PETER J. ELIASBERG (SBN 189110) 1 AHILAN T. ARULANANTHAM (SBN 237841) RANJANA NATARAJAN (SBN 230149) 2 **ACLU FOUNDATION OF** SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA 3 1616 Beverly Boulevard Los Angeles, California 90026 Tel: (213) 977-9500 4 Fax: (213) 250-3919 5 6 Attorneys for Petitioner (Additional counsel listed on following page) 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 WESTERN DIVISION 11 EBRAHIM MOHAMMED MUSSA, Case No.: CV-06-2749-TJH (JTL) 12 A# 29-477-055; JOHN IDRISS RASHEED, A# 75-657-846; AMADOU LAMINE DIOUF, A# 79-13 768-086; RAYMOND GERALD AUGUSTINO SOEOTH, A# 75-694-789; VICTOR MARTINEZ, A# 30-700-636; RUDOLF STEPANIAN, A# 14 AMENDED COMPLAINT AND 15 PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS 30-916-353, 16 Plaintiff-Petitioners, 17 VS. 18 ALBERTO GONZALES, United States Attorney General; MICHAEL 19 CLASS ACTION CHERTOFF, Secretary, Department of Homeland Security; JULIE L. MYERS, Assistant Secretary, United 20 21 States Immigration and Customs Enforcement; NORMA BONALES-GARIBAY, Field Office Director 22 U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement; GEORGE MOLINAR, 23 Chief of Detention and Removal 24 Operations, San Pedro Detention Facility; STUART CORTEZ, Officer-In-Charge, San Pedro Detention Facility; JOHN ZUETEL, U.S. Immigration and Customs Heraing Date: None [Magistrate Judge Jennifer T. Lum] 25 26 Enforcement Officer-in-Charge, Mira 27 Loma Detention Center; and IRMA BECERRA, Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department Captain, Mira 28 Loma Detention Center Defendant-Respondents.

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1	Additional counsel:
2	CECILLIA D. WANG (CSB #187782)
3	CECILLIA D. WANG (CSB #187782) MÓNICA M. RAMÍREZ (CSB #234893)* AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION
4	FOUNDATION IMMIGRANTS' RIGHTS PROJECT
5	39 Drumm Street San Francisco, CA 94111
6	Telephone: (415) 343-0775 Facsimile: (415) 395-0950
7	JAYASHRI SRIKANTIAH (CSB #189566) STANFORD LAW SCHOOL IMMIGRANTS'
8	STANFORD LAW SCHOOL IMMIGRANTS' RIGHTS CLINIC
9	Crown Quadrangle 559 Nathan Abbott Way
10	Stanford, CA 94305-8610 Telephone: (650) 724-2442
11	Facsimile: (650) 723-4426
12	JUDY RABINOVITZ** AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES FOUNDATION
13	IMMIGRANTS' RIGHTS PROJECT 125 Broad Street, 18th Floor
14	New York, NY 10004
15	Telephone: (212) 549-2618 Facsimile: (212) 549-2654
16	*Pending admission to Central District of California **Application for admission <i>pro hac vice</i> forthcoming
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immigration detention statutes on statutory and constitutional grounds. They

Plaintiff-Petitioners challenge the Government's interpretation of the

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contend that the general detention statutes (those applicable to cases not involving national security concerns) do not authorize prolonged immigration detention – longer than about six months – pending completion of removal proceedings. unless there is a significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future. See Nadarajah v. Gonzales, 443 F.3d 1069 (9th Cir. 2006). They also argue that if the general detention statutes did authorize such detention they would be unconstitutional, at least absent substantially greater procedural protections than those currently available. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 692 (2001) (prolonged detention of aliens whose removal is not reasonably foreseeable under administrative procedures presents "obvious" constitutional problem). 2.

- Because Plaintiff-Petitioners assert that the federal government has detained them in violation of federal statutory and constitutional law, this Court has jurisdiction to hear their challenge under the federal habeas corpus statute and the Suspension Clause. See 28 U.S.C. 2241(c)(1); 28 U.S.C. 2241 (c)(3); U.S. Const. Art. I., cl.9; INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 304 (2001). In addition, this Court has jurisdiction to hear these statutory and constitutional claims under the statute conferring general federal question jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. 1331; Walters v. Reno, 145 F.3d 1032, 1052 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding that Section 1331 authorizes review of 'general collateral challenges to unconstitutional practices and policies used by the agency' in the immigration context).¹
- This Court may grant relief under the habeas corpus statute, 28 U.S.C. 2241 et seq., the general federal question statute, 28 U.S.C. 1331, the Declaratory

¹The Due Process Clause and Article III of the Constitution also require that some judicial forum remain available for Plaintiff-Petitioners to challenge the lawfulness of their detention.

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VENUE

4. Venue is proper in this district because at least one of the Defendants resides in this district and because a substantial part of the events giving rise to the action occurred in this district. 28 U.S.C. 1391(e). Venue is also proper because all of the Defendant-Respondents are amenable to service of process in this district. See Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court of Ky., 410 U.S. 484, 485 (1973) ("So long as the custodian can be reached by service of process, the court can issue a writ 'within its jurisdiction' . . . ".).

INTRODUCTION

- 5. Six years after the Supreme Court effectively banned unreasonably prolonged and indefinite detention in the immigration context, the government continues to engage in a policy of de facto indefinite detention. Petitioner Ebrahim Mohammed Mussa originally filed this habeas petition to challenge unlawful prolonged detention under the government's policy. Rather than defend its policy, the government released him. This pattern is not unique. The government has repeatedly released non-citizens who file habeas petitions challenging their prolonged detention rather than defend its policy, while nonetheless keeping in detention those who fail to file such lawsuits.²
- 6. As a result, dozens of non-citizens in this District remain locked away in immigration detention centers for years, under circumstances legally identical to those faced by Mr. Mussa. In each of these cases, as with Mr. Mussa's, the government has made an <u>initial</u> determination to detain, but has utterly failed to

²Examples of such cases in which counsel undersigned have been involved include Molina v. Ashcroft, CV 04-6656 TJH (MLG) (C.D. Cal. 2004), Thangarajah v. Gonzales, et al., CV 05-1608 BEN (POR) (S.D. Cal. 2005), and Bravo Pedroza v. Atunez, et al., No. 06-cv-1176-W (LSP) (S.D. Cal., Pet. for Writ of Habeas Corpus Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 filed Sept. 1, 2006). In each of these cases, the government released the petitioner before the district court had an opportunity to rule on the validity of prolonged detention pending completion of removal proceedings.

assess whether <u>continued</u> detention remains authorized by law as detention becomes prolonged. In response, Mr. Mussa now amends his complaint to add several other Plaintiff-Petitioners who remain detained subject to the government's draconian detention policy. These Plaintiff-Petitioners will also seek to represent a class of similarly-situated non-citizens who are subject to unreasonably prolonged and indefinite detention in violation of controlling authority.

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7. Plaintiff-Petitioners are all non-citizens in removal proceedings whom the government has detained for over six months, and in most cases for years, even though there is no significant likelihood that their removal will occur (and that their detention will end) in the reasonably foreseeable future. Controlling authority establishes that the government may only detain non-citizens in removal proceedings for a reasonable period of time for the purpose of effecting removal – generally about six months – under the statutes at issue here. Congress has authorized more prolonged detention only in rare circumstances when the general statutes authorizing immigration detention may be supplanted by specific statutes enacted to address national security concerns. See Nadarajah v. Gonzales, 443 F.3d 1069 (9th Cir. 2006) (general immigration detention statutes do not authorize prolonged detention); Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 379 n.4 (2005) (prolonged detention authorized only under "special" circumstances involving national security statutes). Cf. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 692 (2001) (prolonged detention of aliens whose removal is not reasonably foreseeable under administrative procedures presents "obvious" constitutional problem). Nonetheless, the government's detention policy neither respects nor recognizes any limit on its power to detain non-citizens pending completion of removal proceedings against them. Indeed, the government has failed to provide any of the Plaintiff-Petitioners with a hearing to determine whether their prolonged detention remains justified. For that reason, the government's detention policy violates the

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federal immigration laws. Moreover, were the immigration statutes to permit such prolonged and indefinite detention, they would violate the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause.

8. Although seven Plaintiff-Petitioners are named in this complaint, dozens of others in this judicial district alone have been detained for similar periods, and face a similar prospect of prolonged indefinite detention. The Plaintiff-Petitioners bring this action on behalf of themselves and other noncitizens similarly situated, seeking freedom from the government's de facto policy of indefinite detention.

PARTIES

Plaintiff-Petitioners

- 9. Petitioner, Ebrahim Mohammed Mussa, is a refugee from Ethiopia who was detained for over two years without a hearing under the general immigration detention statutes. He was released shortly after the original complaint in this case was filed.
- Petitioner John Idriss Rasheed is a citizen of Nigeria who has been detained for over two years without a hearing under the general detention statutes, and who is not likely to be removed in the reasonably foreseeable future. He is currently detained at the San Pedro detention facility, which is located in this judicial district.
- 11. Petitioner Amadou Lamine Diouf is a citizen of Senegal who has been detained for nearly eighteen months without a hearing under the general detention statutes, and who is not likely to be removed in the reasonably foreseeable future. He is currently detained at the San Pedro detention facility.
- Petitioner Raymond Gerald Augustino Soeoth is a citizen of 12. Indonesia who has been detained for two years without a hearing under the general detention statutes, and who is not likely to be removed in the reasonably foreseeable future. He is currently detained at the San Pedro detention facility.

- 13. Petitioner Victor Martinez is a citizen of Ecuador who has been detained for four years without a hearing under the general detention statutes, and who is not likely to be removed in the reasonably foreseeable future. He is currently detained at the San Pedro detention facility.
- 14. Petitioner Rudolf Stepanian is a citizen of Iran who has been detained for nearly ten months under the general detention statutes, and who is not likely to be removed in the reasonably foreseeable future. He is currently detained at the Mira Loma detention facility, which is located within this judicial district.

<u>Defendant-Respondents</u> (sued in their official capacity)

- 15. Respondent, Alberto Gonzales, is the Attorney General of the United States and, as such, he is responsible for the administration of the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement ("ICE") and the implementation and enforcement of the immigration laws. In his official capacity, he is the ultimate legal custodian of the Plaintiff-Petitioners.
- 16. Respondent, Michael Chertoff, is the Secretary of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security ("DHS"), the agency charged with enforcement of the nation's immigration laws. In his official capacity, he is a legal custodian of the Plaintiff-Petitioners.
- 17. Respondent, Julie L. Myers, is the Assistant Secretary of the ICE, the arm of DHS charged with detaining and removing aliens pursuant to federal immigration law. In her official capacity, Ms. Myers is a legal custodian of the Plaintiff-Petitioners.
- 18. Respondent, Norma Bonales-Garibay, is ICE's Field Office Director for the Los Angeles District. In her official capacity, Ms. Bonales-Garibay is authorized to release Mr. Mussa, and she is the local ICE official who has legal custody of the Plaintiff-Petitioners.
- Respondent, George Molinar, is ICE's Chief of Detention and
 Removal Operations at San Pedro Detention Facility in San Pedro, California. As

- 20. Respondent, Stuart Cortez, is ICE's Officer-in-Charge of Detention and Removal Operations at San Pedro Detention Facility in San Pedro, California. As such, he is the local ICE official who has immediate custody of some of the Plaintiff-Petitioners.
- 21. Respondent, John Zuetel, is the ICE's Officer-in-Charge of the Mira Loma Detention Center in Lancaster, California. As such, he is the local ICE official who has immediate custody of some of the Plaintiff-Petitioners.
- 22. Respondent, Irma Becerra, is the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department Captain of the Mira Loma Detention Center in Lancaster, California. As such, she is the local Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department official who has immediate custody of some of the Plaintiff-Petitioners.

LEGAL FRAMEWORK

23. The general immigration detention statutes authorize the detention of non-citizens in removal proceedings under certain circumstances. See 8 U.S.C. 1225 (authorizing detention of aliens seeking admission), 8 U.S.C. 1226 (authorizing detention of aliens admitted to the United States), 8 U.S.C. 1231 (authorizing detention of aliens with final order of removal). Both the Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit have construed these statutes narrowly, reading them to permit detention only for reasonable periods of time for the purpose of effecting removal, in part because of the serious constitutional problems associated with prolonged detention outside the criminal context. See generally Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 692 (2001) (prolonged and potentially indefinite detention of alien ordered removed not authorized by statute); Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 513 (2003) (mandatory detention authorized for the "brief" period necessary to complete removal proceedings); Nadarajah v. Gonzales, 443 F.3d 1069 (9th Cir. 2006) (prolonged detention pending completion of removal proceedings not

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authorized under general detention statutes); <u>Tijani v. Willis</u>, 430 F.3d 1241, 1242 (9th Cir. 2005) (mandatory detention not authorized for prolonged period pending completion of removal proceedings).

- Plaintiff-Petitioners' primary legal claim is simple: Congress has not 24. authorized the government to detain immigrants where their removal is not reasonably foreseeable, and has therefore limited detention pending completion of removal proceedings to a presumptively-reasonable six-month period except in cases involving national security concerns, when it may invoke special statutes authorizing more prolonged detention. See Nadarajah v. Gonzales, 443 F.3d 1069, 1078 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding that "the general immigration detention statutes do not authorize the Attorney General to incarcerate detainees for an indefinite period"). Under the statutes at issue here, where the length of detention has exceeded six months Congress has authorized continued detention only if there is a significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future. Nadarajah, 443 F.3d at 1080-81 ("After a presumptively reasonable six-month detention, once the alien provides good reason to believe that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future, the Government must respond with evidence sufficient to rebut that showing.").
- 25. Despite this clear legal authority, the government routinely detains non-citizens for far longer than six months under the general detention statutes, without ever assessing whether there is a significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future such that their detention remains authorized by law.
- 26. The government holds detainees for years under the general statute authorizing detention of aliens seeking admission, 8 U.S.C. 1225(b), the general statute authorizing detention of admitted aliens convicted of certain crimes (including aggravated felonies), 8 U.S.C. 1226(c), and the general detention statute authorizing detention of aliens whose removal orders have become

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detained beyond six months under these general detention statutes, even though there is no significant likelihood of their removal in the reasonably foreseeable future, because the government simply fails to assess the continuing validity of their detention after six months.

- Because the general immigration detention statutes do not authorize 27. detention for more than a reasonable period of time, which is presumptively not longer than six months, they do not authorize the continued incarceration of any of the Plaintiff-Petitioners. As explained in the Statement of Facts, infra, the Plaintiff-Petitioners have all been detained for far longer than the presumptively reasonable six-month period. While detention for a short period beyond six months might be authorized if removal were imminent, there is no indication that any of the Plaintiff-Petitioners is significantly likely to be removed in the reasonably foreseeable future.
- The government's detention policy also violates the Due Process 28. rights of the named Plaintiff-Petitioners and the class of long-term detainees they seek to represent. As the government currently interprets the law, it can detain aliens in removal proceedings for a prolonged and indefinite period – even for years – without any kind of procedure to determine that their detention remains reasonably related to its purpose as it becomes prolonged. However, the government's position is contrary to controlling authority. Prolonged detention without sufficient procedural protections of aliens who pose no special danger clearly violates the Due Process Clause. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690-91 (2001) (holding that prolonged non-criminal detention violates the Due Process Clause unless accompanied by both "a special justification, such as harm-threatening mental illness" and "strong procedural protections.").
- Controlling Supreme Court authority thus makes clear that Plaintiff-29. Petitioners' detention violates the Due Process Clause. None of the Plaintiff-

Petitioners' removal will occur in the reasonably foreseeable future, if ever, and for that reason their detention is not related to any legitimate purpose. Moreover, even if removal were reasonably foreseeable for some of the Plaintiff-Petitioners, any detainee subject to prolonged non-criminal detention must still be afforded constitutionally-adequate procedural protections. Yet not a single immigrant subject to prolonged detention pending completion of proceedings has received a hearing where the government has justified the prolonged and indefinite detention.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

The following statement describes the cases of several Plaintiff-30. Petitioners who seek to represent a class of similarly-situated non-citizens in this case. Each Petitioner is a non-citizen who has been detained for well over six months under general immigration detention statutes that do not authorize prolonged detention. For each of them, there is no significant likelihood that they will be removed, and that their detention will end, in the reasonably foreseeable future. In some cases they face prolonged and indefinite detention because they continue to litigate their cases before tribunals that do not render decisions in a fixed or rapid period of time. In others it is because they have already won relief from removal, and although the government has kept them detained while it pursues an appeal, the likelihood of their ever being ordered removed is small because they will probably win their cases. In still others removal is not reasonably foreseeable because there is no country to which they can be legally removed that is likely to accept them for deportation. Yet, despite the fact that their removal is not reasonably foreseeable, none of the Plaintiff-Petitioners has received a hearing concerning whether their detention remains justified as it has become prolonged.

Ebrahim Mohammed Mussa

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31. Petitioner Ebrahim Mohammed Mussa is a citizen of Ethiopia and

lawful permanent resident of the United States. He was detained for two years while challenging his removal from the United States.

- 32. Mr. Mussa first came to the United States as a refugee in 1989, when he was found at a refugee camp in Kenya after suffering horrific abuse and tragedy in the war in Ethiopia. He eventually decided to make the United States his permanent home and adjusted his status from refugee to lawful permanent resident.
- 33. After living in the United States for 15 years, Mr. Mussa was convicted of a stalking offense under California law. Shortly afterward, the DHS initiated removal proceedings against him. The DHS proceeded to detain him, asserting that it had authority under 8 U.S.C. 1226(c), which authorizes mandatory detention of aliens convicted of certain crimes, including aggravated felonies. Mr. Mussa did not receive a hearing as to whether he posed a danger to the community or a flight risk.
- 34. One year after Mr. Mussa was first incarcerated, an immigration judge granted his application for relief from removal under the Convention Against Torture ("CAT"), but denied his applications for asylum and withholding of removal. Even after this decision, however, the DHS continued to detain him, presumably because it intended to appeal the decision.
- 35. The government did not release Mr. Mussa from immigration detention until after he filed the instant habeas petition challenging the lawfulness of his detention, and after the Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed the Immigration Judge's decision to grant relief under CAT. Upon finally releasing Mr. Mussa after two years of incarceration, the government moved to dismiss the instant case as moot.
- 36. During the two years he was incarcerated by the government, Mr. Mussa never received any hearing as to whether his prolonged detention was justified.

John Idriss Rasheed

- 37. Petitioner John Idriss Rasheed is a citizen of Nigeria. He is married to a U.S. citizen. He and his wife have a four-year-old daughter. Mr. Rasheed has been detained for two years while he has challenged the government's efforts to remove him from the United States.
- 38. Mr. Rasheed fled to the United States in 1999, fearing torture and political instability in his home country. Upon his arrival, he applied for protection as a refugee under the asylum laws, but was denied relief by an Immigration Judge. He appealed the decision to the Board of Immigration Appeals. The Board failed to decide his case for three years, until, in 2003, it affirmed the Immigration Judge's decision without opinion in a one-line order. Despite the long pendency of the case, the Board's decision was so baseless that when Mr. Rasheed appealed to the Ninth Circuit, the government was unwilling to defend the agency's decision on appeal and agreed to remand for a new hearing. At the new hearing, the Immigration Judge granted him relief under the Convention Against Torture nearly seven years after he first applied for asylum.
- 39. Mr. Rasheed has been incarcerated under the immigration laws since 2004, when he was convicted of forgery and finished serving a sentence of 364 days in jail. In making its decision to detain, the government relied on 8 U.S.C. 1231, a general detention statute that authorizes post-final order detention. The government did not even consider that Mr. Rasheed did not pose a danger to the community or a flight risk, based on the strong merits of his CAT claim, his marriage to a U.S. citizen, and the fact that he has a dependent U.S. citizen daughter. Even when the Immigration Judge granted CAT relief, the government continued to keep Mr. Rasheed in detention while it pursued the appeal just as in Mr. Mussa's case. Mr. Rasheed's case remains pending before the Board of Immigration Appeals.
 - 40. Mr. Rasheed has never had an individualized hearing as to whether

his detention is justified.

Amadou Lamine Diouf

- 41. Petitioner Amadou Lamine Diouf is a citizen of Senegal. He came to the United States as a student in February of 1996. He has been in immigration detention for over eighteen months while fighting a removal order infected by ineffective assistance of counsel.
- 42. In 2003, the government started removal proceedings against Mr. Diouf for overstaying his student visa. Mr. Diouf was granted a voluntary departure, but married his long-time American fiancée before the appointed date of his departure. After his marriage, in June of 2003, he asked his immigration attorney to file a petition to adjust his status based on his marriage, and also to file a motion to reopen his proceedings on that basis. His attorney filed the petition, but (unbeknownst to Mr. Diouf) not the motion to reopen. Thus, his voluntary departure order automatically became a removal order without his knowing it. Nearly two years later, on March 29, 2005, the government arrived at his apartment and arrested him. He has been detained ever since.
- 43. Since his arrest, Mr. Diouf has hired a new attorney who has sought to reopen Mr. Diouf's case based on, inter alia, ineffective assistance of counsel. That claim is currently pending before the Ninth Circuit, which has stayed his removal. Such appeals typically can take a year or more to complete. See Tijani, 430 F.3d at 1242 (foreseeable process on petition for review in Ninth Circuit is a year or more); Administrative Office of the United States Courts, Federal Court Management Statistics 2005, U.S. Court of Appeals Judicial Caseload Profile at 2 (median time from filing of notice of appeal to disposition for Ninth Circuit in 2005 was 16.1 months), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/cmsa2005.pl.
- 44. Mr. Diouf does not pose a danger to the community or a flight risk, in light of his marriage to a U.S. citizen, the absence of any conviction for a

45. Mr. Diouf has never had a hearing to determine whether or not he should be detained at all, let alone a hearing to determine whether his continued detention remains justified despite its length.

Raymond Gerald Augustino Soeoth

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- 46. Petitioner Raymond Gerald Augustino Soeoth is a citizen of Indonesia. He has been incarcerated by immigration authorities for two years while fighting his removal and asserting his claim for asylum.
- 47. Mr. Soeoth and his wife came to the United States in February of 1999 on visitors' visas. After arriving, he affirmatively applied for asylum based on his fear of persecution in Indonesia because of his Christian religious activities. His claim was denied by an Immigration Judge and then the Board of Immigration Appeals. He then filed a petition for review in the Ninth Circuit, which also denied his claim in June of 2004. Shortly afterward, in September of 2004, the government arrested him.
- 48. While his case wended its way through appeals, conditions for Christians in Indonesia substantially worsened because of the ascendency of a more pro-Muslim government. The Ninth Circuit has recognized the danger that Chinese Christians now face in Indonesia. See Sael v. Ashcroft, 386 F.3d 922 (9th Cir. 2004). Based on the changed circumstances, Mr. Soeoth filed a motion to reopen his case to allow the immigration courts to consider the new evidence. The motion was denied by the Board of Immigration Appeals, relying in part on evidence that was not in the record. Mr. Soeoth then filed a petition for review challenging the Board's denial, which is currently pending before the Ninth Circuit.
- 49. The government has detained Mr. Soeoth for two years, presumably under the general detention statute 8 U.S.C. 1231, since the Ninth Circuit initially

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affirmed his removal order. Mr. Soeoth remains detained even though he poses no danger to the community or flight risk, as evidenced by his lack of any criminal record and the strength of his claims pending at the Ninth Circuit.

50. During the two years Mr. Soeoth has been incarcerated, he has never received a hearing concerning whether or not he should be detained, let alone a hearing concerning whether his detention remains justified given its length.

Victor Martinez

- 51. Petitioner Victor Martinez is a citizen of Ecuador. He has been a lawful permanent resident of the United States for over 35 years, and has a nine-year-old daughter who is a U.S. citizen. He has been detained for four years without ever having received a hearing concerning whether or not he should be detained.
- 52. In November 2002, an Immigration Judge ordered Mr. Martinez removed on the basis of his convictions for second-degree burglary and petty theft. The Immigration Judge erroneously held that he was ineligible for any relief from removal, despite a clear regulation to the contrary. Mr. Martinez filed a habeas petition challenging his removal in March of 2005, which was transferred to the Ninth Circuit pursuant to the REAL ID Act. The petition for review is now pending before the Ninth Circuit.
- 53. Despite strong arguments that Mr. Martinez's conviction does not render him ineligible for all relief from removal, he has remained detained during the entire <u>four years</u> that he has litigated his removal case.
- 54. Mr. Martinez has never been offered an individualized hearing as to whether his four-year-long detention is justified. At the beginning of his detention, in 2002, an Immigration Judge denied his request for review of his custody status. On information and belief, the government kept no record of that proceeding, and the basis for the immigration judge's ruling is unknown. Since that initial hearing, Mr. Martinez has had no further opportunity to challenge his

continued detention.

Rudolf Stepanian

- 55. Petitioner Rudolf Stepanian is an Armenian Christian from Iran who entered the United States as a lawful permanent resident in 1974 over thirty years ago. His mother worked for the United States embassy in Iran in the 1970's, while his father worked in the government of the Shah of Iran. Mr. Stepanian has a ten-year-old daughter who is a U.S. citizen.
- 56. The government first detained Mr. Stepanian in December 2005, charging him with removal based on a five-year-old conviction for domestic violence in 2000. Mr. Stepanian has been detained for over ten months, even though the government has <u>conceded</u> that he cannot be removed to Iran and even though both the Immigration Judge and the Board of Immigration Appeals have so ruled, granting his application for relief under the CAT.
- 57. Mr. Stepanian's daughter Chelsea will be eleven years old soon. He spent the entire tenth year of her life in detention, despite the fact that the government had no intention of removing him to Iran at any point during the removal proceedings. Had it held a hearing to determine whether or not his removal was reasonably foreseeable, he would no doubt have been released long ago; however, no such hearing was ever held.

Class-Wide Allegations

- 58. The government has a policy or practice of detaining non-citizens under the general detention statutes for unreasonably prolonged and indefinite periods of time pending completion of their removal proceedings. Specifically, the government detains non-citizens for well beyond the six-month period found presumptively reasonable for completing removal proceedings, without regard to whether their removal is significantly likely in the reasonably foreseeable future.
- 59. In response, Plaintiff-Petitioners bring this action on behalf of themselves and all other persons similarly situated, pursuant to Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure 23(a) and 23(b)(2). Plaintiff-Petitioners propose to represent a class of all non-citizens within this district who are or will be 1) detained for longer than six months pursuant to a general immigration detention statute pending completion of removal proceedings, and 2) whose prolonged detention is not justified because their removal is not significantly likely in the reasonably foreseeable future. Included in this class are individuals whose removal is not significantly likely in the reasonably foreseeable future because (a) their removal proceedings are still pending before an Immigration Judge, the Board of Immigration Appeals or the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, such that the date of any final resolution of their removal cases is indefinite, (b) there is a significant likelihood that they will never be ordered removed because they have already won some form of relief from removal before some tribunal, and (c) their ultimate removal is not significantly likely to occur because there is no country to which they can be legally removed that will accept them for deportation.

60. The proposed class meets the requirements of Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 23(a) and 23(b)(2). Plaintiff-Petitioners' counsel is aware of more than thirty-five other class members in this district who seek the same relief as the named Plaintiff-Petitioners. In addition, the class will include people subject to the government's prolonged detention policy in the future.

- 61. There are several common questions of law and fact in the action. These include 1) whether the government has a policy or practice of detaining non-citizens in removal proceedings for longer than six months under the general detention statutes without providing a hearing to determine whether such detention is justified because there is a significant likelihood of their removal in the reasonably foreseeable future, 2) whether such a detention policy or practice would be authorized by statute, 3) whether such a detention policy or practice would violate the Due Process Clause.
 - 62. The claims of the named Plaintiff-Petitioners are typical of the claims

of the proposed class. Like all of the proposed class members, the named Plaintiff-Petitioners have been detained for more than six months under general detention statutes, but there is no significant likelihood of their being removed in the reasonably foreseeable future.

- 63. The named Plaintiff-Petitioners will fairly and adequately represent the interests of all members of the proposed class because they seek relief identical to the relief sought by all class members, and because they have no interests adverse to other class members. Moreover, the named Plaintiff-Petitioners are represented by pro bono counsel from the ACLU of Southern California, the ACLU Immigrants' Rights Project, and the Stanford Law School Immigrants' Rights Clinic. These organizations and the attorneys working for them have extensive experience litigating on behalf of detained immigrants and similar experience litigating in the class action context.
- 64. Defendant-Respondents' policy or practice of detaining non-citizens in removal proceedings for longer than six months under the general detention statutes without providing a hearing to assess whether there is a significant likelihood of their removal in the reasonably foreseeable future applies generally to all class members, making class-wide injunctive relief appropriate.

FIRST COUNT

Violation of Immigration and Nationality Act and Regulations

- 65. Plaintiff-Petitioners reallege and incorporate by reference each and every allegation contained in the preceding paragraphs as if set forth fully herein.
- 66. Defendant-Respondents' continued detention of Plaintiff-Petitioners under the general immigration detention statutes violates the Immigration and Nationality Act, insofar as the statutes under which they are detained do not authorize detention beyond a presumptively reasonable six-month period necessary to complete removal proceedings where there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future.

SECOND COUNT

Violation of Fifth Amendment Due Process

- 67. Plaintiff-Petitioners reallege and incorporate by reference each and every allegation contained in the preceding paragraphs as if set forth fully herein.
- 68. Defendant-Respondents' continued detention of Plaintiff-Petitioners without a hearing to determine whether their prolonged detention is justified violates their right to be free of prolonged non-criminal detention without adequate justification and sufficient procedural safeguards, as guaranteed by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

THIRD COUNT

Violations of International Law

- 69. Plaintiff-Petitioners reallege and incorporate by reference each and every allegation contained in the preceding paragraphs as if set forth fully herein.
- 70. Defendant-Respondents' prolonged detention of Plaintiff-Petitioners violates their rights to be free from arbitrary detention under Article 9, Section 1 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ("ICCPR"), opened for signature Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976), as interpreted through Article 2, Section 1 of the ICCPR.
- 71. These sections of international law have been incorporated into domestic law and are binding upon Defendant-Respondents.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

Wherefore, Plaintiff-Petitioners respectfully request that the Court grant the following relief:

- (1) Assume jurisdiction over this matter and grant the named Plaintiff-Petitioners' requests for a writ of habeas corpus;
- (2) Pursuant to the accompanying request for preliminary injunctive relief, order that Plaintiff-Petitioners be immediately released under reasonable

conditions of supervision, including electronic monitoring if necessary. <u>See</u>

<u>Nadarajah</u>, 443 F.3d at 1084 (holding that Petitioner is entitled to "immediate release" because he has been detained for far beyond a reasonable period of time).

- (3) In the alternative, if the Court finds that immediate release is not required under the law, order the government to hold individualized hearings to determine whether Plaintiff-Petitioners' continued detention is justified. Such hearings should conform to those procedures required by the Due Process Clause.
- (4) Certify a class, as described <u>supra</u>, pursuant to a motion for class certification to be filed shortly.
- (5) Prohibit the government from transferring class members beyond this judicial district in order to attempt to frustrate this Court's jurisdiction.³
- (6) Order that the government adopt a policy of identifying and releasing under reasonable conditions of supervision all class members by providing hearings for all non-citizens detained under the general detention statutes for longer than six months pending completion of removal proceedings. Require at the hearing that the government determine whether continued detention remains authorized by the statute.
- (7) In the alternative, if the Court finds that the class members' detention is authorized by the immigration statutes, order the government to hold hearings as set forth in paragraph (3) of this Prayer for Relief.
- (8) Declare that Defendant-Respondents' continued detention of Plaintiff-Petitioners under the existing procedures violates the Immigration and Nationality Act, the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, and Article 9, Section 1 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights;

³Because custody attaches at the time a habeas petition is filed, <u>Carafas v. Lavallee</u>, 391 U.S. 234, 238 (1968), this Court would retain jurisdiction over any class members transferred outside of the district as long as they were in the district as of the time this complaint was filed. Nonetheless, it would be much more difficult for the government to implement class-wide relief if it transfers detainees outside the district.

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. 1	(9)	Grant Plaintiff-Petit	ioners reasonable attorneys' fees, costs, and other	
2	disbursements pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412,			
3	because the government's position is not substantially justified; and			
4	(10) Grant such other relief as this Court may deem appropriate.			
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8		His		
9	Dated: Septe	ember 25, 2006	Respectfully submitted,	
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PROOF OF SERVICE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

I am employed in the County of Los Angeles, State of California. I am over the age of 18 and not a party to the within action. My business address is 1616 Beverly Boulevard, Los Angeles, California 90026. I am employed in the office of a member of the bar of this court at whose direction the service was made.

On September 25, 2006, I served the foregoing document:

AMENDED COMPLAINT AND PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

on the parties in this action by electronic mail, facsimile and by placing a true and correct copy of each document thereof, enclosed in a sealed envelope, addressed as follows:

Debra Wong Yang Leon Weidman Robert I. Lester 300 North Los Angeles Street Room 7516 Los Angeles, CA 90012

Fax: (213) 894-7819

robert.lester@usdoj.gov

I am readily familiar with the business' practice of collection and processing correspondence for mailing with the United States Postal Service. I know that the correspondence is deposited with the United States Postal Service on the same day this declaration was executed in the ordinary course of business. I know that the envelope was sealed and, with postage thereon fully prepaid, placed for collection and mailing on this date, following ordinary business practices, in the United States mail at Los Angeles, California.

Executed on September 25, 2006, at Los Angeles, California.

Joseph Alvarado