Affidavit of H. Timothy Lovelace, Jr.

I, H. Timothy Lovelace, Jr. having been duly sworn, do hereby depose and state the following:

1. My name is H. Timothy Lovelace and I am a resident of Durham, North Carolina. I give this statement of my own free will regarding facts within my personal knowledge.
2. In 2020, I joined the faculty of Duke University School of Law as John Hope Franklin Research Scholar and Professor of Law. I teach courses in American legal history, constitutional law, and race and the law. I was previously professor of law at Indiana University and the University of Virginia. I earned a J.D. and a Ph.D. in History at the University of Virginia.
3. In 2021, I was approached by Elizabeth Hambourger, counsel for Nathan Holden, regarding my expertise in legal history and race and the law. Ms. Hambourger explained the basic facts of Mr. Holden's *Batson* claim, including the State's use of racially disparate peremptory strikes, and asked me if I could provide the court considering Mr. Holden's claim with some historical context for this disparity.
4. As I will describe in this affidavit, the problems with racial discrimination in the composition of juries has haunted the United States in general and North Carolina specifically from the beginning. This type of discrimination is harmful to the potential jurors it discriminates against, the criminal justice system and African American citizens in general. In reviewing the record, it appears that this type of discrimination continued in the Nathan Holden case that was tried in Wake County in 2017.
5. The U.S. Supreme Court has stressed that, "with the exception of voting, for most citizens the honor and privilege of jury duty is their most significant opportunity to participate in the democratic process." *Powers v. Ohio*, 499 U.S. 400, 407 (1991).

6. It is important to understand that for much of American history, African Americans were excluded from participation in jury service, as they were prevented from exercising other rights of citizenship, such as voting. Exclusion of Black people from juries is not simply a deprivation of civil rights for those excluded from participation in the democratic process; juries and their composition implicate the fairness of court proceedings for the parties that come before them.

7. This history of exclusion has been accompanied by ongoing efforts to afford African Americans the benefits of the jury system. However, with each advance in jury equity, forces have acted to reduce the effect of that progress, with the consequence that jury exclusion is still is a significant problem today.

8. Before the Civil War, most African Americans were enslaved and thus deprived of basic human rights, let alone civil rights. The enslaved could not serve on juries. And while enslaved people charged with crimes were entitled to jury trials, those juries were made entirely of enslavers, or as the North Carolina statute put it, "good and lawful men, owners of slaves." 1793 c 381 s 1 1831 c 30 s 5, North Carolina Revised Code No. 105, An Act Concerning Slaves and Free Persons of Color.

9. Abolitionists recognized the importance of juries to the fairness of the court system on issues of race, as seen in the debate over the Fugitive Slave Act, which governed the rendition of those who escaped slavery by fleeing North. A critical question was how to determine whether a person was, in fact, enslaved, and "a consistent theme among abolitionists was the desire to obtain jury trials on the question of whether the alleged fugitive was in fact a fugitive or was instead a free man or woman." James Forman, *Juries and Race in the Nineteenth Century*, 113 YALE L. J. 895, 900-901 (2004). Meanwhile, Southern congressmen furiously fought a proposed jury trial provision to the Act. *Id.* at 902. Jefferson Davis, future

president of the Confederacy, suggested a compromise whereby such juries would be drawn only from the alleged owner's slaveholding community. *Id.* at 904. When the jury trial provision was voted down, the "president of Harvard University[] asked how alleged fugitives could be seized without juries when a claim 'of ownership for a cow, an ox, or a horse, or an acre of land' all required a jury trial." *Id.* at 906. Thus, even before the end of slavery, Americans were already actively discussing the power of juries to protect the rights of African Americans.

10. During early Reconstruction, "[putting] blacks on juries was a radical idea." *Id.* at 910. Indeed, even the idea of blacks testifying against whites was controversial, and President Andrew Johnson vetoed the 1866 Civil Rights Bill because he feared that giving Black Americans the right to testify might lead them to eventually obtain the rights to serve on juries and vote. *Id.* Nevertheless, "[i]n parts of the South, black jurors began serving on juries immediately after the Civil War." Frampton at 1601, citing Douglas L. Colbert, *Challenging the Challenge: Thirteenth Amendment as a Prohibition Against the Racial Use of Peremptory Challenges*, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 50 (1990) (listing North Carolina as a state where black jurors began to serve after the Civil War; *see also* Seth Kotch & Robert P. Mosteller, *The Racial Justice Act and the Long Struggle with Race and the Death Penalty in North Carolina*, 88 N.C. L. Rev. 2031, 2054 (2010) (describing how North Carolina's 1868 Constitution and Reconstruction "brought a brief era of black jury participation."); *see, e.g.*, *State v. Holmes*, 63 N.C. 18, 21 (1868) (25 white men and 25 Black men summoned for jury duty; four Blacks served as jurors).

11. Even during Reconstruction, Southern congressmen warned that to allow Black participation in the justice system would lead to the "subjugat[ion] on the white race." Foreman at 913. But it was African Americans who were being subjugated in the South,

where increasing white-supremacist violence was going largely unpunished. "[A] conservative estimate for the number of lynchings in North Carolina between the end of the Civil War and World War II [is] at least 175, not counting attempted lynchings or those that took place out of state at the hands of mobs from inside the state... [or] those murdered during the bloody 1998 coup d'etat in Wilmington—which claimed between 60 and 300 black lives." Seth Kotch, *Lethal State: A History of the Death Penalty in North Carolina*, University of North Carolina Press, 2019, p. 33. The Equal Justice Initiative has documented 120 lynchings in North Carolina between 1877 and 1950. https://lynchinginamerica.eji.org/explore/north-carolina.

12. All-white juries typically "refused to indict or convict white defendants accused of crimes against blacks," and thus "exclusion of blacks from juries made it impossible to achieve justice in Southern courts." Foreman at 897. During the 1871 congressional debates over the Ku Klux Klan Act,

> Judge Settle of the Supreme Court of North Carolina indicated that "any candid name in North Carolina would tell you it is impossible for the civil authorities, however vigilant they may be, to punish those who perpetrate those outrages."... Judge Settle reported that "[t]he defect lies not so much with the courts as with the juries. You cannot get a conviction; you cannot get a bill found by the grand jury; or, if you do, the petit jury acquits the parties." This was because:
>
> > [i]n nine cases out of ten the men who commit the crimes constitute or sit on the grand jury, either they themselves or their near relatives or friends, sympathizers, aiders, or abettors; and if a bill is found it is next to impossible to secure a conviction upon a trial at bar. I have heard no instance in North Carolina where a conviction of that sort has taken place.

Foreman at 921. The Act passed and resulted in many successful prosecutions of violent white supremacists, in large part because of its provisions that resulted in racially integrated

juries; however, that progress ended when the federal government abandoned Reconstruction and its prosecutions of the Klan in 1877. *Id.* at 925-26.

13. In addition to the failure of all-white juries to punish crimes against Black citizens, "discrimination against black defendants was a significant Reconstruction concern." *Id.* at 915. "The president of the Convention of the Colored People of North Carolina, just months after the end of the Civil War, explicitly connected the right to serve on juries with the defendant's right to a fair trial," arguing that "the colored man... should be permitted to sit on a jury where a colored man was to be tried." *Id.* at 915. The Thirteenth Amendment abolished slavery with one notable exception, permitting servitude for those convicted of crimes. In response, Southern States, including North Carolina, adopted "black codes" and turned to convict leasing as a way to maintain an unpaid workforce. "[S]ecuring fair treatment for black defendants was the predominant concern [of advocates for jury equality] by the end of the nineteenth century." Frampton at 1602.

14. For these reasons, Frederick Douglass wrote in 1881 that in order for freed Black people to become full citizens, they would need to obtain "the liberties of the American people... the Ballot-box, the Jury-box, and the Cartridge-box." FREDERICK DOUGLASS, LIFE AND TIMES OF FREDERICK DOUGLASS, HIS EARLY LIFE AS A SLAVE, HIS ESCAPE FROM BONDAGE, AND HIS COMPLETE HISTORY TO THE PRESENT TIME 386 (DeWolfe & Fiske Co., New Revised Ed., 1892).

15. Indeed, during Reconstruction, the importance of jury diversity was widely recognized, debated in Congress, written about in the press, and even addressed through federal legislation. *Id.* at 925-30. However, "like many of the Reconstruction mandates, [it] was not fully enforced." *Id.* at 930. The failure to enforce laws prohibiting jury discrimination is a recurring pattern throughout this history.

16. "Across the South, the exclusion of black jurors from the jury box, in tandem with the exclusion of black voters from the ballot box, served as a key lever for the reassertion of white supremacy." Thomas Ward Frampton, *The Jim Crow Jury*, 71 Vanderbilt L. Rev. 1593 (2018). White supremacist North Carolinians argued that allowing even one Black person onto a jury was dangerous to the white community. In 1899, a Wilmington newspaper declared that it was Black presence on juries that justified lynchings:

> The jury system is a dead failure... the one-man power is permitted to come in and to set aside the decisions of court, and to turn out red-handed murderers and beastly rapists free and ready to begin again their hellish, fiendish work... Hence the increase in lynchings.

Frampton at 1613-14. This was written just months after the Wilmington insurrection and echoes the propaganda that instigated that coup, claiming an epidemic of rape against white women by Black men. David Zucchino, *Wilmington's Lie: the Murderous Coup of 1898 and the Rise of White Supremacy* (2020). By the turn of the 20th century, white supremacy had been fully consolidated in North Carolina through the success of the Wilmington coup and the Democratic party's victory in the election of 1898, which was obtained through racist violence and voter intimidation.

17. In 1879, the Supreme Court decided *Strauder v. West Virginia*, which found unconstitutional a state statute explicitly limiting jury service to whites. 100 U.S. 303 (1879); *see also State v. Peoples*, 131 N.C. 784, 790 (1902) (finding error in forcing Black defendant "to submit to a criminal trial by a jury drawn from a list from which has been excluded the whole of his race, purely and simply because of color, although possessed of the requisite qualifications prescribed by the law")

18. However, *Strauder* had "no meaningful enforcement mechanism to ensure people of color served." Kotch at 113. In North Carolina, as in other states, "[t]he county Board of Commissioners created lists of eligible voters drawn from rolls of residents who paid tax the previous year... from which the jury of twelve was drawn. These names were overwhelmingly white, despite the statistical improbability of such homogeneous jury pools." Kotch at 113.

19. Southern court officials continued to justify exclusion of Black citizens from juries by labeling Black people as inferior, unintelligent, untrustworthy, and therefore unfit for the jury box. *See State v. Perry*, 250 N.C. 119, 125, 10 S.E.2d 447, 451 (1959) (before 1947, North Carolina law limited jury service to "all such persons as have paid all the taxes assessed against them for the preceding year and are of good moral character and of sufficient intelligence"). In the infamous 1935 case of the "Scottsboro Boys," an Alabama jury commissioner testified he did "not know of any negro... who is generally reputed to be honest and intelligent and who is esteemed in the community for his integrity, good character and sound judgment." The Supreme Court found it "impossible to accept such a sweeping characterization," and reversed the conviction. *Norris v. Alabama*, 294 U.S. 587 (1935).

20. But, again, there was the problem of enforcement. Thirteen years after *Norris*, a Bertie County clerk of court admitted that when the names of potential jurors were drawn, the names of white people were written in black ink, while the names of African Americans were written in red. If the name drawn was red, the prosecutor would immediately dismiss the juror "for want of good moral character or sufficient intelligence." The result was that no Black person had ever been selected for a jury in a county whose population was 60 percent Black. *State v. Speller*, 229 N.C. 67 (1948); Kotch at 112-13. The state Supreme Court

overturned the conviction, but the defendant, Raleigh Speller, was eventually executed. Kotch at 114.

21. Moreover, into the mid-twentieth century, citizens could be legally excluded from the jury pool on grounds that they were not tax-paying property owners, even as the legacy of slavery and the ongoing realities of Jim Crow left many Black Americans in poverty. *See State v. Lord*, 225 N.C. 354, 355, 34 S.E.2d 205, 206 (1945) (African Americans who were not "freeholders" were lawfully excused from jury service for cause).

22. During the Civil Rights Movement,

> Jury service became one of the central battlegrounds in the legal campaign to challenge []segregation laws. The National Association of Colored People, Legal Defense Fund (NAACP-LDF) chose discriminatory jury practices to lead its litigation strategy in the South. Charles Hamilton Houston, the architect of the civil rights moment won his first Supreme Court case on a jury discrimination challenge. The civil rights leaders succeeded in getting the Federal Jury Selection Act of 1968 passed, which reaffirmed the policy of the United States that "all citizens shall have the opportunity to be considered for service on grand and petit juries in the district courts of the United States, and shall have an obligation to serve as jurors when summoned for that purpose."

Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, *The Jury as Constitutional Identity*, 47 U. C. DAVIS L. REV. 1105 (2014) at 1126.

23. In 1970, North Carolinians adopted a new constitutional provision: "No person shall be excluded from jury service on account of sex, race, color, religion, or national origin." N.C. Const. art. 1 sec. 26 (1970). And representation of minority citizens in jury pools improved when the Supreme Court adopted a "fair cross-section" standard in the 1970's.

24. Still, discrimination continued in various forms. The North Carolina Supreme Court overturned a 1984 rape conviction after finding that, although Northampton County was

61% Black, the Superior Court judge had chosen only one Black grand jury foreman in the past eighteen years. *State v. Cofield*, 324 N.C. 452 (1989).

25. As jury pools became more racially diverse, discrimination moved to the exercise of peremptory strikes. In *State v. Robinson*, 375 N.C. 173 (2020) the North Carolina Supreme Court recognized:

> As progress was made toward ensuring equal representation in juries, discrimination shifted from the composition of the venire to the composition of the jury itself. Peremptory challenges became the next tool for limiting African-Americans from serving as jurors because there were previously no African-American jurors on the jury panel against whom peremptory challenges could be used. In North Carolina, the number of authorized peremptory challenges increased from six to fourteen during this period.

375 N.C. at 178; *see also Flowers v. Mississippi*, 139 S.Ct. 2228 (2019) ("Even though laws barring blacks from serving on juries were unconstitutional after *Strauder*, many jurisdictions employed various discriminatory tools to prevent black persons from being called for jury service. And when those tactics failed, or were invalidated, prosecutors could still exercise peremptory strikes in individual cases to remove most or all black prospective jurors.") At least one scholar has proposed that the purpose of peremptory strikes has always been to enable demographic discrimination. April Anderson, *Peremptory Challenges at the Turn of the Nineteenth Century: Development of Modern Jury Selection Strategies as Seen in Practitioners' Trial Manuals*, Stanford Journal of Civil Rights and Civil Liberties (forthcoming), available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3340623 (describing how American courts expanded use of peremptory strikes at the same time that jury pools became more demographically diverse due to immigration in the nineteenth-century, while trial-attorneys' practice guides from the time period advised attorneys to use peremptory

strikes to eliminate jurors based on stereotypes regarding race, national origin, religion, and class.)

26. The Supreme Court addressed the issue of race discrimination in peremptory strikes for the first time in 1965, in *Swain v. Alabama*, 380 U.S. 202 (1965). The *Swain* Court held that exclusion of Black jurors was "at war with our basic concepts of a democratic society and a representative government." *Swain* at 204. However, while articulating a prohibition on discrimination, *Swain* created no workable framework to actually correct it. Again, the failure was in the enforcement. The *Swain* Court set the bar so high for proving discriminatory intent that no litigant won a *Swain* claim for the next 20 years. *Batson v. Kentucky*, 476 U.S. 79, 92 (1986) (citing, *State v. Shaw*, 284 N.C. 366, 200 S.E.2d 585 (1973) as an example of a jury discrimination claim that failed under the *Swain* standard).

27. Even as peremptory strikes became the primary tool prosecutors used to remove Black jurors, North Carolina increased the number of peremptory challenges available to them in the most serious cases, capital trials. Since 1935, capital defendants had been given 14 peremptory challenges while prosecutors were given six. Act of May 11, 1935, ch. 475, §§ 2, 3, 1935 N.C. Sess. Laws 834, 835 (current version at N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1217 (1988). However, in 1971, the number of peremptory challenges for prosecutors was increased to nine in capital cases and, in 1977, following reinstatement of the death penalty, the State was given a total of 14 peremptory challenges in capital cases. Act of March 11, 1971, ch. 75, § 1, 1971 N.C. Sess. Laws 56 (codified as amended at N.C. Gen. Stat. § 9-21(b) (1971)) (current version at N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1217(a)(2) (1988)); Act

of June 23, 1977, ch. 711, § 1, 1977 N.C. Sess. Laws, 853, 858 (codified at N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1217 (1988)).

28. In 1986, the Supreme Court decided *Batson v. Kentucky*, acknowledging the failure of *Swain* and finding that its "crippling burden of proof" resulted in peremptory strikes being "largely immune from constitutional scrutiny." *Id.* at 92-93. The Court thus created a new, three-step process to adjudicate objections to discriminatory jury strikes. However, even at the time Justice Marshall predicted in his *Batson* concurrence that this new regime would also fail: "Merely allowing defendants the opportunity to challenge the racially discriminatory use of peremptory challenges in individual cases will not end the illegitimate use of the peremptory challenge." *Batson* at 105, Marshall J., concurring.

29. Many scholars have argued that, indeed, *Batson* has largely failed to correct or prevent race discrimination in jury selection. *See, e.g.*, William T. Pizzi, Batson v. Kentucky*:* *Curing the Disease but Killing the Patient*, 1987 SUP. CT. REV. 97, 134 (describing *Batson* as an "enforcement nightmare"); Brian J. Serr & Mark Maney, *Racism, Peremptory Challenges, and the Democratic Jury: The Jurisprudence of a Delicate Balance*, 79 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 59 (1988) (arguing that the *Batson* procedural hurdles have become "less obstacles to racial discrimination than they are road maps" to disguised discrimination); Jeffrey S. Brand, *The Supreme Court, Equal Protection and Jury Selection: Denying that Race Still Matters*, 1994 WIS. L. REV. 511, 583–96 (claiming that *Batson* fails to permit the identification or elimination of challenges based on race); Sheri Lynn Johnson, *Batson Ethics for Prosecutors and Trial Court Judges*, 73 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 475 (1998); Deborah Ramirez, *Affirmative Jury*

Selection: A Proposal To Advance Both the Deliberative Ideal and Jury Diversity, 1998 U. Chi. Legal F. 161, 173-74.

30. There is evidence of *Batson*'s failure in North Carolina. Until 2022, the North Carolina Supreme Court "ha[d] *never* held that a prosecutor intentionally discriminated against a juror of color." *Robinson,* 375 N.C. 173, 178-79 (2020); Daniel R. Pollitt & Brittany P. Warren, *Thirty Years of Disappointment: North Carolina's Remarkable Appellate Batson Record*, 94 N.C. L. Rev. 6 (2016); *see State v. Clegg*, 380 N.C. 127, 170 (2022) (Earls, J., concurring) ("This is the first case where we have reversed a conviction on *Batson* grounds.") At the same time, studies show that peremptory strikes are still used in North Carolina to exclude African Americans and other racial minorities from jury service at disproportionately high rates. Catherine M. Grosso & Barbara O'Brien, *A Stubborn Legacy: The Overwhelming Importance of Race in Jury Selection in 173 Post- Batson North Carolina Capital Trials*, 97 IOWA L. REV. 1531 (2012). Francis X. Flanagan, *Race, Gender, and Juries: Evidence from North Carolina,* 61 J. LAW & ECON. 189 (2018). Ronald F. Wright, Kami Chavis & Gregory S. Parks, *The Jury Sunshine Project: Jury Selection Data as a Political Issue*, 2018 U. ILL. L. REV. 1407 (2018).

31. I have reviewed the affidavits of Frank Baumgartner, Peter Honnef, Richard Wright, and Catherine Grosso and Barbara O'Brien regarding the history of prosecutor peremptory strikes in Wake County and by the individual prosecutors who tried Mr. Holden's case. The peremptory strike patterns in Wake County are consistent with the long history of exclusion of Black citizens from juries.

32. In *Batson*, the Supreme Court identified racial discrimination in jury selection as not only a violation of a criminal defendant's constitutional rights but also a social problem

harming the jurors discriminated against and the community as a whole. That harm can be seen today. I have reviewed the affidavit of Dorian Hamilton, a Black woman whom the State peremptorily removed from the Holden jury. Her affidavit confirms the harm and reflects the scholarship on racial discrimination in jury selection. Perceptions of jury discrimination undermine public faith in the justice system and raise serious questions about the nation's commitment to racial equality. Ashish S. Joshi and Christina T. Kline, *Lack of Jury Diversity: A National Problem with Individual Consequences*, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION (Sept. 15, 2015), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/litigation/committees/diversity-inclusion/articles/2015/lack-of-jury-diversity-national-problem-individual-consequences.

33. Further affiant sayeth naught.

H. Timothy Lovelace, Jr.

Sworn to and subscribed before me this 22 day of May, 2022.

Notary Public
My commission expires: June 17, 2022

Affidavit of Dorian Hamilton

I, Dorian Hamilton, having been duly sworn, do hereby depose and state the following:

1. My name is Dorian Hamilton and I am a resident of Raleigh, North Carolina. I give this statement of my own free will regarding facts within my personal knowledge.
2. I have lived in Wake County for 13 years. I currently work as a real estate agent/Real Estate Paralegal. I am alsothe Managing Director of Invictus Performing Arts, a dance studio in Garner. I previously worked as a paralegal. In 2020, I was a candidate for Wake County School Board. I am married with 2 teenage, daughters and 1 daughter in college.
3. I was called for jury duty in January 2017. I remember the first day being in the courtroom with many other people. We learned that we would potentially serve in a murder trial: *State v. Nathan Holden*. I saw Mr. Holden at the front of the courtroom. When I saw that he was a Black man, I assumed that, because I am also Black, I would not be serving on the jury.
4. My experience as a Black American has been to expect discrimination. I grew up on Long Island, and my perception of the criminal justice system was that it was run by white people and that all Black people are viewed as criminals. Growing up, I never saw a Black prosecutor or a Black judge. One time, during a traffic stop, a police officer pulled a gun on me for no reason.
5. I was not questioned that first day of jury selection but returned to court at a later date. After the prosecutor questioned me, I was sent out of the courtroom. I had the sense that the two sets of lawyers were arguing about whether I should be on the jury. I guessed that the prosecutors did not want me to serve on the jury. This felt to me like one more instance in my life of being discriminated against on account of my race, and it didn't hurt only because it is something I have

come to expect. A few minutes later, I was brought back into the courtroom and told that I was being excused from jury duty.

6. After that, I followed Mr. Holden's trial on the news. I was aware that he was convicted of murder. I did not feel much sympathy for Mr. Holden. I think what he did is a horrible crime. I think it's wrong for the prosecutors to assume that I could not be a fair juror. I don't think Mr. Holden would have gotten off even if he'd had an all-Black jury. Black people might have a different view of the criminal justice system than white people, because of our experiences, but we still want murderers to be punished.

7. In 2021, I was contacted by Mr. Holden's lawyers, Elizabeth Hambourger and Jonathan Broun. They asked me about my experience during jury selection, and they explained some things to me about the jury selection process. They told me that each side can choose to remove jurors without giving a reason, but that the reason cannot be race or gender. They told me that the prosecutors in Mr. Holden's case had removed Black women at much higher rates than other jurors. They also told me that Mr. Holden's jury was mostly white men and that only one Black person and only three women served on his jury.

8. I am sad to hear this, although not surprised. A jury of your peers should be a jury of your peers. It matters whether a Black man is tried by an all-white or almost all-white jury. Juries are the whole basis of the justice system and until juries are fair, the system will never be fair. As a Black person, I know that innocent people are sent to prison, and one day I or someone I love could be the innocent person falsely accused. If that ever happens I want a fair jury, not one that was chosen by discrimination.

9. I think that a lot of times, Black people in this country see injustice but believe that it cannot be fixed. I assumed from the beginning that I wouldn't be allowed to serve on Mr. Holden's jury, but at the time there was nothing I could do about it. If there are things the court system could be doing to reduce discrimination in jury selection, I think this is something important that the

system needs to work on. As someone who was personally affected by it, I want to do what I can to encourage that change.

Dorian Hamilton

County/City of Wake
Commonwealth/State of NC
The foregoing instrument was acknowledged before me this 1 day of September, 2021
by Dorian Hamilton
(name of person seeking acknowledgement)

Notary Public
My Commission Expires: Sept 05 2022

PATRICK MERRITT
Notary Public
Wake Co., North Carolina
My Commission Expires Sept. 05, 2022