represents part of the deliberative process, as well as pre-decisional information being considered in this process. The information in the emails also include summaries of specific legal opinions regarding liability for various courses of actions being considered. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(5). All other information within this document was segregated and determined non-exempt and disclosed.
1741-1743	Email, RE: Fraud Referral Criteria, dated January 10, 2018	(b)(5)	Email	The information withheld under (b)(5) includes deliberative and attorney-client privileged information related to the summary of a meeting between the SMWG, FDNS, and USCIS OCC. The emails are between USCIS OCC attorneys and FDNS,

				and include statements summarizing current issues being considered as part of the SMWG, and DHS Privacy's concerns with certain aspects of the use of fictitious accounts for fraud purposes, which was still an outstanding issue. This information represents part of the deliberative process, as well as pre-decisional information being considered in this process. The information in the emails also contains legal opinions related to the potential courses of actions being considered. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(5). All other information within this document was segregated and determined non-exempt and disclosed.
1746-1747	Email, RE: Fraud Referral Criteria, dated April 26, 2018	(b)(5)	Email	The information withheld under (b)(5) includes deliberative and attorney-client privileged information related to the summary of a meeting between the SMWG, FDNS, and USCIS OCC. The emails are between USCIS OCC attorneys and FDNS, and include statements summarizing current issues being considered as part of the SMWG, and DHS Privacy's concerns with certain aspects of the use of fictitious accounts for fraud purposes, which was still an outstanding issue. This information represents part of the deliberative process, as well as pre-decisional information being considered in this process. The information in the emails also contains legal opinions

				related to the potential courses of actions being considered. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(5). All other information within this document was segregated and determined non-exempt and disclosed.
1751	Email, RE: Meeting Summary (DRAFT), dated February 1, 2018	(b)(5)	Email	The information withheld under (b)(5) includes deliberative and attorney-client privileged information related to the summary of a meeting between USCIS and DHS Privacy. The emails are between USCIS OCC attorneys, and include statements summarizing current issues being considered as part of the SMWG, and DHS Privacy's concerns with certain aspects of the use of fictitious accounts for fraud purposes, which was still an outstanding issue. This information represents part of the deliberative process, as well as pre-decisional information being considered in this process. The information in the emails also contains legal opinions related to the potential courses of actions being considered. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(5). All other information within this document was segregated and determined non-exempt and disclosed.
1752-1754	Email, RE: Meeting Summary and Status of Draft Delegation, dated February 1, 2018	(b)(5)	Email	The information withheld under (b)(5) includes deliberative and attorney-client privileged information related to the summary of a meeting between USCIS and

				DHS Privacy. The emails are between USCIS OCC attorneys, and include statements summarizing current issues being considered as part of the SMWG, and various USCIS components responses to the proposed revisions to the delegation as it pertains to the use of fictitious accounts for fraud purposes, which was still an outstanding issue. This information represents part of the deliberative process, as well as pre-decisional information being considered in this process. The information in the emails also contains legal opinions related to the potential courses of actions being considered. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(5). All other information within this document was segregated and determined non-exempt and disclosed.
1755-1758	Email, RE: Meeting Summary and Status of Draft Delegation, dated February 6, 2018	(b)(5): pages 1755- 1758 (b)(7)(E): page 1755	Email	The information withheld under (b)(5) includes deliberative and attorney-client privileged information related to the summary of a meeting between USCIS and DHS Privacy. The emails are between USCIS OCC attorneys, and include statements summarizing current issues being considered as part of the SMWG, the meeting held, and various issues that USCIS OCC had noted that required additional research and consideration. This information represents part of the deliberative process, as well as pre-decisional information being considered

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	in this process. The information in the emails also contains legal opinions related to the potential courses of actions being considered. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(5).
	Exemption (b)(7)(E) was used to withhold an attorney's summary of the meeting held and courses of action being considered as part of the International Information Sharing Integrated Product Team (IPT), and the attorney's opinion as to the legal issues that
	needed to be addressed in regards to proposed options for sharing social media information with other law enforcement partners. This information, if disclosed, would reveal the methods that immigration officers are authorized and prohibited from
	using to collect social media information and how that information may be shared with other law enforcement partners, which is part of specific techniques and procedures involved in the enforcement of certain immigration and national security laws and
	directives. The release of this information would also reveal guidelines that could risk circumvention of the law, because it would put individuals on notice as to what limitations law enforcement has in sharing information, which could impact the
	effectiveness of the screening and vetting process, and could reasonably be expected to

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				risk the circumvention of law and render the guidelines for additional screening measures relevant to national security, public safety, and fraud prevention useless. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(7)(E). All other information within this document was segregated and determined non-exempt and disclosed.
1760	Email, RE: Meeting to discuss FDNS Fictitious Account SMOUT, ROB, and PIA, dated October 4, 2017	(b)(7)(E)	Email	Exemption (b)(7)(E) was used to withhold a portion of an email sent between FDNS, USCIS Privacy, and USCIS OCC related to an upcoming meeting to discuss DHS Privacy's outstanding questions on the draft USCIS privacy documentation for the agency's social media use and collection. The information withheld under (b)(7)(E) includes the link to an internal USCIS conference number and passcode. This information, if disclosed, would reveal the technology resources currently being used in the government to host conference calls and to discuss sensitive law enforcement information. The release of this information would put individuals on notice as to how to access internal agency phone calls, and could reasonably be expected to risk the circumvention of law and render the guidelines for additional screening measures relevant to national security, public safety, and fraud prevention useless. Accordingly,

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				this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(7)(E).
1761-1762	Email, RE: OMB/OIRA comments on draft social media PRA package, dated September 27, 2017	(b)(5)	Email	The information withheld under (b)(5) includes deliberative and attorney-client privileged information related to the review of draft social media PRA materials and responses to comments received by the DHS Office of Management and Budget (OMB). The emails are between USCIS OCC attorneys and USCIS employees and include clarifications and responses to OMB questions, which represents part of the deliberative process, as well as pre-decisional information being considered in this process. The information in the emails also contains information related to OCC's legal position on the various issues raised and the potential courses of actions being considered. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(5). All other information within this document was segregated and determined non-exempt and disclosed.
1763-1764, 1768	Email, RE: Outstanding issues re the use of fictitious social media accounts when fraud is suspected, dated October 16, 2017	(b)(5)	Email	The information withheld under (b)(5) includes deliberative and attorney-client privileged information related to guidance being developed related to the use of fictitious social media accounts when fraud is suspected. The emails are between USCIS OCC attorneys, and include statements summarizing outstanding issues being considered that required additional research and consideration. This information

				represents part of the deliberative process, as well as pre-decisional information being considered in this process. The information in the emails also contains legal opinions related to the potential courses of actions being considered. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(5). All other information within this document was segregated and determined non-exempt and disclosed.
1769-1771,	Email, RE: Document sent for concurrence "Delegation of Authority to Conduct Certain Law Enforcement Activities Including but Not Limited to Accessing Internet and Publicly Available Social Media Content Using a Fictitious Account or Identity", dated April 3, 2017	(b)(5)	Email	The information withheld under (b)(5) includes deliberative and attorney-client privileged information related to the review of the re-delegation to allow USCIS to conduct certain law enforcement activities including accessing social media content using a fictious account or identity. The emails are between USCIS OCC attorneys, and include statements summarizing specific edits and comments that OCC attorneys had included in the draft re-delegation. This information represents part of the deliberative process, as well as pre-decisional information being considered in this process. The information in the emails also contains legal opinions related to the potential courses of actions being considered. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(5). All other information within this document was segregated and determined non-exempt and disclosed.

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Draft Legal Memorandum USCIS's Chief Counsel to DHS's General Counsel regarding Legal Considerat regarding the Operational U of Social Media, dated Janu XX, 2016	1805 ons (b)(7)(E): page	Draft Legal Memorandum	The information withheld under (b)(5) as attorney-client privileged information consists of legal opinions contained in this legal memorandum. The memorandum is written from USCIS's Office of Chief Counsel to DHS's Office of General Counsel, and explores legal considerations regarding the operational use of social media. The memorandum outlines the legal considerations regarding whether USCIS employees may engage in fraud, misrepresentation, and/or deception while engaging in the operational use of social media, including an overview of the legal authorities and principles that USCIS had developed relating to their legal opinions. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(5). The information withheld under (b)(7)(E) includes summaries of the proposed processes and courses of action being considered for USCIS employees while engaging in the operational use of social media, analysis outlining the legal considerations with the various methods proposed, the specific social media applications searched and what's permitted under their terms of service and under the relevant legal authority, and the specific methods that counsel advised that the agency authorize and prohibit. This information, if
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	disclosed, would reveal the specific methods
	and procedures that immigration officers are
	able to use to conduct social media research
	for certain immigration applicants and
	petitioners that need additional background
	checks or vetting, which is part of specific
	techniques and procedures involved in the
	enforcement of certain immigration and
	national security laws and directives. The
	release of this information would also reveal
	guidelines that could risk circumvention of
	the law, because it would put individuals on
	notice as to what information is considered as
	part of the screening and vetting process, the
	specific information that is searched on
	specific social media applications, and the
	type of actions or methods an immigration
	officer may engage in during information
	collection, which would tip off the
	individuals that the immigration officer was
	investigating possible national security or
	public safety concerns. The release of this
	information could result in individuals being
	able to ascertain when an immigration officer
	has searched social media or what
	information may be subject or not subject to a
	search, resulting in actions to avoid proper
	vetting, which would impact the effectiveness
	of screening and vetting procedures used for
	the enforcement of certain immigration and
	national security laws and directives, and
	could reasonably be expected to risk the
	circumvention of law and render the
	cheamyendon of law and lender the

				guidelines for additional screening measures relevant to national security, public safety, and fraud prevention useless. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(7)(E). All other information within this document was segregated and determined non-exempt and disclosed.
1808-1825	Draft, Guidance for Use of Social Media in Field Operations Adjudications, dated 2017	(b)(5) (b)(7)(E)	Draft Guidance Document	The information withheld under (b)(5) as deliberative process privileged information consists of a draft version of a document that details Guidance for Use of Social Media in Field Operations Directorate Adjudications. The withheld information focuses on the types of questions and issues that adjudicators may want to look for when reviewing an application or interviewing an applicant related to social media information. The material is also pre-decisional and includes information that is not reflected in the final version of the document. The information withheld under (b)(7)(E) includes draft language in the document that the specific technology that the agency would be using to conduct social media research as part of the vetting process, how to access that technology, which employees are authorized to search for social media information, what information should be saved and documented, and what types of searches should be conducted for various immigration

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safety, and fraud prevention useless.		
		Accordingly, this material is appropriately

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				exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(7)(E). All other information within this document was segregated and determined non-exempt and disclosed.
1830-1841	Email, RE: Social Media Pilot Plan & Privacy Act/ First Amendment Issues (DRAFT), dated July 21, 2016	(b)(5)	Email	The information withheld under (b)(5) includes deliberative and attorney-client privileged information related to a request for legal guidance regarding USCIS's authority to collect and use social media information, specifically in relation to Privacy Act issues and First Amendment protected activities. The emails are between USCIS OCC attorneys and include a summary of the legal issues and draft responses, which represents part of the deliberative and pre-decisional process. The information in the emails also contains the detailed legal opinions on two specific issues. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(5). All other information within this document was segregated and determined non-exempt and disclosed.
1886-1888, 1890-1891, 1895-1896, 1898-1900, 1902-1905	PowerPoint training presentation, "Protect the First Amendment in Social Media Research," presented to USCIS's FDNS by the Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties	(b)(7)(E)	PowerPoint	Exemption (b)(7)(E) was used to redact portions of a PowerPoint training presentation, "Protect the First Amendment in Social Media Research," presented to USCIS's FDNS by the Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties. The PowerPoint summarizes what First Amendment protectives are in relation to information

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collection and what is authorized and
prohibited. The redacted information
consists of detailed instructions regarding
what social media may or may not be
searched for various immigration benefit
types, how the information collected may be
used in the determination, and specific
scenarios to illustrate whether information
searches and collection may be conducted in
specific circumstances. and when social
media searches are conducted for certain
immigration applicants and petitioners that
need additional background checks or
vetting, which is part of specific techniques
and procedures involved in the enforcement
of certain immigration and national security
laws and directives. The release of this
information would also reveal guidelines that
could risk circumvention of the law, because
it would put individuals on notice as to what
technology is being used, so that individuals
could research the technology to identify
vulnerabilities and limitations, which could
impact the effectiveness of the screening and
vetting process. It could also result in
individuals hiding the use of certain social
media platforms when applying for certain
benefit types since they know a search will be
conducted, which would impact the
effectiveness of screening and vetting
procedures used for the enforcement of
certain immigration and national security
laws and directives, and could reasonably be

				expected to risk the circumvention of law and render the guidelines for additional screening measures relevant to national security, public safety, and fraud prevention useless. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(7)(E). All other information within this document was segregated and determined non-exempt and disclosed.
1907-1909	Web Access Request Process: Questions for Social Media, dated December 14, 2015	(b)(7)(E)	Privacy Office Questions for Draft Process	Exemption (b)(7)(E) was used to redact portions of a draft copy of a web access request process, which included questions from the DHS Privacy office regarding the web access process, and draft responses to those questions. The information withheld under (b)(7)(E) includes specifics as to which DHS employees are permitted to request access to the browser used to conduct social media searches, the specific purposes allowed for conducting searches, and a flowchart laying out the exact method for requesting and obtaining access to the web browser and which components are authorized and for what purposes. This information, if disclosed, would reveal the technology resources currently being used in the vetting process by law enforcement and immigration officers to conduct social media screening, which is part of specific techniques and procedures involved in the enforcement of certain immigration and national security laws and

				directives. The release of this information would also reveal guidelines that could risk circumvention of the law, because it would put individuals on notice as to what technology is being used, so that individuals could research the technology to identify vulnerabilities and limitations, which could impact the effectiveness of the screening and vetting process, and could reasonably be expected to risk the circumvention of law and render the guidelines for additional screening measures relevant to national security, public safety, and fraud prevention useless. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(7)(E). All other information within this document was segregated and determined non-exempt and disclosed.
1912-1913	Draft edits, USCIS Policy Manual, Volume 1: General Policies and Procedures	(b)(5)	Draft Policy Manual	The information withheld under (b)(5) as deliberative process and attorney client privileged information consists of a draft version of the USCIS Policy Manual, Volume 1. The withheld information includes comments made by OCC regarding the proposed policy, certain statements, and clarifications related to legal concerns. In addition to containing legal guidance, the information is also deliberative and predecisional and includes information that is not reflected in the final version of the document. All other information within this document was segregated and determined non-exempt and disclosed.

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provided by attorneys within USCIS OCC, ICE OPLA, CBP OCC, and DHS OGC who had been asked to provide legal review. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(5). The information withheld under (b)(7)(E) includes summaries of the proposed processes and courses of action being considered as part of the Delegation, and how it impacts CBP and ICE law enforcement officers and their work, the concerns that some DHS employees have with the Delegation and how it would impact their	1914-1919	Delegation 15002, Revision 01, Delegation to the Director of U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services to Conduct Certain Law Enforcement Activities, Review Workflow #1159363	(b)(5): pages 1914- 1919 (b)(7)(E): pages 1916-1918	Review Workflow	ICE OPLA, CBP OCC, and DHS OGC who had been asked to provide legal review. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(5). The information withheld under (b)(7)(E) includes summaries of the proposed processes and courses of action being considered as part of the Delegation, and how it impacts CBP and ICE law enforcement officers and their work, the concerns that some DHS employees have with the
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		as part of the social media search and collection process. This information, if disclosed, would reveal the specific methods and procedures that law enforcement and
		immigration officers are able to use to conduct social media research to support
		operational needs, which is part of specific
		techniques and procedures involved in the
		enforcement of certain immigration and
		national security laws and directives. The
		release of this information would also reveal guidelines that could risk circumvention of
		the law, because it would put individuals on
		notice as to what information is considered as
		part of the screening and vetting process and
		what the limitations of access are. The
		release of this information could result in
		individuals identifying law enforcement based on the methods used in search and
		collection operations, which would impact
		the effectiveness of screening and vetting
		procedures used for the enforcement of
		certain immigration and national security
		laws and directives, and could reasonably be
		expected to risk the circumvention of law and render the guidelines for additional screening
		measures relevant to national security, public
		safety, and fraud prevention useless.
		Accordingly, this material is appropriately
		exempt from disclosure pursuant to
		Exemption $(b)(7)(E)$.

				All other information within this document was segregated and determined non-exempt and disclosed.
1921	DHS draft response letter to The Honorable Jeanne Shaheen, United States Senate	(b)(5)	Draft letter	The information withheld under (b)(5) as deliberative process privileged information consists of a comment and revision. This information is part of the deliberative process related to the review of a draft response from the DHS Secretary to Senator Shaheen, related to DHS's use of social media. The withheld portions of the document contain pre-decisional information that is not reflected in the final version of the document. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(5). All other information within this document was segregated and determined non-exempt and disclosed.
1954-1955	Memorandum from DHS Secretary Johnson to Component Heads, "Social Media Use," dated February 11, 2016	(b)(7)(E)	Memorandum	Exemption (b)(7)(E) was used to redact portions of a memorandum from DHS Secretary Johnson to Component Heads, "Social Media Use," dated February 11, 2016. The information withheld under (b)(7)(E) includes summaries of the Social Media Task Force's recommendations regarding DHS's current and future use of social media to support operational and investigative purposes, which employees within USCIS are authorized to search social media information, which immigration benefit types and individuals were part of the pilot to expand the use of social media in

				screening immigration applicants, and the upcoming priorities to continue to expand DHS's use of social media information to support its' mission. This information, if disclosed, would reveal the specific methods and procedures that law enforcement and immigration officers are able to use to conduct social media research, and which immigration benefit types are likely to be subject to social media screening, which is part of specific techniques and procedures involved in the enforcement of certain immigration and national security laws and directives. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(7)(E).
1962-1963	Additional Considerations for Email to James McCament, dated May 24, 2018	(b)(5)	Draft Document and legal considerations	The information withheld under (b)(5) includes deliberative and attorney-client privileged information related to a draft copy of DHS Delegation Number 15002, "Delegation 15002, Revision 01, Delegation to the Director of U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services to Conduct Certain Law Enforcement Activities." The document contains OCC attorneys' summary of additional considerations for revising the draft email which OCC leadership planned to send to James McCament to summarize OCC's legal recommendations regarding the revised delegation. This information is part of the deliberative and pre-decisional process.

				The considerations contain detailed summaries of various legal opinions from USCIS OCC, ICE OPLA, and CBP attorneys related to the revised delegation. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(5). All other information within this document was segregated and determined non-exempt and disclosed.
1964-1968	Draft summary memorandum detailing USCIS's Social Media and Vetting Efforts to Date, dated January 14, 2016	(b)(5) (b)(7)(E)	Draft Summary Overview	The information withheld under (b)(5) as deliberative process privileged information consists of multiple draft comments, revisions, additions, re-wordings, suggestions, clarifications, questions about accuracy, statements of uncertainty, and requests for additional information. All of this information is part of the deliberative process related to the draft Summary/Updates on USCIS's Social Media & Vetting efforts to date, as of January 1, 2016. The material reflects deliberative information, is predecisional, and includes information that is not reflected in the final version of the document. The information withheld under (b)(5) as attorney-client privileged information consists of comments and legal opinions added to this draft document by USCIS OCC attorneys that had been asked to provide legal review. Accordingly, this material is

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pursuant to Exemption (b)(5). The information redacted under Exemption (b)(7)(E) consists of a summary of the social media screening efforts to date, the timeline for proposed pilot projects, optional courses of action and recommendations, and summaries of the limitations and resource constraints. The document also contains detailed information about some applicants that had been sercened and the results of that screening, the specific social media applications reviewed, and which key words were used to search those social media applications. This information, if disclosed, would reveal the technology resources currently being used in the vetting process by law enforcement and immigration officers, and the specific websites, applications, and social media that is being reviewed by immigration officers for certain immigration applicants and petitioners that need additional background checks or vetting, which is part of specific techniques and procedures involved in the enforcement of certain immigration and national security laws and directives. The release of this information would also reveal guidelines that could risk circumvention of the law, because it would put individuals on notice as to what information is considered as part of the screening and vetting process, what words			appropriately exempt from disclosure
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				and images are being searched for, and the specific tools used by law enforcement. The release of this information would put individuals on notice as to what technology is being used, so that individuals could research the technology to identify vulnerabilities and limitations, which could impact the effectiveness of the screening and vetting process. It could also result in individuals hiding the use of certain social media platforms or encouraging the use of platforms that the agency does not access to, which would impact the effectiveness of screening and vetting procedures used for the enforcement of certain immigration and national security laws and directives, and could reasonably be expected to risk the circumvention of law and render the guidelines for additional screening measures relevant to national security, public safety, and fraud prevention useless. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(7)(E). All other information within this document was segregated and determined non-exempt and disclosed.
1972	Ian's comment to USCIS revised delegation, part of Additional Considerations for Email to James McCament, dated May 24, 2018	(b)(5)	Draft Document and legal considerations	The information withheld under (b)(5) includes deliberative and attorney-client privileged information related to a draft copy of DHS Delegation Number 15002, "Delegation 15002, Revision 01, Delegation to the Director of U.S. Citizenship and

				Immigration Services to Conduct Certain Law Enforcement Activities." The document contains OCC attorneys' summary of additional considerations for revising the draft email which OCC leadership planned to send to James McCament to summarize OCC's legal recommendations regarding the revised delegation. This information is part of the deliberative and pre-decisional process. The draft email also contains summaries of various legal opinions from USCIS OCC, ICE OPLA, and CBP attorneys related to the revised delegation. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(5). All other information within this document was segregated and determined non-exempt and disclosed.
1973-1975	Draft Email from USCIS Chief Counsel to James McCament	(b)(5)	Draft Email and comments	The information withheld under (b)(5) includes deliberative and attorney-client privileged information related to a draft copy of DHS Delegation Number 15002, "Delegation 15002, Revision 01, Delegation to the Director of U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services to Conduct Certain Law Enforcement Activities." The document is a draft email written by multiple USCIS OCC attorneys, which OCC leadership planned to send to James McCament to summarize OCC's legal recommendations regarding the revised delegation. This information is part of the deliberative and pre-decisional process. The draft email also

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				contains comments and summaries of various legal opinions from USCIS OCC, ICE OPLA, and CBP attorneys related to the revised delegation. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(5). All other information within this document was segregated and determined non-exempt and disclosed.
1976-1982	Draft memorandum, "Use of Social Media"	(b)(5)	Draft Memorandum	The information withheld under (b)(5) as deliberative process and attorney-client privileged information consists of the draft version of a Use of Social Media memorandum, which was written by USCIS OCC attorneys, and outlined the legal questions related to FDNS's use of social media when investigating applicants seeking an immigration benefit. The withheld information includes draft text and comments. This predecisional information is part of the deliberative process. Further, the information withheld under (b)(5) as attorney-client privileged information consists of a comment that contain a legal opinion related to this draft document by USCIS OCC attorneys that had been asked to provide legal review. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(5). All other information within this document was segregated and determined non-exempt and disclosed.

1983-1984	Technical Comments for Engagement#: 16-079-ISP-USCIS, ICE, "DHS' Pilots for Social Media Screening Need Increased Rigor to Ensure Scalability and Long-term Success"	(b)(5)	Review Workflow	The information withheld under (b)(5) as deliberative process privileged information related to USCIS's OCC coordinated review of the draft paper titled "DHS's Pilots for Social Media Screening Need Increased Rigor to Ensure Scalability and Long-Term Success." The document lists specific details as to which attorneys reviewed and their specific comments, edits, revisions, and questions made by each agency. All of this information is part of the deliberative process. The information withheld under (b)(5) as attorney-client privileged information consists of comments and legal opinions about the draft document, which were provided by USCIS OCC attorneys who had been asked to provide legal review. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(5). All other information within this document was segregated and determined non-exempt and disclosed.
1985-1992, 1994-1995, 1998	Draft Memorandum, "Shared Social Media Screening Service: Implementation Plan"	(b)(5) (b)(7)(E)	Draft Memorandum	The information withheld under (b)(5) as deliberative process privileged information consists of the draft version of a Shard Social Media Screening Service Implementation Plan. The document was compiled by the DHS Social Media Task Force and included a summary of potential lines of action being

	considered to develop an initial operating capacity, as well as options for expanding pilots, establishing funding, creation of policy and government, and progress updates. The withheld information includes draft text and comments. This predecisional information is part of the deliberative process. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(5). The information withheld under (b)(7)(E) includes specifics for the implementation of the expansion of social media screening and vetting use across DHS mission sets, the timelines for implementation of expanded uses, the planned methods and courses of action, planned coordination between DHS components and other law enforcement agencies, and summaries of the limitations and resource constraints. This information, if disclosed, would reveal the technology resources currently being used in the vetting process by law enforcement and immigration officers, and DHS's priorities for the use of social media, which is part of specific techniques and procedures involved in the enforcement of certain immigration and national security laws and directives. The release of this information would put individuals on notice as to what technology is being used the methods and the set of the single process of the properties of the security laws and directives.
	being used, the methods used, and the specific DHS employees authorized to

Draft memorandum from DHS's Associate General Counsel of the Legal Counsel Division to the DHS Social Media Task Force Draft Memorandum Draf	DHS's Couns Divisi	s Associate General sel of the Legal Counsel ion to the DHS Social	2006 (b)(7)(E): page	Draft Memorandum	conduct vetting efforts, which would allow individuals to research the technology and DHS processes to identify vulnerabilities limitations, which could impact the effectiveness of the screening and vetting process and could reasonably be expected risk the circumvention of law and render guidelines for additional screening measurelevant to national security, public safety and fraud prevention useless. According this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(7)(All other information within this docume was segregated and determined non-exemption and disclosed. The information withheld under (b)(5) as deliberative process and attorney-client privileged information consists of the drawersion of a legal memorandum, which would be sent by DHS's Associate General Counsel to the DHS Social Media Task. Force. The memorandum focused on the legal issue of how the Privacy Act impact USCIS's use of social media content. The withheld information includes draft text, revisions, deletions, recommendations, and comments, all of which is predecisional information that is part of the deliberative process, and isn't reflected in the final version. Further, the information withhe under (b)(5) as attorney-client privileged information consists of comments that
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	contain a legal opinion related to this draft document by USCIS OCC attorneys that had been asked to provide legal review. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(5).
	The information withheld under (b)(7)(E) includes summaries of the proposed processes and courses of action being considered for USCIS employees while engaging in the operational use of social media, analysis outlining the legal considerations with the various methods proposed, whether there were any legal
	restrictions to the use of information to grant or deny a benefit request, and the specific law enforcement activities that would be permitted using the information collected. This information, if disclosed, would reveal the specific methods and procedures that immigration officers are able to use to conduct social media research for certain
	immigration applicants and petitioners that need additional background checks or vetting, which is part of specific techniques and procedures involved in the enforcement of certain immigration and national security laws and directives. The release of this information would also reveal guidelines that
	could risk circumvention of the law, because it would put individuals on notice as to what information is considered as part of the

2007-2011	Draft talking points - Social	(b)(5): pages 2007-	Draft Talking Points	screening and vetting process, the specific information that is searched on specific social media applications, and the type of actions or methods an immigration officer may engage in during information collection, which would tip off the individuals that the immigration officer was investigating possible national security or public safety concerns. The release of this information could result in individuals being able to ascertain when an immigration officer has searched social media or what information may be subject or not subject to a search, resulting in actions to avoid proper vetting, which would impact the effectiveness of screening and vetting procedures used for the enforcement of certain immigration and national security laws and directives, and could reasonably be expected to risk the circumvention of law and render the guidelines for additional screening measures relevant to national security, public safety, and fraud prevention useless. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(7)(E). All other information within this document was segregated and determined non-exempt and disclosed. The information withheld under (b)(5) as
2007-2011	Media Task Force and Social Media Vetting	2011	Dian Taiking Foints	deliberative process privileged information consists of multiple draft comments, revisions, additions, re-wordings,

(b)(7)(E): pages 2007-2010	suggestions, clarifications, questions about accuracy, statements of uncertainty, and requests for additional information. All of this information is part of the deliberative process related to a draft Social Media Talking Points document put together by the DHS Social Media Task Force, which contains pre-decisional information that is
	not reflected in the final version of the document. The information withheld under (b)(5) as attorney-client privileged information consists of comments and legal opinions added to this draft document by USCIS OCC attorneys that had been asked to provide legal review. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure
	pursuant to Exemption (b)(5). Exemption (b)(7)(E) was used to redact comments and edits that contain specifics as to what methods CBP, ICE, and USCIS's law enforcement and immigration officers are authorized to use as part of social media vetting, what information may be used for, planned projects to use social media vetting,
	and the limitations that are placed on the use and collection methods. This information, if disclosed, would reveal the specific methods and procedures that immigration officers are able to use to conduct social media research for certain immigration applicants and

2012-2015	Draft summary of USCIS	(b)(5): pages 2012-	Draft Summary Overview	petitioners that need additional background checks or vetting, which is part of specific techniques and procedures involved in the enforcement of certain immigration and national security laws and directives. The release of this information would also reveal guidelines that could risk circumvention of the law, because it would put individuals on notice as to what information is considered as part of the screening and vetting process and what the limitations of access are. The release of this information could result in individuals hiding the use of certain information on social media platforms or engaging in behavior to avoid proper vetting, which would impact the effectiveness of screening and vetting procedures used for the enforcement of certain immigration and national security laws and directives, and could reasonably be expected to risk the circumvention of law and render the guidelines for additional screening measures relevant to national security, public safety, and fraud prevention useless. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(7)(E). All other information within this document was segregated and determined non-exempt and disclosed. The information withheld under (b)(5) as
2012 2013	Social Media & Vetting:	2015	Zimi zaminarj zverview	deliberative process privileged information consists of multiple draft comments,

Overview and dated August 2	Efforts to Date, (b)(7)(E): pages 2, 2016 2012-2014	revisions, additions, re-wordings, suggestions, clarifications, questions about accuracy, statements of uncertainty, and requests for additional information. All of
		this information is part of the deliberative process related to the draft document titled USCIS's Social Media & Vetting: Overview and Efforts to Date, as of August 6, 2016. The material reflects deliberative
		information, is pre-decisional, and includes information that is not reflected in the final version of the document.
		The information withheld under (b)(5) as attorney-client privileged information consists of comments and legal opinions added to this draft document by USCIS OCC attorneys that had been asked to provide legal
		review. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(5).
		The information redacted under Exemption (b)(7)(E) consists of a summary of the social media screening efforts to date, the timeline for proposed pilot projects, optional courses of action and recommendations, detailed information about which social media
		applications were used and the immigrant populations subject to screening, and summaries of the limitations and resource constraints. The document also contains detailed information about some applicants

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that had been screened and the results of that
screening, the specific social media
applications reviewed, and which key words
were used to search those social media
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put individuals on notice as to what
information is considered as part of the
screening and vetting process, what words
and images are being searched for, and the
specific tools used by law enforcement. The
release of this information would put
individuals on notice as to what technology is
being used, so that individuals could research
the technology to identify vulnerabilities and
limitations, which could impact the
effectiveness of the screening and vetting
process. It could also result in individuals
hiding the use of certain social media
platforms or encouraging the use of platforms

				that the agency does not access to, which would impact the effectiveness of screening and vetting procedures used for the enforcement of certain immigration and national security laws and directives, and could reasonably be expected to risk the circumvention of law and render the guidelines for additional screening measures relevant to national security, public safety, and fraud prevention useless. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(7)(E). All other information within this document was segregated and determined non-exempt and disclosed.
2016-2017	Draft Memorandum to USCIS Acting Director, "Delegation of Authority to Access Internet and Social Media Content Using a Fictitious Account or Identity"	(b)(5) (b)(7)(E)	Draft Memorandum	The information withheld under (b)(5) as deliberative process privileged information consists of a draft version of a memorandum titled "Delegation of Authority to Access Internet and Social Media Content Using a Fictitious Account or Identity," which would be sent by USCIS's Acting Director to the heads of each USCIS Directorate once finalized. The draft memorandum contains pre-decisional and deliberative information, including multiple draft comments, revisions, additions, re-wordings, suggestions, clarifications, questions about accuracy, statements of uncertainty, and requests for additional information. All of this information is part of the deliberative process.

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	The information withheld under (b)(5) as
	attorney-client privileged information
	consists of comments and legal opinions about the draft memorandum, which were
	provided by USCIS OCC attorneys that had
	been asked to provide legal review.
	Accordingly, this material is appropriately
	exempt from disclosure pursuant to
	Exemption (b)(5).
	The information redacted under Exemption
	(b)(7)(E) consists of a summary of the draft
	Delegation and the changes proposed to
	permit a technique that law enforcement
	officials could use to allow them to collect
	social media information for vetting
	purposes. This information, if disclosed,
	would reveal the techniques being used and those that are prohibited in the vetting
	process by law enforcement and immigration
	officers, which is part of specific techniques
	and procedures involved in the enforcement
	of certain immigration and national security
	laws and directives. The release of this
	information would also reveal guidelines that could risk circumvention of the law, because
	it could also result in individuals hiding the
	use of certain social media platforms or
	encouraging the use of platforms that the
	agency does not access to, which would
	impact the effectiveness of screening and
	vetting procedures used for the enforcement

				of certain immigration and national security laws and directives, and could reasonably be expected to risk the circumvention of law and render the guidelines for additional screening measures relevant to national security, public safety, and fraud prevention useless. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(7)(E). All other information within this document was segregated and determined non-exempt and disclosed.
2018-2019	Memorandum from DHS Secretary Johnson to Component Heads, "Social Media Use," dated February 11, 2016	(b)(7)(E)	Memorandum	Exemption (b)(7)(E) was used to redact portions of a memorandum from DHS Secretary Johnson to Component Heads, "Social Media Use," dated February 11, 2016. The information withheld under (b)(7)(E) includes summaries of the Social Media Task Force's recommendations regarding DHS's current and future use of social media to support operational and investigative purposes, which employees within USCIS are authorized to search social media information, which immigration benefit types and individuals were part of the pilot to expand the use of social media in screening immigration applicants, and the upcoming priorities to continue to expand DHS's use of social media information to support its' mission. This information, if disclosed, would reveal the specific methods and procedures that law enforcement and

				immigration officers are able to use to conduct social media research, and which immigration benefit types are likely to be subject to social media screening, which is part of specific techniques and procedures involved in the enforcement of certain immigration and national security laws and directives. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(7)(E).
2021-2028	Vetting and Screening Enhancements, dated June 20, 2017	(b)(5): pages 2026- 2028 (b)(7)(E): pages 2021-2025, 2028	Summary Overview	The information withheld under (b)(5) consists of deliberative process privileged information related to proposed changes being considered as part of the finding of fraud at the case level. The withheld information includes a summary of the proposed changes that were being considered and the factors that should be taken into account when making a determination on the process of finding fraud in an immigration benefit case, which is part of the deliberative and pre-decisional process. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(5). The information redacted under Exemption (b)(7)(E) consists of a list of specific items under consideration for law enforcement sharing between USCIS and the FBI as part of USCIS's biometric screening, as well as other proposals and changes to policy by ICE, CBP, DHS, Department of State, and other law enforcement partners. Proposals

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focus on interview tactics, data collection,
screening and vetting, biometrics, and social
media screening. A spreadsheet and graph
were also redacted which includes benefit
fraud statistics that detail the number of fraud
referrals in the past three years. This
information, if disclosed, would reveal the
technology resources currently being used in
the vetting process by law enforcement and
immigration officers, and specific techniques
and procedures involved in the enforcement
of certain immigration and national security
laws and directives. The release of this
information would also reveal guidelines that
could risk circumvention of the law, because
it would put individuals on notice as to what
information is considered as part of the
screening and vetting process, what
information is available to law enforcement
agencies, and the types of methods and
patterns being used by law enforcement to
enforce the law. The release of this
information would put individuals on notice
as to what technology is being used, so that
individuals could research the technology to
identify vulnerabilities and limitations, which
could impact the effectiveness of the
screening and vetting process, and could
reasonably be expected to risk the
circumvention of law and render the
guidelines for additional screening measures
relevant to national security, public safety,
and fraud prevention useless. Accordingly,

				this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(7)(E). All other information within this document was segregated and determined non-exempt and disclosed.
2029-2030	Draft summary, Homeland Security Advisory Council In- Person Meeting, dated January 21, 2016	(b)(5)	Briefing and Meeting Agenda	The information withheld under (b)(5) includes deliberative process information related to an upcoming meeting of the Homeland Security Advisory Council In-Person Meeting on January 21, 2016. The document contains an overview of meeting and agenda, and background information. The withheld information consists of draft discussion points related to DHS's social media efforts, and highlighted the issues that needed to be discussed and decisions that needed to be made. This information represents part of the deliberative process, as well as pre-decisional information being considered in this process. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(5). All other information within this document was segregated and determined non-exempt and disclosed.
2031	Memorandum from USCIS Director to FDNS and RAIO, "Fraud Detection and National Security Use of Social Media"	(b)(7)(E)	Memorandum	Exemption (b)(7)(E) was used to withhold information within a memorandum from USCIS Director to FDNS and RAIO, "Fraud Detection and National Security Use of Social Media." The information redacted under Exemption (b)(7)(E) consists of a specific authority for FDNS to begin

				screening certain applicants with potential terrorism ties using social media vetting. This information, if disclosed, would reveal the criteria in place that is used to determine whether enhanced screening methods and procedures are necessary for the enforcement of certain immigration and national security laws and directives. The release of this information would also reveal guidelines that could risk circumvention of the law, because it would put individuals on notice as to what the focus will be when conducting vetting, what patterns and factors are being evaluated, and what information is available to law enforcement agencies, and could reasonably be expected to risk the circumvention of law and render the guidelines for additional screening measures relevant to national security, public safety, and fraud prevention useless. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(7)(E).
2033-2034	Draft Memorandum from USCIS Director to FDNS's Associate Director, "Use of Social Media for the DHS K-1 Review"	(b)(5) (b)(7)(E)	Draft Memorandum	The information withheld under (b)(5) as deliberative process privileged information consists of a draft version of a memorandum titled "Use of Social Media for the DHS K-1 Review," which would be sent by the USCIS Director to FDNS's Associate Director once finalized. The draft memorandum contains pre-decisional and deliberative information, including multiple draft comments, revisions, additions, re-wordings, suggestions, clarifications, and requests for additional

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	information. All of this information is part of the deliberative process.
	The information withheld under (b)(5) as attorney-client privileged information consists of comments and legal opinions about the draft memorandum, which were provided by USCIS OCC attorneys that had been asked to provide legal review. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(5).
	The information redacted under Exemption (b)(7)(E) consists of a specific authority for FDNS to begin screening certain applicants with potential fraud, public safety, and national security concerns. This information, if disclosed, would reveal the criteria in place that is used to determine whether enhanced screening methods and procedures are necessary for the enforcement of certain immigration and national security laws and directives. The release of this information would also reveal guidelines that could risk circumvention of the law, because it would put individuals on notice as to what the focus will be when conducting vetting, what
	patterns and factors are being evaluated, and what information is available to law enforcement agencies, and could reasonably be expected to risk the circumvention of law and render the guidelines for additional

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				screening measures relevant to national security, public safety, and fraud prevention useless. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(7)(E). All other information within this document was segregated and determined non-exempt and disclosed.
2044-2046	Social Media Task Force Action Plan -Future State, draft component questions and responses	(b)(5)	Draft Talking Points	The information withheld under (b)(5) consists of draft responses from multiple component subject matter experts, which respond to questions related to USCIS's use of social media in support of certain mission areas. The withheld information includes draft comments, revisions, additions, rewordings, suggestions, and clarifications. All of this information is part of the deliberative process related to the draft document, which contains pre-decisional information that is not reflected in the final version of the document. The information withheld under (b)(5) as attorney-client privileged information consists of comments and legal opinions added to this draft document by USCIS OCC
				attorneys that had been asked to provide legal review. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(5).

				All other information within this document was segregated and determined non-exempt and disclosed.
2047	Draft USCIS Briefer with Social Media Talking Points	(b)(5)	Draft Talking Points	The information withheld under (b)(5) consists of deliberative process privileged information within a draft document containing talking points on the use of social media in DHS's vetting programs. The withheld information includes draft text, revisions, additions, and re-wordings. All of this information is part of the deliberative process related to the draft document, which contains pre-decisional information that is not reflected in the final version of the document. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(5). All other information within this document was segregated and determined non-exempt and disclosed.
2049	Public Affairs Guidance, "System of Records Notice (SORN)-Alien File, Index, and National File Tracking System of Records, published to Federal Register (82 FR 43556) on September 18, 2017," dated October 20, 2017	(b)(5)	Draft Guidance	The information withheld under (b)(5) consists of attorney-client privileged information within draft Responses to Queries (RTQ) in a draft copy of Public Affairs Guidance, "System of Records Notice (SORN)-Alien File, Index, and National File Tracking System of Records, published to Federal Register (82 FR 43556) on September 18, 2017," dated October 20, 2017. The withheld information includes a summary of a legal opinion related to potential liability in response to a question from other USCIS employees. Accordingly,

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				this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(5). All other information within this document was segregated and determined non-exempt and disclosed.
2052-2057	Memorandum from DHS's Associate General Counsel of the Legal Counsel Division to USCIS's Chief Counsel, "Social Media Vetting Task Force - Identification of USCIS Legal Authorities for Operational Use of Social Media," dated December 19, 2015	(b)(5)	Legal Memorandum	The information withheld under (b)(5) as attorney-client privileged information consists of legal opinions contained in this legal memorandum. The memorandum details legal issues, opinions, and analysis related to the relevant legal authorities for USCIS's operational use of social media. It is written by USCIS's Chief Counsel, and is directed to DHS's Associate General Counsel, and contains USCIS OCC's legal analysis and opinion. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(5). All other information within this document was segregated and determined non-exempt and disclosed.
2062-2063, 2065	Email, FW: URGENT request for review, dated September 6, 2016	(b)(5): pages 2062- 2063, 2065 (b)(7)(E): pages 2062, 2065	Email	The information withheld under (b)(5) consists of deliberative and attorney-client privileged information within an email related to the review of draft documents in preparation for briefing the USCIS Director for an upcoming Committee on Homeland Security hearing on September 14, 2016, which covered issues related to USCIS's use of social media in the vetting process. The withheld information includes comments,

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recommendations, requests for additional
information, and clarifications.
The information withheld under (b)(5) as
attorney-client privileged information
consists of comments and legal opinions
within emails between USCIS OCC attorneys
that had been asked to provide legal review.
Accordingly, this material is appropriately
exempt from disclosure pursuant to
Exemption (b)(5).
Exemption (b)(3).
The information withheld under (b)(7)(E)
includes summaries of draft responses to
questions for an upcoming congressional
hearing on social media use in DHS, and a
list of document titles that relate to the social
media vetting process. This information was
compiled by USCIS employees as part of the
review/revision process in finalizing the
documents, and drafting the responses to the
congressional inquiries. The summaries and
the titles contain law enforcement
information and objectives, and specific
details on the focus of the vetting initiatives,
including the types of applications and
applicants that would fall under this vetting
process. This information, if disclosed,
would reveal the types of factors considered
when determining whether an application
needs additional background checks or
vetting, which is part of specific techniques
and procedures involved in the enforcement

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	of certain immigration a	nd national security
	laws and directives. It v	vould also reveal
	guidelines that could ris	k circumvention of
	the law, including specif	ric factors and
	information that law enf	
	pertaining to the types o	
	may need additional scre	
	of this information woul	_
	notice as to what inform	•
	part of the screening and	
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	could result in them not	
	information to law enfor	
	immigration officers. T	
	information would revea	_
	procedures for the enfor	
	immigration and nationa	•
	directives, and could rea	
	to risk the circumvention	n of law and render
	the guidelines for addition	onal screening
	measures relevant to nat	ional security, public
	safety, and fraud preven	tion useless.
	Accordingly, this materi	al is appropriately
	exempt from disclosure	pursuant to
	Exemption $(b)(7)(E)$.	•
	All other information wi	thin this document
	was segregated and dete	rmined non-exempt
	and disclosed.	-T ·
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	All other information wi	thin this document
	was segregated and dete	
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	and disclosed.	

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2066-2068, 2071-2079	Draft Issue Paper - USCIS Q & A's for CHS hearing, "Shutting Down Terrorist Pathways," dated September 1, 2016	(b)(5): pages 2066- 2067, 2071-2079 (b)(7)(E): pages 2066-2068, 2071- 2079	Draft Issue Paper	The information withheld under (b)(5) as deliberative process privileged information consists of draft comments, revisions, additions, re-wordings, suggestions, clarifications, and requests for additional information. All of this information is part of the deliberative process related to the draft Q & A document that was drafted by USCIS employees to prepare USCIS's for an upcoming Committee on Homeland Security hearing on September 14, 2016, which covered issues related to USCIS's use of social media in the vetting process. The draft contains pre-decisional information that is not reflected in the final version of the
				document. The information withheld under (b)(5) as attorney-client privileged information consists of comments and legal opinions added to this draft document by USCIS OCC attorneys that had been asked to provide legal review. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(5). The information redacted under Exemption (b)(7)(E) consists of detailed information regarding the current status of DHS's social media screening and vetting tools, which social media applications are used, the government technology currently used as part of vetting, future plans to acquire new

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	technologies, and other key parts to DHS's
	social media process. Portions are also
	redacted that contain specifics on the results
	of screening using social media information,
	including which populations DHS focuses on
	when determining whether additional vetting
	is needed, how information is used, the
	results of screening specific applicants to
	date, what DHS's current background check
	process is and how social media is used in
	that process, and which law enforcement
	agencies collaborate with DHS and in what
	capacity. This information, if disclosed,
	would reveal the technology resources
	currently being used in the vetting process by
	law enforcement and immigration officers,
	and the specific websites, applications, and
	social media that is being reviewed by
	immigration officers for certain immigration
	applicants and petitioners that need additional
	background checks or vetting, which is part
	of specific techniques and procedures
	involved in the enforcement of certain
	immigration and national security laws and
	directives. The release of this information
	would also reveal guidelines that could risk
	circumvention of the law, because it would
	put individuals on notice as to what
	information is considered as part of the
	screening and vetting process, what words
	and images are being searched for, and the
	specific tools used by law enforcement. The
	release of this information would put
	resease of this information would but

				individuals on notice as to what technology is being used, so that individuals could research the technology to identify vulnerabilities and limitations, which could impact the effectiveness of the screening and vetting process. It could also result in individuals hiding the use of certain social media platforms or encouraging the use of platforms that the agency does not access to, which would impact the effectiveness of screening and vetting procedures used for the enforcement of certain immigration and national security laws and directives, and could reasonably be expected to risk the circumvention of law and render the guidelines for additional screening measures relevant to national security, public safety, and fraud prevention useless. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(7)(E). All other information within this document was segregated and determined non-exempt and disclosed.
2082	Email, FW: K-1vetting LOI, dated December 16, 2015	(b)(5)	Email	The information withheld under (b)(5) consists of deliberative and attorney-client privileged information within an email related to the review of a draft K-1 visa letter of interrogatory (LOI), which is part of the background investigation process of adjudication immigration benefits. The withheld information includes OCC's summary of two key points regarding the

2090-2092	Email, FW: FINAL - Social Media and K-1 Visa Process,	(b)(5): pages 2090- 2092	Email	LOI and social media screening initiative. This information reveals both deliberative and predecisional information, as well as privileged legal opinions of the USCIS OCC attorneys that had been asked to provide legal review. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(5). All other information within this document was segregated and determined non-exempt and disclosed. The information withheld under (b)(5) consists of deliberative and attorney-client privileged information within an email.
	dated December 17, 2015	(b)(7)(E): page 2090		privileged information within an email related to legal questions concerning proposed process changes to the K-1 visa adjudication process, including the background investigation process. The withheld information includes proposals, recommendations, summaries of options, and feedback on options. This information reveals both deliberative and predecisional information, as well as privileged legal opinions of the USCIS OCC attorneys that had been asked to provide legal analysis. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(5).
				The information withheld under (b)(7)(E) includes a statement regarding the social media pilot that details who has access to the browsing system used for social media

				screening. This information, if disclosed, would reveal the individuals who have authorization for accessing social media as part of specific techniques and procedures involved in the enforcement of certain immigration and national security laws and directives, which would put individuals on notice that they were part of enhanced screening if those individuals handled their case. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(7)(E). All other information within this document was segregated and determined non-exempt and disclosed.
2094	Email, FW: Social Networking Sites, dated December 7, 2011	(b)(5)	Email	The information withheld under (b)(5) consists of deliberative process privileged information within an email related to accessing social media sites as part of the adjudication process. The withheld information includes a summary of the outstanding decisions that are being considered for the process and authority to access certain information during adjudication. The withheld information reveals both deliberative and predecisional information. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(5). All other information within this document was segregated and determined non-exempt and disclosed.

2097-2099	Email, FW: S1 needs quick assistance Email, RE: social media vetting for visa applicants, dated December 17, 2015	(b)(5)	Email	The information withheld under (b)(5) consists of deliberative and attorney-client privileged information within an email related to a request from the DHS Secretary for information regarding USCIS's social media vetting of visa applicants, which was requested in preparation for an upcoming press engagement that the Secretary was participating in on December 16, 2015. The withheld information includes comments, recommendations, requests for additional information, and clarifications. The information withheld under (b)(5) as attorney-client privileged information consists of comments and legal opinions within emails between USCIS OCC attorneys that had been asked to provide legal review. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(5). All other information within this document was segregated and determined non-exempt and disclosed.
2103-2106	Email, FW: USCIS SMOUTs, dated December 17, 2015	(b)(5): pages 2103- 2106 (b)(7)(E): pages 2104-2106	Email	The information withheld under (b)(5) includes deliberative and attorney-client privileged information related to the review of five draft USCIS SMOUTs and Rules of Behavior documents related to the social media vetting process. The emails are between USCIS OCC attorneys and include a legal summary of the draft documents and

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	key legal issues and recommendations regarding the optional courses of action. This pre-decisional information is part of the deliberative process, and is also protected under attorney-client privilege, as it reveals OCC's attorneys' legal opinions and analysis. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(5).
	The information withheld under (b)(7)(E) includes specifics as to what methods USCIS's immigration officers are authorized to use as part of social media vetting, and what limitations are placed on their collection methods. This information, if disclosed, would reveal the specific methods and procedures that immigration officers are able to use to conduct social media research for certain immigration applicants and petitioners that need additional background checks or vetting, which is part of specific techniques and procedures involved in the enforcement of certain immigration and national security laws and directives. The release of this information would also reveal guidelines that could risk circumvention of the law, because it would put individuals on notice as to what information is considered as part of the
	screening and vetting process and what the limitations of access are. The release of this information could result in individuals hiding the use of certain information on social media

2113	Web Access Request Process: Questions for Social Media December 14, 2015	(b)(5)	Draft Process Flowchart	platforms or engaging in behavior to avoid proper vetting, which would impact the effectiveness of screening and vetting procedures used for the enforcement of certain immigration and national security laws and directives, and could reasonably be expected to risk the circumvention of law and render the guidelines for additional screening measures relevant to national security, public safety, and fraud prevention useless. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(7)(E). All other information within this document was segregated and determined non-exempt and disclosed. The information withheld under (b)(5) as deliberative process privileged information consists of a draft version of a flowchart which details the proposed Web Access Request process. The draft flowchart is predecisional and is pending determinations on the overall process of social media screening. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(5). All other information within this document was segregated and determined non-exempt and disclosed.
2117-2118	Briefing Paper- Evaluation of Social Media Tools	(b)(7)(E)	Briefing Paper	Exemption (b)(7)(E) was used to redact a copy of a briefing paper evaluating the use of a specific tool as part of the social media

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screening process. The information redacted
under Exemption (b)(7)(E) consists of the
name of the technological tool, evaluations of
the uses of the tool as part of actual screening
and the results, optional courses of action and
recommendations, and summaries of the
limitations and resource constraints. This
information, if disclosed, would reveal the
technology resources currently being used in
the vetting process by law enforcement and
immigration officers, which is part of specific
techniques and procedures involved in the
enforcement of certain immigration and
national security laws and directives. The
release of this information would also reveal
guidelines that could risk circumvention of
the law, because it would put individuals on
notice as to what technology is being used, so
that individuals could research the
technology to identify vulnerabilities and
limitations, which could impact the
effectiveness of the screening and vetting
process. It could also result in individuals
hiding the use of certain social media
platforms or encouraging the use of platforms
that the agency does not access to, which
would impact the effectiveness of screening
and vetting procedures used for the
enforcement of certain immigration and
national security laws and directives, and
could reasonably be expected to risk the
circumvention of law and render the
guidelines for additional screening measures

				relevant to national security, public safety, and fraud prevention useless. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(7)(E).
2119-2122	DHS Social Media Initiative Topline Document	(b)(5) (b)(7)(E)	Briefing Summary	The information withheld under (b)(5) as deliberative process privileged information consists of a Topline Document that contains a summary of key issues and initiatives being considered as part of the pilot to use social media information for vetting purposes related to certain immigration programs. This information is part of the deliberative process related, and consists of predecisional considerations on the pilot programs and options being considered by DHS, and each Components proposed submissions for operational use, and the status of those considerations. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(5). The information redacted under Exemption (b)(7)(E) consists of a summary of DHS's policy regarding the use of social media to support and perform core missions of CBP, ICE, and USCIS. Specific examples are redacted, which include multiple pilots to expand the use of social media in DHS's vetting process and the results of the screening efforts during that pilot. This information, if disclosed, would reveal the current procedures and authorized components that use social media as part of

				vetting and how that screening is used, which is part of specific techniques and procedures involved in the enforcement of certain immigration and national security laws and directives. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(7)(E). All other information within this document was segregated and determined non-exempt and disclosed.
2123-2126	Briefing Paper - USCIS Social Media Use	(b)(5): pages 2123- 2126 (b)(7)(E): page 2125	Briefing Paper	The information withheld under (b)(5) consists of deliberative information contained in a USCIS Briefing Paper drafted by FDNS. The Briefing Paper focused on USCIS's social media use, the operations currently in progress, and operations being considered for future expansion. The withheld information includes summary of the pilot programs, potential courses of action being considered, benefits and challenges that had been identified, and recommended course of action, all of which is part of the deliberative and pre-decisional process. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(5). The information redacted under Exemption (b)(7)(E) consists of a summary of a draft policy memorandum that proposed to expand the use of social media more broadly across USCIS, and details as to which USCIS employees would be given access and for

				what specific purposes, and the benefits and challenges involved with the proposed course of action. This information, if disclosed, would reveal the current procedures and authorized components that use social media as part of vetting and how that screening is used, which is part of specific techniques and procedures involved in the enforcement of certain immigration and national security laws and directives. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(7)(E). All other information within this document was segregated and determined non-exempt and disclosed.
2127-2130	Email, RE: Social Media partnership, dated December 18, 2015	(b)(5): pages 2127- 2128, 2130 (b)(7)(E): pages 2127-2130	Email	The information withheld under (b)(5) includes deliberative and attorney-client privileged information related to the drafting and review of a legal opinion that USCIS OCC attorneys were preparing for DHS OGC. The emails are between USCIS OCC attorneys and include a legal summary of the draft paper and key legal issues related to statutory and regulatory authorities pertaining to USCIS's social media vetting operations. This pre-decisional information is part of the deliberative process, and is also protected under attorney-client privilege, as it reveals OCC's attorneys' legal opinions and analysis. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(5).

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includes a summary of two current an upcoming third pilot program it social media vetting to examine ce refugee applicants, the results of se during those pilots, and which law enforcement agencies had partnere USCIS for the pilots. This inform disclosed, would reveal the specificand procedures that immigration of able to use to conduct social media for certain immigration applicants petitioners that need additional bace checks or vetting, which is part of techniques and procedures involve enforcement of certain immigration national security laws and directive release of this information would a guidelines that could risk circumve the law, because it would put indivinotice as to what information is co part of the screening and vetting probability what the limitations of access are release of this information could re individuals hiding the use of certain information on social media platformation on social media platformation on social media platformation on social media platformation in social media platformation on social media platformation in social media platformation on social media platformation on social media platformation on social media platformation on social media platformation in the platformation on social media platformation in the platformation on social media platformation to avoid programmation to avoid programmatical pro		
		enforcement agencies had partnered with USCIS for the pilots. This information, if disclosed, would reveal the specific methods and procedures that immigration officers are able to use to conduct social media research for certain immigration applicants and petitioners that need additional background checks or vetting, which is part of specific techniques and procedures involved in the enforcement of certain immigration and national security laws and directives. The release of this information would also reveal guidelines that could risk circumvention of the law, because it would put individuals on notice as to what information is considered as part of the screening and vetting process and what the limitations of access are. The release of this information could result in individuals hiding the use of certain information on social media platforms or engaging in behavior to avoid proper vetting,
governing and vetting massed years		information on social media platforms or engaging in behavior to avoid proper vetting, which would impact the effectiveness of
enforcement of certain immigration national security laws and directive		screening and vetting procedures used for the enforcement of certain immigration and national security laws and directives, and could reasonably be expected to risk the

				circumvention of law and render the guidelines for additional screening measures relevant to national security, public safety, and fraud prevention useless. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(7)(E). All other information within this document was segregated and determined non-exempt and disclosed.
2132-2135	Email, RE: Social Media planningMonday Deliverable Part 2, dated December 18, 2015	(b)(5) (b)(7)(E)	Email	The information withheld under (b)(5) includes deliberative and attorney-client privileged information related to review of a draft memorandum regarding FDNS's Use of Social Media for Refugee Processing. The emails are between USCIS OCC attorneys and USCIS employees, and include proposed language for the memorandum and recommended courses of action. The language highlights specific proposals and changes that were being considered for USCIS's use of social media as part of the refugee vetting process. This pre-decisional information is part of the deliberative process, and is also protected under attorney-client privilege, as it reveals OCC's attorneys' legal opinions and analysis. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(5). The information withheld under (b)(7)(E) includes a summary of a proposed expansion

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	to the use of social media vetting to examine certain refugee applicants, what the use
	would involve, the limited list of social media
	applications that it would involve, and how it
	would be limited and what the information
	could be used for. This information, if
	disclosed, would reveal the specific methods
	and procedures that immigration officers are
	able to use to conduct social media research
	for certain immigration applicants and
	petitioners that need additional background
	checks or vetting, which is part of specific
	techniques and procedures involved in the
	enforcement of certain immigration and
	national security laws and directives. The
	release of this information would also reveal
	guidelines that could risk circumvention of
	the law, because it would put individuals on
	notice as to what information is considered as
	part of the screening and vetting process and
	what the limitations of access are. The
	release of this information could result in
	individuals hiding the use of certain
	information on social media platforms or
	engaging in behavior to avoid proper vetting,
	which would impact the effectiveness of
	screening and vetting procedures used for the
	enforcement of certain immigration and
	national security laws and directives, and
	could reasonably be expected to risk the circumvention of law and render the
	guidelines for additional screening measures
	relevant to national security, public safety,

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				and fraud prevention useless. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(7)(E). All other information within this document was segregated and determined non-exempt and disclosed.
2138-2140	Email, FW: sub-IPC read out (Social Media), dated December 21, 2015	(b)(5): pages 2138- 2139 (b)(7)(E): page 2140	Email	The information withheld under (b)(5) includes deliberative and attorney-client privileged information related to a request from the Department of State for USCIS to provide information to the National Security Council regarding the collection of social media information. The emails are between USCIS OCC attorneys and USCIS employees, and include detailed summaries of the issues that need to be considered and recommended courses of action. The language highlights specific proposals and changes that were being considered for USCIS's use of social media as part of the refugee vetting process. This pre-decisional information is part of the deliberative process, and is also protected under attorney-client privilege, as it reveals OCC's attorneys' legal opinions and analysis. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(5). The information withheld under (b)(7)(E) includes a list of the specific social media applications and websites that were approved

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information is considered as part of the screening and vetting process and could result in individuals hiding the use of certain social media platforms or encouraging the use of platforms that the agency does not access to, which would impact the effectiveness of screening and vetting procedures used for the enforcement of certain immigration and national security laws and directives, and could reasonably be expected to risk the circumvention of law and render the guidelines for additional screening measures relevant to national security, public safety, and fraud prevention useless. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(7)(E).		for use by agency employees when conducting social media screening and vetting. This information, if disclosed, would reveal the specific websites, applications, and social media that is being reviewed by immigration officers for certain immigration applicants and petitioners that need additional background checks or vetting, which is part of specific techniques and procedures involved in the enforcement of certain immigration and national security laws and directives. The release of this information would also reveal guidelines that could risk circumvention of the law, because it would put individuals on notice as to what
result in individuals hiding the use of certain social media platforms or encouraging the use of platforms that the agency does not access to, which would impact the effectiveness of screening and vetting procedures used for the enforcement of certain immigration and national security laws and directives, and could reasonably be expected to risk the circumvention of law and render the guidelines for additional screening measures relevant to national security, public safety, and fraud prevention useless. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to		information is considered as part of the
access to, which would impact the effectiveness of screening and vetting procedures used for the enforcement of certain immigration and national security laws and directives, and could reasonably be expected to risk the circumvention of law and render the guidelines for additional screening measures relevant to national security, public safety, and fraud prevention useless. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to		result in individuals hiding the use of certain social media platforms or encouraging the
procedures used for the enforcement of certain immigration and national security laws and directives, and could reasonably be expected to risk the circumvention of law and render the guidelines for additional screening measures relevant to national security, public safety, and fraud prevention useless. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to		access to, which would impact the
laws and directives, and could reasonably be expected to risk the circumvention of law and render the guidelines for additional screening measures relevant to national security, public safety, and fraud prevention useless. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to		procedures used for the enforcement of
render the guidelines for additional screening measures relevant to national security, public safety, and fraud prevention useless. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to		laws and directives, and could reasonably be
safety, and fraud prevention useless. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to		render the guidelines for additional screening
exempt from disclosure pursuant to		safety, and fraud prevention useless.
		exempt from disclosure pursuant to

				All other information within this document was segregated and determined non-exempt and disclosed.
2141-2143	Email, RE: quick look for CIS (social media sites and eliciting account info), dated December 21, 2015	(b)(5): pages 2141- 2142 (b)(7)(E): pages 2141-2143	Email	The information withheld under (b)(5) includes deliberative and attorney-client privileged information within emails that relate to the review of a draft proposal on incorporating certain social media sites as part of screening certain refugee applicants. The emails are between USCIS OCC attorneys and USCIS employees, and include proposed language for the document, courses of action being considered, and recommendations. Draft language for the collection of information on immigration forms is also discussed as part of the review of the proposed process. This pre-decisional information is part of the deliberative process, and is also protected under attorney-client privilege, as it reveals OCC's attorneys' legal opinions and analysis. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(5). The information withheld under (b)(7)(E) includes a discussion of the collection of social media information from applicants, whether to use forms to request that information, and how the information collected would be used. This information, if disclosed, would reveal the specific information being collected for use in

2144-2152	Email DEr social modio	(b)(5); magas 2144	Email	screening and vetting, which is part of specific techniques and procedures involved in the enforcement of certain immigration and national security laws and directives. The release of this information would also reveal guidelines that could risk circumvention of the law, because it would put individuals on notice as to what information is considered as part of the screening and vetting process and could result in individuals hiding the use of certain social media platforms or encouraging the use of platforms that the agency does not access to, which would impact the effectiveness of screening and vetting procedures used for the enforcement of certain immigration and national security laws and directives, and could reasonably be expected to risk the circumvention of law and render the guidelines for additional screening measures relevant to national security, public safety, and fraud prevention useless. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(7)(E). All other information within this document was segregated and determined non-exempt and disclosed.
2144-2152	Email, RE: social media planning- due Monday, dated December 22, 2015	(b)(5): pages 2144- 2152 (b)(7)(E): pages 2149-2152	Email	The information withheld under (b)(5) includes deliberative and attorney-client privileged information within emails that relate to the review of a draft proposal on

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	incorporating certain social media sites as
	part of screening certain refugee applicants.
	The emails are between USCIS OCC
	attorneys and USCIS employees, and include
	proposed language for the document, courses
	of action being considered, and
	recommendations. This pre-decisional
	information is part of the deliberative
	process, and is also protected under attorney-
	client privilege, as it reveals OCC's
	attorneys' legal opinions and analysis.
	Accordingly, this material is appropriately
	exempt from disclosure pursuant to
	Exemption (b)(5).
	The information withheld under (b)(7)(E)
	includes a discussion of the collection of
	social media information from applicants,
	whether to use forms to request that
	information, and how the information
	collected would be used. This information, if
	disclosed, would reveal the specific
	information being collected for use in
	screening and vetting, which is part of
	specific techniques and procedures involved
	in the enforcement of certain immigration
	and national security laws and directives.
	The release of this information would also
	reveal guidelines that could risk
	circumvention of the law, because it would
	put individuals on notice as to what
	information is considered as part of the
	screening and vetting process and could
	screening and vetting process and could

				result in individuals hiding the use of certain social media platforms or encouraging the use of platforms that the agency does not access to, which would impact the effectiveness of screening and vetting procedures used for the enforcement of certain immigration and national security laws and directives, and could reasonably be expected to risk the circumvention of law and render the guidelines for additional screening measures relevant to national security, public safety, and fraud prevention useless. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(7)(E). All other information within this document was segregated and determined non-exempt and disclosed.
2154, 2157	Email, RE: Here's the Final K-1 Visa Fact Sheet - Congressional Notification - Response to K-1 Application process, dated December 22, 2015	(b)(5) (b)(7)(E)	Email	The information withheld under (b)(5) consists of deliberative and attorney-client privileged information within an email related to the review of a draft K-1 Visa Fact Sheet that would be submitted to Congress. The emails contain draft language for the fact sheet and summaries of proposed process changes to the K-1 visa adjudication process, including the background investigation process. The withheld information includes proposals, questions for clarification, recommendations, summaries of options, and feedback on options. This information reveals both deliberative and predecisional

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	information, as well as privileged legal opinions of the USCIS OCC attorneys that had been asked to provide legal analysis. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(5). The information withheld under (b)(7)(E) includes specific details of what documents and biographic information are used for the background check process, what other governments require and use during their vetting process, and the types of applications and applicants that would fall under this vetting process. This information, if disclosed, would reveal the types of factors considered when determining whether an application needs additional background checks or vetting, which is part of specific techniques and procedures involved in the enforcement of certain immigration and national security laws and directives. It would also reveal guidelines that could risk
	techniques and procedures involved in the enforcement of certain immigration and
	national security laws and directives. It would also reveal guidelines that could risk circumvention of the law, including specific
	factors and information that law enforcement is aware of pertaining to the types of
	applications that may need additional screening. The release of this information would put individuals on notice as to what
	information is considered as part of the screening and vetting process and could
	result in them not disclosing that information to law enforcement or immigration officers.

				The disclosure of this information would reveal guidelines and procedures for the enforcement of certain immigration and national security laws and directives, and could reasonably be expected to risk the circumvention of law and render the guidelines for additional screening measures relevant to national security, public safety, and fraud prevention useless. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(7)(E). All other information within this document was segregated and determined non-exempt and disclosed.
2161	Memorandum from DHS Office of Legislative Affairs, Congressional Notification, "Response to Chairman Goodlatte's Statement on the K-1 application review"	(b)(7)(E)	Memorandum	Exemption (b)(7)(E) was used to withhold memorandum for Congressional Notification from the DHA Office of Legislative Affairs. The information withheld under (b)(7)(E) includes a response to Chairman Goodlatte's Statement on the K-1 application review, which includes a detailed summary of the K-1 visa vetting process. The document also contains a summary of the vetting process that was conducted for a specific individual who was accused of perpetrating a terrorist attack, and the results of those screening processes. This information, if disclosed, would reveal the types of factors considered when determining whether an application needs additional background checks or vetting, which is part of specific techniques and procedures involved in the enforcement

				of certain immigration and national security laws and directives. It would also reveal guidelines that could risk circumvention of the law, including specific factors and information that law enforcement is aware of pertaining to the types of applications that may need additional screening. The release of this information would put individuals on notice as to what information is considered as part of the screening and vetting process and could result in them not disclosing that information to law enforcement or immigration officers. The disclosure of this information would reveal guidelines and procedures for the enforcement of certain immigration and national security laws and directives, and could reasonably be expected to risk the circumvention of law and render the guidelines for additional screening measures relevant to national security, public safety, and fraud prevention useless. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(7)(E).
2163-2169	Email, RE: social media planning- due Monday, dated December 22, 2015	(b)(5): pages 2163- 2169 (b)(7)(E): pages 2163, 2166-2167, 2169	Email	The information withheld under (b)(5) includes deliberative and attorney-client privileged information within emails that contain a summary of a recent DHS Social Media Task Force meeting and outstanding issues currently pending regarding social media use for operational and intelligence purposes across DHS. The emails are between USCIS OCC attorneys, USCIS

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employees, and DHS employees, and include
a summary of significant actions requiring
follow up, courses of action being
considered, and recommendations. This pre-
decisional information is part of the
deliberative process, and is also protected
under attorney-client privilege, as it reveals
USCIS OCC and ICE OPLA's attorneys'
legal opinions and analysis. Accordingly,
this material is appropriately exempt from
disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(5).
The information withheld under (b)(7)(E)
includes a summary of a proposed expansion
to the use of social media vetting to examine
certain refugee applicants, what the use
would involve, the specific social media
applications that it would involve, and how it
would be limited and what the information
could be used for. This information, if
disclosed, would reveal the specific methods
and procedures that immigration officers are
able to use to conduct social media research
for certain immigration applicants and
petitioners that need additional background
checks or vetting, which is part of specific
techniques and procedures involved in the
enforcement of certain immigration and
national security laws and directives. The
release of this information would also reveal
guidelines that could risk circumvention of
the law, because it would put individuals on
notice as to what information is considered as

				part of the screening and vetting process and what the limitations of access are. The release of this information could result in individuals hiding the use of certain information on social media platforms or engaging in behavior to avoid proper vetting, which would impact the effectiveness of screening and vetting procedures used for the enforcement of certain immigration and national security laws and directives, and could reasonably be expected to risk the circumvention of law and render the guidelines for additional screening measures relevant to national security, public safety, and fraud prevention useless. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(7)(E). All other information within this document was segregated and determined non-exempt and disclosed.
2172-2174, 2176-2179, 2181-2182, 2184	DHS Social Media Task Force PowerPoint presentation, "Current State of Social Media Use," dated December 23, 2015	(b)(5): pages 2172, 2182, 2184 (b)(7)(E): pages 2173-2182	PowerPoint	Exemptions (b)(5) was used to withhold portions of a PowerPoint presentation created by the DHS Social Media Task Force, titled "Current State of Social Media Use," dated December 23, 2015. The information withheld under (b)(5) as deliberative process privileged information consists of portions of pages 2182 and 2184, which contain summaries of outstanding topics, courses of action being considered, and recommendations for next steps. The information withheld under (b)(5) as

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	attorney-client privileged information consists of a portion of page 2172, which
	contains a summary of a legal opinion
	regarding potential legal concerns and risks
	of liability that could arise. Accordingly, this
	material is appropriately exempt from
	disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(5).
	The information redacted under Exemption
	(b)(7)(E) consists of a summary of the social
	media screening usage policies and how
	many were pending approval, the specific
	operational and intelligence uses approved
	for each DHS component, how DHS
	components leverage social media for
	operational and intelligence uses, including
	specific examples of those uses and results,
	the technological tools used for conducting
	operations, the technical capabilities and
	gaps, and proposed next steps planned. This
	information, if disclosed, would reveal the
	technology resources currently being used in
	the vetting process by law enforcement and
	immigration officers, and the specific
	websites, applications, and social media that
	is being reviewed by immigration officers for
	certain immigration applicants and petitioners
	that need additional background checks or
	vetting, which is part of specific techniques
	and procedures involved in the enforcement of certain immigration and national security
	laws and directives. The release of this
	information would also reveal guidelines that

2190-2191	DHS/USCIS/DOS-CA K-1	(b)(5)	Draft List of Tasks	could risk circumvention of the law, because it would put individuals on notice as to what information is considered as part of the screening and vetting process, what words and images are being searched for, and the specific tools used by law enforcement. The release of this information would put individuals on notice as to what technology is being used, so that individuals could research the technology to identify vulnerabilities and limitations, which could impact the effectiveness of the screening and vetting process. It could also result in individuals hiding the use of certain social media platforms or encouraging the use of platforms that the agency does not access to, which would impact the effectiveness of screening and vetting procedures used for the enforcement of certain immigration and national security laws and directives, and could reasonably be expected to risk the circumvention of law and render the guidelines for additional screening measures relevant to national security, public safety, and fraud prevention useless. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(7)(E). All other information within this document was segregated and determined non-exempt and disclosed. The information withheld under (b)(5) as
Z17U-Z171	Program Review: Draft	(0)(3)	Dian List of Tasks	deliberative process privileged information

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Recommendations/ Actions on the use of Social Media in the screening process	(b)(7)(E)	consists of a draft version of a recommendations document developed by the joint USCIS, DHS, and DOS Social Media working group. The recommendations focused on the review of the K-1 visa program and the use of social media in the screening process. The draft contains predecisional and deliberative information, including comments, revisions, additions, re-
		wordings, suggestions, clarifications, and requests for additional information. All of this information is part of the deliberative process.
		The information withheld under (b)(5) as attorney-client privileged information consists of comments and legal opinions about the draft recommendations, which were provided by USCIS OCC attorneys that had been asked to provide legal review. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(5).
		The information redacted under Exemption (b)(7)(E) consists of the draft recommendations and actions on the use of social media to screen a specific applicant type, and comments that include discussion of the proposed courses of action, including how the screening procedures could be used by law enforcement, how they were used in the screening of individuals involved in a

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recent terrorist event, and proposed options for consideration in the process of social media screening and vetting. This information, if disclosed, would reveal how
law enforcement agencies coordinate with USCIS and the methods used to conduct
searches, and the specific factors that
immigration officers are looking for to
indicate possible indicators of fraud, public
safety, or national security concerns, which is
part of specific techniques and procedures
involved in the enforcement of certain
immigration and national security laws and
directives. The release of this information
would also reveal guidelines that could risk
circumvention of the law, because it would put individuals on notice as to what
information is considered as part of the
screening and vetting process, which areas
and applicants will be screened, and the
specific factors being considered by law
enforcement during the vetting process. The
release of this information could also result in
individuals hiding the use of certain social
media platforms or encouraging the use of
platforms that the agency does not access to,
which would impact the effectiveness of
screening and vetting procedures used for the
enforcement of certain immigration and
national security laws and directives, and
could reasonably be expected to risk the
circumvention of law and render the
guidelines for additional screening measures

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				relevant to national security, public safety, and fraud prevention useless. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(7)(E). All other information within this document was segregated and determined non-exempt and disclosed.
2193-2197	DHS Management Directive 110-01, SMOUT Compliance Timeline	(b)(5)	Review Flowchart	The information withheld under (b)(5) as deliberative process privileged information related to the department-wide coordinated review of a draft SMOUT compliance timeline. The document lists specific details revealing the nature of every SMOUT being drafted by each component regarding their use of social media, and outstanding issues and recommendations for each. All of this information is part of the deliberative process. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(5). All other information within this document was segregated and determined non-exempt and disclosed.
2233-2235, 2237-2241, 2243, 2245, 2247-2248	DHS Social Media Task Force PowerPoint presentation, "Operational Recommendations for Improving Social Media Use,"	(b)(5): pages 2233- 2235, 2237-2241, 2245, 2247-2248	PowerPoint	Exemptions (b)(5) was used to withhold portions of a PowerPoint presentation created by the DHS Social Media Task Force, titled "Operational Recommendations for Improving Social Media Use," dated
	dated December 30, 2015	(b)(7)(E): pages 2235, 2237-2239, 2243		December 30, 2015. The information withheld under (b)(5) as deliberative process privileged information consists of summaries of outstanding topics, courses of action being

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	considered, recommendations for next steps, and challenges identified. This information, if released, would reveal the deliberative process and predecisional information. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(5).
	The information redacted under Exemption (b)(7)(E) consists of a summary of the social media screening usage policies and how many were pending approval, the specific operational and intelligence uses approved for each DHS component, how DHS components leverage social media for operational and intelligence uses, including specific examples of those uses and results, the technological tools used for conducting operations, the technical capabilities and gaps, and proposed next steps planned. This information, if disclosed, would reveal the technology resources currently being used in the vetting process by law enforcement and immigration officers, and the specific websites, applications, and social media that
	is being reviewed by immigration officers for certain immigration applicants and petitioners that need additional background checks or vetting, which is part of specific techniques and procedures involved in the enforcement of certain immigration and national security laws and directives. The release of this information would also reveal guidelines that

2251-2253	DHS Social Media Task Force,	(b)(5)	Draft Response	it would put individuals on notice as to what information is considered as part of the screening and vetting process, what words and images are being searched for, and the specific tools used by law enforcement. The release of this information would put individuals on notice as to what technology is being used, so that individuals could research the technology to identify vulnerabilities and limitations, which could impact the effectiveness of the screening and vetting process. It could also result in individuals hiding the use of certain social media platforms or encouraging the use of platforms that the agency does not access to, which would impact the effectiveness of screening and vetting procedures used for the enforcement of certain immigration and national security laws and directives, and could reasonably be expected to risk the circumvention of law and render the guidelines for additional screening measures relevant to national security, public safety, and fraud prevention useless. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(7)(E). All other information within this document was segregated and determined non-exempt and disclosed. The information withheld under (b)(5)
	USCIS draft Response to Task		Dian itempone	includes deliberative and attorney-client

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Force Recommendations, January 5, 2016	, dated (b)(7)(E)	privileged information related to the review of a draft USCIS response to the DHS Social Media Task Force's recommendations for next steps of developing policies and guidance for the use of social media to support USCIS's mission. The draft includes detailed summaries of the issues that need to be considered and recommended courses of action, as well as comments and revisions to the draft USCIS responses. This predecisional information is part of the
		deliberative process, and is also protected under attorney-client privilege, as it reveals OCC's attorneys' legal opinions and analysis. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(5).
		The information withheld under (b)(7)(E) includes summaries of the DHS Social Media Task Force's recommendations regarding DHS's current and future use of social media to support operational and investigative purposes, which employees within USCIS are authorized to search social media information, which immigration benefit types and individuals were part of the pilot to
		expand the use of social media in screening immigration applicants, what technological tools are being acquired for DHS use, analysis of how effective or difficult social media screening was for different background check types, and the upcoming

				priorities to continue to expand DHS's use of social media information to support its' mission. This information, if disclosed, would reveal the specific methods and procedures that law enforcement and immigration officers are able to use to conduct social media research, and which immigration benefit types are likely to be subject to social media screening, which is part of specific techniques and procedures involved in the enforcement of certain immigration and national security laws and directives. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(7)(E).
				All other information within this document was segregated and determined non-exempt and disclosed.
2254, 2256	Email, RE: [CLEARANCE REQUEST] Social Media K-1 Authorization Memo, dated January 8, 2016	(b)(5) (b)(7)(E)	Email	Exemptions (b)(5) was used to withhold deliberative process and attorney-client privileged information within emails between USCIS OCC and USCIS employees, which are related to the review of a draft Social Media K-1 Authorization Memo, which would allow FDHS to conduct an analysis of certain social media information related to certain applicants for immigration benefits. The information withheld under (b)(5) as deliberative process privileged information consists of a summary of the draft, questions about accuracy, and requests for additional

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	information, which includes pre-decisional and deliberative information. The information withheld under (b)(5) as attorney-client privileged information consists of a legal opinion regarding the proposed language in the memorandum drafted by USCIS OCC attorneys that had been asked to provide legal review.
	Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(5).
	The information withheld under (b)(7)(E) includes a discussion of the collection of social media information from applicants, what privacy documentation would be needed to document this collection, and the specific immigration benefit type that would be subject to collection of social media information. This information, if disclosed, would reveal the specific information being collected for use in screening and vetting, which is part of specific techniques and procedures involved in the enforcement of
	certain immigration and national security laws and directives. The release of this information would also reveal guidelines that could risk circumvention of the law, because it would put individuals on notice as to what information is considered as part of the screening and vetting process and could result in individuals hiding the use of certain

				social media platforms or encouraging the use of platforms that the agency does not access to, which would impact the effectiveness of screening and vetting procedures used for the enforcement of certain immigration and national security laws and directives, and could reasonably be expected to risk the circumvention of law and render the guidelines for additional screening measures relevant to national security, public safety, and fraud prevention useless. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(7)(E). All other information within this document was segregated and determined non-exempt and disclosed.
2259-2269	Privacy Threshold Analysis (PTA), version number 01-2014, "S&T Social A2356Media Tool Pilot Evaluation"	(b)(5): pages 2260- 2269 (b)(7)(E): pages 2259-2265, 2268- 2269	Privacy Threshold Analysis	Exemptions (b)(5) was used to withhold deliberative process privileged information within Privacy Threshold Analysis (PTA), version number 01-2014, "S&T Social A2356Media Tool Pilot Evaluation." This document covered a study of the application of social media tools to k-1 visa applicants, and examined options to address the use of social media as part of background checks for immigrations populations. The information withheld under (b)(5) as deliberative process privileged information consists of a review of proposed process challenges, concerns, and recommendations, which include predecisional and deliberative information.

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Accordingly, this material is appropriately
exempt from disclosure pursuant to
Exemption (b)(5).
The information redacted under Exemption
(b)(7)(E) consists of the names of several
technological tool being considered by DHS
for use in facilitating its' operational use of
social media, evaluations of the uses of the
tools as part of actual screening and the
results, optional courses of action and
recommendations, and summaries of the
limitations and resource constraints. This
information, if disclosed, would reveal the
technology resources currently being used in
the vetting process by law enforcement and
immigration officers, which is part of specific
techniques and procedures involved in the
enforcement of certain immigration and
national security laws and directives. The
release of this information would also reveal
guidelines that could risk circumvention of
the law, because it would put individuals on
notice as to what technology is being used, so
that individuals could research the
technology to identify vulnerabilities and
limitations, which could impact the
effectiveness of the screening and vetting
process. It could also result in individuals
hiding the use of certain social media
platforms or encouraging the use of platforms
that the agency does not access to, which
would impact the effectiveness of screening

				and vetting procedures used for the enforcement of certain immigration and national security laws and directives, and could reasonably be expected to risk the circumvention of law and render the guidelines for additional screening measures relevant to national security, public safety, and fraud prevention useless. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(7)(E). All other information within this document was segregated and determined non-exempt and disclosed.
2270-2284	Memorandum from DHS's Office of General Counsel to the DHS Social Media Task Force, "Overview of Department of Homeland Security Legal Authorities to Use Social Media," dated December 22, 2015	(b)(5): pages 2270- 2284 (b)(7)(E): pages 2273, 2280	Legal Memorandum	The information withheld under (b)(5) as attorney-client privileged information consists of legal opinions contained in this legal memorandum. The memorandum details legal issues related to the Overview of Department of Homeland Security Legal Authorities to Use Social Media. It is written by DHS OGC and directed to the SMTF, which had requested legal analysis and opinion. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(5). The information withheld under (b)(7)(E) includes summaries of National Protection and Programs (NPPD) and ICE's use of social media for operational purposes and methods used by law enforcement for screening purposes, the specific social media

				applications screened, and analysis outlining the legal considerations with the various methods proposed. This information, if disclosed, would reveal the specific methods and procedures that law enforcement and immigration officers are able to use to conduct social media research for operational and investigative purposes, which is part of specific techniques and procedures involved in the enforcement of certain immigration and national security laws and directives. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(7)(E). All other information within this document was segregated and determined non-exempt and disclosed.
2285-2286	Draft, "USCIS Social Media & Vetting: Efforts to Date," dated January 4, 2016	(b)(5) (b)(7)(E)	Draft Summary Overview	The information withheld under (b)(5) as deliberative process privileged information consists of multiple draft comments, revisions, additions, re-wordings, suggestions, clarifications, questions about accuracy, statements of uncertainty, and requests for additional information. All of this information is part of the deliberative process related to the draft Summary/Updates on USCIS's Social Media & Vetting efforts to date, as of January 4, 2016. The material reflects deliberative information, is predecisional, and includes information that is not reflected in the final version of the document.

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The information withheld under (b)(5) as attorney-client privileged information consists of comments and legal opinions added to this draft document by USCIS OCC attorneys that had been asked to provide legal review. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(5). The information redacted under Exemption (b)(7)(E) consists of a summary of the social media screening efforts to date, the timeline for proposed pilot projects, optional courses of action and recommendations, detailed information about which social media applications were used and the immigrant populations subject to screening, and summaries of the limitations and resource constraints. The document also contains detailed information about some applicants that had been screened and the results of that screening, the specific social media applications reviewed, and which key words were used to search those social media applications. This information, if disclosed, would reveal the technology resources currently being used in the vetting process by law enforcement and immigration officers, and the specific worksites, applications, and social media that is being reviewed by immigration officers for certain immigration applicants and petitioners that need additional applications and escentain immigration applicants and petitioners that need additional applicants and petitioners that need additi	
(b)(7)(E) consists of a summary of the social media screening efforts to date, the timeline for proposed pilot projects, optional courses of action and recommendations, detailed information about which social media applications were used and the immigrant populations subject to screening, and summaries of the limitations and resource constraints. The document also contains detailed information about some applicants that had been screened and the results of that screening, the specific social media applications reviewed, and which key words were used to search those social media applications. This information, if disclosed, would reveal the technology resources currently being used in the vetting process by law enforcement and immigration officers, and the specific websites, applications, and social media that is being reviewed by immigration officers for certain immigration	attorney-client privileged information consists of comments and legal opinions added to this draft document by USCIS OCC attorneys that had been asked to provide legal review. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure
	(b)(7)(E) consists of a summary of the social media screening efforts to date, the timeline for proposed pilot projects, optional courses of action and recommendations, detailed information about which social media applications were used and the immigrant populations subject to screening, and summaries of the limitations and resource constraints. The document also contains detailed information about some applicants that had been screened and the results of that screening, the specific social media applications reviewed, and which key words were used to search those social media applications. This information, if disclosed, would reveal the technology resources currently being used in the vetting process by law enforcement and immigration officers, and the specific websites, applications, and social media that is being reviewed by

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background checks or vetting, which is part
of specific techniques and procedures
involved in the enforcement of certain
immigration and national security laws and
directives. The release of this information
would also reveal guidelines that could risk
circumvention of the law, because it would
put individuals on notice as to what
information is considered as part of the
screening and vetting process, what words
and images are being searched for, and the
specific tools used by law enforcement. The
release of this information would put
individuals on notice as to what technology is
being used, so that individuals could research
the technology to identify vulnerabilities and
limitations, which could impact the
effectiveness of the screening and vetting
process. It could also result in individuals
hiding the use of certain social media
platforms or encouraging the use of platforms
that the agency does not access to, which
would impact the effectiveness of screening
and vetting procedures used for the
enforcement of certain immigration and
national security laws and directives, and
could reasonably be expected to risk the
circumvention of law and render the
guidelines for additional screening measures
relevant to national security, public safety,
and fraud prevention useless. Accordingly,
this material is appropriately exempt from
disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(7)(E).

				All other information within this document was segregated and determined non-exempt and disclosed.
2288-2299	Memorandum from DHS's Office of General Counsel, "DHS's Use of the Internet and Social Media Tools in Conducting Enforcement and Intelligence Operations," dated January 27, 2010	(b)(5): pages 2288- 2299 (b)(7)(E): pages 2289-2292	Legal Memorandum	The information withheld under (b)(5) as attorney-client privileged information consists of legal opinions contained in this legal memorandum. The memorandum details legal issues related to DHS's Use of the Internet and Social Media Tools in Conducting Enforcement and Intelligence Operations. It is written by DHS OGC, and contains their legal analysis and opinion. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(5). The information withheld under (b)(7)(E) includes legal analysis regarding enforcement and intelligence activities involving online and social media monitoring, and DHS's compliance with applicable privacy laws, civil rights and civil liberties and constitutional rights, proposed courses of action as part of enforcement activities and procedures, and analysis outlining the legal considerations with the various methods proposed. Detailed information is redacted that includes the use of social media for enforcement activities within ICE, CBP, NPPD, Federal Protective Services, USCIS, TSA, Federal Air Marshalls, and the Secret Service, what methods are used, and the

2303-2305	Email, RE: Social Media memo, dated January 25, 2016	(b)(5): pages 2303- 2305 (b)(7)(E): pages 2303-2304	Email	results of specific enforcement operations that use social media screening. This information, if disclosed, would reveal the specific methods and procedures that law enforcement and immigration officers are able to use to conduct social media research for operational and investigative purposes, which is part of specific techniques and procedures involved in the enforcement of certain immigration and national security laws and directives. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(7)(E). All other information within this document was segregated and determined non-exempt and disclosed. Exemptions (b)(5) was used to withhold deliberative process and attorney-client privileged information within emails between USCIS OCC attorneys, which are related to the review of a draft Social Media memo on USCIS's use of certain social media information related to certain applicants for immigration benefits. The information withheld under (b)(5) as deliberative process privileged information consists of a summary of the draft, questions about legal authority and relevant statutory and regulatory citations, and requests for additional information, which includes pre-decisional and deliberative information.
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The information withheld under (b)(5) as attorney-client privileged information consists of a legal opinion regarding the draft which was written by USCIS OCC attorneys that had been asked to provide legal review. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(5).
The information withheld under (b)(7)(E) includes draft language that was written for a memorandum on whether USCIS has authority to engage in undercover activities while engaging in the operational use of social media, and a summary of the outstanding issues and courses of action being considered, and a summary of the form that would be used to collect the information and the draft notice for the form. This information, if disclosed, would reveal the collection methods and uses the agency considered for certain immigration applicants and petitioners that need additional background checks or vetting, which is part of specific techniques and procedures involved in the enforcement of certain immigration and national security laws and directives. The release of this information
would also reveal guidelines that could risk circumvention of the law, because it would put individuals on notice as to what information is considered as part of the screening and vetting process and could

				result in individuals hiding the use of certain social media platforms or encouraging the use of platforms that the agency does not access to, which would impact the effectiveness of screening and vetting procedures used for the enforcement of certain immigration and national security laws and directives, and could reasonably be expected to risk the circumvention of law and render the guidelines for additional screening measures relevant to national security, public safety, and fraud prevention useless. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(7)(E). All other information within this document was segregated and determined non-exempt
2306	Email, Director Rodriguez testimony and social media vetting, dated January 29, 2016	(b)(5)	Email	and disclosed. Exemptions (b)(5) was used to withhold deliberative process and attorney-client privileged information within emails between USCIS OCC and DHS OGC attorneys, which are related to the review of draft testimony to be submitted by Director Rodriguez related to social media vetting in refugee screening. The information withheld under (b)(5) as deliberative process privileged information consists of a summary of the draft testimony and specific edits and issues of note, which includes pre-decisional and deliberative information.

				The information withheld under (b)(5) as attorney-client privileged information consists of a legal opinion regarding the draft which was written by USCIS OCC attorneys that had been asked to provide legal review. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(5). All other information within this document was segregated and determined non-exempt and disclosed.
2310-2311	Draft testimony for USCIS Director Rodriguez for a hearing on "Crisis of Confidence: Preventing Terrorist Infiltration through U.S. Refugee and Visa Programs," dated February 3, 2015	(b)(5)	Draft Testimony	Exemptions (b)(5) was used to withhold deliberative process and attorney-client privileged information within a copy of draft testimony to be submitted by Director Rodriguez related to social media vetting in refugee screening. The information withheld under (b)(5) as deliberative process privileged information consists of edits, revisions, comments, questions, and recommendations for the draft testimony, which is pre-decisional and deliberative information.
				The information withheld under (b)(5) as attorney-client privileged information consists of comments that include legal opinions regarding the draft which were written by USCIS OCC attorneys that had been asked to provide legal review. Accordingly, this material is appropriately

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				exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(5). All other information within this document was segregated and determined non-exempt and disclosed.
2313, 2315	Email, RE: Director Rodriguez testimony and social media vetting, dated January 31, 2016	(b)(5)	Email	Exemptions (b)(5) was used to withhold deliberative process and attorney-client privileged information within emails between USCIS OCC and DHS OGC attorneys, which are related to the review of draft testimony to be submitted by Director Rodriguez related to social media vetting in refugee screening. The information withheld under (b)(5) as deliberative process privileged information consists of a summary of the draft testimony and specific edits and issues of note, which includes pre-decisional and deliberative information. The information withheld under (b)(5) as attorney-client privileged information consists of a legal opinion regarding the draft which was written by USCIS OCC attorneys that had been asked to provide legal review. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(5). All other information within this document was segregated and determined non-exempt and disclosed.

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2317-2327	Email, RE: *URGENT* Testimony #1117293 - USCIS - Refugee/Visa Screening - need response to FO, dated February 1, 2016	(b)(5): pages 2317- 2327 (b)(7)(E): page 2325	Email	Exemptions (b)(5) was used to withhold deliberative process and attorney-client privileged information within emails between USCIS OCC attorneys and USCIS employees, which are related to the review of draft testimony to that will be given to the House Committee on Homeland Security related to social media vetting in refugee screening. The information withheld under (b)(5) as deliberative process privileged information consists of a summary of the draft testimony and specific edits and issues of note, which includes pre-decisional and deliberative information. The information withheld under (b)(5) as attorney-client privileged information consists of a legal opinion regarding the draft which was written by USCIS OCC attorneys that had been asked to provide legal review. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(5). The information withheld under (b)(7)(E) includes summaries of draft testimony from a hearing on refugee visa screening, discussions over the legal authorities impacting the statements in the testimony, clarifications on specific procedures and methods USCIS's employees use in

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reveal guidelines and procedures for the enforcement of certain immigration and national security laws and directives, and could reasonably be expected to risk the circumvention of law and render the guidelines for additional screening measures relevant to national security, public safety, and fraud prevention useless. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(7)(E).	initiatives, including the types of applications and applicants that would fall under this vetting process. This information, if disclosed, would reveal the types of factors considered when determining whether an application needs additional background checks or vetting, which is part of specific techniques and procedures involved in the enforcement of certain immigration and national security laws and directives. It would also reveal guidelines that could risk circumvention of the law, including specific factors and information that law enforcement is aware of pertaining to the types of applications that may need additional screening. The release of this information would put individuals on notice as to what information is considered as part of the screening and vetting process and could result in them not disclosing that information to law enforcement or immigration officers. The disclosure of this information would
is aware of pertaining to the types of applications that may need additional screening. The release of this information would put individuals on notice as to what information is considered as part of the screening and vetting process and could result in them not disclosing that information to law enforcement or immigration officers. The disclosure of this information would reveal guidelines and procedures for the enforcement of certain immigration and national security laws and directives, and could reasonably be expected to risk the circumvention of law and render the guidelines for additional screening measures relevant to national security, public safety, and fraud prevention useless. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from	
applications that may need additional screening. The release of this information would put individuals on notice as to what information is considered as part of the screening and vetting process and could result in them not disclosing that information to law enforcement or immigration officers. The disclosure of this information would reveal guidelines and procedures for the enforcement of certain immigration and national security laws and directives, and could reasonably be expected to risk the circumvention of law and render the guidelines for additional screening measures relevant to national security, public safety, and fraud prevention useless. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from	
screening. The release of this information would put individuals on notice as to what information is considered as part of the screening and vetting process and could result in them not disclosing that information to law enforcement or immigration officers. The disclosure of this information would reveal guidelines and procedures for the enforcement of certain immigration and national security laws and directives, and could reasonably be expected to risk the circumvention of law and render the guidelines for additional screening measures relevant to national security, public safety, and fraud prevention useless. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from	
information is considered as part of the screening and vetting process and could result in them not disclosing that information to law enforcement or immigration officers. The disclosure of this information would reveal guidelines and procedures for the enforcement of certain immigration and national security laws and directives, and could reasonably be expected to risk the circumvention of law and render the guidelines for additional screening measures relevant to national security, public safety, and fraud prevention useless. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from	
screening and vetting process and could result in them not disclosing that information to law enforcement or immigration officers. The disclosure of this information would reveal guidelines and procedures for the enforcement of certain immigration and national security laws and directives, and could reasonably be expected to risk the circumvention of law and render the guidelines for additional screening measures relevant to national security, public safety, and fraud prevention useless. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from	
result in them not disclosing that information to law enforcement or immigration officers. The disclosure of this information would reveal guidelines and procedures for the enforcement of certain immigration and national security laws and directives, and could reasonably be expected to risk the circumvention of law and render the guidelines for additional screening measures relevant to national security, public safety, and fraud prevention useless. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from	
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The disclosure of this information would reveal guidelines and procedures for the enforcement of certain immigration and national security laws and directives, and could reasonably be expected to risk the circumvention of law and render the guidelines for additional screening measures relevant to national security, public safety, and fraud prevention useless. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from	
reveal guidelines and procedures for the enforcement of certain immigration and national security laws and directives, and could reasonably be expected to risk the circumvention of law and render the guidelines for additional screening measures relevant to national security, public safety, and fraud prevention useless. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from	
national security laws and directives, and could reasonably be expected to risk the circumvention of law and render the guidelines for additional screening measures relevant to national security, public safety, and fraud prevention useless. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from	
could reasonably be expected to risk the circumvention of law and render the guidelines for additional screening measures relevant to national security, public safety, and fraud prevention useless. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from	
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and fraud prevention useless. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from	
this material is appropriately exempt from	, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

				All other information within this document was segregated and determined non-exempt and disclosed.
2330-2332	Draft Social Media Expansion Plan for Refugee Applicants, Concept of Operations	(b)(5) (b)(7)(E)	Draft Concept of Operations	Exemptions (b)(5) was used to withhold deliberative process and attorney-client privileged information within a draft Concept of Operations (CONOP) document which focused on the Social Media Expansion Plan for Refugee Applicants. The CONOP draft focused on certain key elements of the plan including the categories of applicants that will be part of the social media vetting process, the social media platforms to access, staffing requirements, and the process for reviewing results and incorporating them into the adjudicative process. The information withheld under (b)(5) as deliberative process privileged information consists of comments, edits, revisions, and proposed options for courses of action, as
				well as alternative courses of action. This information is part of the deliberative process and consists of information that is not reflected in the final version of the document. The information withheld under (b)(5) as attorney-client privileged information consists of comments including legal opinions regarding the draft which was written by USCIS OCC attorneys that had been asked to provide legal review.
				Accordingly, this material is appropriately

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exempt from disclosure pursuant to
Exemption (b)(5).
The information redacted under Exemption
(b)(7)(E) consists of specific techniques and
procedures involved in the operational use of
social media to conduct screening for certain
applicants, including detailed information
about some applicants that had been screened
and the results of that screening, the specific
social media applications reviewed, and the
factors, patterns, words, and phrases that are
used to search those social media
applications. The redacted information also
contains summaries of the program that detail
which applicants will be flagged for
enhanced review that includes social media
screening, which areas the pilot will be taking
place, the indicators that will be looked for
and on which social media applications, and
the challenges identified in the process of
social media screening and vetting. This
information, if disclosed, would reveal the
technology resources currently being used in
the vetting process by law enforcement and
immigration officers, the methods used to
conduct searches, and the specific factors that
immigration officers are looking for to
indicate possible indicators of fraud, public
safety, or national security concerns, which is
part of specific techniques and procedures
involved in the enforcement of certain
immigration and national security laws and
miningration and national security laws and

				directives. The release of this information would also reveal guidelines that could risk circumvention of the law, because it would put individuals on notice as to what information is considered as part of the screening and vetting process, which areas and applicants will be searched during which time periods, and the specific factors being considered by law enforcement during the vetting process. The release of this information would put individuals on notice as to what technology is being used, so that individuals could research the technology to identify vulnerabilities and limitations, which could impact the effectiveness of the screening and vetting process. It could also result in individuals hiding the use of certain social media platforms or encouraging the use of platforms that the agency does not access to, which would impact the effectiveness of screening and vetting procedures used for the enforcement of certain immigration and national security laws and directives, and could reasonably be expected to risk the circumvention of law and render the guidelines for additional screening measures relevant to national security, public safety, and fraud prevention useless.
2334-2335	Email, RE: Sharing of social media handles etc. with IC partners, dated March 28, 2016	(b)(5): pages 2334- 2335	Email	Exemptions (b)(5) was used to withhold deliberative process and attorney-client privileged information within emails between USCIS OCC and DHS OGC attorneys, which are related to review of a draft agreement that

(b)(7)(E): page 2334	will detail what information DHS is able to share with the intelligence community, specifically related to information collected during the social media vetting process. The information withheld under (b)(5) as deliberative process privileged information consists of a summary of the draft agreement, the specific process issues being considered, and optional courses of action, which includes pre-decisional and deliberative information. The information withheld under (b)(5) as attorney-client privileged information consists of a legal opinion regarding the draft agreement and thoughts on potential liability, which was written by USCIS OCC attorneys that had been asked to provide legal review, and shared with DHS OGC attorneys. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(5).
	Exemption (b)(7)(E) was used to withhold an attorney's summary of the draft agreement and courses of action being considered as part of certain information sharing agreements with other law enforcement agencies, and whether USCIS would be share information from social media screening, including social media handles, with intelligence community partners, the proposed uses for the information, and the

2336-2339	Draft USCIS/State Social	(b)(5)	Draft Concept of Operations	proposed options for sharing social media information with other law enforcement partners. This information, if disclosed, would reveal the methods that immigration officers are authorized and prohibited from using to collect social media information and how that information may be shared with other law enforcement partners, which is part of specific techniques and procedures involved in the enforcement of certain immigration and national security laws and directives. The release of this information would also reveal guidelines that could risk circumvention of the law, because it would put individuals on notice as to what limitations law enforcement has in sharing information, which could impact the effectiveness of the screening and vetting process, and could reasonably be expected to risk the circumvention of law and render the guidelines for additional screening measures relevant to national security, public safety, and fraud prevention useless. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(7)(E). All other information within this document was segregated and determined non-exempt and disclosed. Exemptions (b)(5) was used to withhold
	Media Elicitation Plan -	(-)(-)	21111 John Professions	deliberative process and attorney-client

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Concept of Operations, dated February 19, 2016	(b)(7)(E)	privileged information within a draft Concept of Operations (CONOP) document which focused on the Social Media Elicitation Plan for the Refugee Applicant Pilot. The CONOP draft focused on certain key elements of the plan, which involved a pilot to elicit certain social media identifiers of certain refugee applicants. The information withheld under (b)(5) as deliberative process privileged information consists of draft language and comments, as well as proposed options for courses of
		action, all of which is pre-decisional and part of the deliberative process. The information redacted under Exemption (b)(7)(E) consists of specific techniques and procedures involved in the operational use of social media to conduct screening for certain applicants, including detailed information about some applicants that had been screened
		and the results of that screening, the specific social media applications reviewed, and the factors and patterns that are highlighted as part of searching those social media applications. The redacted information also contains summaries of the program that detail which applicants will be flagged for enhanced review that includes social media screening, which areas the pilot will be taking place, the indicators that will be looked for
		screening, which areas the pilot will be place, the indicators that will be looked and on which social media applications,

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	the challenges identified in the process of
	social media screening and vetting. This
	information, if disclosed, would reveal the
	technology resources currently being used in
	the vetting process by law enforcement and
	immigration officers, the methods used to
	conduct searches, and the specific factors that
	immigration officers are looking for to
	indicate possible indicators of fraud, public
	safety, or national security concerns, which is
	part of specific techniques and procedures
	involved in the enforcement of certain
	immigration and national security laws and
	directives. The release of this information
	would also reveal guidelines that could risk
	circumvention of the law, because it would
	put individuals on notice as to what
	information is considered as part of the
	screening and vetting process, which areas
	and applicants will be searched during which
	time periods, and the specific factors being
	considered by law enforcement during the
	vetting process. The release of this
	information would put individuals on notice
	as to what technology is being used, so that
	individuals could research the technology to
	identify vulnerabilities and limitations, which
	could impact the effectiveness of the
	screening and vetting process. It could also
	result in individuals hiding the use of certain
	social media platforms or encouraging the
	use of platforms that the agency does not
	access to, which would impact the
<u> </u>	access to, which would impact the

				effectiveness of screening and vetting procedures used for the enforcement of certain immigration and national security laws and directives, and could reasonably be expected to risk the circumvention of law and render the guidelines for additional screening measures relevant to national security, public safety, and fraud prevention useless. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(7)(E). The information withheld under (b)(5) as attorney-client privileged information consists of summaries of legal opinions and potential liability risks provided to USCIS employees by USCIS OCC attorneys that had been asked to provide legal review. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(5).
2340-2341	Email, RE: Comments on Social Media paper, dated March 28, 2016	(b)(5) (b)(7)(E)	Email	Exemptions (b)(5) was used to withhold deliberative process privileged information within emails between USCIS employees and USCIS OCC and DHS OGC attorneys, which are related to review of a draft Concept of Operations (CONOP) document which focused on the Social Media Expansion Plan for Refugee Applicants. The information withheld under (b)(5) as deliberative process privileged information consists of a summary of the draft agreement, the specific process issues being considered, and optional courses

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of action, which includes pre-decisional and
deliberative information.
denoerative information.
The information withheld under (b)(7)(E)
includes a list of document titles that relate to
the social media vetting process and DHS's
plans for expansion. This information was
compiled by USCIS employees as part of the
review/revision process in finalizing the
documents, and the titles contain law
enforcement information and objectives. The
titles also contain specific details on the focus
of the vetting initiatives, including the types
of applications and applicants that would fall
under this vetting process. This information,
if disclosed, would reveal the types of factors
considered when determining whether an
application needs additional background
checks or vetting, which is part of specific
techniques and procedures involved in the
enforcement of certain immigration and
national security laws and directives. It
would also reveal guidelines that could risk
circumvention of the law, including specific
factors and information that law enforcement
is aware of pertaining to the types of asylum
applications that may need additional
screening. The release of this information
would put individuals on notice as to what
information is considered as part of the
screening and vetting process and could
result in them not disclosing that information
to law enforcement or immigration officers.

				The disclosure of this information would reveal guidelines and procedures for the enforcement of certain immigration and national security laws and directives, and could reasonably be expected to risk the circumvention of law and render the guidelines for additional screening measures relevant to national security, public safety, and fraud prevention useless. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(7)(E). All other information within this document was segregated and determined non-exempt and disclosed.
2345, 2350- 2353	USCIS's Refugee Affairs Division, Guidance for Use of Social Media in Syrian Refugee Adjudications, dated September 25, 2018	(b)(5): pages 2351- 2353 (b)(7)(E): pages 2345, 2350-2353	Guidance Document	The information withheld under (b)(5) as deliberative process privileged information consists of a document written by USCIS's Refugee Affairs Division, "Guidance for Use of Social Media in Syrian Refugee Adjudications," dated September 25, 2018. The purpose of the document is to provide guidance to immigration officers regarding how to use the results of social media checks in the refugee process. The withheld information focuses on the types of questions and issues that adjudicators may want to look for when reviewing an application or interviewing an applicant related to social media information. These questions are used in adjudications and reveal the immigration officers' predecisional deliberations and thoughts.

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	The information withheld under (b)(7)(E) includes methods and guidance to immigration officers regarding how to use the results of social media checks in the refugee process, including specific examples of questions that can be used by immigration officers to question applicants to verify social media results as part of social media vetting. This information, if disclosed, would reveal the specific methods and procedures that immigration officers are able to use to conduct social media research for certain immigration applicants and petitioners that need additional background checks or vetting, which is part of specific techniques and procedures involved in the enforcement of certain immigration and national security laws and directives. The release of this
	could risk circumvention of the law, because it would put individuals on notice as to what information is considered as part of the screening and vetting process and what
	questions may be asked, which would tip off the individuals that the immigration officer was investigating possible national security
	or public safety concerns. The release of this information could result in individuals hiding the use of certain information on social media
	platforms or engaging in behavior to avoid proper vetting, which would impact the effectiveness of screening and vetting

				procedures used for the enforcement of certain immigration and national security laws and directives, and could reasonably be expected to risk the circumvention of law and render the guidelines for additional screening measures relevant to national security, public safety, and fraud prevention useless. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(7)(E). All other information within this document was segregated and determined non-exempt and disclosed.
2355	Email, RE: CRCL Protecting First Amendment in Social Media Research, dated April 14, 2016	(b)(5)	Email	The information withheld under (b)(5) includes deliberative and attorney-client privileged information related to a request for legal guidance regarding USCIS's authority to collect and use social media information, specifically in relation to First Amendment protected activities. The emails are between USCIS OCC attorneys and include a summary of the legal issues and the legal research being conducted, and the proposed courses of action, which represents part of the deliberative and pre-decisional process. The information in the emails also contains the detailed legal opinions on issues related to First Amendment protected activities and how that analysis impacts the recommended courses of action. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(5). All other

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				information within this document was segregated and determined non-exempt and disclosed.
2356-2357	Email, RE: Social Media Pilot Update, dated April 25, 2016	(b)(5): pages 2356- 2357 (b)(7)(E): page 2357	Email	Exemptions (b)(5) was used to withhold deliberative process privileged information within emails between USCIS OCC attorneys and USCIS employees, which are related to the review of draft Social Media Pilot Plan. The information withheld under (b)(5) as deliberative process privileged information consists of a summary of the Social Media Working Group's feedback on the draft, and specific edits made to the draft, which consists of pre-decisional and deliberative information. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(5). The information withheld under (b)(7)(E) includes summaries of the proposed processes and courses of action being considered as part of the Social Media Pilot Plan, specific edits to language in the plan describing the restrictions on searches, what methods USCIS's immigration officers are authorized to use as part of social media vetting, and what limitations are placed on their collection methods. This information, if disclosed, would reveal the specific methods and procedures that immigration officers are able to use to conduct social media research for certain immigration applicants and petitioners that need additional

2250 2275				background checks or vetting, which is part of specific techniques and procedures involved in the enforcement of certain immigration and national security laws and directives. The release of this information would also reveal guidelines that could risk circumvention of the law, because it would put individuals on notice as to what information is considered as part of the screening and vetting process and what the limitations of access are. The release of this information could result in individuals hiding the use of certain information on social media platforms or engaging in behavior to avoid proper vetting, which would impact the effectiveness of screening and vetting procedures used for the enforcement of certain immigration and national security laws and directives, and could reasonably be expected to risk the circumvention of law and render the guidelines for additional screening measures relevant to national security, public safety, and fraud prevention useless. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(7)(E). All other information within this document was segregated and determined non-exempt and disclosed.
2359-2375	USCIS's Office of Policy & Strategy (OP&S), National	(b)(5): pages 2359-	Draft Pilot Plan	Exemptions (b)(5) was used to withhold deliberative process and attorney-client
	Security & Benefits Integrity	2375		privileged information within a draft version

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Division (NSBI), Social Media Pilot Plan - Draft	(b)(7)(E): page 2374	of the USCIS's Office of Policy & Strategy (OP&S), National Security & Benefits Integrity Division (NSBI), Social Media Pilot Plan. The document provides the goals and scope of the pilot, and the options for testing
		the operational requirements, process, and functionality for using social media to support the agency's mission. The information withheld under (b)(5) as
		deliberative process privileged information consists of the draft text and proposed process for the pilot, which consists of predecisional and deliberative information.
		Additionally, (b)(5) was used to protect attorney-client information that included a summary of a legal opinion and analysis from USCIS OCC attorneys regarding First
		Amendment protected activities. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to
		Exemption (b)(5). Exemption (b)(7)(E) was used to redact details regarding the current social media
		pilot plans in progress, proposed processes and courses of action being considered regarding who might be the subject of a search, the pilot duration and timeline, the
		technology tools to be used, and limitations on social media use. This information, if disclosed, would reveal the methods and
		technology resources currently being used in the vetting process by law enforcement and

2376	Email RE: May 1th and 11th	(b)(5)	Fmail	immigration officers, which is part of specific techniques and procedures involved in the enforcement of certain immigration and national security laws and directives. It would also reveal guidelines that could risk circumvention of the law, including the specific tools used by law enforcement as part of the vetting and screening process. The release of this information would put individuals on notice as to what technology is being used, so that individuals could research the technology to identify vulnerabilities and limitations, which could impact the effectiveness of the screening and vetting process. Releasing this information could reasonably be expected to risk the circumvention of law and render the guidelines for additional screening measures relevant to national security, public safety, and fraud prevention useless. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(7)(E). All other information within this document was segregated and determined non-exempt and disclosed.
2376	Email, RE: May 4th and 11th, 2016 SMTF meetings, dated May 12, 2016	(b)(5)	Email	The information withheld under (b)(5) includes deliberative and attorney-client privileged information related to the review of the draft delegation. The emails are between USCIS OCC attorneys and include a summary of a recent meeting between the Department of State, USCIS, and DHS

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2378-2381	State-DHS K-1 Review Action Plan	(b)(5): pages 2378-	Action Plan	focused on draft documents put together by the DHS Social Media Working Group. The withheld information includes specific legal issues and outstanding questions that OCC attorneys had following the meeting. This information represents part of the deliberative process, as well as pre-decisional information being considered in this process. The information in the emails also contains a summary of USCIS OCC attorneys' legal position and questions regarding courses of actions being considered. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(5). All other information within this document was segregated and determined non-exempt and disclosed. The information withheld under (b)(5) as deliberative process privileged information
		2381 (b)(7)(E): pages 2378, 2380		consists of an Action Plan related to a review of the K-1 visa process. The draft contains pre-decisional and deliberative information, including proposed improvements and changes that DHS and the Department of State were considering, next steps and proposed courses of action, and summaries of challenges and concerns to take into account. All of this information is part of the deliberative process. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(5).

2384-2386	Email, RE: Documents to	(b)(5): pages 2384	Email	The information withheld under (b)(7)(E) includes the specific background check steps that DHS and Department of State planned to take for review actions on K-1 visa petitions, included each background check and the stage it would occur for each petitioner, and coordination information pertaining to other law enforcement agencies. This information, if disclosed, would reveal the specific procedures and methods taken place as part of the vetting process for certain immigration applicants and petitioners that need additional background checks or vetting, which is part of specific techniques and procedures involved in the enforcement of certain immigration and national security laws and directives. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(7)(E). All other information within this document was segregated and determined non-exempt and disclosed. All other information within this document was segregated and determined non-exempt and disclosed.
2384-2386	Email, RE: Documents to review in advance of the next SMWG meeting (Monday - 5/23/16), dated May 23, 2016	(b)(5): pages 2384- 2386 (b)(7)(E): pages 2384-2385	Email	The information withheld under (b)(5) includes deliberative and attorney-client privileged information within emails between USCIS OCC attorneys and USCIS employees related to a request for legal guidance from the Social Media Working Group and the draft Social Media Pilot Plan. The withheld

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information consists of a summary outstanding legal and privacy conc specifically related to the coordinate review of potentially derogatory so information, and the courses of action considered. The information in the also contains the detailed legal issue outstanding, and a summary of the	erns tion and ocial media ion being e emails
specifically related to the coordinate review of potentially derogatory so information, and the courses of actions considered. The information in the also contains the detailed legal issues.	tion and ocial media ion being e emails
review of potentially derogatory so information, and the courses of action considered. The information in the also contains the detailed legal issues.	ocial media ion being e emails
information, and the courses of action considered. The information in the also contains the detailed legal issues	ion being e emails
considered. The information in the also contains the detailed legal issu	emails
considered. The information in the also contains the detailed legal issu	emails
	es that are
outstanding, and a summary of the	
	legal
opinions and questions. According	_
material is appropriately exempt from	
disclosure pursuant to Exemption (
)(-)
The information withheld under (b)	(7)(E)
includes a list of document titles th	
the social media pilot plan, and dis-	cussions
between USCIS employees as part	
review/revision process in finalizin	
documents. The redacted informat	
contains specific details on the foci	us of the
pilot and vetting initiatives, and res	
on how the information could be us	
information, if disclosed, would rev	veal the
types of factors considered when d	etermining
whether an application needs additional whether are application needs and application needs additional whether a need to be application	
background checks or vetting, which	
of specific techniques and procedu	res
involved in the enforcement of cert	
immigration and national security l	aws and
directives. The release of this info	
would put individuals on notice as	to what
information is considered as part of	
screening and vetting process and o	
result in them not disclosing that in	

				to law enforcement or immigration officers. The disclosure of this information would reveal guidelines and procedures for the enforcement of certain immigration and national security laws and directives, and could reasonably be expected to risk the circumvention of law and render the guidelines for additional screening measures relevant to national security, public safety, and fraud prevention useless. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(7)(E). All other information within this document was segregated and determined non-exempt and disclosed.
2387-2389	Draft, "Coordination, Review, and Authorization Prior to Using Derogatory Social Media Information in Adjudicating Immigration Benefits"	(b)(5) (b)(7)(E)	Draft Guidance and Process	Exemptions (b)(5) was used to withhold deliberative process and attorney-client privileged information within a draft version of a process document, "Coordination, Review, and Authorization Prior to Using Derogatory Social Media Information in Adjudicating Immigration Benefits." The information withheld under (b)(5) as deliberative process privileged information consists of the draft text, comments, edits, revisions, and proposed process options, which consists of pre-decisional and deliberative information. Additionally, (b)(5) was used to protect attorney-client information that includes comments containing legal opinions and analysis from USCIS OCC attorneys. Accordingly, this

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material is appropriately exempt from
disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(5).
disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(3).
The information withheld we der (b)(7)(E)
The information withheld under (b)(7)(E)
includes draft language in the document and
comments written by USCIS employees that
contain summaries of the proposed processes
and courses of action being considered for
coordination of derogatory social medial
information, how information could be use
and the restrictions on use, as well as details
about the CARRP process and how to handle
social media results involve potential fraud or
national security concerns. This
information, if disclosed, would reveal the
specific methods and procedures that
immigration officers are able to use to
conduct social media research for certain
immigration applicants and petitioners that
need additional background checks or
vetting, which is part of specific techniques
and procedures involved in the enforcement
of certain immigration and national security
laws and directives. The release of this
information would also reveal guidelines that
could risk circumvention of the law, because
it would put individuals on notice as to what
information is considered as part of the
screening, which would tip off the
individuals that the immigration officer was
investigating possible national security or
public safety concerns, and could reasonably
be expected to risk the circumvention of law
to expected to risk the circumvention of law

				and render the guidelines for additional screening measures relevant to national security, public safety, and fraud prevention useless. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(7)(E). All other information within this document was segregated and determined non-exempt and disclosed.
2390-2393	Email, FW: (DIRECTOR'S OFFICE PASSBACK]: Review of Social Media Pilot Analysis for Front Office, dated June 2, 2016	(b)(7)(E)	Email	The information withheld under (b)(5) includes deliberative and attorney-client privileged information within emails between USCIS OCC attorneys and USCIS employees related to a request for review of a draft version of a document related to the Social Media Pilot analysis. The withheld information consists of a summary of outstanding legal and privacy concerns specifically related to the coordination and review of potentially derogatory social media information, and the courses of action being considered. The information in the emails also contains the detailed legal issues that are outstanding, and a summary of the legal opinions and questions. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(5). The information withheld under (b)(7)(E) includes the name of a specific technology tool and a list of document titles that relate to the social media vetting process and DHS's

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		plans for expansion. This information
		plans for expansion. This information was
		compiled by USCIS employees as part of the
		review/revision process in finalizing the
		documents, and the titles contain law
		enforcement information and objectives. The
		titles also contain specific details on the focus
		of the vetting initiatives, including the
		technology tools being used to support social
		media searches. This information, if
		disclosed, would reveal the methods and
		technology resources currently being used in
		the vetting process by law enforcement and
		immigration officers, which is part of specific
		techniques and procedures involved in the
		enforcement of certain immigration and
		national security laws and directives. It
		would also reveal guidelines that could risk
		circumvention of the law, including the
		specific tools used by law enforcement as
		part of the vetting and screening process.
		The release of this information would put
		individuals on notice as to what technology is
		being used, so that individuals could research
		the technology to identify vulnerabilities and
		limitations, which could impact the
		effectiveness of the screening and vetting
		process. Releasing this information could
		reasonably be expected to risk the
		circumvention of law and render the
		guidelines for additional screening measures
		relevant to national security, public safety,
		and fraud prevention useless. Accordingly,
		man providence asserted in the ordingry,

				this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(7)(E). All other information within this document was segregated and determined non-exempt and disclosed.
2396-2407	USCIS's FDNS, "Review of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency 2.0 Social Media Pilot," draft dated June 24, 2016	(b)(5): pages 2397- 2407 (b)(7)(E): pages 2396-2407	Draft Pilot Project Summary	Exemptions (b)(5) was used to withhold deliberative process and attorney-client privileged information within a draft version of document drafted by USCIS's FDNS, "Review of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) 2.0 Social Media Pilot," draft dated June 24, 2016. The document summarizes the status of the pilot, and the results obtained, and proposed recommendations and options for moving forwards with the next steps in developing the process. The information withheld under (b)(5) as deliberative process privileged information consists of the draft text, comments, edits, revisions, and proposed process options, which consists of predecisional and deliberative information. Additionally, (b)(5) was used to protect attorney-client information that includes comments containing legal opinions and analysis from USCIS OCC attorneys. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(5). The information withheld under (b)(7)(E) includes a description of the specific

	technology that USCIS and DHS would be using to conduct social media research as part of the vetting process, the specific cases and applicants that would be screened, and the challenges and limitations in the process. This information, if disclosed, would reveal the technology resources currently being used in the vetting process by law enforcement and immigration officers, which is part of specific techniques and procedures involved in the enforcement of certain immigration and national security laws and directives. It would also reveal guidelines that could risk circumvention of the law, including the specific tools used by law enforcement as part of the vetting and screening process. The release of this information would put individuals on notice as to what technology is being used, so that individuals could research the technology to identify vulnerabilities and limitations, which could impact the effectiveness of the screening and vetting process. Releasing this information could reasonably be expected to risk the
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				All other information within this document was segregated and determined non-exempt and disclosed.
2412-2413	Email, RE: DHS Social Media governance issue, dated June 28, 2016	(b)(5)	Email	The information withheld under (b)(5) includes deliberative and attorney-client privileged information within emails between USCIS OCC attorneys and DHS employees related to a request for legal opinions on concerns raised by DHS's Office for CRCL, which relate to the draft Social Media Government Charter. The withheld information consists of a summary of outstanding legal and privacy concerns, and the courses of action being considered. The information in the emails also contains the detailed legal issues that are outstanding, and a summary of the legal opinions and questions. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(5). All other information within this document was segregated and determined non-exempt and disclosed.
2414-2420	Charter for the Department of Homeland Security, Social Media Governance Structure – Draft	(b)(5)	Draft Charter Document	Exemptions (b)(5) was used to withhold deliberative process and attorney-client privileged information within a draft version of the Charter for the Department of Homeland Security, Social Media Governance Structure. The document defines the mission, goals, authorities, and procedures for the DHS Social Media Governance Structure. The information withheld under (b)(5) as deliberative process

				privileged information consists of the draft text, revisions, deletions, and comments on the draft, all of which contain pre-decisional and deliberative information. Additionally, (b)(5) was used to protect summaries of legal opinions written by DHS OGC and USCIS OCC attorneys and legal questions asked by DHS CRCL. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(5). All other information within this document was segregated and determined non-exempt and disclosed.
2421-2426	Email, RE: Access, dated July 19, 2016	(b)(5): pages 2421-2424 (b)(7)(E): pages 2421-2426	Email	The information withheld under (b)(5) includes deliberative and attorney-client privileged information within emails between USCIS OCC attorneys and USCIS employees related to the process for submitting access requests by DHS employees who require access to certain website content. The information withheld under (b)(5) as deliberative process privileged information consists of comments, suggestions, clarifications, questions about accuracy, statements of uncertainty, and requests for additional information. All of this predecisional information is part of the deliberative process. The information withheld under (b)(5) as attorney-client privileged information consists of comments and legal opinions written by USCIS OCC attorneys that had

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been asked to provide legal opinions.
Accordingly, this material is appropriately
exempt from disclosure pursuant to
Exemption (b)(5).
The information withheld under (b)(7)(E) includes specifics as to how DHS employees must to request access to the browser used to conduct social media searches, and which components are authorized and for what purposes. This information, if disclosed, would reveal the technology resources currently being used in the vetting process by
law enforcement and immigration officers to
conduct social media screening, which is part
of specific techniques and procedures
involved in the enforcement of certain
immigration and national security laws and
directives. The release of this information
would also reveal guidelines that could risk
circumvention of the law, because it would
put individuals on notice as to what
technology is being used, so that individuals
could research the technology to identify
vulnerabilities and limitations, which could
impact the effectiveness of the screening and
vetting process, and could reasonably be
expected to risk the circumvention of law and
render the guidelines for additional screening
measures relevant to national security, public
safety, and fraud prevention useless.
Accordingly, this material is appropriately

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				exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(7)(E). All other information within this document was segregated and determined non-exempt and disclosed.
2428-2431	Social Media WG Meeting Minutes, Information, Proposals, & Requests, dated November 9, 2015	(b)(5) (b)(7)(E)	Meeting Minutes	The information withheld under (b)(5) includes deliberative and attorney-client privileged information contained within a copy of Social Media WG Meeting Minutes, Information, Proposals, & Requests, dated November 9, 2015. The document summarizes a recent meeting between the DHS Social Media Working Group, and the issues discussed and left outstanding. The information withheld under (b)(5) as deliberative process privileged information consists of summaries of recommendations, proposed actions, clarifications, questions about accuracy, statements of uncertainty, and requests for additional information. All of this pre-decisional information is part of the deliberative process. The information withheld as attorney-client privilege includes summaries of specific legal opinions and outstanding legal questions, as well as a list of some of the potential courses of actions. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(5).

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		The information withheld under (b)(7)(E)
		includes summaries of the proposed
		processes and courses of action being
		considered for USCIS's use of social media
		as part of its operations, including the status
		of the current use, the impact on law
		enforcement operations and other national
		security issues, and outstanding decisions that
		need to be made. This information, if
		disclosed, would reveal the specific methods
		and procedures that immigration officers are
		able to use to conduct social media research
		for certain immigration applicants and
		petitioners that need additional background
		checks or vetting, which is part of specific
		techniques and procedures involved in the
		enforcement of certain immigration and
		national security laws and directives. The
		release of this information would also reveal
		guidelines that could risk circumvention of
		the law, because it would put individuals on
		notice as to what information is considered as
		part of the screening and vetting process, how
		that information is obtained, and what the
		limitations of access are. The release of this
		information could result in individuals hiding
		the use of certain information on social media
		platforms or engaging in behavior to avoid
		proper vetting, which would impact the
		effectiveness of screening and vetting
		procedures used for the enforcement of
		certain immigration and national security
		laws and directives, and could reasonably be
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				expected to risk the circumvention of law and render the guidelines for additional screening measures relevant to national security, public safety, and fraud prevention useless. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(7)(E). All other information within this document was segregated and determined non-exempt and disclosed.
2433-2435	Email, RE: Social Media Pilot Plan & Privacy Act / First Amendment Issues (DRAFT), dated July 20, 2016	(b)(5): pages 2433- 2435 (b)(7)(E): pages 2434-2435	Email	The information withheld under (b)(5) includes deliberative and attorney-client privileged information related to a request for legal guidance regarding USCIS's authority to collect and use social media information, specifically in relation to Privacy Act issues and First Amendment protected activities. The emails are between USCIS OCC attorneys and include a summary of the legal issues and draft responses, which represents part of the deliberative and pre-decisional process. The information in the emails also contains the detailed legal opinions on two specific issues. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(5). The information withheld under (b)(7)(E) includes discussions between USCIS OCC attorneys as part of the review/revision process in finalizing the social media pilot plan. The redacted information contains

				specific details on the focus of the pilot and vetting initiatives, and restrictions on how the information could be used. This information, if disclosed, would reveal the types of factors considered when determining whether an application needs additional background checks or vetting, which is part of specific techniques and procedures involved in the enforcement of certain immigration and national security laws and directives. The release of this information would put individuals on notice as to what information is considered as part of the screening and vetting process and could result in them not disclosing that information to law enforcement or immigration officers. The disclosure of this information would reveal guidelines and procedures for the enforcement of certain immigration and national security laws and directives, and could reasonably be expected to risk the circumvention of law and render the guidelines for additional screening measures relevant to national security, public safety, and fraud prevention useless. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(7)(E). All other information within this document was segregated and determined non-exempt and disclosed.
2442-2445	Email, RE: Follow up on Social Media Pilot Plans DRAFT	(b)(5)	Email	The information withheld under (b)(5) includes deliberative and attorney-client

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		o)(7)(E)	privileged information related to a request for
August	15, 2016		legal guidance regarding USCIS's legal
			review of draft social media pilot plans. The
			emails are between USCIS OCC attorneys
			and include a summary of the legal issues and
			a draft email for DHS OGC which contains
			USCIS OCC's legal questions and analysis,
			which represents part of the deliberative and
			pre-decisional process. The information in
			the emails also contains the detailed legal
			opinions on a variety of specific issues
			pertaining to the draft social media pilot
			plans. Accordingly, this material is
			appropriately exempt from disclosure
			pursuant to Exemption (b)(5).
			The information withheld under (b)(7)(E)
			includes discussions between USCIS OCC
			and DHS OGC attorneys as part of the
			review/revision process in finalizing the
			social media pilot plan. The redacted
			information contains specific details on the
			focus of the pilot and vetting initiatives, and restrictions on how the information could be
			used. This information, if disclosed, would
			reveal the types of factors considered when
			determining whether an application needs
			additional background checks or vetting,
			which is part of specific techniques and
			procedures involved in the enforcement of
			certain immigration and national security
			laws and directives. The release of this
			iaws and uneclives. The release of this

				information would put individuals on notice as to what information is considered as part of the screening and vetting process and could result in them not disclosing that information to law enforcement or immigration officers. The disclosure of this information would reveal guidelines and procedures for the enforcement of certain immigration and national security laws and directives, and could reasonably be expected to risk the circumvention of law and render the guidelines for additional screening measures relevant to national security, public safety, and fraud prevention useless. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(7)(E). All other information within this document was segregated and determined non-exempt
				and disclosed.
2447-2452	Email, RE: Waiver language, dated August 26, 2016	(b)(5)	Email	The information withheld under (b)(5) includes deliberative and attorney-client privileged information related to a request for legal guidance regarding USCIS's legal review of draft social media pilot plans. The emails are between USCIS OCC attorneys and include a summary of the legal issues, legal questions and analysis, and other opinions regarding the legal question that was asked of USCIS OCC. This information represents part of the deliberative and predecisional process. The information in the

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				emails also contains the detailed legal opinions on whether or not waivers are legally required, and the courses of action being considered. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(5). All other information within this document was segregated and determined non-exempt and disclosed.
2453-2460	Draft memorandum from DHS's Office of General Counsel, regarding the use of social media	(b)(5): pages 2453-2460 (b)(7)(E): pages 2453-2455, 2459-2460	Draft Legal Memorandum	The information withheld under (b)(5) as deliberative and attorney-client privileged information consists of legal opinions contained in this draft legal memorandum from DHS's Office of General Counsel, regarding the use of social media. The memorandum explores the protections of the Privacy Act and how it impacts the collection of social content in relation to the adjudication of immigration benefits. It is written by multiple DHS OGC attorneys, who have not finalized the draft yet, and includes comments, edits, revisions, additions, and questions. It also contains a variety of legal opinions and deliberative material on the legal questions being raised. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(5). The information withheld under (b)(7)(E) includes summaries of the proposed processes and courses of action being considered for USCIS employees while

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engaging in the operational use of social
media, analysis outlining the legal
considerations with the various methods
proposed, whether there were any legal
restrictions to the use of information to grant
or deny a benefit request, and the specific law
enforcement activities that would be
permitted using the information collected.
This information, if disclosed, would reveal
the specific methods and procedures that
immigration officers are able to use to
conduct social media research for certain
immigration applicants and petitioners that
need additional background checks or
vetting, which is part of specific techniques
and procedures involved in the enforcement
of certain immigration and national security
laws and directives. The release of this
information would also reveal guidelines that
could risk circumvention of the law, because
it would put individuals on notice as to what
information is considered as part of the
screening and vetting process, the specific
information that is searched on specific social
media applications, and the type of actions or
methods an immigration officer may engage
in during information collection, which
would tip off the individuals that the
immigration officer was investigating
possible national security or public safety
concerns. The release of this information
could result in individuals being able to
ascertain when an immigration officer has
ascertain when an initingration officer has

				searched social media or what information may be subject or not subject to a search, resulting in actions to avoid proper vetting, which would impact the effectiveness of screening and vetting procedures used for the enforcement of certain immigration and national security laws and directives, and could reasonably be expected to risk the circumvention of law and render the guidelines for additional screening measures relevant to national security, public safety, and fraud prevention useless. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(7)(E). All other information within this document was segregated and determined non-exempt and disclosed.
2461-2466	Draft memorandum from USCIS's Office of Chief Counsel, regarding the use of social media	(b)(5) (b)(7)(E)	Draft Legal Memorandum	The information withheld under (b)(5) as deliberative and attorney-client privileged information consists of legal opinions contained in this draft legal memorandum from USCIS's OCC, regarding the use of social media. The memorandum explores whether USCIS can use social media to support its mission and to what extent and how it can be used within its legal authority. It is written by multiple USCIS OCC attorneys, who have not finalized the draft yet, and includes comments, edits, revisions, additions, and questions. It also contains a variety of legal opinions and deliberative material on the legal questions being raised.

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Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(5).
Exemption (b)(7)(E) was used to redact portions of a draft version of a memorandum on FDNS's use of social media as part of immigration adjudication. The information withheld under (b)(7)(E) includes draft language in the document and comments written by USCIS employees and OCC attorneys that contain summaries of the proposed processes and courses of action being considered for FDNS employees who would be authorized to access the internet and social media content to support USCIS's mission. The redacted language also contains specifics as to what actions should be taken for certain cases where there is suspected
fraud or concerns regarding public safety or national security, the specific methods USCIS's immigration officers are authorized
USCIS's immigration officers are authorized to use as part of social media vetting, and what limitations are placed on their collection methods. This information, if disclosed, would reveal the specific methods and
procedures that immigration officers are able to use to conduct social media research for certain immigration applicants and petitioners that need additional background checks or
vetting, which is part of specific techniques

				and procedures involved in the enforcement of certain immigration and national security laws and directives. The release of this information would also reveal guidelines that could risk circumvention of the law, because it would put individuals on notice as to what information is considered as part of the screening and vetting process and what the limitations of access are. The release of this information could result in individuals hiding the use of certain information on social media platforms or engaging in behavior to avoid proper vetting, which would impact the effectiveness of screening and vetting procedures used for the enforcement of certain immigration and national security laws and directives, and could reasonably be expected to risk the circumvention of law and render the guidelines for additional screening measures relevant to national security, public safety, and fraud prevention useless. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(7)(E). All other information within this document was segregated and determined non-exempt
2470-2480	Memorandum from DHS's Office of General Counsel, "DHS's Use of the Internet and Social Media Tools in	(b)(5): pages 2470- 2480	Legal Memorandum	was segregated and determined non-exempt and disclosed. The information withheld under (b)(5) as attorney-client privileged information consists of legal opinions contained in this legal memorandum. The memorandum

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Conducting Enforcement and Intelligence Operations," dated January 27, 2010 (b)(7)(E): pages 2471-2480 (b)(7)(E): pages 3 471-2480 (c) Conducting Enforcement and Social Media Tools in Conducting Enforcement and Intellige Operations. It is written by DHS OGC contains their legal analysis and opinion Accordingly, this material is appropria	nce
January 27, 2010 Conducting Enforcement and Intellige Operations. It is written by DHS OGO contains their legal analysis and opinion	nce
Operations. It is written by DHS OGO contains their legal analysis and opinion	
contains their legal analysis and opinion	` and
exempt from disclosure pursuant to	icry
Exemption (b)(5).	
Exemption $(0)(3)$.	
The information withheld under (b)(7)	(F)
includes legal analysis regarding enfor	` /
and intelligence activities involving or	
and social media monitoring, and DHS	
compliance with applicable privacy la	
civil rights and civil liberties and	<i>N</i> 5,
	o.f
constitutional rights, proposed courses	
action as part of enforcement activities	
procedures, and analysis outlining the	
considerations with the various method	
proposed. Detailed information is red	
that includes the use of social media for	
enforcement activities within ICE, CB	
NPPD, Federal Protective Services, U	
TSA, Federal Air Marshalls, and the S	
Service, what methods are used, and the	
results of specific enforcement operation	ons
that use social media screening. This	
information, if disclosed, would reveal	the
specific methods and procedures that 1	aw
enforcement and immigration officers	are
able to use to conduct social media res	earch
for operational and investigative purpo	ses,
which is part of specific techniques an	

				procedures involved in the enforcement of certain immigration and national security laws and directives. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(7)(E). All other information within this document was segregated and determined non-exempt and disclosed.
2481-2495	Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Principles for DHS Intelligence Products Version 1.0 (September 19, 2014)	(b)(5): pages 2481- 2495 (b)(7)(E): pages 2481-2494	Legal Memorandum	The information withheld under (b)(5) as attorney-client privileged information consists of legal opinions contained in this legal memorandum. The memorandum was written by DHS's Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties (CRCL), and contains the CRCL Principles for DHS Intelligence Products, and related legal analysis and opinion. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(5). The information withheld under (b)(7)(E) includes the CRCL Principles for DHS Intelligence Products which outline specific law enforcement methods and how CRCL principles apply to those methods, legal analysis regarding enforcement and intelligence activities involving online and social media monitoring, and DHS's compliance with civil rights and civil liberties and constitutional rights, proposed courses of action as part of enforcement activities and procedures, and analysis outlining the legal considerations with the various methods

				proposed. This information, if disclosed, would reveal the specific methods and procedures that law enforcement and immigration officers are able to use to conduct social media research for operational and investigative purposes, which is part of specific techniques and procedures involved in the enforcement of certain immigration and national security laws and directives. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(7)(E). All other information within this document was segregated and determined non-exempt and disclosed.
2496	Email, Delegation regarding Social Media, dated February 13, 2017	(b)(7)(E)	Email	Exemption (b)(7)(E) was used to withhold a portion of an email related to a request for legal guidance regarding the implementation of DHS Delegation Number 15002, which granted USCIS's Director the authority to conduct certain law enforcement activities. The information withheld under (b)(7)(E) includes specifics as to what implementation documents have been reviewed by OCC attorneys, their legal options on the documents and the proposed methods for collection of social media information, and the limitations that will be placed on the collection methods. This information, if disclosed, would reveal the specific methods and procedures that immigration officers are able to use to conduct social media research

2400 2400		(1)(5)		for certain immigration applicants and petitioners that need additional background checks or vetting, which is part of specific techniques and procedures involved in the enforcement of certain immigration and national security laws and directives. The release of this information would also reveal guidelines that could risk circumvention of the law, because it would put individuals on notice as to what information is considered as part of the screening and vetting process and what the limitations of access are. The release of this information could result in individuals hiding the use of certain information on social media platforms or engaging in behavior to avoid proper vetting, which would impact the effectiveness of screening and vetting procedures used for the enforcement of certain immigration and national security laws and directives, and could reasonably be expected to risk the circumvention of law and render the guidelines for additional screening measures relevant to national security, public safety, and fraud prevention useless. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(7)(E).
2498-2499	Email, RE: Social Media Delegation Templates, dated March 10, 2017	(b)(5): page 2499 (b)(7)(E): pages 2498-2499	Email	The information withheld under (b)(5) includes deliberative and attorney-client privileged information related to a request for legal guidance regarding USCIS's legal review of draft social media delegation templates. The emails are between USCIS

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OCC attorneys and include a summary of the
legal issues, legal questions and analysis, and
other opinions regarding the legal question
that was asked of USCIS OCC. This
information represents part of the deliberative
and pre-decisional process. The information
in the emails also contains the detailed legal
opinions on the courses of action being
considered. Accordingly, this material is
appropriately exempt from disclosure
pursuant to Exemption (b)(5).
The information withheld under (b)(7)(E)
includes comments from OCC attorneys that
have reviewed the draft delegation
documents, their legal options on the
documents and the proposed methods for
collection of social media information, and
the limitations that will be placed on the
collection methods. This information, if
disclosed, would reveal the specific methods
and procedures that immigration officers are
able to use to conduct social media research
for certain immigration applicants and
petitioners that need additional background
checks or vetting, which is part of specific
techniques and procedures involved in the
enforcement of certain immigration and
national security laws and directives. The
release of this information would also reveal
guidelines that could risk circumvention of
the law, because it would put individuals on
notice as to what information is considered as

				part of the screening and vetting process and what the limitations of access are. The release of this information could result in individuals hiding the use of certain information on social media platforms or engaging in behavior to avoid proper vetting, which would impact the effectiveness of screening and vetting procedures used for the enforcement of certain immigration and national security laws and directives, and could reasonably be expected to risk the circumvention of law and render the guidelines for additional screening measures relevant to national security, public safety, and fraud prevention useless. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(7)(E). All other information within this document was segregated and determined non-exempt and disclosed.
2502-2503	Email, FW: Social Media Delegation Templates, dated March 16, 2017	(b)(5) (b)(7)(E)	Email	The information withheld under (b)(5) includes deliberative and attorney-client privileged information related to the review of the draft Social Media Delegation. The emails are between USCIS OCC attorneys and include two versions of a portion of the Delegation, highlighting the differences between the two versions, and clarifying the options involved, which represents part of the deliberative process, as well as pre-decisional information being considered in this process. The information in the emails also contains

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	information related to a request for legal
	opinions and includes potential courses of
	actions being considered. Accordingly, this
	material is appropriately exempt from
	disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(5).
	disclosure pursuant to Exemption (0)(3).
	The information withheld under $(b)(7)(E)$
	includes comments from OCC attorneys that
	have reviewed the draft delegation
	documents, their legal options on the
	documents and the proposed methods for collection of social media information, and
	the limitations that will be placed on the
	collection methods. This information, if
	disclosed, would reveal the specific methods
	and procedures that immigration officers are
	able to use to conduct social media research
	for certain immigration applicants and
	petitioners that need additional background
	checks or vetting, which is part of specific
	techniques and procedures involved in the
	enforcement of certain immigration and
	national security laws and directives. The
	release of this information would also reveal
	guidelines that could risk circumvention of
	the law, because it would put individuals on
	notice as to what information is considered as
	part of the screening and vetting process and
	what the limitations of access are. The
	release of this information could result in
	individuals hiding the use of certain
	information on social media platforms or
	engaging in behavior to avoid proper vetting,
	tinguisms in contained to avoid proper vetting,

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				which would impact the effectiveness of screening and vetting procedures used for the enforcement of certain immigration and national security laws and directives, and could reasonably be expected to risk the circumvention of law and render the guidelines for additional screening measures relevant to national security, public safety, and fraud prevention useless. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(7)(E). All other information within this document was segregated and determined non-exempt and disclosed.
2504	Email, RE: Query re: signed Delegation 15002 (WF1137322), dated January 24, 2017	(b)(5)	Email	The information withheld under (b)(5) includes deliberative process privileged information related to the review of the draft Social Media Delegation. The emails are between USCIS and DHS employees, and include a question about a specific edit that USCIS made, and whether DHS had included that edit in the current draft Delegation. This information represents part of the deliberative process, as well as pre-decisional information being considered in this process. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(5). All other information within this document was segregated and determined non-exempt and disclosed.

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2511-2513	Draft Memorandum from DHS Acting Under Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis to the Inspector General, "DHS's 90 Day Letter to Office of Inspector General (OIG) 17-40 Final Report: DHS' Pilots for Social Media Screening Need Increased Rigor to Ensure Scalability and Long-term Success (OIG Project No. 16-	(b)(5): pages 2511- 2512 (b)(7)(E): pages 2511-2513	Draft Memorandum	The information withheld under (b)(5) as deliberative process privileged information consists of multiple draft comments, revisions, additions, re-wordings, suggestions, clarifications, questions about accuracy, statements of uncertainty, and requests for additional information. All of this information is part of the deliberative process related to the drafting of a Memorandum from DHS to the Inspector General regarding DHS' pilots for social
	079-ISP-USCIS)," – Draft			media screening. The draft memorandum contains draft recommendations and responses, which are pre-decisional and include information that is not reflected in the final version of the document. The information withheld under (b)(5) as attorney-client privileged information consists of comments and legal opinions added to this draft document by USCIS OCC attorneys that had been asked to provide legal
				review. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(5). The information withheld under (b)(7)(E) includes draft language in the document and comments written by USCIS employees and OCC attorneys that contain summaries of the proposed processes and courses of action being considered for DHS's pilots for social media screening. The redacted language also

2514-2564	Homeland Security Systems Engineering and Development Institute (HSSEDI), "Open Source and Social Media Technology/Tools Operational Effectiveness Evaluation Methodology," dated April 10, 2011	(b)(5): pages 2514-2523, 2525, 2527-2539, 2541-2545, 2547-2564 (b)(7)(E): pages 2514-2564	Evaluation Methodology	contains specifics as to what actions should be taken by different DHS components, including USCIS, CBP, and ICE, and details as to how each component was involved in the social media pilots. This information, if disclosed, would reveal the specific methods and procedures that law enforcement and immigration officers are able to use to conduct social media research, which is part of specific techniques and procedures involved in the enforcement of certain immigration and national security laws and directives. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(7)(E). All other information within this document was segregated and determined non-exempt and disclosed. Exemptions (b)(5) and (b)(7)(E) were used to withhold a copy of Homeland Security Systems Engineering and Development Institute (HSSEDI), "Open Source and Social Media Technology/Tools Operational Effectiveness Evaluation Methodology," dated April 10, 2011. HSSEDI is a federally funded research and development center (FFRDC) established by the Secretary of Homeland Security under Section 305 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002. HSSEDI's mission is to assist the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Under Secretary for Science and Technology, and
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	the DHS operating elements in addressing
	national homeland security system
	development issues where technical and
	systems engineering expertise is required.
	This evaluation methodology report includes
	the results of an Open Source and Social
	Media (OSSM) Technology Operational
	Effectiveness Evaluation Methodology. The
	focus is on the critical success factors, issues,
	and metrics for assessing these OSSM
	technologies and tools during the OSSM
	operational pilots.
	The information withheld under Exemption
	(b)(5) consists of deliberative process
	privileged information, including specific
	courses of action that DHS was considering
	as part of the use of social media collection,
	including the options for certain tools,
	keyword data, search techniques, and other
	key elements pertaining to the technological
	development of the collection process. The
	evaluation provides analysis on the options
	for the process, recommendations,
	challenges, issues to consider, and other key
	information that DHS would take into
	consideration prior to finalizing the
	technological part of the process. This
	information is pre-decisional, and the release
	of the information would reveal factors
	considered as part of USCIS's technological
	decision making process. These factors and
	potential options considered are deliberative
	potential options considered are defiberative

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in nature, and the release of this information would chill and inhibit the ability of DHS employees to appropriately address concerns and various options when considering and developing new technological processes to support DHS's mission. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(5).
The information withheld under Exemption (b)(7)(E) includes a description of the specific technology that USCIS and DHS would be using to conduct social media research as part of the vetting process, the specific cases and applicants that would be screened, the specific social media applications reviewed, which employees and offices were involved in the process, how that information is used, how it will be analyzed, real data scripts and data files, and detailed process information regarding how information will be stored and shared. This information, if disclosed, would reveal the technology resources currently being used in the vetting process by law enforcement and immigration officers, and the specific websites, applications, and social media platforms that are being reviewed by
immigration officers for certain immigration applicants and petitioners that need additional background checks or vetting, which is part of specific techniques and procedures involved in the enforcement of certain

2567-2592 Homeland Security Operational (b)(5): pages	
Analysis Center, In-Progress Briefing, "Integrating Open-	withhold portions of a PowerPoint

source Data and Social Media into Information Systems," dated May 18, 2017	(b)(7)(E): pages 2567-2569, 2577, 2582	Security Operational Analysis Center (HSAC). The PowerPoint contains an inprogress briefing, "Integrating Open-source Data and Social Media into Information Systems," dated May 18, 2017.
		The information withheld under (b)(5) as deliberative process privileged information consists of portions of pages 2567-2581, and 2583-2592, which contain summaries of outstanding topics, courses of action being considered, and recommendations for next steps. Draft documents are also included to highlight outstanding issues and decisions to be made. This information is pre-decisional and deliberative in nature, and the release of this information would chill and inhibit the ability of DHS employees to appropriately address concerns and various options when considering and developing new processes to support DHS's mission. Accordingly, this
		material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(5). Exemption (b)(7)(E) was used to redact information that consists of specific technology platforms being used by to conduct social media searches and analyze data, how it should be accessed and used, the benefits to the use of these platforms, how to evaluate information collected, what information should be deemed credible or significant, what information should be saved

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	and documented, what techniques should be used when accessing user accounts, which specific social media platforms are required to be searched, and specific activities that are prohibited. The information also includes details regarding how CBP, TSA, ICE, USCIS, and other project stakeholders use social media to support differing screening goals. This information, if disclosed, would reveal the technology resources currently being used in the vetting process by law enforcement and immigration officers, and the specific websites, applications, and social media platforms that are being reviewed by law enforcement for screening purposes, which is part of specific techniques and procedures involved in the enforcement of certain immigration and national security laws and directives. The release of this information would also reveal guidelines that could risk circumvention of the law, because it would put individuals on notice as to what information is considered as part of the screening and vetting process, what types of patterns, actions, and words are being searched for, and the specific tools used by law enforcement. The release of this information would put individuals on notice as to what individuals could research the technology to identify vulnerabilities and limitations, which could impact the effectiveness of the
	screening and vetting process. It could also

2594-2597 Email, RE: Follow-up to last week's meeting, dated June 2, 2596-2597 (b)(7)(E): page 2594-2597	result in individuals hiding the use of certain social media platforms or encouraging the use of platforms that the agency does not access to, which would impact the effectiveness of screening and vetting procedures used for the enforcement of certain immigration and national security laws and directives, and could reasonably be expected to risk the circumvention of law and render the guidelines for additional screening measures relevant to national security, public safety, and fraud prevention useless. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(7)(E). All other information within this document was segregated and determined non-exempt and disclosed. The information withheld under (b)(5) includes deliberative and attorney-client privileged information related to a follow-up meeting held by the Social Media Working Group. The emails are between USCIS OCC attorneys and USCIS employees, and include a summary of the meeting, a specific outstanding issue related to DHS's social media vetting process, decisions to be made, and factors to take into account when making a decision. This information represents part of the deliberative process, as well as predecisional information being considered in this process. The information in the emails
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	also contains information related to a request for legal opinions and includes potential courses of actions being considered. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(5).
	The information withheld under (b)(7)(E) includes a summary of the draft Privacy Impact Assessment, and specific language from the PIA that outlined methods that were approved for use by agency employees when conducting social media screening and vetting. This information, if disclosed, would reveal the specific websites, applications, and
	social media that is being reviewed by immigration officers for certain immigration applicants and petitioners that need additional background checks or vetting, which is part of specific techniques and procedures involved in the enforcement of certain immigration and national security laws and directives. The release of this information
	would also reveal guidelines that could risk circumvention of the law, because it would put individuals on notice as to what information is considered as part of the screening and vetting process and could result in individuals hiding the use of certain social media platforms or encouraging the
	use of platforms that the agency does not access to, which would impact the effectiveness of screening and vetting

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				procedures used for the enforcement of certain immigration and national security laws and directives, and could reasonably be expected to risk the circumvention of law and render the guidelines for additional screening measures relevant to national security, public safety, and fraud prevention useless. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(7)(E). All other information within this document was segregated and determined non-exempt and disclosed.
2600-2601	Email, RE: FDNS SMOUT and Rules of Behavior Updates for Clearance, dated June 12, 2017	(b)(5): page 2601 (b)(7)(E): pages 2600-2601	Email	The information withheld under (b)(5) includes deliberative and attorney-client privileged information related to the review of the draft FDNS SMOUT and Rules of Behavior documents. The emails are between USCIS OCC attorneys and USCIS employees and include clarifications, and requests for additional information, which represents part of the deliberative process, as well as pre-decisional information being considered in this process. The information in the emails also contains information related to a request for legal opinions and includes potential courses of actions being considered. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(5).

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includes specifics as to what methods USCIS's immigration officers are authorized to use as part of social media vetting, and what limitations are placed on their collection methods. This information, if disclosed, would reveal the specific methods and procedures that immigration officers are able to use to conduct social media research for certain immigration applicants and petitioners that need additional background checks or vetting, which is part of specific techniques and procedures involved in the enforcement of certain immigration and national security laws and directives. The release of this information would also reveal guidelines that could risk circumvention of the law, because it would put individuals on notice as to what information is considered as part of the screening and vetting process and what the limitations of access are. The release of this information could result in individuals hiding the use of certain information on social media platforms or engaging in behavior to avoid proper vetting, which would impact the effectiveness of screening and vetting procedures used for the enforcement of certain immigration and national security laws and directives, and could reasonably be expected to risk the circumvention of law and render the guidelines for additional sercening measures relevant to national security, public		The information withheld under (b)(7)(E)
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		safety, and fraud prevention useless.

				Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(7)(E). All other information within this document was segregated and determined non-exempt and disclosed.
2602	Email, RE: Draft Social Media Delegation, dated June 28, 2017	(b)(5)	Email	Exemption (b)(5) was used to withhold deliberative and attorney-client privileged information related to the review of the draft Social Media Delegation. The emails are between USCIS employees and PCC attorneys, and include a question about a specific edit that USCIS made, and whether DHS had included that edit in the current draft Delegation. This information represents part of the deliberative process, as well as pre-decisional information being considered in this process. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(5). All other information within this document was segregated and determined non-exempt and disclosed.
2605-2606	Delegation to the Director of U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services Regarding Social Media Vetting and Screening - Draft	(b)(5)	Draft Delegation	The information withheld under (b)(5) includes deliberative and attorney-client privileged information related to a draft copy of DHS Delegation Number 15002, "Delegation 15002, Revision 01, Delegation to the Director of U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services to Conduct Certain Law Enforcement Activities." The Delegation, once finalized, would reaffirm

2610-2611	Email, Meeting Follow-up,	(b)(5)	Email	the authority of the Director of USCIS to conduct specific law enforcement activities, which include the use of social media content as part of immigration adjudications. The draft contains comments, revisions, additions, re-wordings, clarifications, and legal opinion. This information is part of the deliberative process and contains pre-decisional information that is not reflected in the final version of the document. The draft also contains edits and comments made by OCC attorneys which contain their legal opinions. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(5). All other information within this document was segregated and determined non-exempt and disclosed. The information withheld under (b)(5)
	dated July 31, 2017	(b)(7)(E)		includes deliberative and attorney-client privileged information related to a follow-up meeting held by the Social Media Working Group and DHS's Chief Information Officer. The emails are between USCIS OCC attorneys and USCIS employees, and include a summary of the meeting, a specific outstanding issue related to DHS's social media vetting process, decisions to be made, and factors to take into account when making a decision. This information represents part of the deliberative process, as well as predecisional information being considered in this process. The information in the emails also contains information related to a request

				for legal opinions and includes potential courses of actions being considered. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(5). The information withheld under (b)(7)(E) includes a summary of a specific proposed course of action and methods that FDNS and USCIS were considering as part of the social media screening process, and details how that process and methods would be implemented. This information, if disclosed, would reveal the specific websites, applications, and social media that is being reviewed by immigration officers for certain immigration applicants and petitioners that need additional background checks or vetting, which is part of specific techniques and procedures
				involved in the enforcement of certain immigration and national security laws and directives. Accordingly, this material is
				appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(7)(E).
				All other information within this document was segregated and determined non-exempt and disclosed.
2612-2613	Email, RE: Heard at the CIO	(b)(5)	Email	The information withheld under (b)(5)
	staff meeting, dated July 31, 2017	(b)(7)(E)		includes deliberative and attorney-client privileged information related to a follow-up meeting held by the Social Media Working Group and DHS's Chief Information Officer.

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and petitioners that need additional

involved in the enforcement of certain immigration and national security laws and directives. Accordingly, this material is

background checks or vetting, which is part of specific techniques and procedures

		The emails are between USCIS OCC
		attorneys and USCIS employees, and include
		a summary of the meeting, a specific
		outstanding issue related to DHS's social
		media vetting process, decisions to be made,
		and factors to take into account when making
		a decision. This information represents part
		of the deliberative process, as well as pre-
		decisional information being considered in
		this process. The information in the emails
		also contains information related to a request
		for legal opinions and includes potential
		courses of actions being considered.
		Accordingly, this material is appropriately
		exempt from disclosure pursuant to
		Exemption (b)(5).
		The information withheld under (b)(7)(E)
		includes a summary of a specific proposed
		course of action and methods that FDNS and
		USCIS were considering as part of the social
		media screening process, and details how that
		process and methods would be implemented.
		This information, if disclosed, would reveal
		the specific websites, applications, and social
		media that is being reviewed by immigration
		officers for certain immigration applicants
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				appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(7)(E). All other information within this document was segregated and determined non-exempt and disclosed.
2615	Email, RE: FDNS Operational Use of Social Media Training, dated July 31, 2017	(b)(5)	Email	The information withheld under (b)(5) includes deliberative and attorney-client privileged information related to the legal review of a draft training document focused on FDNS's operational use of social media, dated July 31, 2017. The emails are between USCIS OCC attorneys and agency employees, and include a summary of the draft training, requests for legal review, statements of uncertainty, and requests for additional information, which represents part of the deliberative process, as well as predecisional information being considered in this process. The information in the emails also contains a request for legal opinions related to potential courses of actions being considered. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(5). All other information within this document was segregated and determined non-exempt and disclosed.
2616	Email, RE: FDNS Social Media Training, dated August 4, 2017	(b)(5) (b)(7)(E)	Email	The information withheld under (b)(5) includes deliberative and attorney-client privileged information related to the legal review of a draft training document focused on FDNS's operational use of social media,

dated July 31, 2017. The emails are between
USCIS OCC attorneys and agency
employees, and include a summary of the
draft training, requests for legal review,
statements of uncertainty, and requests for
additional information, which represents part
of the deliberative process, as well as pre-
decisional information being considered in
this process. The information in the emails
also contains a request for legal opinions
related to potential courses of actions being
considered. Accordingly, this material is
appropriately exempt from disclosure
pursuant to Exemption (b)(5).
Exemption (b)(7)(E) was used to redact
portions of an email sent by OCC attorneys
discussing FDNS specific portions of a
training of the use of social media, and
whether the training accurately reflected the
SMOUT and Rules of Behavior, including
the portions regarding the methods that were
permitted and prohibited by DHS. This
information, if disclosed, would reveal the
technology resources and methods currently
being used in the vetting process by law
enforcement and immigration officers, which
is part of specific techniques and procedures
involved in the enforcement of certain
immigration and national security laws and
directives. Accordingly, this material is
appropriately exempt from disclosure
pursuant to Exemption (b)(7)(E).

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				All other information within this document was segregated and determined non-exempt and disclosed.
2622	Email, Latest Draft of Social Media Delegation, dated July 28, 2017	(b)(5)	Email	The information withheld under (b)(5) includes deliberative and attorney-client privileged information related to the legal review of a draft Social Media delegation. The emails are between DHS OGC and USCIS OCC attorneys and include a summary of the draft document, requests for legal review, statements of uncertainty, and requests for additional information, which represents part of the deliberative process, as well as pre-decisional information being considered in this process. The information in the emails also contains a request for legal opinions related to potential courses of actions being considered. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(5). All other information within this document was segregated and determined non-exempt and disclosed.
2625-2634	Memorandum from USCIS's Office of Chief Counsel to USCIS Chief Counsel Craig Symons, "Delegation of Law Enforcement Authority to U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services," dated August 7, 2017	(b)(5): pages 2625- 2634 (b)(7)(E): pages 2627-2632	Legal Memorandum	The information withheld under (b)(5) as attorney-client privileged information consists of legal opinions contained in this legal memorandum. The memorandum details legal issues related to the Delegation of Law Enforcement Authority to U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services. It is directed to the USCIS Chief Counsel, and was written by multiple USCIS OCC

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attorneys, and contains their legal analysis
and opinion. Accordingly, this material is
appropriately exempt from disclosure
pursuant to Exemption (b)(5).
The information withheld under $(b)(7)(E)$
includes summaries of USCIS's current law
enforcement authority, what authority may be
delegated by DHS to USCIS, how that
impacts USCIS's vetting process, the
proposed processes and courses of action
being considered for USCIS employees while
engaging in the operational use of social
media, analysis outlining the legal
considerations with the various methods
proposed, and the specific methods that
counsel advised that the agency authorize and
prohibit. This information, if disclosed,
would reveal the specific methods and
procedures that immigration officers are able
to use to conduct social media research for
certain immigration applicants and petitioners
that need additional background checks or
vetting, which is part of specific techniques
and procedures involved in the enforcement
of certain immigration and national security
laws and directives. The release of this
information would also reveal guidelines that
could risk circumvention of the law, because
it would put individuals on notice as to what
information is considered as part of the
screening and vetting process, the specific
information that is searched on specific social
information that is scarcifed on specific social

				media applications, and the type of actions or methods an immigration officer may engage in during information collection, which would tip off the individuals that the immigration officer was investigating possible national security or public safety concerns. The release of this information could result in individuals being able to ascertain when an immigration officer has searched social media or what information may be subject or not subject to a search, resulting in actions to avoid proper vetting, which would impact the effectiveness of screening and vetting procedures used for the enforcement of certain immigration and national security laws and directives, and could reasonably be expected to risk the circumvention of law and render the guidelines for additional screening measures relevant to national security, public safety, and fraud prevention useless. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(7)(E). All other information within this document was segregated and determined non-exempt and disclosed.
2638-2639, 2641-2642	Email, RE: FDNS Social Media - Privacy/Training Requirements, dated September 5, 2017	(b)(5) (b)(7)(E)	Email	The information withheld under (b)(5) includes deliberative and attorney-client privileged information related to the development of privacy training requirements as part of USCIS's use of social media information to support the agency's mission.

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The emails are between USCIS OCC
attorneys and agency employees, and include
draft language for the training requirements
document, requests for legal review,
statements of uncertainty, and requests for
additional information, which represents part
of the deliberative process, as well as pre-
decisional information being considered in
this process. The information in the emails
also contains a request for legal opinions
related to potential courses of actions being
considered. Accordingly, this material is
appropriately exempt from disclosure
pursuant to Exemption (b)(5).
Exemption (b)(7)(E) was used to redact
portions of an email sent by USCIS
employees and OCC attorneys discussing
privacy training for FDNS immigration
officers involved in social media vetting and
background investigations. The information
withheld under (b)(7)(E) includes a
description of the specific methods and
technology that FDNS would be using to
conduct social media research as part of the
vetting process. This information, if
disclosed, would reveal the technology
resources currently being used in the vetting
process by law enforcement and immigration
officers, which is part of specific techniques
and procedures involved in the enforcement
of certain immigration and national security
laws and directives. It would also reveal

				guidelines that could risk circumvention of the law, including the specific tools used by law enforcement as part of the vetting and screening process. The release of this information would put individuals on notice as to what technology is being used, so that individuals could research the technology to identify vulnerabilities and limitations, which could impact the effectiveness of the screening and vetting process. Releasing this information could reasonably be expected to risk the circumvention of law and render the guidelines for additional screening measures relevant to national security, public safety, and fraud prevention useless. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(7)(E). All other information within this document was segregated and determined non-exempt and disclosed.
2643-2644	Email, RE: RAD SVI Operational Use of SM, dated September 13, 2017	(b)(5) (b)(7)(E)	Email	The information withheld under (b)(5) includes deliberative and attorney-client privileged information related to the development of the USCIS refugee and asylum division's operational use of social media. The emails are between USCIS OCC attorneys, and include requests for legal review, statements of uncertainty, and requests for additional information, which represents part of the deliberative process, as well as pre-decisional information being considered in this process. The information

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	in the emails also contains a request for legal opinions related to potential courses of actions being considered. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(5).
	The information withheld under (b)(7)(E) includes a legal opinion in response to a question regarding the USCIS asylum division's operational use of social media, and the specific authorization that they have to conduct social media research as part of the vetting process. This information, if disclosed, would reveal the methods and technology resources currently being used in the vetting process by law enforcement and immigration officers, which is part of apocific
	immigration officers, which is part of specific techniques and procedures involved in the enforcement of certain immigration and national security laws and directives. Accordingly, this material is appropriately exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption (b)(7)(E). All other information within this document was segregated and determined non-exempt and disclosed.